

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a
Class of similarly situated persons
and entities.

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
A component unit of Oakland County
with a separate legal existence,

Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation.

Defendant.

COA Case No. 369632

Oakland County Circuit Court
Case No 2023-200422-CZ
Hon. David M. Cohen

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PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ON CROSS-APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Jeffery Eisenberg (“Plaintiff”) cross-appeals from the Circuit Court’s January 24, 2024 Order Regarding George W. Kuhn Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) (Cross Appx. 2), which granted summary disposition in favor of Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the “Drainage District”) as to Plaintiff’s Count I (Assumpsit – Money Had and Received Unreasonable Rates and Charges Drainage District Only) under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “for the reasons stated on the record ...” The transcript of the Circuit Court’s January 24, 2024 hearing on the Drainage District’s motion for summary disposition establishes that the Circuit Court granted summary disposition as to Count I on the grounds that assumpsit has been abolished as a cause of action under Michigan law. *See* Hearing Trans. 1/24/24, Cross Appx. 3, pp. 32-33.

This Court has jurisdiction over this Cross-Appeal under MCR 7.207(A)(1) and (B)(2). The Drainage District timely filed its Application for Leave to Appeal on February 7, 2024. This Court granted the Drainage District’s Application for Leave to Appeal on July 10, 2024. Plaintiff timely filed his Claim of Cross-Appeal as of right under MCR 7.207(A)(1) on July 30, 2024, which was within 21 days of the date when this Court granted the Drainage District’s Application for Leave to Appeal. The subject matter of Plaintiff’s Cross-Appeal is not limited to the issues raised in the Drainage District’s Application for Leave to Appeal. *See Costa v. Cmty. Emergency Med. Sers.*, 263 Mich. App. 572, 584; 689 N.W.2d 712 (2004) (“The language of MCR 7.207 does not restrict a cross-appellant from challenging whatever legal rulings or other perceived improprieties occurred during the trial court proceedings.”).

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Has assumpsit been abolished as a cause of action in Michigan where the plaintiff seeks to compel disgorgement of money a unit of government collected through an unlawful exaction and has an independent legal basis for the action?

Plaintiff states: No

Defendant states: Yes

The Circuit Court held: Yes

This Court should hold: No

2. If assumpsit has been abolished as a cause of action, is assumpsit still available as a remedy for an unlawful exaction by a unit of government in violation of the common law?

Plaintiff states: Yes

Defendant states: No

The Circuit Court held: No

This Court should hold: Yes

I. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

In this Cross-Appeal, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Jeffrey Eisenberg (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Circuit Court’s decision to grant summary disposition to Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the “Drainage District”) under MCR 2.116(C)(8) as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is titled “Assumpsit – Money Had and Received - Unreasonable Rates and Charges - Drainage District Only”. The Circuit Court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because assumpsit has been abolished as a cause of action in Michigan. *See* January 24, 2024 Order (Cross Appx. 2) granting summary disposition on Count I “for the reasons stated on the record ...”; Hearing Trans. 1/24/24 (Cross Appx. 3), pp. 32-33 (“There is no claim for assumpsit. It doesn’t exist under Michigan law. I think it was very clearly established.”). The Circuit Court’s conclusion was incorrect; as the Michigan Supreme Court stated in *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich. 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013), “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished. **But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]**” (emphasis added).

The relevant factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Cross Appx. 4, are set forth in detail below. The factual “bottom line” is that Plaintiff alleges the Drainage District imposed on Plaintiff and the putative class, and in fact collected from Plaintiff and most class members, charges for stormwater disposal service that exceed the costs the Drainage District actually incurs for stormwater disposal (hereinafter the “Stormwater Disposal Overcharge” or the “Overcharge”). The legal issue before the Court in this Cross-Appeal is whether Plaintiff – taking all of his allegations as true – stated a claim for assumpsit, and/or whether Plaintiff can invoke assumpsit as a remedy to recover money the Drainage District in violation of the common law.

Like many older communities in Southeast Michigan, the City has a combined sanitary and storm sewer system, which is a system that is designed to collect both (i) snowmelt and rainwater (“stormwater”) runoff and (ii) domestic sewage and industrial wastewater (“sanitary sewage”), in the same pipe. Complaint, ¶ 8.

Sanitary sewage – i.e., spent water from a municipal water supply system which may be a combination of liquid and water-carried wastes -- enters a combined system directly from residences, commercial buildings, industrial plants, institutions, and other structures. Owners and/or occupiers of such structures which generate the sewage are “users” of the sanitary sewage disposal services provided by the City. *Id.*, ¶ 9.

Stormwater, in contrast, does not originate from any use of the water supply system or sanitary sewer system, and its presence in the combined system is wholly unrelated to the amount of tap water used, or sanitary sewage generated, by users of the system whose structures are physically connected to that system. *Id.*, ¶ 10. Stormwater collects on both private and public land, roads and other physical surfaces during rainfall events, and the runoff enters the combined sewer system through catch-basins and other collection devices. *Id.*, ¶ 11. Even though they have different origins, both sanitary sewage and stormwater collected in a combined sewer system need to be disposed of. *Id.*, ¶ 12.

The City’s combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the “County System”), which is owned and maintained by the Drainage District. *Id.*, ¶ 13. Except during heavy rainfall (when high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and stormwater exceed the outlet capacity causing excess flow to be diverted to the George W. Kuhn Retention Treatment Basin), the entire stormwater flow from the combined sewers of the County System, (*i.e.* the City’s stormwater and the stormwater of various other communities in the area) is conveyed by

the Drainage District to a treatment plant operated by the Great Lakes Water Authority (the “Water Authority” or “GLWA”) for ultimate disposal.¹ *Id.*, ¶ 14.

The Drainage District’s stormwater flow (including the portion of stormwater flow that originates in the City) passes through Detroit’s Dequindre Interceptor, which contains a master meter which measures the total flow passing from the Drainage District System into the Water Authority treatment plant. *Id.*, ¶ 15. The Water Authority charges the Drainage District a flat annual rate to dispose of the City’s total sewage flows, which include stormwater (the “Water Authority Charge”). *Id.*, ¶ 16. The Water Authority’s rate-making methodology (more particularly described below) is sufficiently detailed to allow a mathematical calculation of the amount of the total Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District attributable to the treatment and disposal of stormwater. *Id.*

The Drainage District, in turn, allocates the annual Water Authority Charge among all of the municipalities in the district, including the City, and charges each municipality a flat annual “Sewage Charge” for sanitary sewage disposal (the “Sanitary Charge”) and a flat annual charge for “Pollution Control,” *i.e.*, stormwater disposal (the “Stormwater Charge”). *Id.*, ¶ 17. The Drainage District collectively charges end-users in the City in excess of \$11 million per year for Sanitary Charges and Stormwater Charges. Those charges are imposed in the first instance through billings from the Drainage District to the City. *Id.*, ¶ 18.

The City passes on that cost to its sewer customers (*i.e.*, Plaintiff and the Class) by imposing charges in its sewer rates to recover the entire \$11 million plus per year imposed by the Drainage District on an annual basis. *Id.*, ¶ 19.

¹ Prior to January 2016, the Detroit Water and Sewerage Authority (“Detroit”) provided wholesale sewage treatment services to the Drainage District. Effective in 2016, the Water Authority, pursuant to agreements with the City of Detroit, became the wholesale supplier of water and sewage treatment services to the City. Notwithstanding that change, the City’s public water supply and sewage treatment services still are provided by Detroit facilities and the Detroit water and sewage treatment plants.

The amount of the Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District is based on a formula tied to the total volume of sewage flows that enter the Drainage District's system for ultimate disposal by the Water Authority, and the pollutants present in those sewage flows. *Id.*, ¶ 20. An identifiable portion of the total Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District is attributable to the costs to treat stormwater flows that come from the Drainage District service area. *Id.* As described below, the Drainage District's pass-through Stormwater Charge to the City's end-users should be the same amount, but it is not. *Id.*

For a number of years, the Drainage District has charged end-users in the City substantially more than the amount that GLWA charges the Drainage District for the disposal of the portion of the Drainage District's stormwater flow that originates in the City. *Id.*, ¶ 21. The Drainage District has therefore overcharged the City for stormwater disposal service since at least 2017 and the City, in turn, has passed that overcharge on to end-users in the City, including Plaintiff and the Class. *Id.*

The Drainage District's Final Order of Apportionment dated April 19, 2005 (Exhibit 2 to Complaint) provides that the stormwater charges to the City consist of two components: (1) the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department's charges to the [Drainage District] to treat the total storm water flow, and (2) the administrative costs of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. Complaint, ¶ 22. The Final Order of Apportionment was imposed pursuant to a Resolution of the Board of the Drainage District dated April 19, 2005 (the "Resolution"), Exhibit 3 to Complaint.

Plaintiff does not challenge the Final Order of Apportionment or the Resolution. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that the Final Order of Apportionment and the Resolution are valid and binding on the Drainage District. Complaint, ¶ 23.

The Resolution obligated the Drainage District to pass through to the City's end-users the City's proportionate share of the Water Authority's actual charges to the Drainage District for treating

the storm water. The Drainage District has breached its obligations, and continues to breach its obligations, under the Resolution because, in assessing storm water charges to the City, the Drainage District has **not** passed on to the City's sewer end-users the City's proportionate share of the actual costs the Drainage District has incurred to the Water Authority for storm water disposal. Instead, the Drainage District has grossly increased the Water Authority stormwater treatment charges. Complaint, ¶ 24.

As Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint, ¶ 25, the Water Authority's annual rate calculations demonstrate the precise amount the Water Authority includes in the Water Authority Charges to recover from the Drainage District the costs for stormwater disposal from communities within the Drainage District service area. For example, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021, the Water Authority charged the Drainage District the total amount of \$45,851,800 in Water Authority Charges to cover the costs of disposing of all sewage flows. *See* Exhibit 4 to Complaint. According to the Water Authority rate methodology implemented in 2017 and in effect in 2021, the Water Authority allocated 50% of that \$45,851,800 (\$22,925,900) based upon the Drainage District's total sewage flows and 50% (\$22,925,900) based upon the Drainage District's share of the total pollutant load of all sewage flows treated by the Water Authority. *See* Exhibit 5 to Complaint.

As Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint, ¶ 26, the Water Authority determined that stormwater constitutes 33% of the total sewage flows coming from the Drainage District, and therefore, 33% of the total flow-related costs are attributable to stormwater disposal. *See* Exhibit 5 to Complaint (26.03 cfs of stormwater vs. 78.57 csf of total flows). The Water Authority further determined that stormwater contributed 16.4% of the total pollutant loads attributable to the Drainage District, and therefore, 16.4% of the total pollutant-related costs are attributable to stormwater disposal. *See* Exhibit 5 to Complaint (GLWA cost of service study) and Exhibit 7 to Complaint (detailed calculation derived from Exhibit 5). As a result, the Water Authority charged the Drainage District \$7,565,547 for

stormwater flows (\$22,925,900 x 33%) and \$3,759,847 (\$22,925,900 x 16.4%) for pollutant loadings in the stormwater. The total stormwater charges from the Water Authority to the Drainage District for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021 thus were **\$11,325,394**. The balance of the Water Authority's charges to the Drainage District for that fiscal year (\$34,526,406) are attributable to non-stormwater sewage flows.

In contrast, the Drainage District falsely represented to the City that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021:

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$45,939,650** million in total disposal charges;

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$21,963,110** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$23,976,540** million for storm water disposal. [Exhibit 6 to Complaint]. *See* Complaint, ¶ 27.

Instead of allocating the Water Authority's stormwater charge in the amounts actually charged by the Water Authority, the Drainage District improperly reallocated the total charges imposed by the Water Authority to increase the amount of the storm water charges to end-users of the County System by over \$12 million (\$23,976,540 in actual Stormwater Charges vs. \$11,325,394 incurred from the Water Authority for stormwater disposal). Because the Drainage District allocated to the City a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges (29.7%) than sanitary sewage disposal charges (19.3%), the more of the total Water Authority Charges that the Drainage District allocates to storm water charges, the more the City's end-users pay in the aggregate. *Id.*, ¶ 28.

In other words, for each dollar of storm water disposal charges the Drainage District allegedly incurs, the City pays 29.7 cents. But for each dollar of sanitary sewage disposal charges the Drainage District allegedly incurs, the City pays only 19.3 cents. *Id.*, ¶ 29. Based upon the Drainage District's representations and the allocation percentage assigned to the City, the Drainage District charged the

City's end-users aggregate sewage disposal costs of **\$11,361,901** for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021. This was calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$4,240,198 ($\$21,963,110 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .19306 = \$4,240,198$)
- Storm water -- \$7,121,703 ($\$23,976,540 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .297028 = \$7,121,703$) [*Id.*, ¶ 30.]

Given the Water Authority's actual charges to the Drainage District, however, the Drainage District should have charged the City **\$10,029,626** for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021. This is calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$6,665,667 ($\$34,526,406 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .19306 = \$6,665,667$)
- Storm water -- \$3,363,959 ($\$11,325,394 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .297028 = \$3,363,959$) [*Id.*, ¶ 31.]

Based upon the foregoing, the Drainage District overcharged the City by at least **\$1,332,275** for just the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021. *Id.*, ¶ 32. This Overcharge is based solely upon the Drainage District's misallocation of the Water Authority's "common-to-all" sewer charges (*i.e.*, the Water Authority Charges) imposed upon Plaintiff and the Class. The actual Overcharge is even higher because the Drainage District similarly overallocated its own non-Water Authority expenses to stormwater disposal. *Id.*

There are similar overcharges for prior years and for the years since. The total Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed by the Drainage District since May 18, 2017 well exceed **\$7 million**. *Id.*, ¶ 33. Plaintiff and the Class need not rely upon the Resolution to invalidate the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges because, even in the absence of the Resolution, the Drainage District's stormwater charges to end-users in the City have been unreasonable and unlawful because the stormwater charges far exceed the actual costs the Drainage District incurs to dispose of the City's stormwater. *Id.*, ¶ 34. The Stormwater Disposal Overcharges have been arbitrary, capricious and/or

unreasonable,” because the challenged Charges, “viewed as a whole,” have been, and continue to be, “excessive.” *Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021). *Id.*, ¶ 35.

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action. *See* Complaint, Cross Appx. 4. On July 25, 2023, the Drainage District filed its Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). *See* Cross Appx. 5.

On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition. *See* Cross Appx. 6. On January 17, 2024, the Drainage District filed its Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. *See* Cross Appx. 7.

On January 24, 2024, the Circuit Court heard the Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition. *See* Hearing Trans. 1/24/24, Cross Appx. 3. That same day, the Circuit Court entered an order denying in part the Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition as to Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment, which is the subject of the Drainage District’s appeal by leave. *See* Order Regarding Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition, Cross Appx. 2. The Circuit Court also granted in part the Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition as to Plaintiff’s claim for assumpsit, which is the subject of this Cross-Appeal as of right.

The Circuit Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for assumpsit on the grounds that assumpsit “doesn’t exist under Michigan law.” *See* January 24, 2024 Order (Cross Appx. 2) granting summary disposition on Count I “for the reasons stated on the record ...”; Hearing Trans. 1/24/24 (Cross Appx. 3), pp. 32-33 (“There is no claim for assumpsit. It doesn’t exist under Michigan law. I think it was very clearly established.”).

III. ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “tests whether the complaint states a claim as a matter of law, and the motion should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” *Feyz v. Mery Mem. Hosp.*, 475 Mich. 663; 672, 719 N.W.2d 1 (2006). When deciding a motion for summary disposition, “all well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, and construed most favorably to the nonmoving party.” *Wade v. Dep’t of Corrections*, 439 Mich. 158, 162-163; 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992).

This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) de novo. *Maiden v. Rozwood*, 461 Mich. 109, 118; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999).

B. Assumpsit Remains a Viable Claim and a Proper Remedy for an Unlawful Governmental Exaction²

The Circuit Court held that assumpsit has been abolished in Michigan as a cause of action. However, it is well settled that when there has been an illegal or excessive collection of fees, a plaintiff may maintain an “action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction.” *Bond v. Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.*, 383 Mich. 693, 704; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970). Indeed, “an action seeking a refund of fees paid to [a governmental entity] is properly characterized as a claim in assumpsit for money had and received.” *Service Coal Co v. Unemployment Compensation Comm*, 333 Mich. 526, 530-531; 53 N.W.2d 362 (1952); *Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v. Michigan*, 231 Mich. App. 194, 203; 585 N.W.2d 762 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 464 Mich. 21; 627 N.W.2d 236 (2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 36, 123 S. Ct. 371, 154 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2002). In *Fisher Sand & Gravel*, 494 Mich. at 564, the court observed that “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished.

² Plaintiff preserved this argument in his Response to the Drainage District’s Motion for Summary Disposition, Cross Appx. 6, pp. 10-12.

But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]” *Id.* (emphasis added).

In dismissing Plaintiff’s assumpsit claims, the Circuit Court misconstrued the prevailing law. The Circuit Court essentially adopted the first sentence from *Fisher Sand & Gravel, supra*, but ignored the second sentence stating that “notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies ... were preserved.” Indeed, in *Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit*, No. 358868; 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 (March 9, 2023) (Cross Appx. 8), which the Drainage District cited on pp. 13-14 of its Brief in support of summary disposition – and which the Circuit Court may have relied upon as persuasive authority³ – this Court cited *Fisher Sand & Gravel*’s holding in its entirety, and recognized that “[a]lthough no independent cause of action for assumpsit exists, ‘the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved.’ *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). In this instance, appellant’s counts of assumpsit essentially were covered by its claims of unjust enrichment.” *Midwest Valve*, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 at *14, n.6. Thus, although this Court in *Midwest Valve* remarked in passing that “Michigan no longer recognizes an independent cause of action for assumpsit” (*Id.* at *14), it was not required to perform any actual analysis of the plaintiff’s assumpsit claims because the plaintiff did not appeal the Circuit Court’s decision on those counts of its complaint. *Id.* (“The trial court dismissed Counts II and VI, which alleges independent causes of action of assumpsit. ... Notably, appellant does not challenge the dismissal of those counts.”).

Binding, published authority supports Plaintiff’s right to recover in assumpsit. In *Fisher Sand*

³ The Circuit Court’s Order on summary disposition (Cross Appx. 2) stated that the Circuit Court was granting summary disposition as to the assumpsit claims “for the reasons stated on the record,” and on the record the Circuit Court did not cite a particular case as the basis for its conclusion that assumpsit claims had been abolished in Michigan. It is possible, but not certain, that the Circuit Court relied on *Midwest Valve* as persuasive authority.

Gravel, 494 Mich. at 564, the court observed that “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished. **But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]**” *Id.* (emphasis added); see also *Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton*, No. 360116, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2259, at *26 (Mar. 30, 2023) (quoting *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 213; 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021)) (Cross Appx. 9) (“Though plaintiff’s complaint contains a claim of ‘assumpsit,’ assumpsit has technically been abolished as a cause of action, but ‘the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]’”).

In *Youmans*, 336 Mich. App. at 218-19, this Court discussed “the fundamental nature of plaintiff’s equitable ‘assumpsit’ claims” at length, and did not hold or note as dicta that the entire cause of action or remedy had been abolished:

“[E]quity regards and treats as done what in good conscience ought to be done.” *Allard v Allard* (On Remand), 318 Mich App 583, 597; 899 NW2d 420 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Had plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain costs included in the disputed water and sewer rates were improper or illegal, perhaps she would be correct that the presumption of reasonableness would be irrelevant. Instead, however, by asserting her claims for assumpsit, plaintiff sought “restitution”—in the form of a refund to herself and the plaintiff class—of whatever amount was necessary to “correct for the unfairness flowing from” the Township’s “benefit received,” i.e., its “unjust retention of a benefit owed to another.” *Wright*, 504 Mich at 417-418, 422-423. Whether the Township would receive an unjust “benefit” from retaining the disputed rate charges in this case depends on whether the water and sewer rates, viewed as a whole, were unreasonable inasmuch as they were “excessive,” not on whether some aspect of the Township’s ratemaking methodology was improper. See *id.* at 419 (“Unjust enrichment . . . doesn’t seek to compensate for an injury but to correct against one party’s retention of a benefit at another’s expense. And the correction, or remedy, is therefore not compensatory damages, but restitution. Restitution restores a party who yielded excessive and unjust benefits to his or her rightful position.”) (emphasis added).

Thus, said this Court, “we conclude that plaintiff’s assumpsit claims under MCL 123.141(3) are not viable in light of the presumption of reasonableness discussed in *Trahey [v. Inkster]*, 311 Mich App 582, 594, 597-598; 876 NW2d 582 (2015)] and *Novi [v. Detroit]*, 433 Mich 414, 428-429; 446 NW2d 118 (1989)]” – **not** that the plaintiff’s claims failed because assumpsit was not available as a cause of action

and/or remedy. *Youmans*, 336 Mich. App. at 224.

Thus, as long as a plaintiff can demonstrate that money was obtained by a defendant in violation of the law and the charges imposed on the plaintiff were excessive or inaccurate for the services rendered, that plaintiff properly invokes the equitable doctrine of assumpsit to obtain a remedy. That is why the Michigan appellate courts have repeatedly recognized long after the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963 that a plaintiff who can establish that the government collected monies in violation of the law can properly invoke the remedy of assumpsit. Here, Plaintiff's causes of action are based upon the common law requirement that the Drainage District's charges be "reasonable." See Complaint, Cross Appx. 4, ¶¶ 45-62. Assumpsit merely provides the **substantive remedy** for the Drainage District's violation of the common law. **Assumpsit is not the source of Plaintiff's substantive rights.**

Assumpsit is similar to a declaratory judgment; it is a remedy that is tethered to a substantive legal right. The common law imposes a duty on the Drainage District to charge a reasonable amount. Plaintiff alleges – and the Court must take as true – that the Drainage District has charged an **unreasonable** amount. Charging an unreasonable amount is the violation of a substantive legal right. One remedy for that violation is assumpsit.

In *Bond v. Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.*, 383 Mich. 693, 696-97; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970), the plaintiffs sued the Ann Arbor public school district alleging that the district's fees for books and supplies violated a provision of the Michigan Constitution that required "a system of free public elementary and secondary schools." The plaintiffs claimed "that large amounts were illegally collected by defendant from its pupils as general fees, so-called, determined pursuant to a schedule adopted by the board of education of defendant." *Id.* at 697. The plaintiffs thus sought a "judgment for the full amount of the general fees collected." *Id.* at 698. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in their favor: "We remand this cause to the circuit court for the entry of a judgment against defendant for the

amount of the general fees collected by it in the sum of \$140,862, plus interest from date of collection of same . . .” *Id.* at 705. In *Bond*, as here, the plaintiffs sued because the defendant had imposed unlawful charges. The *Bond* court ordered the defendant to repay the amounts it had unlawfully collected, and the Court here should do likewise.

Recently, in *Woodland Condos Homeowners Ass’n v. Fannie Mae*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 384 (2019) (Cross Appx. 10), this Court held that the label applied to the plaintiff’s claim does not govern the validity of the claim and confirmed that “assumpsit” is a proper vehicle for an otherwise valid claim:

Defendants argue that they were entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim for assumpsit because assumpsit has been abolished as a form of action. In *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. v. Neal A. Sweebe, Inc.*, 494 Mich 543, 564, 837 N.W.2d 244 (2013), our Supreme Court recognized that “assumpsit as a form of action was abolished” with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963. The Court further stated, however, that “notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved.” *Id.* **Consequently, plaintiff’s use of the term “assumpsit” in labeling its claim does not warrant dismissal if plaintiff otherwise substantively pleaded a valid claim.** [emphasis added].

A very recent opinion by this Court confirms that assumpsit is available as a remedy even outside the context of governmental exactions. In *Isaac v. Future Holdings, LLC*, No. 365303, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 5016, at *10-12 (June 27, 2024) (citing *Youmans, supra*) (Cross Appx. 11), this Court held:

Michigan recognizes the quasi-contractual claim of monies had and received, which is based on the common-law claim of ‘assumpsit for money had and received,’ an equitable action grounded in the equitable principle that if a defendant holds money that is actually the plaintiff’s, the plaintiff should be able to recover those funds.

* * *

The factual allegations in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, accepted as true, indicate that Isaac Holdings loaned Future Holdings \$75,000 and \$15,000 in May 2017 and August 2017, respectively, and another \$100,000 in April 2019, and that Future Holdings received the loan proceeds and deposited the funds into its bank account. Although only Imad signed a promissory note agreeing to repay the combined balance of \$190,000, plaintiffs alleged that Imad did not pay back the money when payment was demanded and subsequently died in 2022, apparently without any assets. Despite that only Imad promised to repay the money, plaintiffs’ allegations indicate

that the funds from Isaac Investments were actually transferred to Imad's business, Future Holdings, and deposited into Future Holdings' bank account. **These facts, accepted as true, are such that equity may be able to intervene to allow plaintiffs to recover their funds from Future Holdings, the party actually in possession of the \$190,000 loaned by Isaac Investments with the expectation of repayment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for monies had and received under MCR 2.116(C)(8).** [emphasis added]

Corey v. Wayne County, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 513 (Mich. App. 2016) (Cross Appx. 12), which the Drainage District cites on page 11 of its Brief on Appeal, is inapposite. There, this Court found that the plaintiff **could have** brought a claim for assumpsit, but did not, and the court declined to apply the usual rule that labeling of claims is not dispositive. See *Corey*, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 513 at *19 n.7 ("However, we note that a claim to recover fees paid to the state in excess of the amount allowed under applicable law is properly filed as an action in assumpsit for money had and received. ... Thus, when there has been an illegal or excessive collection of fees, it may be possible to maintain a class 'action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction.' *Bond v Pub Sch of Ann Arbor Sch Dist*, 383 Mich 693, 704; 178 NW2d 484 (1970). But, plaintiff did not frame his complaint in this way, and 'as a court of review that is principally charged with the duty of correcting errors,' we think it inappropriate to rewrite plaintiff's complaint or address unpreserved claims. See *Burns v Detroit* (On Remand), 253 Mich App 608, 615; 660 NW2d 85 (2002). Consequently, we confine our review to the claims pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, and we offer no opinion on the legality of the fees collected or whether plaintiff should receive a refund of those amounts under MCL 600.2529.") (citing *Yellow Freight and Service Coal Co.*).

Corey is inapposite because its facts are entirely unlike the facts of this case. In *Corey*, the plaintiff alleged that all divorce parties who filed temporary custody motions paid the same \$80 Friend of the Court fee. *Corey*, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 513 at *1-3. There was no question of some persons or entities being overcharged and others being overcharged. By contrast, this case revolves around the Drainage District's decision to overcharge Royal Oak customers and undercharge customers in

other cities. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Drainage District has been unjustly enriched **as to Royal Oak customers in particular**, and alternatively is liable under a theory of assumpsit and/or for violation of the common law with a corresponding remedy in assumpsit because it overcharged **Royal Oak customers in particular** in violation of the common law. Plaintiff will discuss *Corey* further in its forthcoming Appellee's Brief on Appeal.

Again, Plaintiff's allegations in his Complaint must be taken as true. Because the Complaint alleges that the Drainage District imposed the Overcharges in violation of the common law, Plaintiff has properly asserted assumpsit claims in order to provide a substantive remedy for the Drainage District's improper collection of the water and sewer charges.

C. Defendants In Other Cases Challenging Municipal Utility Charges Have Argued that Assumpsit is Not Available as a Remedy for Unlawful Government Exactions, But the Circuit Judges Were Not Misled

In *Huron Valley Outfitters v. Lyon Township*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 20-179677-CK, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary disposition as to the plaintiff's claims which, like Plaintiff's claims in this action, were related to charges for sewer service. The court held as follows regarding the plaintiff's assumpsit claims:

Accepting plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, this Court does not find that plaintiffs claims is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. The parties acknowledge that the *Fisher Sand* Court recognized that "assumpsit as a form of action was abolished" with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963 but it preserved "the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit." *Fisher Sands, supra*. at 564. Having reviewed the complaint, this Court finds that plaintiff used the term "assumpsit" in labeling its claim but that does not automatically warrant dismissal. *Adams, supra* at 710-711. Plaintiffs allegations clearly seek the substantive remedy traditionally available under assumpsit pursuant to its claim that defendant violated common laws when it charged the sewage rates. Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.1 16(C)(8) is, therefore, inappropriate. [*Huron Valley* Opinion 6/3/20, Cross Appx. 13, pp. 13-14.]

Another municipal utility case rejecting the blanket "assumpsit has been abolished" argument is *Nofar v. City of Novi*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 20-183155-CZ, COA Case No. 363356.

On the defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the Circuit Court held that the plaintiff could maintain a claim for assumpsit and chastised the defendant for failing to properly present the *Fisher Sand* holding:

Finally, the City argues that all of Plaintiffs assumpsit claims fail because Michigan has abolished assumpsit as a cause of action. Assumpsit is like unjust enrichment and is defined as "an express or implied promise, not under seal, by which one person undertakes to do some act or pay something to another." *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564 (2013). In *Fisher Sand, supra*, the Michigan Supreme Court held that "assumpsit as a form of action was abolished" with the passage of the General Court Rules in 1963. **However, the City conveniently leaves out a majority of the *Fisher* opinion in its brief.** *Fisher* actually says, "with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished. But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." *Id.*

A recent Court of Appeals decision addressed the City's argument. In *Woodland Condos Homeowners Ass'n v Fannie Mae*, Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals, February 28 2019 (Docket No. 339850), the Court of Appeals held as follows:

Defendants argue that they were entitled to summary disposition of plaintiffs claims for assumpsit because assumpsit has been abolished as a form of action. In *Fisher*, [supra], our Supreme Court recognized that assumpsit was abolished ... with the adoption of the General Court Rules ... however. .. the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved. Consequently, plaintiffs use of the term 'assumpsit' in labeling its claim does not warrant dismissal if plaintiff otherwise substantively pleaded a valid claim. [*Id.* citing *Fisher*, supra].

The use of the word "assumpsit" does not necessarily preclude these claims. Here, the Plaintiffs allegations clearly seek the substantive remedy available under assumpsit, i.e., a return of monies allegedly unlawfully collected by the City in excess of what the City was permitted to collect. Summary disposition on this basis is inappropriate. [*Nofar* Summary Disposition Opinion 1/21/22, Cross Appx. 14 (emphasis added).]⁴

Huron Valley and *Nofar* are obviously not appellate opinions, but the circuit judges in those cases dealt with the same issue the Circuit Court addressed here and reached the opposite result. With

⁴ *Nofar* is currently pending on appeal in this Court. A panel of this Court heard oral argument in July, but has not yet issued its opinion. See *Nofar* Register of Actions, Cross Appx. 15.

all due respect to the Circuit Court, the *Huron Valley* and *Nofar* courts were correct, and the Circuit Court in this case erred.

IV. CONCLUSION

Michigan's courts have not abolished assumpsit as a remedy for a governmental unit's violation of a statute, constitutional provision, or – as Plaintiff alleges here – the common law. This Court should reverse the Circuit Court's holding that Plaintiff cannot recover under a theory of assumpsit or rely upon assumpsit as a remedy to recover the Overcharges he paid to the Drainage District.

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Date: November 19, 2024

STATEMENT OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to MCR 7.212(B)(3), Plaintiff's counsel states that Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief on Cross-Appeal contains 5,795 "countable words" as defined under MCR 7.212(B). Counsel relies on the word count function of its word processing system, as permitted under MCR 7.212(B)(3).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 19, 2024, I electronically served the foregoing document on all counsel of record using the court's electronic filing system.

/s/ Edward F. Kickham Jr.
Edward F. Kickham Jr.

4866-7119-6669 v.3

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a
Class of similarly situated persons
and entities.

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
A component unit of Oakland County
with a separate legal existence,

Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation.

Defendant.

COA Case No. 369632

Oakland County Circuit Court
Case No 2023-200422-CZ
Hon. David M. Cohen

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Case Number 2023-200422-CZ		
Entitlement EISENBERG JEFFREY vs. GEORGE W KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRIC		
Judge Name DAVID M. COHEN		
Case E-Filed YES		
Case Filed 05/19/2023		
Case Disposed 07/10/2024		
Date	Code	Desc
07/30/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/30/2024	CA	CLAIM OF APPEAL FILED /CROSS/NTC/POS/PLF
07/12/2024	TRN	TRANSCRIPT FILED MTN AMD CMLPNT 06/26/24
07/10/2024	FD	FINAL DISPOSITION
07/10/2024	SY	STAY ADMINISTRATIVE (COA GRANTED STAY)
07/10/2024	ORD	ORDER FILED COA
07/08/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/05/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/02/2024	ANS	ANSWER FILED TO DFT REQ ADMISS/PLF
07/02/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/27/2024	ORD	ORDER FILED DENY PLF MTN FOR LEAVE
06/26/2024	OTH	ZOOM VIDEO APPEARANCE
06/26/2024	M	MOTION LEAVE TO FILE 1ST AMENDED CMPLT - DENIED
06/26/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/25/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/25/2024	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED REMOTE
06/24/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/24/2024	OTH	DFT CONCUR IN RES IN OPP TO MTN LV/POS FILED
06/24/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/24/2024	RES	RESPONSE FILED IN OPPT TO MTN FILE AMD CMPLT/POS/DFT
06/18/2024	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 06262024 JUDGE 06
06/18/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
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04/15/2024	INT	INTERROGATORIES FILED /REQ FOR PRODUCTION/TO ADMIT/PLF
04/15/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
04/12/2024	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED REMOTE
04/12/2024	APR	DATE SET FOR STAT CONF ON 02202025 08 30 AM Y 06

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Date	Code	Desc
04/12/2024		PROCEEDING TO BE HELD REMOTELY BY ZOOM
04/10/2024	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 04172024 JUDGE 06
04/10/2024	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED
04/10/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
04/10/2024	MTN	MOTION FILED TO COMPEL/BRF/PLF
04/08/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
04/03/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
04/02/2024	POS	AFFIDAVIT/PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
04/02/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/29/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/25/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/25/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/25/2024	OBJ	OBJECTION FILED /RES TO RENEWED INT REQ FOR PROD/DFT
03/22/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/15/2024	SO	SCHEDULING ORDER FILED
03/14/2024	OTH	SCHEDULING CONF HELD W/ JUDGE
03/14/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
03/11/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/23/2024	TRN	TRANSCRIPT FILED MTNS HRG 02/14/24
02/23/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/23/2024	ATC	ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FILED AFM/JD/POS
02/22/2024	STO	STIP/ORD FILED DISMISS W/O PREJ COUNTS III & IV ONLY
02/20/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/16/2024	ORD	ORDER FILED RE DFT MTN STAY PENDING/QUASH
02/14/2024	DM	DEFENSE MOTION STAY/QUASH/PROTEC ORD-DENIED
02/14/2024	OTH	VIA ZOOM VIDEO CONFERENCE
02/14/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/13/2024	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED
02/09/2024	TRN	TRANSCRIPT FILED 01/24/24 MTN
02/09/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/09/2024	RES	RESPONSE FILED TO MTN STAY PEND INT APPEAL/POS/PLF
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02/07/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
02/07/2024	MTN	MOTION FILED TO STAY PENDING APPEAL/BRF/GEORGE KUHN
01/25/2024	APR	DATE SET FOR E SCHED C ON 03142024 09 00 AM Y 06
01/25/2024		PROCEEDING TO BE HELD REMOTELY BY ZOOM
01/25/2024	ORD	ORDER FILED RE MTN SUM DISP
01/25/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
01/24/2024	OTH	ZOOM VIDEO APPEARANCE
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01/24/2024	FDE	FINAL DISPOSITION ERROR
01/24/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
01/23/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
01/23/2024	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED ZOOM
01/17/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
01/17/2024	REP	REPLY FILED SUPPT MTN SUM DISP/DFT
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01/08/2024	STO	STIP/ORD FILED DISMISS CTS III/IV ONLY
01/05/2024	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
12/01/2023	TRN	TRANSCRIPT FILED 08/30/23 MTNS HRG

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Date	Code	Desc
09/01/2023	ORD	ORDER FILED GRNT DFT MTN RE INITIAL SO/AMD SO
08/31/2023	FD	FINAL DISPOSITION
08/31/2023	SY	STAY PENDING SUMM DISP MOTIONS
08/30/2023	DM	DEFENSE MOTION OBJ TO INT SCHED ORD AND 8/1/23 ORD-G
08/30/2023	DM	DEFENSE MOTION FOR PROTECT ORD/QUASH P'S DISC REQ-G
08/30/2023	OTH	VIA ZOOM VIDEO CONFERENCE
08/30/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/29/2023	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED
08/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/25/2023	RES	RESPONSE FILED TO DFT OBJ TO S/O/MTN STAY/PLF
08/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/25/2023	RES	RESPONSE FILED TO MTN FOR PROT ORD/POS/PLF
08/23/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/23/2023	MTN	MOTION FILED PROTECTIVE ORD/BRF/DFT
08/23/2023	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 08302023 JUDGE 06
08/14/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/14/2023	INT	INTERROGATORIES FILED /REQ PROD/ADMIT/PLF
08/09/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/09/2023	OBJ	OBJECTION FILED TO SCHED ORDER/POS/DFT
08/08/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
08/08/2023	MTN	MOTION FILED RE INITIAL SCHED ORD/POS/DFT
08/08/2023	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 08302023 JUDGE 06
08/01/2023	OFM	ORDER FOR FACILITATIVE MEDIATION FILED /REMOVE EVAL
07/31/2023	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 01242024 JUDGE 06
07/31/2023	SO	SCHEDULING ORDER FILED
07/31/2023	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 01242024 JUDGE 06
07/31/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/31/2023	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED
07/29/2023	SOP	SCHEDULING ORDER WRITTEN
07/29/2023		11/24/2023 EXPERT DATE.
07/29/2023		01/24/2024 CASE EVALUATION DATE.
07/29/2023		11/24/2023 WITNESS DATE.
07/29/2023		02/23/2024 MOTION DATE.
07/29/2023		12/25/2023 DISCOVERY DATE.
07/29/2023		02/23/2024 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
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07/29/2023	APR	DATE SET FOR PRETRIAL ON 02232024 08 30 AM
07/29/2023	APR	DATE SET FOR TRIAL ON 04252024 08 30 AM
07/27/2023	SO	SCHEDULING ORDER FILED /SUM DISP BRF
07/27/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/27/2023	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED /POS
07/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/25/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED POS/ROYAL OAK
07/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/25/2023	NOH	NOTICE OF HEARING FILED POS
07/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
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07/25/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
07/25/2023	MTN	MOTION FILED SUM DISP/CITY ROYAL OAK
07/25/2023	MPR	MOTION PRAECIPE FILED FOR 08302023 JUDGE 06
07/25/2023	MTN	MOTION FILED SUM DISP/BRF/POS/DFT

Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
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Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Date	Code	Desc
06/26/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS/DFT
06/26/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/26/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/26/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS/DFT
06/26/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/26/2023	STO	STIP/ORD FILED RE TIME FOR DFT TO RESPOND/FILE MTN
06/22/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/22/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/GEORGE
06/22/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/21/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED NTC/DFT/POS
06/21/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/21/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS/DFT
06/21/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/20/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/20/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /ROYAL OAK
06/20/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/20/2023	STO	STIP/ORD FILED EXTEND DEADLINE TO RESPOND
06/08/2023	STO	STIP/ORD FILED RE TIME FOR DFT TO ANS/RESPOND
06/07/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS
06/07/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/07/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS/GEORGE KUHN
06/07/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/07/2023	APP	APPEARANCE FILED /NTC/POS/GEORGE KUHN
06/07/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/07/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/06/2023	SUM	P/S ON SUMMONS FILED 05/30/23
06/06/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/06/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
06/06/2023	SUM	P/S ON SUMMONS FILED 05/31/23
06/06/2023	SUM	P/S ON SUMMONS FILED 05/30/23
06/06/2023	MPS	MIFILE PROOF OF SERVICE FILED
05/18/2023	SI	SUMMONS ISSUED
05/18/2023	C	COMPLAINT FILED /JURY DEMAND

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EXHIBIT - 2

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

v.

Honorable David M. Cohen

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

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**ORDER REGARDING GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND MCR 2.116(C)(8)**

This matter having come before the Court on George W. Kuhn Drainage District's ("Drainage District") Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) ("Motion"), the Court having heard oral argument on January 24, 2024, and being otherwise advised, the Court orders as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Drainage District's Motion as to Count I of Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand ("Assumpsit – Money Had and Received Unreasonable Rates and Charges Drainage District Only") based on MCR 2.116(C)(8), is GRANTED for the reasons stated on the record, and Count I of Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand is dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Drainage District's Motion as to Count II of Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand ("Unjust Enrichment Unreasonable Rates Drainage District Only") based on MCR 2.116(C)(8), is DENIED for the reasons stated on the record.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Drainage District's Motion as to Count I and Count II of Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand based on the MCR 2.116(C)(7) grounds set forth in the Drainage District's Motion (Res Judicata - Claim Preclusion, Collateral Estoppel - Issue Preclusion, and Release), are DENIED for the reasons stated on the record.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Drainage District has until and including February 23, 2024 (30 days after January 24, 2024) to file an answer to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a scheduling conference is set for March 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. via Zoom, to address scheduling, including without limitation, a scheduling order and class certification deadlines, including motion, response, and reply deadlines.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This order does not resolve the last pending claim and does not close this case.


/s/ David M. Cohen
January 24, 2024
HONORABLE DAVID M. COHEN

LE

Dated: 1/24/2024

Approved as to form only:

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

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EXHIBIT - 3

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as
representative of a
Class of
similarly-situated
persons and entities,
Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 23-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN
DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit
of Oakland County
with a separate
legal existence and
CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a
municipal corporation,
Defendants.

_____/

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MOTION
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID M. COHEN, CIRCUIT JUDGE
Pontiac, Michigan - Wednesday, January 24, 2024

1 APPEARANCES:

2 For the Plaintiff: EDWARD F. KICKHAM, JR. (P70332)
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11 For the Defendant
12 City of
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20 Transcript Provided by: Ace Transcripts, LLC
21 Firm #8612
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22 Reporter: Laurie A. Jefferson, CSR-6909

23
24
25

INDEX

WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

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1 Pontiac, Michigan

2 Wednesday, January 24, 2024

3 11:23 a.m.

4 THE CLERK: Your Honor, calling docket
5 number 24, that is Eisenburg versus GWKDD, case
6 number 2023-200422-CZ.

7 THE COURT: All right. Good morning,
8 everyone. Thank you for your patience with the
9 Court.

10 Let's have appearances starting with the
11 moving party.

12 MR. PETZ: Good morning, Judge Cohen.
13 Scott Petz on behalf the Drainage District named the
14 George W. Kuhn Drainage District, also referred to as
15 the GWKDD.

16 And for oral argument purposes, I will try
17 to refer to it as the Drainage District to make it
18 simpler for all of us, including me.

19 THE COURT: Anything to make this simpler
20 is appreciated by the Court, because I spent a lot of
21 time with it.

22 Let's take appearance now. I guess we'll
23 go next to -- I don't want to mispronounce your name,
24 Ms. Giordano.

25 MS. GIORDANO: Caroline Giordano on behalf

1 of the City.

2 And, your Honor, I believe you probably
3 noticed that I'm just here on behalf of the City to
4 observe today, given that the two counts at issue in
5 our motion were dismissed.

6 THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome to
7 observe of course.

8 MS. GIORDANO: Thank you.

9 THE COURT: Let's have appearance from
10 plaintiff's counsel.

11 MR. KICKHAM: Good morning, your Honor,
12 Edward Kickham on behalf of the plaintiff.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel. All
14 right. I did spend a lot of time with this, but it's
15 a complicated matter and I certainly think it's only
16 appropriate because it's a dispositive in nature
17 motion and I need to entertain oral argument from
18 everyone.

19 So I'll turn to you, sir, first for
20 whatever you wish to indicate on behalf of the
21 Drainage District.

22 MR. PETZ: Yes. Judge Cohen, thank you.
23 As I mentioned, I represent the Drainage District in
24 this lawsuit.

25 This lawsuit was filed on, I think, May 18

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1 of 2023 and it includes five counts originally.

2 They include a count one, assumpsit against
3 the Drainage District.

4 Count two, unjust enrichment against the
5 Drainage District.

6 A count three and four against Royal Oak
7 only as to assumpsit and unjust enrichment, which
8 Ms. Giordano just indicated the subject of a
9 stipulated order of dismissal.

10 Moreover, there was a count five,
11 injunctive relief claim against Royal Oak only, which
12 is also the subject of the stipulated order of
13 dismissal based upon how you rule on the Drainage
14 District's motion before you.

15 The motion before you is based on two
16 aspects of 2.116. It's a (C) (8) aspect and a (C) (7)
17 aspect.

18 The (C) (7) aspect relates only to what is
19 the subject of our motion, which is res judicata,
20 also known as claim preclusion.

21 Collateral estoppel, also known is an issue
22 of preclusion and release.

23 I'm going to address the (C) (8) aspect
24 first. Quite frankly, Judge Cohen, it is much
25 simpler. And put simply, the law is going to tell us

1 we need to dismiss counts one and two and thus, the
2 lawsuit gets dismissed completely.

3 And so working from the (C)(8) aspect, we
4 have the count one assumpsit against the Drainage
5 District.

6 Like I said, this case was filed in May of
7 2023. I made a point to say that, because before May
8 of 2023, Kickham Hanley, PLLC, who files many
9 lawsuits against governmental agencies, had a trial
10 court victory reversed. And in that decision is a
11 2021 Yomans (phonetic) decision -- it's in our
12 briefing -- the Court indicated and declared that
13 assumpsit is not a cause of action.

14 Further, in another case involving the
15 Kickham Hanley Law Firm, they brought a punitive
16 class action, which was dismissed by motion and the
17 Court of Appeals confirmed.

18 In that opinion in which the Court of
19 Appeals affirmed, once again, assumpsit is not a
20 cause of action.

21 So before this lawsuit was filed, on two
22 occasions and two cases involving the law firm
23 bringing this case on behalf of the plaintiff,
24 they've been told that assumpsit is not a cause of
25 action. Count one needs to be dismissed. And so

1 now --

2 THE COURT: All right.

3 MR. PETZ: Okay.

4 THE COURT: Move on to count two.

5 MR. PETZ: Sure. So now we're on to count
6 two, which is unjust enrichment.

7 Unjust enrichment, like all causes of
8 action that are not abolished, have elements.
9 Elements must be met.

10 In this case, there is no allegation that
11 the Drainage District has retained any alleged
12 stormwater overcharge at issue. No allegation.

13 We say this in our motion. We say this in
14 our reply. And we cite to law that actually says,
15 they've abandoned the ability to argue otherwise.

16 But the pleading doesn't say that. And the
17 way this works, your Honor, and this if where things
18 get more complicated, but the elements of unjust
19 enrichment are not complicated.

20 There must be an allegation that the
21 Drainage District retained the alleged stormwater
22 overcharge.

23 What happens is, there's a pool of bills
24 sent by GLWA. And I'm using the term pool so we can
25 envision a pool. We all go in a pool. Frankly, we

1 may all be dreaming of swimming in a pool right now
2 rather than working through this morass. But you
3 have a pool that GLWA sends to Drainage Districts,
4 including the Drainage District at issue in this
5 case, the GWKDD. That's the GLWA bill, it's for
6 sewerage.

7 Sewerage includes two aspects. Storm and
8 sanitary.

9 The allegation in this case is not that the
10 GWKDD collected more than what is in the pool. It's
11 this idea that too much of the pool was interpreted
12 and allocated to Royal Oak in particular years, which
13 means that less of the pool was paid by sanitary
14 communities, meaning -- sanitary communities meaning,
15 where their percentage is higher.

16 And we gave the Court an example in the
17 briefing. So storm, Troy has approximately a 2.47
18 percent or so percentage of whatever is allocated in
19 the storm. Royal Oak has a 29.7.

20 So in a wet year, they're saying that Royal
21 Oak payers pay too much. But they're not alleging
22 that we retained a benefit.

23 What they're really alleging is that Troy
24 benefited or other communities that have a percentage
25 in which their sanitary is higher.

1 So for Troy, their sanitary is 31.431
2 approximately where Royal Oak's is 19.3.

3 Now, you need to look through the briefing
4 to obviously have all of these numbers in your head,
5 Judge Cohen, but essentially, there's a pool of GLWA
6 sewerage bills that need to be paid by the GWKDD.

7 The communities give the money. It goes in
8 the pool and that pool goes to GLWA. There's no
9 retention of a benefit by the Drainage District at
10 all.

11 And if you go to Yomans again, which is a
12 case, obviously, we are all familiar with, and we go
13 to page one of the reply, you know, a quote from the
14 Court, an actual not a lie against one who has not
15 been personally enriched by the transaction because
16 the fundamental basis of the action is not only the
17 loss occasioned to the plaintiff and account of the
18 payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment
19 of the defendant.

20 There is not enrichment of the defendant
21 being alleged as to the Drainage District.

22 And in fact, when you work through the
23 logic of the complaint, at most what's being said is
24 that in certain years they believe that Royal Oak
25 pays more than their fair share and Troy does not pay

1 their fair share. And that would be in a wet year
2 that they make that allegation.

3 I'm guessing they would not complain about
4 a dry year. And so really, what they're trying to do
5 is essentially take over the rate-making process.

6 This is something they're been trying to do
7 for years, and we're going to talk about that as
8 well.

9 We're going to talk about the 2017 action,
10 which is defined in the court papers that involved an
11 assumpsit claim and a breach of contract claim
12 against the Drainage District in regards to what?
13 The alleged stormwater overcharge.

14 We're also going to talk about a 2019
15 action to some extent, which once again, involves the
16 alleged stormwater overcharge and involves claims of
17 assumpsit, breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

18 When we talk about those types of things,
19 we're going to talk about the (C)(7) bases now. I
20 believe under (C)(8), it's simple, you must dismiss.

21 Under (C)(7), things get a little more
22 convoluted, but the conclusion is the same. Under
23 (C)(7), as I indicated, we have three grounds, one of
24 which is res judicata or claimed preclusion.

25 So we have this 2017 action that is

1 grounded in the fact that there was a 2014 action
2 related to the alleged stormwater overcharge against
3 Royal Oak on behalf of the rate payers of Royal Oak,
4 and they're represented by very able counsel, Kickham
5 Hanley.

6 And Kickham Hanley chose not to sue the
7 Drainage District correctly in that case.

8 Royal Oak filed motions and got the case
9 dismissed. And that case included the alleged
10 stormwater overcharge involved in this case, as well
11 as what's called a (unintelligible) debt facility
12 charge, which we do not need to focus on for purposes
13 of this case.

14 A motion for reconsideration was filed by
15 the Kickham Hanley Law Firm on behalf of Royal Oak
16 rent payers and they've been pending for well over a
17 year.

18 And for whatever reason, the case settled.
19 When the case settled, the (unintelligible) debt
20 facility charge claim against Royal Oak was resolved
21 for a payment of money, whereas the alleged
22 stormwater overcharge was resolved with an assignment
23 for any claim, if any, that exists against the
24 Oakland County entities related to the alleged
25 stormwater overcharge. So that's a 2014 action.

1 And then goes to the 2017 action where now
2 Kickham Hanley has chosen to sue the Drainage
3 District directly.

4 They're suing in this weird vehicle called
5 a litigation trust for which the trust -- and it's in
6 the caption -- for the benefit of the class or for
7 the benefit of the rate payers of Royal Oak.

8 So Kickham Hanley suing for the benefit of
9 the rate payers in 2017, once again sue for the
10 alleged stormwater overcharge.

11 The case is dismissed. It's affirmed
12 three/zero on peel and a similar thing was done as to
13 Oak Park and the alleged stormwater overcharge, which
14 is the 2019 action.

15 I'm not going to get into all of the
16 nitty-gritty. You gotta review the papers. I know
17 you have, Judge Cohen, but I'm not looking to just
18 flood your mind with a whole bunch of things, but
19 rather, the most salient points.

20 So what is the most salient points from
21 what I just read through? Make no mistake about it,
22 Kickham Hanley in the caption as litigation trust,
23 was in privity with Royal Oak rent payers, including
24 Eisenberg when Kickham Hanley unsuccessfully sued the
25 Drainage District in the 2017 action as to the

1 alleged stormwater overcharge.

2 See page 7 of our motion. Page 7 of our
3 motion cites to the final judgment and order in the
4 action and literally says that Kickham Hanley is
5 authorized as plaintiff to institute and prosecute
6 this action on behalf of the class. If that's not
7 privity, I don't know what is.

8 Another aspect they attack as to our (C) (7)
9 defenses, which we believe are additional reasons
10 that this lawsuit is barred, is that the Court of
11 Appeals in either the 2017 action or 2019 action or
12 both somehow invited this lawsuit against the
13 Drainage District as if yet another alleged
14 stormwater overcharge case was what we need. Nobody
15 needs it.

16 The Court of Appeals did not say that Royal
17 Oak rate payers have assumpsit cause of action. And
18 we all know that an assumpsit cause of action does
19 not exist under Michigan law.

20 The Court of Appeals didn't say that in the
21 2017 action or the 2019 action.

22 THE COURT: The Court of Appeals did leave
23 open the issue of whether there was unjust enrichment
24 of expense of the end users, which is sort of what
25 this claim is sounding in.

1 MR. PETZ: The Court of Appeals did not say
2 that you can ignore the elements of unjust
3 enrichment, your Honor.

4 It did not say that the Drainage District
5 had been unjustly enriched by the alleged stormwater
6 overcharge. It did not say that. There's no
7 findings on that whatsoever.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. PETZ: And so you know, the elements of
10 unjust enrichment matter and nothing in the Court of
11 Appeals opinions from 2017 or 2019 say otherwise.

12 Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not even
13 address dismissal based on claim preclusion, issue
14 preclusion or release.

15 So I would submit to the Court that the
16 Court of Appeals do not send out invitations to file
17 lawsuits and they do not file -- send out invitations
18 to file lawsuits based on claims that are abolished
19 or claims for which the elements are not fulfilled.

20 So I believe that this Court has one
21 option, and that is to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit in
22 its entirety.

23 THE COURT: I appreciate that, Counsel.
24 Let me turn to your brother counsel, who's been
25 waiting patiently for whatever he wishes to present.

1 Please speak to everything in whatever
2 order you wish to, but I'm very focused on whatever
3 you have to say about the assumpsit matter, perhaps
4 telegraphing I think your brother counsel has a
5 strong argument.

6 MR. KICKHAM: Okay. Well, that's where I
7 was going to start anyway.

8 First of all, we don't concede that it's
9 impossible to recover on a theory of assumpsit, as
10 they claim in their reply brief.

11 And this is I hope not too fine a
12 distinction. It seems pretty obvious to me how this
13 works, but you just have to look at (inaudible) sand
14 and gravel where the Court said, notwithstanding the
15 abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies
16 traditionally available under assumpsit were
17 preserved.

18 So assumpsit is a substantive remedy and
19 here we're asking the Court to apply it as a remedy
20 for a violation of the common law.

21 The common law creates a duty on the
22 Drainage District to charge a reasonable amount.

23 Plaintiff alleges in its complaint, and the
24 Court must take it as true for the purposes of this
25 motion, that the Drainage District has charged an

1 unreasonable -- charged too much.

2 Assumpsit is the mechanism by which a
3 plaintiff can recover those excess charges
4 (inaudible) action.

5 It's like a claim for declaratory
6 judgement. It can stand alone as a remedy for a
7 violation of the plaintiff's substantive rights.

8 And the abolition of assumpsit that the
9 courts talk about is like the abolition of the
10 distinctions between courts of law and equity.

11 That didn't abolish equitable claims.
12 Equitable remedies are still available. A party can
13 still get an injunction or a declaratory judgment.
14 And similarly, the remedy of assumpsit is still
15 available.

16 And again, the violation of the legal right
17 is the Drainage District's failure to charge
18 plaintiff in the class a reasonable amount.

19 The substantive remedy is assumpsit.

20 Before I move on, does the Court have any
21 questions about that, is that the Court's primary
22 concern?

23 THE COURT: Well, I think I could pose
24 questions, but the case law you just cited to me, my
25 interpretation of it seems to say that, yes, these

1 things can survive but under an unjust enrichment
2 theory, not under assumpsit.

3 That's how I'm reading it. It seems to say
4 it survives as assumpsit. Is that your reading of
5 the law?

6 MR. KICKHAM: That is my reading of the
7 law. I believe we could bring only an assumpsit
8 claim and not an unjust enrichment claim --

9 THE COURT: Okay.

10 MR. KICKHAM: -- and still prevail. Just
11 like we --

12 THE COURT: And I have --

13 MR. KICKHAM: (Inaudible).

14 THE COURT: I totally respect -- I talked
15 over you. I didn't mean to.

16 MR. KICKHAM: Just like we could bring a
17 declaratory judgement action without a breach of
18 contract claim, for example.

19 THE COURT: Please proceed with your other
20 arguments.

21 MR. KICKHAM: Okay. So unjust enrichment,
22 we didn't abandon that issue. And in any event, in a
23 motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the Court has to
24 look at the pleadings.

25 Count two of our complaint contains a

1 discussion of the facts in law. Paragraphs 55
2 through 62, we talk about how the charges must be
3 reasonable.

4 A utility charge is unreasonable if it
5 contains illegal or improper expenses.

6 We cite Yomans for the proposition that a
7 municipal utility charge is unreasonable if viewed as
8 a whole and has been excessive.

9 And that's the holding of Yomans. We don't
10 have to show in this instance that the Drainage
11 District has accumulated more than 100 percent of
12 what its entitled to do.

13 It is overflowed at the pool. The pool is
14 overflowing.

15 We -- here, we just have to show that
16 they've put too much water into the pool, too much
17 money into the pool that they collected from the
18 people of Royal Oak.

19 The analogy I would use is, imagine you
20 have ten houses, the Drainage District, the whole
21 thing is just ten houses, right, and it cost a
22 thousand dollars a year for the Drainage District to
23 dispose of that stormwater and service those houses.

24 So that's a hundred dollars per house,
25 right. The Drainage District couldn't just decide to

1 collect from only eight of the houses and collect
2 \$125 from each of those houses and nothing from the
3 other two. That would be unjust. It would unjustly
4 enrich the Drainage District.

5 And I understand Mr. Petz's point about
6 how, you know, some of the benefit has possibly
7 flowed to cities like Troy and Madison Heights have
8 been undercharged.

9 But whose fault is it that Troy and Madison
10 Heights are being undercharged? Who decides how much
11 to charge? The Drainage District.

12 And if the Drainage District charged the
13 right amount to Royal Oak and continued to charge
14 Troy and Madison Heights what they're charging them,
15 their pool would be underfilled. They wouldn't fill
16 up their pool.

17 So the fact that they're able to fill up
18 the pool is only true by virtue of their unjustly
19 enriching themselves by overcharging the people of
20 Royal Oak.

21 Now, on the res judicata and claim
22 preclusion issues, first of all, there is a temporal
23 distinction between the claims in the 2017 action and
24 the claims in this action.

25 That's I think, the most important thing to

1 remember on that. That as we explained in our brief,
2 we can assert the claims in this case without
3 impinging on the -- most of the time period this case
4 covers, doesn't impinge on the time period that was
5 at issue in the 2017 action.

6 That time period ended in 2019 at the
7 latest. So we can at least look back to 2019, as we
8 described in our brief.

9 I'm a little unclear on the Drainage
10 District's privity arguments.

11 I think what they're trying to say is that
12 Eisenberg was in privity with themselves, that
13 Eisenberg was a beneficiary of the trust in the 2017
14 action and he's a party here. So he's the same
15 person.

16 All right. That's not exactly privity.
17 Because it doesn't seem to matter to me whether the
18 law firm is in privity with somebody.

19 I mean, I can -- my firm can represent
20 client A in one action and that doesn't mean that
21 what happened to client A -- client B is not estopped
22 to assert claims that client A asserted just because
23 the law firm is the same. That's not -- so I don't
24 think that's what Mr. Petz is saying.

25 I think what he's saying is that Eisenberg

1 was a beneficiary of the trust and he's a class
2 member and he's the named class member, the named
3 plaintiff in this case.

4 But that doesn't matter because the trust
5 wasn't asserting claims on behalf of the people of
6 Royal Oak. It was asserting claims that belonged to
7 the City of Royal Oak that the City assigned to the
8 trust.

9 They're different claims. The theories
10 were the same. We were still saying, well, they're
11 overcharging because of all of the reasons we stated
12 in our complaint, but those were Royal Oak's claims.

13 And what happened in that case, it says, if
14 Royal Oak sued the Drainage District, I think the
15 Court -- if you'll forgive me -- the Court should
16 forget about the fact that there was even a trust,
17 because it's -- the trust was asserting a claim that
18 belonged to Royal Oak.

19 And all the Court of Appeals said is, that
20 claim fails, in part, because Royal Oak hadn't
21 suffered any damages, the Court of Appeals said,
22 because Royal Oak passed on the charges to Mr.
23 Eisenberg and the people who make up the class in
24 this case.

25 So we -- you know, went home in

1 disappointment. We thought about it some more.
2 Thought, well, let's bring the case -- we don't agree
3 with that. We think Royal Oak, you know -- as we're
4 talking in our firm, we're saying, well, it's too
5 bad. We think Royal Oak (inaudible) of charges, but
6 the Court of Appeals said, somebody has to bear the
7 (inaudible).

8 The Drainage District can't just charge
9 whoever it wants. And if you take the Drainage
10 District's argument to its logical conclusion, it
11 could charge the people of Royal Oak a hundred
12 percent of the cost of managing all of the stormwater
13 from all the member communities, and the people of
14 Royal Oak would have no recourse against the Drainage
15 District.

16 So with that in mind, we filed this class
17 action on behalf of the people of Royal Oak.

18 It's asserting different claims, but under
19 the same theories.

20 And so that, first of all, takes care of
21 the res judicata and the collateral estoppel issues.

22 And if you even get past that, you run into
23 the temporal thing, which means, we still get to
24 assert our claims back to 2019 through the present.

25 Now -- and in its brief, the Drainage

1 District keeps pounding on this language under the
2 Royal Oak settlement agreement from the 2014 case,
3 about how Royal Oak could continue to include the
4 Drainage District stormwater charges and its rates.

5 That has nothing to do with whether the
6 Drainage District will continue to charge the City
7 too much for stormwater disposal.

8 Or as it turns out, what matters, according
9 to the Court of Appeals in its opinion in the 2017
10 case, what matters is how much the Drainage District
11 is charging the people of Royal Oak.

12 So just because Eisenberg released Royal
13 Oak, that doesn't mean he released the Drainage
14 District.

15 And Royal Oak doesn't have -- what we tried
16 to do in the 2017 action, was assert claims on behalf
17 of Royal Oak.

18 Those weren't released in the settlement.
19 They were signed. And now we're trying to assert
20 claims that were not brought in the 2014 class action
21 against Royal Oak.

22 It couldn't have been brought there because
23 the Drainage District wasn't a party. And those
24 claims we now bring on behalf of all of the residents
25 of Royal Oak against the Drainage District.

1 And again, as to the release, the same
2 timing issue I discussed a minute ago, applies. The
3 release in the Royal Oak class action, the 2014 case,
4 was limited in time to charges imposed through
5 January 2017 and that doesn't impinge on the claims
6 at issue here.

7 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Again, I
8 understand that counsel (inaudible). I just don't
9 want to go past your rights in any way if you wanted
10 to say something but you're not really a party here.

11 Let me turn back to the moving party and I
12 will give you final word because it is your motion.

13 MR. PETZ: Your Honor, the bottom line is
14 you can't just assume because you think you can do a
15 better job than the government, just like you can't
16 just assume because you think you can make a whole
17 lot of money by your theories of how you can do
18 things differently than the government.

19 This is yet another alleged stormwater
20 overcharge case.

21 Counsel himself indicated that he does not
22 need to show the pool is overflowing. That's an
23 admission that this is not fulfilling the unjust
24 enrichment element.

25 You do need to prove that the Drainage

1 District has received a benefit. You need to allege
2 it. They're not doing that.

3 They're saying that too much of the pool is
4 paid by one city's rate payers, rather than another
5 in a wet year versus a dry year.

6 And when you look through all of the case
7 law, including Yomans, you need a cause of action to
8 obtain a remedy.

9 There's no cause of action alleged that
10 survives. Not the subject of the motion, but rates
11 are presumed reasonable. See Trahey (phonetic),
12 that's footnote one.

13 Essentially, Kickham Hanley, the law firm,
14 has decided that they want to bring a lawsuit.

15 And they have brought it in 2014, 2017,
16 2019, before 2019 against Oak Park and now in 2023.
17 But you can't just bring a lawsuit because you want
18 to or you think you can make money in doing so. You
19 have to have a cause of action.

20 There is no cause of action. This takes me
21 back to the 2017 action in which they were alleging a
22 breach of contract based on an order of
23 apportionment, in which the Court said that's not a
24 contract.

25 And so this is just another way for them to

1 try to get to a whole bunch of money that the
2 Drainage District doesn't even have. And it's just
3 going to hurt the very rate payers that are being
4 persuaded to bring these types of causes of action.

5 Moreover, in 2014 when the decision was
6 made to sue Royal Oak, they could have sued the
7 Drainage District at that time. They chose not to.

8 Somehow there's a settlement with an
9 assignment that says, if you have any claims, if any,
10 you can sue the county as to the alleged stormwater
11 overcharge. Case dismissed. Affirmed.

12 Two trial court Judges dismissed this
13 alleged stormwater overcharge theory previously. Six
14 Court of appeals Judges, and this is the same
15 theories. It's the same alleged stormwater
16 overcharge.

17 And, you know, in terms of getting to the
18 nitty-gritty of claim, issue and release, I direct
19 the Court to the papers because for me it takes
20 reading the papers to get a grasp of each one of the
21 additional bases for dismissal, but it does not take
22 any additional review of the papers for me to know
23 that you cannot sue us for assumpsit, you cannot sue
24 us for unjust enrichment. It fails as a matter of
25 law under (C) (8).

1 And that's my last word, your Honor. I
2 will stop at this point. And I appreciate you being
3 patient as always, Judge Cohen.

4 THE COURT: Oh, my gosh, I appreciate all
5 of you very much and while I'll probably manage to
6 upset everyone here, that's certainly not my
7 intension to do that, because I think you're all very
8 fine attorneys and I appreciate all of your arguments
9 very much.

10 The oral argument was very beneficial to
11 me, so don't think it wasn't, even though I'm looking
12 down as I issue my ruling. I just don't want to miss
13 anything with all of the moving parts here. And I
14 did spend a lot of time with it. And I did find the
15 argument very informed.

16 At the end of the day, I do feel that the
17 plaintiff can maintain a claim for unjust enrichment.
18 Understanding and respecting the argument by the
19 moving party here that they don't show any -- that
20 they retained wealth from this or not, I think it's
21 pled. If you read it in their pleadings, it's there
22 and it's commonsense.

23 The fact that perhaps Troy or Madison
24 Heights weren't charged adequately, doesn't mean that
25 potentially just on the pleadings, that the Drainage

1 Commission might have been unjustly enriched by the
2 individual citizens in Royal Oak paying more and than
3 the pleading are sufficient there.

4 MR. PETZ: Your Honor, for purposes of
5 appeal, you know, there's no allegation of retention
6 of a benefit as to the GLWA bills.

7 Those GLWA bills were collected from the
8 community and GLWA got the money.

9 So, I mean, could you be more particular as
10 to what allegation in the complaint alleges that?

11 THE COURT: Well, you made a very good
12 record -- you orally made a -- not in the pleadings,
13 you made a very good record orally today on that
14 issue, so I think it's preserved for you on appeal.
15 I certainly wouldn't deny you that right, by all
16 means, but I think that it's in the pleading.

17 I think the pleadings, if you read
18 paragraphs 55 through 62, the entirety of it, you're
19 talking about paying more money to the Drainage
20 District than what they should have been charged.

21 And that unjustly enriches the Drainage
22 District because they're receiving that money.
23 They're in receipt of it.

24 What they choose to do with it, you know, I
25 think it's there. I think you could -- a jury could

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1 find, I think a trier of fact could find how they
2 were unjustly enriched based on what's pled.

3 But certainly you're free to appeal. And
4 if I'm corrected by the Court of Appeals, it won't be
5 the first time and it probably won't be the last time
6 and I will accept it with grace.

7 I honesty think I'm ruling correctly. And
8 I would only make rulings believing I'm ruling
9 correctly. With any --

10 MR. PETZ: Judge, I appreciate that. Just
11 know that when a community is billed for the Drainage
12 District's portion of the GLWA bill, Royal Oak
13 receives the bill and then it bills its rate payers
14 and then collects the money from the rate payers,
15 which then goes to the Drainage District, which then
16 goes to GLWA. So there's no retention of a benefit.

17 I appreciate you letting me make my record
18 and I guess --

19 THE COURT: No. I understand we disagree
20 on it, but you just sort of said that it then goes to
21 GLWA and ends with your client. But that's neither
22 here nor there. I think I've made --

23 MR. PETZ: (Inaudible).

24 THE COURT: I --

25 MR. PETZ: GLWA is not my client.

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1 THE COURT: I misunderstood you. Can you
2 repeat that just so I can have it for the record?

3 MR. PETZ: Yeah, so GLWA has bills. They
4 go to things called Drainage Districts --

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MR. PETZ: -- garaged as the GWKDD.

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 MR. PETZ: That bill is the GLWA bill.
9 Then that bills goes to communities. The communities
10 collects from the rate payers, such as Royal Oak and
11 Troy.

12 They send the money to the Drainage
13 District. Then the Drainage District then sends all
14 of that money to GLWA, so like the Drainage District
15 does not have money.

16 So like this lawsuit moving forward is
17 literally going to take money away from the Drainage
18 District it does not have, if successful.

19 THE COURT: Right.

20 MR. PETZ: There's no way the --

21 THE COURT: Well --

22 MR. PETZ: (Inaudible).

23 THE COURT: No. No. No. Well, let's be
24 done on your part.

25 The Drainage District is receiving the

1 funds and then using the funds to pay above them to
2 pay through. And they could receive -- this is all
3 allegation. Nothing's established and I wouldn't
4 make any rulings regarding overcharges whatsoever
5 right now, but taking the pleadings as truthful for
6 purposes of the motion, that means that the
7 individual citizens in Royal Oak are paying more than
8 they should.

9 The Drainage Commission receives that
10 money, then chooses to pass it along to cover, you
11 know, the charges here, instead of pulling in money
12 from different sources, perhaps as they should.

13 I just don't see it as unjust enrichment.
14 I think to find otherwise would setup a situation
15 where people could be overcharged and have no
16 recourse.

17 But take it on appeal. And certainly,
18 it's -- I think it's definitely Court of Appeals
19 material, because it is complicated and it does have
20 multiple moving parts.

21 And perhaps, I haven't been clear enough
22 but I certainly tried to be.

23 Now, the next ruling is -- you're probably
24 not going to be (inaudible) by it, because it's in
25 your favor.

1 There is no claim for assumpsit. It
2 doesn't exist under Michigan law. I think it was
3 very clearly established.

4 So the assumpsit claim, I would grant that
5 relief. It would survive under unjust enrichment.
6 Okay.

7 I do find that the 2014 release was not
8 between the parties and did not release claims after
9 2017.

10 Further, res judicata and collateral
11 estoppel does not apply here. The only issue decided
12 in the prior action was that the City of Royal Oak
13 did not have a cause of action against the Drainage
14 District and therefore, did not have a cause of
15 action to assign to the trust, which stood in the
16 shoes of -- which stood in its shoes in the prior
17 lawsuit.

18 And I also note, and I think I said it
19 during the argument, I read the Court of Appeals has
20 left open the issue of whether a payer -- individual
21 rate payer suffered the loss could be brought
22 forward.

23 So I don't find that there -- the motion
24 for summary disposition based on release, res
25 judicata or collateral estoppel under (C)(7) would be

1 appropriate and I would deny for that reason. Okay.

2 Certainly I understand you may appeal at
3 the end of this, but we have to get this on a track.
4 We need to answer the complaint, presuming no
5 interrogatory matters.

6 So can you have an answer -- if I give you
7 30 days, is that jamming you, is that appropriate?

8 MR. PETZ: So an answer to the complaint in
9 30 days?

10 THE COURT: I'm trying to be fair to
11 everyone to keep it moving. I think 30 should be
12 appropriate.

13 MR. PETZ: I mean, yeah. With the
14 knowledge that, you know, it would be 30 days from
15 the 24th today that we would have to answer the
16 complaint, but it may be that we exercise appellate
17 rights that make it so --

18 THE COURT: Oh, and I was trying to be so
19 clear that you're free to appeal.

20 Presuming, if you say you choose not to, I
21 want the answer in 30 days, if that make sense.

22 MR. PETZ: Judge --

23 THE COURT: If there's a stay granted by
24 the Court of Appeals, that changes everything, of
25 course, if that makes any sense.

1 MR. PETZ: Yeah, it does.

2 THE COURT: Yeah.

3 MR. PETZ: A just for clarity, assumpsit
4 count one is dismissed under (C)(8). Unjust
5 enrichment under (C)(8) you have denied for the
6 reasons you have stated on the record. And the same
7 goes for the (C)(7) bases that we actually raised in
8 this motion for summary judgement, which was
9 collateral estoppel, res judicata and release.

10 THE COURT: And release. Yes. You said it
11 very well as you have said everything very well.

12 I think after 30 days we need to -- and
13 again, I know this may get derailed, but presuming we
14 have an answer in 30 days and the matter is
15 proceeding, let's have an early status scheduling
16 conference because I think we should all sit down
17 together to go over timelines and dates and make sure
18 everything is on a fair track for everyone.

19 That could probably be set today, because
20 we have you all present, knowing that it may be
21 stayed.

22 So I might give you a breakout room with
23 Ms. Lombardo, my secretary because I actually have
24 several other matters today, and you can pick a date
25 for that, just so we have a holding date, presuming

1 that we keep it. Okay.

2 And that will conclude it for purposes of
3 today. I wish everyone well. And I commend the
4 Royal Oak attorney for having nothing better to do
5 than have to listen to this.

6 MS. GIORDANO: My pleasure, your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Always a pleasure to have all
8 of you. All right. Everyone take care.

9 MR. KICKHAM: Thank you, your Honor.

10 THE COURT: You're welcome.

11

12 (Zoom proceedings concluded at 12:03 p.m.)

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
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF MICHIGAN)
) SS
COUNTY OF OAKLAND)

I hereby certify that I reported
stenographically the foregoing Zoom proceedings and
testimony under oath at the time and place
hereinbefore set forth; that thereafter the same was
reduced to computer transcription under my
supervision; and that this is a full, true, complete
and correct transcription of said proceedings.



Laurie A. Jefferson
CSR-6909, Notary Public
Oakland County, Michigan

My Commission expires: August 27, 2026

Sunday, January 28, 2024

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EXHIBIT - 4

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a
Class of similarly-situated persons
and entities.

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County
with a separate legal existence, and
CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation.

Defendant.

2023-200422-CZ

Case No 2023- -CZ
Hon.

JUDGE DAVID M. COHEN

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Ave., Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

There is no other pending or dismissed civil action that arises out of
transactions or occurrences alleged in this complaint.

PLAINTIFF'S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff Jeffrey Eisenberg, through his attorneys, Kickham Hanley PLLC, individually and as
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons and entities (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") states as
follows for his Class Action Complaint against Defendant George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the
"Drainage District") and the City of Royal Oak, Michigan (the "City"):

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action challenging the amount charged by Defendant Drainage District to
Plaintiff and the Class – through the City – for stormwater disposal service which exceeds the costs

the Drainage District actually incurs for stormwater disposal (hereinafter, the “Stormwater Disposal Overcharge”).

2. The Drainage District has systematically overcharged Plaintiff and the Class for stormwater disposal services by imposing the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge for at least the last six years.

3. Plaintiff, on behalf of the Class, seeks, among other things, a refund of all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges they paid to the Drainage District through the City from May 18, 2017 through the filing of this action and all such Overcharges collected during the pendency of this action.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. Plaintiff owns real property in the City and receives water and sewer services. Plaintiff has been assessed, and has paid, the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge at issue in this case; and seeks to act as class representative for all similarly situated persons and entities. Plaintiff is a member of the Class he seeks to represent.

5. Defendant Drainage District is a component unit of Oakland County with a separate legal existence. The City lies within the geographical boundaries of the Drainage District. The City’s combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the “County System”), which is owned and maintained by the Drainage District.

6. The City is a municipal corporation which passes through the Drainage District’s charges, including the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge, to sewer users located in the City. The City collects the Drainage District’s charges on behalf of Drainage District and remits those charges to the Drainage District. The Court of Appeals has explicitly recognized that end-users of the County System are the “actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge.” *See Kickham Hanley PLLC v. GWKDD*, COA Case No. 351317 (Exhibit 1 hereto) at p. 7. Absent a release, those end-users are “entitled to recover the overcharges” from Drainage District and/or the City. *Id.* at p. 9.

7. Venue and jurisdiction are proper with this Court because all parties are present here and the actions which give rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in the County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8. Like many older communities in Southeast Michigan, the City has a combined sanitary and storm sewer system, which is a system that is designed to collect both (i) snowmelt and rainwater ("stormwater") runoff and (ii) domestic sewage and industrial wastewater ("sanitary sewage"), in the same pipe.

9. Sanitary sewage – i.e., spent water from a municipal water supply system which may be a combination of liquid and water-carried wastes -- enters a combined system directly from residences, commercial buildings, industrial plants, institutions and other structures. Owners and/or occupiers of such structures which generate the sewage are "users" of the sanitary sewage disposal services provided by the City.

10. Stormwater, in contrast, does not originate from any use of the water supply system or sanitary sewer system, and its presence in the combined system is wholly unrelated to the amount of tap water used, or sanitary sewage generated, by users of the system whose structures are physically connected to that system.

11. Stormwater collects on both private and public land, roads and other physical surfaces during rainfall events, and the runoff enters the combined sewer system through catch-basins and other collection devices.

12. Even though they have different origins, both sanitary sewage and stormwater collected in a combined sewer system need to be disposed of.

13. The City's combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the "County System"), which is owned and maintained by the Drainage District.

14. Except during heavy rainfall (when high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and stormwater exceed the outlet capacity causing excess flow to be diverted to the George W. Kuhn Retention Treatment Basin), the entire stormwater flow from the combined sewers of the County System, (*i.e.* the City's stormwater and the stormwater of various other communities in the area) is conveyed by the Drainage District to a treatment plant operated by the Great Lakes Water Authority (the "Water Authority") for ultimate disposal.¹

15. The Drainage District's stormwater flow (including the portion of stormwater flow that originates in the City) passes through Detroit's Dequindre Interceptor, which contains a master meter which measures the total flow passing from the Drainage District System into the Water Authority treatment plant.

16. The Water Authority charges the Drainage District a flat annual rate to dispose of the City's total sewage flows, which include stormwater (the "Water Authority Charge"). The Water Authority's rate-making methodology (more particularly described below) is sufficiently detailed to allow a mathematical calculation of the amount of the total Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District attributable to the treatment and disposal of stormwater.

17. The Drainage District, in turn, allocates the annual Water Authority Charge among all of the municipalities in the district, including the City, and charges each municipality a flat annual "Sewage Charge" for sanitary sewage disposal (the "Sanitary Charge") and a flat annual charge for "Pollution Control," *i.e.*, stormwater disposal (the "Stormwater Charge").

¹ Prior to January 2016, the Detroit Water and Sewerage Authority ("Detroit") provided wholesale sewage treatment services to the Drainage District. Effective in 2016, the Water Authority, pursuant to agreements with the City of Detroit, became the wholesale supplier of water and sewage treatment services to the City. Notwithstanding that change, the City's public water supply and sewage treatment services still are provided by Detroit facilities and the Detroit water and sewage treatment plants.

18. The Drainage District collectively charges end-users in the City in excess of \$11 million per year for Sanitary Charges and Stormwater Charges. Those charges are imposed in the first instance through billings from the Drainage District to the City.

19. The City passes on that cost to its sewer customers (i.e., Plaintiff and the Class) by imposing charges in its water and sewer rates to recover the entire \$11 million plus per year imposed by the Drainage District on an annual basis.

20. The amount of the Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District is based on a formula tied to the total volume of sewage flows that enter the Drainage District's system for ultimate disposal by the Water Authority, and the pollutants present in those sewage flows. An identifiable portion of the total Water Authority Charge to the Drainage District is attributable to the costs to treat stormwater flows that come from the Drainage District service area. As described below, the Drainage District's pass-through Stormwater Charge to the City's end-users should be the same amount, but it is not.

21. For a number of years, the Drainage District has charged end-users in the City substantially more than the amount that GLWA charges the Drainage District for the disposal of the portion of the Drainage District's stormwater flow that originates in the City. The Drainage District has therefore overcharged the City for stormwater disposal service since at least 2017 and the City, in turn, has passed that overcharge on to end-users in the City, including Plaintiff and the Class.

22. The Drainage District's Final Order of Apportionment dated April 19, 2005 (Exhibit 2 hereto), provides that the stormwater charges to the City consist of two components: (1) the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department's charges to the [Drainage District] to treat the total storm water flow, and (2) the administrative costs of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. The Final Order of

Apportionment was imposed pursuant to a Resolution of the Board of the Drainage District dated April 19, 2005 (the “Resolution”). Exhibit 3 hereto.

23. Plaintiff does not challenge the Final Order of Apportionment or the Resolution. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that the Final Order of Apportionment and the Resolution are valid and binding on the Drainage District.

24. The Resolution obligated the Drainage District to pass through to the City’s end-users the City’s proportionate share of the Water Authority’s actual charges to the Drainage District for treating the storm water. The Drainage District has breached its obligations, and continues to breach its obligations, under the Resolution because, in assessing storm water charges to the City, the Drainage District has **not** passed on to the City’s sewer end-users the City’s proportionate share of the actual costs the Drainage District has incurred to the Water Authority for storm water disposal. Instead, the Drainage District has grossly increased the Water Authority stormwater treatment charges.

25. The Water Authority’s annual rate calculations demonstrate the precise amount the Water Authority includes in the Water Authority Charges to recover from the Drainage District the costs for stormwater disposal from communities within the Drainage District service area. For example, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021, the Water Authority charged the Drainage District the total amount of \$45,851,800 in Water Authority Charges to cover the costs of disposing of all sewage flows. *See* Exhibit 4 hereto. According to the Water Authority rate methodology implemented in 2017 and in effect in 2021, the Water Authority allocated 50% of that \$45,851,800 (\$22,925,900) based upon the Drainage District’s total sewage flows and 50% (\$22,925,900) based upon the Drainage District’s share of the total pollutant load of all sewage flows treated by the Water Authority. *See* Exhibit 5 hereto.

26. The Water Authority determined that stormwater constitutes 33% of the total sewage flows coming from the Drainage District, and therefore, 33% of the total flow-related costs are attributable to stormwater disposal. *See* Exhibit 5 hereto (26.03 cfs of stormwater vs. 78.57 csf of total flows). The Water Authority further determined that stormwater contributed 16.4% of the total pollutant loads attributable to the Drainage District, and therefore, 16.4% of the total pollutant-related costs are attributable to stormwater disposal. *See* Exhibit 5 (GLWA cost of service study) and Exhibit 7 (detailed calculation derived from Exhibit 5). As a result, the Water Authority charged the Drainage District \$7,565,547 for stormwater flows ($\$22,925,900 \times 33\%$) and \$3,759,847 ($\$22,925,900 \times 16.4\%$) for pollutant loadings in the stormwater. The total stormwater charges from the Water Authority to the Drainage District for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021 thus were **\$11,325,394**. The balance of the Water Authority's charges to the Drainage District for that fiscal year (\$34,526,406) are attributable to non-stormwater sewage flows.

27. In contrast, the Drainage District falsely represented to the City that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021:

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$45,939,650** million in total disposal charges;

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$21,963,110** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

The Water Authority charged the Drainage District **\$23,976,540** million for storm water disposal. [Exhibit 6 hereto].

28. Instead of allocating the Water Authority's stormwater charge in the amounts actually charged by the Water Authority, the Drainage District improperly reallocated the total charges imposed by the Water Authority to increase the amount of the storm water charges to end-users of the County System by over \$12 million (\$23,976,540 in actual Stormwater Charges vs. \$11,325,394 incurred from the Water Authority for stormwater disposal). Because the Drainage District allocated

to the City a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges (29.7%) than sanitary sewage disposal charges (19.3%), the more of the total Water Authority Charges that the Drainage District allocates to storm water charges, the more the City's end-users pay in the aggregate.

29. In other words, for each dollar of storm water disposal charges the Drainage District allegedly incurs, the City pays 29.7 cents. But for each dollar of sanitary sewage disposal charges the Drainage District allegedly incurs, the City pays only 19.3 cents.

30. Based upon the Drainage District's representations and the allocation percentage assigned to the City, the Drainage District charged the City's end-users aggregate sewage disposal costs of **\$11,361,901** for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021. This was calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$4,240,198 ($\$21,963,110 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .19306 = \$4,240,198$)
- Storm water -- \$7,121,703 ($\$23,976,540 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .297028 = \$7,121,703$)

31. Given the Water Authority's actual charges to the Drainage District, however, the Drainage District should have charged the City **\$10,029,626** for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021.

This is calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$6,665,667 ($\$34,526,406 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .19306 = \$6,665,667$)
- Storm water -- \$3,363,959 ($\$11,325,394 \text{ in Water Authority charges} \times .297028 = \$3,363,959$)

32. Based upon the foregoing, the Drainage District overcharged the City by at least **\$1,332,275** for just the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021. This Overcharge is based solely upon the Drainage District's misallocation of the Water Authority's "common-to-all" sewer charges (*i.e.*, the Water Authority Charges) imposed upon Plaintiff and the Class. The actual Overcharge is even higher because the Drainage District similarly overallocated its own non-Water Authority expenses to stormwater disposal.

33. There are similar overcharges for prior years and for the years since. The total Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed by the Drainage District since May 18, 2017 well exceed **\$7 million**.

34. Plaintiff and the Class need not rely upon the Resolution to invalidate the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges because, even in the absence of the Resolution, the Drainage District's stormwater charges to end-users in the City have been unreasonable and unlawful because the stormwater charges far exceed the actual costs the Drainage District incurs to dispose of the City's stormwater.

35. The Stormwater Disposal Overcharges have been arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonable," because the challenged Charges, "viewed as a whole," have been, and continue to be, "excessive." *Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).

36. Since at least 2015, the City has known of the Drainage District's Stormwater Disposal Overcharges but has done nothing to contest them. To the contrary, the City merely has continued to pass through Stormwater Charges it knows are excessive.

37. Plaintiff and the Class are the real parties in interest and have standing to sue Drainage District and the City because they paid the Overcharges as part of their sewer charges, which were passed through by the City. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has explicitly recognized that end-users of the County System are the "actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge." *See Kickham Hanley PLLC v. GWKDD*, COA Case No. 351317 (Exhibit 1 hereto) at p. 7.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

38. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to MCR 3.501, individually and on behalf of a proposed class consisting of all persons and entities who or which were billed and/or paid the City for sewer service between May 18, 2017 and the date of the final judgment in this action (the "Class Period").

39. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

40. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class it seeks to represent, and Plaintiff was injured by the same wrongful conduct that injured the other members of the Class.

41. The Defendants have acted wrongfully in the same basic manner as to the entire class.

42. There are questions of law and fact common to all Class Members that predominate over any questions, which, if they exist, affect only individual Class Members, including:

- a. whether the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge is "unreasonable;"
- b. the amounts charged by the Water Authority to the Drainage District for stormwater disposal and the amounts of Stormwater Charges imposed and/or collected by the Drainage District from Plaintiff and the Class;
- c. whether by including the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge, the Drainage District's sewer rates and charges incurred by Plaintiff and the Class "viewed as a whole" have been "excessive." *See Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 219, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).
- d. whether the Drainage District has complied with the Final Order of Apportionment and the associated resolution; and
- e. whether the Drainage District and/or the City have been unjustly enriched by collecting the Stormwater Disposal Overcharge.

43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent and experienced counsel to prosecute this action.

44. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. The prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. Furthermore, the prosecution of separate actions would substantially impair and impede the ability of individual class members to protect their interests. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.

COUNT I
ASSUMPSIT – MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
UNREASONABLE RATES AND CHARGES
DRAINAGE DISTRICT ONLY

45. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

46. The Drainage District's sewer rates and charges must be "reasonable." *Trabey v. City of Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 595; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015); *Mapleview Estates v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich. App. 412 (2003).

47. A municipal utility charge is "unreasonable" if it contains illegal or improper expenses. *Trabey*, 311 Mich. App. at 595.

48. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is unreasonable because, in allocating sewer charges to the City, the Drainage District grossly and fraudulently inflates the actual Water Authority's stormwater disposal charge and therefore it contains improper expenses.

49. A municipal utility charge is "unreasonable" if "viewed as a whole" it has been "excessive." See *Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 219, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).

50. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' improper conduct, Defendants have collected millions of dollars to which they are not entitled (the "Stormwater Disposal Overcharges"). By paying the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges, Plaintiff and the Class have conferred a benefit upon the Drainage District.

52. A claim to recover amounts paid to a governmental unit in excess of the amount allowed under law is properly filed as an equitable action in assumpsit for money had and received.

53. By virtue of the Drainage District's inclusion of the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges in the Stormwater Charges, the Drainage District has collected amounts in excess of the amounts it was legally entitled to collect. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to maintain an equitable action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction. *See, e.g., Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor*, 383 Mich. 693, 704, 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970).

WHEREFORE, the Drainage District should be required to disgorge the revenues attributable to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed or collected by the Drainage District between May 18, 2017 and the date of the filing of this action, and during the pendency of this action, and refund all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges it has collected to Plaintiff and the Class.

COUNT II
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
UNREASONABLE RATES
DRAINAGE DISTRICT ONLY

54. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-44 in their entirety as if fully set forth herein.

55. The Drainage District's sewer Charges must be "reasonable." *Trabey v. City of Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 595; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015); *Mapleview Estates v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich. App. 412 (2003).

56. A municipal utility charge is "unreasonable" if it contains illegal or improper expenses. *Trabey*, 311 Mich. App. at 595.

57. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is unreasonable because, in allocating sewer charges to the City, the Drainage District grossly and fraudulently inflates the actual Water Authority stormwater disposal charge and therefore it contains improper expenses.

58. A municipal utility charge is “unreasonable” if “viewed as a whole” it has been “excessive.” See *Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 219, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).

59. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

60. As a direct and proximate result of the Drainage District’s improper conduct, the Drainage District has collected millions of dollars to which it is not entitled (the “Stormwater Disposal Overcharges”). By paying the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges, Plaintiff and the Class have conferred a benefit upon the Drainage District.

61. The Drainage District has improperly received the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges to which it was not legally entitled, and it would be unfair for the Drainage District to retain the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges under the circumstances.

62. The Drainage District should be required to disgorge all unlawfully collected Stormwater Disposal Overcharges.

WHEREFORE, the Drainage District should be required to disgorge the revenues attributable to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed or collected by the Drainage District between May 18, 2017 and the date of the filing of this action, and during the pendency of this action, and refund all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges it has collected to Plaintiff and the Class.

COUNT III
ASSUMPSIT – MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
UNREASONABLE RATES AND CHARGES
CITY ONLY

63. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-44 in their entirety as if fully set forth herein.

64. The City’s sewer rates and charges must be “reasonable.” *Trabey v. City of Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 595; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015); *Mapleview Estates v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich. App. 412 (2003).

65. A municipal utility charge is “unreasonable” if it contains illegal or improper expenses. *Trabey*, 311 Mich. App. at 595.

66. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is unreasonable because, in allocating sewer charges to the City, the Drainage District grossly and fraudulently inflates the actual Water Authority stormwater disposal charge and therefore it contains improper expenses.

67. A municipal utility charge is “unreasonable” if “viewed as a whole” it has been “excessive.” *See Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 219, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).

68. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ improper conduct, Defendants have collected millions of dollars to which they are not entitled (the “Stormwater Disposal Overcharges”). By paying the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges, Plaintiff and the Class have conferred a benefit upon on the City.

70. A claim to recover amounts paid to a governmental unit in excess of the amount allowed under law is properly filed as an equitable action in assumpsit for money had and received.

71. By virtue of the City’s inclusion of the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges in the Stormwater Charges, the City – either on its own behalf or as agent of the Drainage District – has collected amounts in excess of the amounts it was legally entitled to collect. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to maintain an equitable action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction. *See, e.g., Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor*, 383 Mich. 693, 704, 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970).

WHEREFORE, the City should be required to disgorge the revenues attributable to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed or collected by the City between May 18, 2017 and the date of the filing of this action, and during the pendency of this action, and refund all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges it has collected to Plaintiff and the Class.

COUNT IV
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
UNREASONABLE RATES
CITY ONLY

72. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-44 in their entirety as if fully set forth herein.

73. The City's sewer Charges must be "reasonable." *Trabey v. City of Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 595; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015); *Mapleview Estates v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich. App. 412 (2003).

74. A municipal utility charge is "unreasonable" if it contains illegal or improper expenses. *Trabey*, 311 Mich. App. at 595.

75. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is unreasonable because, in allocating sewer charges to the City, the Drainage District grossly and fraudulently inflates the actual Water Authority stormwater disposal charge and therefore it contains improper expenses.

76. A municipal utility charge is "unreasonable" if "viewed as a whole" it has been "excessive." *See Youmans v. Bloomfield Township*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 219, 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021).

77. As applied to Plaintiff and the Class, the Stormwater Disposal Charge is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

78. As a direct and proximate result of the City's improper conduct, the City – either on its own behalf or as an agent on behalf of the Drainage District -- has collected millions of dollars to which it is not entitled (the "Stormwater Disposal Overcharges"). By paying the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges, Plaintiff and the Class have conferred a benefit upon on the City.

79. The City has improperly received the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges to which it was not legally entitled, and it would be unfair for the City to retain the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges under the circumstances.

80. The City should be required to disgorge all unlawfully collected Stormwater Disposal Overcharges.

WHEREFORE, the City should be required to disgorge the revenues attributable to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges imposed or collected by the City between May 18, 2017 and the date of the filing of this action, and during the pendency of this action, and refund all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges it has collected to Plaintiff and the Class.

COUNT V
MANDATORY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
THE CITY ONLY

81. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-44 in their entirety as if fully set forth herein.

82. This claim is an alternative claim to Counts III and IV of this Complaint.

83. The City maintains billing and payment records sufficient to demonstrate the amount of Stormwater Disposal Overcharges incurred or paid by each Class Member. Access to those records is necessary to effectuate the relief requested herein, including the refund remedy.

84. In addition, the City has authority under state statutes and its own ordinances to place liens against properties in the City that incur sewer charges (including Stormwater Charges) and to transfer unpaid sewer bills to the City's tax rolls. It is probable that any liens and associated taxes that the City has imposed during the Class Period are attributable in part to unpaid Stormwater Disposal Overcharges.

85. In order to provide and facilitate full relief to Plaintiff and the Class for the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges, the Court should require the City (a) to provide records sufficient to determine the amount of refunds of Stormwater Disposal Overcharges each Class Member is entitled to receive and otherwise cooperate in the process of providing a remedy to Plaintiff and the Class and (b) require the City to invalidate any municipal lien or associated tax liens which have been imposed, or which may become imposed, against the properties of all class members arising out of or relating to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff requests that the Court grant the following relief:

- A. Certify this action to be a proper class action with Plaintiff certified as Class Representative and Kickham Hanley PLLC designated as Class Counsel;
- B. With respect to Counts I through IV, define the Class to include all persons and entities in the City who or which were billed and/or paid the City for sewer service between May 18, 2017 and the date of the final judgment in this action (the “Class Period”);
- C. With respect to Counts I through IV, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against the City and the Drainage District, and order and direct the Drainage District to disgorge and refund all Stormwater Disposal Overcharges collected during the Class Period, and order the Drainage District to pay into a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and all other members of the Class the total amount of Stormwater Disposal Overcharges to which Plaintiff and the Class are entitled;
- D. With respect to Count V, require the City to provide records sufficient to determine the amount of refunds of Stormwater Disposal Overcharges each Class Member is entitled to receive and otherwise cooperate in the process of providing a remedy to Plaintiff and the Class;
- E. With respect to Count V, enter an order requiring the City to invalidate any municipal lien or associated tax liens which have been imposed, or which may become imposed, against the properties of all class members arising out of or relating to the Stormwater Disposal Overcharges.
- F. Appoint a Trustee to seize, manage and distribute in an orderly manner the common fund thus established;

- G. Award Plaintiff and the Class the costs and expenses incurred in this action, including reasonable attorneys', accountants', and experts' fees; and
- H. Grant any other appropriate relief.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

By: /s/ Gregory D. Hanley
Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073

Date: May 18, 2023

4871-9002-2500 v.2

EXHIBIT – 1

RECEIVED by MCOA 11/19/2024 5:52:31 PM

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC, as Trustee for a
Certified Class of Persons and All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED

January 14, 2021

No. 351317

Oakland Circuit Court

LC No. 2019-172077-CZ

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and TUKEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, assignee of the City of Oak Park and trustee for a certified class of persons defined in the final order approving a class settlement in Lower Court No. 15-149751-CZ, appeals as of right the trial court's opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Defendant is a drainage district, which is an independent corporate entity that has powers conferred upon it by law.¹ Drainage districts are governed by drainage boards.² Defendant maintains and operates the George W. Kuhn Drain (the drain), which operates in an area that includes Oak Park.

Oak Park has a combined sewer system that collects both sanitary sewage and stormwater. That sewer system flows to the system operated by defendant. Generally, defendant diverts all of the stormwater flow from Oak Park and the other communities within the operational area of the drain to two water treatment plants respectively operated by the Detroit Water and Sewerage

¹ See MCL 280.5.

² See MCL 280.464.

Department and the Great Lakes Water Authority. All of the subject stormwater flow travels through Detroit's Dequindre Interceptor, and there the flow is measured by a meter. Accordingly, the water treatment plants charge defendant an annual flat rate to dispose of stormwater based on the measured flow, and defendant allocates that charge among the communities within the operational area of the drain.

In February 2005, defendant's drainage board tentatively established an apportionment of the costs of the drain for stormwater disposal for the communities within the operational area of the drain. As part of the apportionment, the drainage board made an allocation on the basis of an assumption that all water purchased from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department would be returned as sanitary flow, and so only the difference between the purchased water and the "Master Meter Charges" would be considered stormwater flow. Thus, under the apportionment, two rates would be charged to the communities within the drain's operational area, one for the cost of sanitary sewage flow into the drain, and the other for stormwater flow, which would be apportioned among the communities on the basis of an engineering study that determined each community's contribution of stormwater.

In April 2005, the drainage board resolved to adopt the tentative apportionment of costs it established in February 2005. On the same day, the drainage board entered a Final Order of Apportionment that provided an apportionment of costs between the communities within the operational areas of the drain.

In February 2019, in Lower Court No. 2015-149951-CZ, the trial court entered a final judgment and order approving a class settlement between the plaintiffs, two persons acting as individuals and as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons (the class action plaintiffs), and the defendant, Oak Park.³ The instant trial court took specific notice of the assignment provisions of that settlement agreement according to which any claims Oak Park possessed against Oakland County or its agencies—including defendant—for storm water management services relating to overcharges for stormwater management services would be assigned to the class action plaintiffs "or for their benefit." Additionally, plaintiff was appointed trustee of a litigation trust to pursue the claims against defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs, and was also appointed counsel for the litigation trust.

The trial court also noted that the class action plaintiffs and other members of the class who did not ask to be excluded from the class would be deemed to have executed a release of all claims against Oak Park relating to the assessment and costs of water and sewer rates "from the beginning of time through the date" of the final judgment and a period of time thereafter. Subsequently, Oak Park executed an assignment of claims to plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on the basis of the assignment of Oak Park's claims to plaintiff as a trustee for the class action plaintiffs. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant charged Oak Park approximately \$3 million dollars per year for the disposal of stormwater. It further alleged that Oak Park "passe[d] on that cost to its sewer Customers by imposing stormwater charges in its sewer rates to recover the entire \$3 million plus per year imposed upon

³ These class action plaintiffs were legally represented by plaintiff.

the City by [defendant] on an annual basis.” According to the complaint, the amount defendant charged Oak Park for stormwater disposal should have been the same amount defendant was charged by the water treatment plants for stormwater disposal.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant charged Oak Park “substantially more than the amount” charged by the water treatment plants for the disposal of Oak Park’s stormwater since at least 2011. According to the complaint, defendant improperly reallocated the sanitary sewage disposal costs imposed by the water treatment plants to stormwater disposal costs, and as a result defendant overcharged Oak Park. Thus, plaintiff raised claims of breach of contract, assumpsit, and unjust enrichment against defendant. The trial court ultimately granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s claims.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. *Zaher v Miotke*, 300 Mich App 132, 139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013). The trial court granted defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). “A court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if ‘[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.’ A motion brought under subrule (C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint solely on the basis of the pleadings.” *Dalley v Dykema Gossett*, 287 Mich App 296, 304; 788 NW2d 679 (2010) (alteration in original), quoting *Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed*, 470 Mich 274, 277; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). “When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” *El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc*, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” *Id.*

“Generally, this Court reviews de novo ‘[t]he interpretation of statutes and court rules.’ ” *Simcor Constr, Inc v Trupp*, 322 Mich App 508, 513; 912 NW2d 216 (2018) (alteration in original), quoting *Estes v Titus*, 481 Mich 573, 578; 751 NW2d 493 (2008). “[T]he rules governing statutory interpretation apply with equal force to a municipal ordinance” *Bonner v City of Brighton*, 495 Mich 209, 222; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo.” *Kloian v Domino’s Pizza LLC*, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). This Court reviews equity cases “de novo on the record on appeal.” *Tkachik v Mandeville*, 487 Mich 38, 44-45; 790 NW2d 260 (2010). “Whether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law that we review de novo.” *Karaus v Bank of New York Mellon*, 300 Mich App 9, 22; 831 NW2d 897 (2012).

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff failed to state a breach-of-contract claim. We disagree.

“A party claiming a breach of contract must establish (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach.” *Dunn v Bennett*, 303 Mich App 767, 774; 846 NW2d 75 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The party seeking to enforce a contract bears the burden of proving that the contract exists.” *AFT Mich v Michigan*, 497 Mich 197, 235; 866 NW2d 782 (2015). “Michigan courts will not lightly presume the existence of an enforceable contract because, regardless of the equities in a case, the courts cannot make a contract for the parties when none exists.” *Huntington Nat’l Bank v Daniel J Aronoff Living Trust*, 305 Mich App 496, 508; 853 NW2d 481 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is a “strong presumption that statutes do not create contractual rights.” *Studier v Mich Pub Sch Employees’ Retirement Bd*, 472 Mich 642, 661; 698 NW2d 350 (2005). Thus, “absent an adequate expression of an actual intent of the State to bind itself, courts should not construe laws declaring a scheme of public regulation as also creating private contracts to which the state is a party.” *Id.* at 662 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

The elements required to create a valid contract are “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” *Thomas v Leja*, 187 Mich App 418, 422; 468 NW2d 58 (1991). “In order for consideration to exist, there must be a bargained-for exchange—a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the other.” *Bank of America, NA v First American Title Ins Co*, 499 Mich 74, 101; 878 NW2d 816 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contracts necessarily contain promises: a contract may consist of a mutual exchange of promises, or the performance of a service in exchange for a promise.” *AFT*, 497 Mich at 235-236 (citations omitted). “‘Before a contract can be completed, there must be an offer and acceptance. Unless an acceptance is unambiguous and in strict conformance with the offer, no contract is formed.’” *Kloian*, 273 Mich App at 452, quoting *Pakideh v Franklin Commercial Mtg Group, Inc*, 213 Mich App 636, 640; 540 NW2d 777 (1995). “A basic requirement of contract formation is that the parties mutually assent to be bound.” *Rood v Gen Dynamics Corp*, 444 Mich 107, 118; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). In other words, “the parties must have a ‘meeting of the minds’ on all the essential elements of the agreement.” *Huntington*, 305 Mich App at 508. Courts determine if there was a meeting of the minds by reviewing objective evidence such as “the expressed words of the parties and their visible acts.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the April 2005 resolution of the drainage board and the Final Order of Apportionment created a contract between defendant and Oak Park, and that defendant breached that contract when it overcharged Oak Park for stormwater disposal. The trial court ruled that those documents did not satisfy the elements of contract formation because they did not contain “any offer or promises or promises made by either party to the other that require[d] acceptance”

In its brief on appeal, plaintiff does not explain how the April 2005 resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment satisfied the elements of contract formation, and instead argues that the April 2005 resolution was binding on defendant whether or not it was a contract. However, in its reply brief, plaintiff addressed for the first time whether the Final Order of Apportionment and the April 2005 resolution satisfied the elements of contract formation, arguing that the consideration between Oak Park and defendant consisted of defendant’s promise to charge Oak Park “a particular allocated percentage of the total cost of stormwater disposal.”

“Reply briefs must be confined to rebuttal, and a party may not raise new or additional arguments in its reply brief.” *Kinder Morgan Mich, LLC v City of Jackson*, 277 Mich App 159, 174; 744 NW2d 184 (2007). Further, “[a] party may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” *Wolfe v Wayne-Westland Community Sch*, 267 Mich App 130, 139; 703 NW2d 480 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a party fails to adequately brief a position, or support a claim with authority, it is abandoned.” *MOSES, Inc v SEMCOG*, 270 Mich App 401, 417; 716 NW2d 278 (2006).

Plaintiff did not raise any challenges regarding the elements of contract formation in its brief on appeal, and may not do so in its reply brief. Given that plaintiff failed to adequately brief this argument, we deem it abandoned. And even if plaintiff had properly presented its arguments regarding consideration, plaintiff failed to address the other elements of contract formation therefore plaintiff would have otherwise failed to expose error on the part of the trial court.

Regardless, even if plaintiff had properly argued that the April 2005 resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment satisfied the elements of contract formation, a brief review of the relevant portions of the Drain Code reveals that such an argument would have been meritless. Plaintiff is the assignee of Oak Park, and Oak Park is a public corporation that benefits from the drain that is operated and maintained by defendant. Under MCL 280.468, the drainage board was required to apportion the costs for the drain on the basis of the benefits accrued to each benefiting public corporation, and under MCL 280.478(1) and MCL 280.478(2) the drainage board was required to make an apportionment of costs for any necessary expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the drain. As a benefiting public corporation, Oak Park had the opportunity to object to the drainage board’s apportionment of costs. See MCL 280.469.

Plaintiff’s complaint did not raise any claim that the drainage board failed to comply with the Drain Code when it entered the Final Order of Apportionment, MCL 280.460, and plaintiff explicitly abandoned any such challenge in its brief on appeal. Given the requirements set by the Drain Code, the drainage board was in no way engaged in bargaining with Oak Park or any of the other benefiting public corporations when it entered the Final Order of Apportionment pursuant to its statutory obligations. The drainage board made no offer to Oak Park, there was no bargained-for exchange, or meeting of the minds, between Oak Park and defendant before the Final Order of Apportionment was entered, and none was required. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to overcome the strong presumption that the Final Order of Apportionment did not create a contract. See *Studier*, 472 Mich at 661. And while the Drain Code authorizes a drainage board to enter into contracts with public corporations, MCL 280.471, plaintiff did not allege that Oak Park had a separate contract with defendant.

Plaintiff also briefly contends that municipal resolutions are enforceable by their beneficiaries, citing our Supreme Court’s holding in *Hardaway v Wayne Co*, 494 Mich 423; 835 NW2d 336 (2013). In that decision, the Court held that this Court improperly applied the last antecedent rule when it interpreted a municipal resolution pertaining to the entitlement of retirement benefits, and reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary disposition of the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim in favor of the defendant. *Id.* at 425, 427-429. Given that *Hardaway* concerned a declaratory judgment claim disposed of by way of summary disposition, rather than a

breach-of-contract claim premised on a municipal resolution, it is unclear why plaintiff relies on *Hardaway*.

C. ASSUMPSIT & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff failed to allege any damages in support of its assumpsit and unjust enrichment claims. We disagree.

The Michigan Supreme Court explained actions of assumpsit as follows:

“We understand the law to be well settled, that the action of *assumpsit* for money had and received is essentially an equitable action, founded upon all the equitable circumstances of the case between the parties, and if it appear, from the whole case, that the defendant has in his hands money which, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, belongs, or ought to be paid, to the plaintiff, he is entitled to recover. And that, as a general rule, where money has been received by a defendant under any state of facts which would in a court of equity entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the money, when that is the specific relief sought, the same state of facts will entitle him to recover the money in this action.” [*Trevor v Fuhrmann*, 338 Mich 219, 223-224; 61 NW2d 49 (1953), quoting *Moore v Mandlebaum*, 8 Mich 433, 448 (1860).]

“Assumpsit may be upon an express contract or promise, or for nonperformance of an oral or simple written contract, or it may be a general assumpsit upon a promise or contract implied by law.” *Kristoffy v Iwanski*, 255 Mich 25, 28; 237 NW 33 (1931). “The right to bring this action exists whenever a person, natural or artificial, has in his or its possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff, and neither express promise nor privity between the parties is essential.” *Hoyt v Paw Paw Grape Juice Co*, 158 Mich 619, 626; 123 NW 529 (1909). “The basis of a common-law action for money had and received is not only the loss occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment of the defendant by reason of having received the same.” *Trevor*, 338 Mich at 224-225 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Unjust enrichment is “the equitable counterpart of a legal claim for breach of contract.” *AFT Mich v Michigan*, 303 Mich App 651, 677; 846 NW2d 583 (2014). A party may raise a claim of unjust enrichment “only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.” *Local Emergency Fin Assistance Loan Bd v Blackwell*, 299 Mich App 727, 734; 832 NW2d 401 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The complaining party must establish (1) the receipt of a benefit by the other party from the complaining party and (2) an inequity resulting to the complaining party because of the retention of the benefit by the other party.” *Karaus*, 300 Mich App at 22-23. Unjust enrichment “describes the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of or for property or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor.” *Id.* at 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that, even if there was no contract between Oak Park and defendant, defendant overcharged Oak Park for stormwater disposal by way of the Final Order of Apportionment. Plaintiff thus raised claims in assumpsit and unjust enrichment against defendant.

The trial court granted summary disposition of those claims because it ruled that plaintiff “failed to show that Oak Park suffered any damages.” At the outset, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff’s claims in assumpsit and unjust enrichment, and it notes that those claims are essentially indistinguishable. We agree with the latter proposition and so will consider plaintiff’s arguments regarding its unjust enrichment and assumpsit claims together.

Following its recitation of why it believes that claims of unjust enrichment and assumpsit against defendant were proper if there was no contract between defendant and Oak Park, plaintiff does not directly address the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff failed to show that Oak Park was damaged by the stormwater disposal overcharges. Instead, plaintiff contends that Oak Park was the only entity that had standing to bring these claims against defendant, because the class action plaintiffs (i.e., Oak Park’s ratepayers) did not directly pay the assessed stormwater disposal costs to defendant. However, the trial court did not reach the issue of plaintiff’s standing by virtue of the assignment⁴ it received from Oak Park, having disposed of the case on the ground that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Oak Park was damaged by the stormwater disposal overcharges.

While the trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling, plaintiff alleged in its complaint that Oak Park “passe[d] on that cost to its sewer Customers by imposing stormwater charges in its sewer rates to recover the entire \$3 million plus per year imposed upon the City by [defendant] on an annual basis.” Plaintiff attached a copy of the final judgment of the class action lawsuit to its complaint, in which the trial court for that case noted that, per the settlement agreement between Oak Park and the class action plaintiffs, the class action plaintiffs were deemed to have executed a release of all claims against Oak Park relating to the assessment and costs of water and sewer rates “from the beginning of time through the date” of the final judgment, as well as a period of time for future claims. And plaintiff concedes in its reply brief that the class action plaintiffs released their claims against Oak Park.

Given the foregoing, we surmise that the trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish that Oak Park was harmed by the stormwater disposal overcharges because Oak Park directly passed on that cost to the class action plaintiffs, who in turn released any claims they had against Oak Park. Because the actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge (i.e., the class action plaintiffs) released their claims against Oak Park, plaintiff cannot show that defendant either retained money that in “good conscience, belongs, or ought to be paid, to the plaintiff,” *Trevor*, 338 Mich at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted), or that Oak Park suffered an inequity, *Karaus*, 300 Mich App at 22-23, because the money at issue belonged to Oak Park’s ratepayers as opposed to Oak Park itself.

Plaintiff argues that any ruling that Oak Park was not harmed by the stormwater disposal overcharges because it passed through the overcharges to the class action plaintiffs runs afoul of a general rejection of “pass-through” defenses in all jurisdictions where such a defense has been

⁴ “Under general contract law, rights can be assigned unless the assignment is clearly restricted,” and an “assignee stands in the position of the assignor, possessing the same rights and being subject to the same defenses.” *Burkhardt v Bailey*, 260 Mich App 636, 653; 680 NW2d 453 (2004).

raised. In support of its argument, plaintiff relies on a miscellany of decisions from a number of different contexts.

The earliest decision upon which plaintiff relies, *Southern Pacific Co v Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co*, 245 US 531, 533-535; 38 S Ct 186; 62 L Ed 451 (1918), arose from a judgment obtained against a number of railroad defendants (i.e., common carriers) after the Interstate Commerce Commission found that the rate they charged for transporting hardwood lumber was excessive, and where the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were permitted to collect a judgment against the defendants even if the plaintiffs may have passed on the excessive charge to their own customers. The Court explained that a common “carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from whom the carrier took the sum,” because “of the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result.” *Id.* Thus, that holding pertained to proceedings involving a decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and commercial transactions where it would be difficult to ascertain how the excessive rate affected the prices paid by customers of the affected businesses. Given that plaintiff readily alleged in its complaint that Oak Park passed the overcharges on to its ratepayers, and has not shown that there would be any particular complexity in determining how the overcharge directly affected the fees paid by Oak Park’s ratepayers, plaintiff’s reliance on *Southern Pacific Co* is inapt.

Plaintiff also relies on decisions with similar holdings that pertain to claims based on federal antitrust violations: *Hanover Shoe, Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp*, 392 US 481, 488-489, 493-494; 88 S Ct 2224; 20 L Ed 2d 1231 (1968) (rejecting a “passing-on” defense while recognizing that a buyer who was charged an illegally high price for materials used for the buyer’s business had established a prima facie case under federal antitrust law); *Oakland Co v Detroit*, 866 F2d 839, 844-846 (CA 6, 1989)⁵ (holding that the county plaintiffs would have standing to bring claims under federal antitrust and racketeering law and could demonstrate an injury even if they recouped the illegal overcharges by passing it on to their own customers). However, those decisions pertain to claims based on violations of specific federal statutes rather than claims in assumpsit or unjust enrichment. Because the rationale for their disavowal of a “pass-through” or “passing-on” defense is based on considerations directly related to the aforementioned federal statutes, those cases do not militate in favor of adopting those holdings in the wholly distinct context of claims in assumpsit or unjust enrichment. Moreover, plaintiff, by virtue of its representation of the class action plaintiffs, fully demonstrated that a class action claim could be brought against Oak Park by its ratepayers, even if that litigation ended with the class action plaintiffs agreeing to release their claims against Oak Park.

Plaintiff also cites *Northern Arizona Gas Serv, Inc v Petrolane Transp, Inc*, 145 Ariz 467, 476; 702 P2d 696 (Ariz App, 1984), where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s “waiver of its claim for lost profits did not constitute an admission that none resulted from [the defendant’s] activities,” because “it was based on the complexity of issues of proof—the very reason for the supreme court’s rejection of the passing-on defense in *Hanover Shoe*.” And the

⁵ “Opinions of the lower federal courts and foreign jurisdictions are not binding but may be considered persuasive.” *People v Patton*, 325 Mich App 425, 435 n 1; 925 NW2d 901 (2018).

Arizona court also noted that the plaintiff was “the only party that can recover the overcharge from” the defendant. *Id.* Plaintiff has not shown that there is any complexity with issues of proof regarding the effect of the overcharges, and, as discussed above, Oak Park’s rate-payers were entitled to recover the overcharges from Oak Park but they released those claims. Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on this decision is inapt.

For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Oak Park did not incur any damages in this matter.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition because plaintiff’s allegation that defendant charged Oak Park an unreasonable rate for stormwater disposal presented a question of fact. Again, we are not persuaded.

In its complaint, plaintiff supported its second claim in assumpsit and its claim of unjust enrichment by alleging that defendant’s charge for stormwater disposal was unreasonable because it exceeded the costs set by the Final Order of Apportionment. The trial court did not specifically address that allegation in its ruling, having disposed of the case on the ground of the lack of damages suffered by Oak Park. Because we affirm the result below on that ground, we need not consider the question of reasonableness of the stormwater disposal charge.

Nonetheless, plaintiff fails to show that defendant was under some general duty of reasonableness in connection with its stormwater disposal charges. Plaintiff relies on *Mapleview Estates, Inc v City of Brown City*, 258 Mich App 412; 671 NW2d 572 (2003). The discussion of reasonableness in that decision was limited to whether a “tap-in fee” for connecting to a municipal water system was reasonable under the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, MCL 141.101 *et seq.*, where a municipality is permitted to set the rates for services falling under that act provided that those rates are reasonable. *Id.* at 417-418.⁶ But plaintiff provides no argument or explanation regarding how the RBA might be applicable in this situation.

And plaintiff did not raise an independent claim in its complaint that defendant charged unreasonable rates; rather, its allegation that the rates were unreasonable merely supported a claim in assumpsit and a claim of unjust enrichment. Given that plaintiff has failed to cite legal authorities that establish defendant was required to charge a reasonable rate, or otherwise adequately brief how the trial court erred, plaintiff has abandoned this argument on appeal. See *MOSES, Inc*, 270 Mich App at, 417; *Wolfe*, 267 Mich App at 139.

⁶ Plaintiff also cites two other decisions that do not show that defendant was required to charge a reasonable rate. See *Trahey v Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 594; 876 NW2d 582 (2015) (where the city defendant challenged the trial court’s finding that its water and sewer rates were unreasonable under the defendant’s own city charter, which required the defendant’s city council to set “just and reasonable rates” for public utility services provided by the defendant); *Plymouth v Detroit*, 423 Mich 106, 111; 377 NW2d 689 (1985) (a breach of contract action where the municipal water contract between the parties required the defendant to set rates for the water that was reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the defendant).

Plaintiff also briefly contends that defendant asserts that Oak Park released its claims against defendant during the class action suit. There is no indication that defendant actually raised this argument in the trial court. Because the trial court never considered any such contention, we decline to consider it.

Affirmed.

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jonathan Tukel

EXHIBIT – 2

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FINAL ORDER OF APPORTIONMENT
OF COST OF ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
IN RE GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN

In accordance with a resolution adopted by the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain on the 19th day of April, 2005, the apportionments of the cost of administration, operations and maintenance of the George W. Kuhn Drain shall be borne by the several public corporations are as follows:

The combined total volume of storm water and sewage disposal effluent flowing from the George W. Kuhn Drain into the City of Detroit treatment facilities is and will continue to be calculated through master meter charges ("Master Meter Charges") by the City of Detroit to the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.

In order to allocate the total costs of combined storm water and sewerage disposal and treatment by the City of Detroit, it is necessary to establish which portion of the flow from the George W. Kuhn Drain to the City of Detroit is sewage disposal and which portion is storm water runoff. This allocation will be made by assuming that all water purchased from the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) by the cities of Berkley, Birmingham, Clawson, Ferndale, Hazel Park, Huntington Woods, Madison Heights, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Royal Oak, Southfield and Troy, the Township of Royal Oak and Village of Beverly Hills (the "Local Public Corporations") located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District is returned as sanitary flow. Therefore, the difference between such purchased and metered water sales to the Local Public Corporations located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District and the Master Meter Charges is, by definition, storm water flow.

A sewage disposal rate will be used to charge the Local Public Corporations for their respective sanitary sewage disposal flow into the George W. Kuhn Drain. Such a charge will be composed of the administrative costs of the costs of the sewage disposal portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, together with the appropriate total sewage disposal rate per 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) of sewage flow for each Local Public Corporation.

The total storm water operation and maintenance component consists of two (2) categories. The first component is the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow. The second cost component is the administrative cost of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. An engineering study, utilizing area and land use, has been used to determine each Local Public Corporation's percentage of storm water contribution into the George W. Kuhn Drain System. These percentages will be utilized to apportion the storm water charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain communities. The percentages are finally apportioned as follows:

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, excluding the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:


<u>Public Corporation (Community)</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Berkley	6.4895%
City of Birmingham	4.8837%
City of Clawson	5.9262%
City of Ferndale	10.2885%
City of Hazel Park	2.2554%
City of Huntington Woods	2.9061%
City of Madison Heights	6.5410%
City of Oak Park	13.6383%
City of Pleasant Ridge	1.3390%
City of Royal Oak	29.7915%
City of Southfield	7.7156%
City of Troy	2.4799%
Township of Royal Oak	1.2775%
Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.5274%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>2.1035%</u>
	100.0000%

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, inclusive of the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Madison Heights	94.4820%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.3065%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>4.2115%</u>
	100.0000%

DRAINAGE BOARD FOR THE
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN

By:



John F. McCulloch, Chairperson

Dated and Filed: April 19, 2005

BLOOMFIELD 9007-326 684648v1 4/12/2005

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EXHIBIT – 3

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**MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE DRAINAGE
BOARD FOR THE GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN**

April 19, 2005

At a meeting of the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain held in the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner, Public Works Building, One Public Works Drive, Waterford, Michigan, on the 19th day of April, 2005.

The meeting was called to order by the Chairperson.

PRESENT: John P. McCulloch, Chairperson and
Oakland County Drain Commissioner

Bill Bullard, Chairperson of the
Oakland County Board of Commissioners

Chuck Moss, Chairperson of the
Finance Committee of the
Oakland County Board of Commissioners

ALSO

PRESENT: Joseph P. Kozma,
Deputy & Manager, Engineering & Construction

Philip Sanzica,
Chief Engineer

Eugene R. Snowden, Jr.,
Engineer

Lynn Sonkiss,
Chief of Fiscal Services

Shawn Phelps,
Fiscal Services

Jeremy Adams,
Fiscal Services

Joseph Colaianne,
Insurance Administrator

Chuck Lawhorn,
Civil Engineer

Elaine Van Dyke
Secretary

J. Bryan Williams, Bond Counsel
Dickinson Wright PLLC

John R. Axe,
Municipal Financial Consultants Incorporated

Howard Aube
City of Novi

Jon Austin
City of Madison Heights

Gary Nigro
Engineer

The Chairperson presented the minutes of the meeting of this Board held on March 22, 2005. Upon motion by Moss, seconded by Bullard, and unanimously adopted, the minutes were approved as presented.

There were no public comments.

The Chairperson offered proofs of the publication and mailing of notice of the public hearing. It was moved by Moss, seconded by Bullard and unanimously adopted that the proofs of publication and mailing be received and filed in the office of the Chairperson of the Drainage Board.

The Chairperson then opened the hearing and asked if there were any written objections. Ms. Van Dyke reported that there were no written objections on file. Mr. McCulloch noted for the record the receipt of a favorable letter from MDOT.

The Chairperson then asked if there were any comments or objections from those present at the hearing. Mr. Austin commented formally on the unanimous recommendation of the Advisory Committee with respect to the proposed final apportionments of cost with respect to administration, operations and maintenance of the George W. Kuhn Drain. On behalf of the members of the Advisory Committee, Mr. Austin thanked Mr. McCulloch and the staff of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner for their hard work in resolving serious issues and concerns related to such apportionment. Thereafter, the Chairperson declared the hearing closed.

After the hearing, the following resolution was offered by Moss and seconded by Bullard:

WHEREAS, the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain, on the 28th day of February, 2005, tentatively established apportionments of the cost of the George W. Kuhn Drain, to be borne by the several public corporations, as follows:

The combined total volume of storm water and sewage disposal effluent flowing from the George W. Kuhn Drain into the City of Detroit treatment facilities is and will continue to be calculated through master meter charges ("Master Meter Charges") by the City of Detroit to the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.

In order to allocate the total costs of combined storm water and sewerage disposal and treatment by the City of Detroit, it is necessary to establish which portion of the flow from the George W. Kuhn Drain to the City of Detroit is sewage disposal and which portion is storm water runoff. This allocation will be made by assuming that all water purchased from the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) by the cities of Berkley, Birmingham, Clawson, Ferndale, Hazel Park, Huntington Woods, Madison Heights, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Royal Oak, Southfield and Troy, the Township of Royal Oak and Village of Beverly Hills (the "Local Public Corporations") located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District is returned as sanitary flow. Therefore, the difference between such purchased and metered water sales to the Local Public Corporations located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District and the Master Meter Charges is, by definition, storm water flow.

A sewage disposal rate will be used to charge the Local Public Corporations for their respective sanitary sewage disposal flow into the George W. Kuhn Drain. Such a charge will be composed of the administrative costs of the costs of the sewage disposal portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, together with the appropriate total sewage disposal rate per 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) of sewage flow for each Local Public Corporation.

The total storm water operation and maintenance component consists of two (2) categories. The first component is the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow. The second cost component is the administrative cost of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. An engineering study, utilizing area and land use, has been used to determine each Local Public Corporation's percentage of storm water contribution into the George W. Kuhn Drain System. These percentages will be utilized to apportion the storm water charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain communities. The percentages are finally apportioned as follows:

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, excluding the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation (Community)</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Berkley	6.4895%

City of Birmingham	4.8837%
City of Clawson	5.9262%
City of Ferndale	10.2885%
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Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.5274%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>2.1035%</u>
	100.0000%

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, inclusive of the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Madison Heights	94.4820%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.3065%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>4.2115%</u>
	100.0000%

WHEREAS, after due notice the Drainage Board met on the 19th day of April, 2005, to hear any objections to the apportionments; and

WHEREAS, the apportionments of cost have been made by taking into consideration the benefits to accrue to each of the public corporations to be assessed and by taking into consideration the extent to which each public corporation contributes to the conditions which made the George W. Kuhn Drain necessary, limiting such

factors in the case of the County of Oakland and the State of Michigan solely to the drainage of county and state highways; and

WHEREAS, this Drainage Board has given due and full consideration to all objections offered thereto; and

WHEREAS, the George W. Kuhn Drain is necessary for the public health.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain:

1. The apportionments of cost as above set forth be and the same are fixed and confirmed.

2. The Chairperson of this Drainage Board is authorized and directed to issue on behalf of the Board its Final Order of Apportionment setting forth the several apportionments as herein fixed and confirmed.

3. All former resolutions and orders of this Board, insofar as the same may be in conflict with the terms of this resolution, are rescinded.

ADOPTED: Yeas: 3
Nays: 0

The Chairperson proceeded to sign the Final Order of Apportionment for the George W. Kuhn Drain as directed in the foregoing resolution. The order was dated April 19, 2005, and, upon motion by Moss, supported by Bullard and unanimously adopted, was filed with the Chairperson.

Invoices in the amount of \$108,305.17 (as attached) were presented for consideration. It was moved by Moss, supported by Bullard, that the invoices be approved for payment in the amount of \$108,305.17.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0

Construction Estimate No. 41 (Contract No. 4) in the amount of \$750,883.85 was presented for approval. Following discussion, it was moved by Moss, supported by Bullard, that Construction Estimate No. 41 (Contract No. 4) in the amount of \$750,883.85 be approved for payment to Walbridge Aldinger Company, Contractor.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0


Mr. Colaianne updated the Board with respect to issues involving the revocation and reissuance of the NPDES permit previously discussed at the February 28, 2005 meeting of the Drain Board. He reported that he had met with the attorneys for the various local communities in March, 2005 concerning the continuation of the practice of naming the individual communities as co-permittees. Mr. Colaianne indicated that the

Advisory Committee was prepared to take up the issue of the communities being named as co-permitees at its next meeting.

It was moved by McCulloch and supported by Moss, to certify attendance and authorize pro rata share payment of \$25 per day to both Mr. Moss and Mr. Bullard.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0

There being no further business to come before the meeting, the meeting was adjourned.




Chairperson

Date: April 19, 2005

STATE OF MICHIGAN)
)SS.
COUNTY OF OAKLAND)

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the minutes of the George W. Kuhn Drain, Oakland County, Michigan, held on the 19th day of April, 2005 and that the said minutes are on file in the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner and are available to the public.

I further certify that notice of the meeting was posted at least 18 hours in advance of the meeting at the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner which is the principal office of the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.



John P. McCulloch, Chairperson

Dated: May 9, 2005

BLOOMFIELD 9007-328 689578v1 5/2/2005

EXHIBIT – 4

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Great Lakes Water Authority

Approved FY 2021 Sewage Disposal System Allocated Revenue Requirements and Service Charges

Approved by the GLWA Board on March 11, 2020

	Fixed Monthly <u>Charge</u> \$/mo	Annual Revenue <u>Requirement</u> \$
Suburban Wholesale		
1 OMID	6,400,000	76,799,400
2 Rouge Valley	4,575,900	54,910,700
3 Oakland GWK	3,821,000	45,851,800
4 Evergreen Farmington	2,944,100	35,329,000
5 SE Macomb San Dist	2,097,000	25,164,500
6 Dearborn	1,646,200	19,754,700
7 Grosse Pointe Farms	232,300	2,787,700
8 Grosse Pointe Park	153,000	1,835,600
9 Melvindale	129,600	1,554,600
10 Farmington	97,200	1,166,900
11 Center Line	87,300	1,047,900
12 Allen Park	72,200	866,300
13 Highland Park	478,900	5,747,300
14 Hamtramck	337,000	4,044,200
15 Grosse Pointe	75,400	904,300
16 Harper Woods	18,500	222,100
17 Redford Township	22,300	267,500
18 Wayne County #3	4,300	51,500
19 Subtotal "Regional Wholesale Revenues from Charges"		278,306,000
20 Industrial Specific Revenues		14,038,200
21 Subtotal "Regional Wholesale Revenues from Charges"		292,344,200
22 less: Highland Park Bad Debt		(1,294,200)
23 Total "Regional Wholesale Revenues" (a)		291,050,000
* Wholesale charges will be effective July 1, 2020		
Detroit Customer Class - \$		
24 Wholesale Revenue Requirement (c)		195,628,100
25 less: Ownership Benefit per Lease		(5,516,000)
26 Net Wholesale Revenue Requirement		190,112,100
27 Indirect Retail Revenue Requirements (d)		36,245,300
28 less: Use of Lease Payment for Debt Service		(3,257,200)
29 Net Indirect Retail Revenue Requirements (d)		32,988,100
30 Subtotal Subject to GLWA Board Approval (26) + (29)		223,100,200
31 Direct Retail Revenue Requirements (e)		72,771,700
32 Total Local System Revenue Requirement (29) + (31)		105,759,800
33 Net Requirement from Detroit Customer Class (a)		295,871,900

(a) Agrees with GLWA Budget "Schedule 3A"

(b) Reserved

(c) Wholesale revenue requirements for the Detroit Customer Class.

(d) Local System revenue requirements related to Master Bond Ordinance (local debt service, etc.)

(e) Local System operating expenses (net of shared services reimbursement) and I&E deposit. Not Subject to GLWA Board approval.

EXHIBIT – 5

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FY 2018 SHARE CALCULATIONS

Volume Data Analysis - cfs

						41.88			
						11.3%			
	4-Year Average Flow Contributions from FY 2013 through FY 2016								
	Total Contributed	Total	Dry Weather Sanitary	DWII	Wet Weather	less: Overflow	Net Wet Weather	less: NNNRW	Net Contributed
						4.73			
						37.15		0	
M Customers									
1a	OMID - Unadjusted	103.97	93.58	74.67	18.91	10.39			93.58
1b	Adjust for C/O Diversion	(9.96)	(7.77)	(5.50)	(2.27)	(2.19)			(7.77)
1	Adjusted OMID	94.01	85.81	69.17	16.64	8.20	(0.43)	7.77	93.57
2	Rouge Valley	87.84	70.90	45.96	24.95	16.94	(0.89)	16.05	86.95
3	Oakland GWK	80.01	52.54	32.06	20.48	27.47	(1.44)	26.03	78.57
4	Evergreen Farmington	54.46	47.03	31.63	15.40	7.43	(0.39)	7.04	54.07
5	NE Wayne Co	43.20	27.98	18.13	9.85	15.22	(0.80)	14.42	42.40
6	Allen Park	1.35	1.01	0.74	0.27	0.34	(0.02)	0.32	1.33
7	Center Line	1.57	1.16	0.91	0.25	0.41	(0.02)	0.39	1.55
8	Dearborn East & West	31.89	21.36	13.38	7.98	10.53	(0.55)	9.98	31.34
9	Farmington	1.90	1.56	0.96	0.59	0.34	(0.02)	0.32	1.88
10	Grosse Pointe Park	3.20	2.12	1.32	0.80	1.08	(0.06)	1.02	3.15
11	Melvindale	2.42	1.92	1.33	0.59	0.51	(0.03)	0.48	2.40
12	Grosse Pointe Farms	4.62	3.05	1.68	1.37	1.57	(0.08)	1.48	4.53
13	M Total	406.46	316.43	217.26	99.17	90.03	(4.73)	85.30	401.73
14	D+	396.93	282.11	89.11	193.01	114.82	(37.15)	77.67	359.79
15	Subtotal	803.40	598.54	306.37	292.17	204.86	(41.88)	162.98	761.52
16	Z	185.98	124.13		124.13	61.85		61.85	185.98
17	Net Adjusted	989.38	722.67	306.37	416.30	266.71	(41.88)	224.83	947.50
Relative %									
18	M	41.1%	43.8%	70.9%	23.8%	33.8%	11.3%	37.9%	42.4%
19	D+	40.1%	39.0%	29.1%	46.4%	43.1%	88.7%	34.5%	38.0%
20	Z	18.8%	17.2%	0.0%	29.8%	23.2%	0.0%	27.5%	19.6%
Allocation %									
21	M	50.6%	52.9%	70.9%	33.9%	44.0%	11.3%	52.3%	52.8%
22	D+	49.4%	47.1%	29.1%	66.1%	56.0%	88.7%	47.7%	47.2%
23	Original W	962.79	734.37						
24	less: OMID Diversion	(9.96)	(7.77)						
25	less: WTUA Diversion	(5.33)	(3.93)						
26	Net Adjusted W	947.50	722.67						
27	plus Overflow	41.88							
28	Total Contributed	989.38	722.67						
Reported D+									
29	Direct	213.25	146.28			66.97			
30	Indirect	183.68	135.84			47.85			
31	Original Total	396.93	282.11			114.82			
32	Indirect Adj Factor	100.000%	100%						
33	Adjusted Indirect	183.68	135.84						
34	Adjusted Total	396.93	282.11						
35	OMID Diversion %	9.6%	8.3%						

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THE FOSTER GROUP

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PRELIMINARY

FY 2018 SHARE CALCULATIONS

Volume Data Summary - cfs

	<u>Sanitary</u>	<u>DWII</u>	<u>Wet Weather</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Adjusted OMID	69.17	16.64	7.77	93.57
2 Rouge Valley	45.96	24.95	16.05	86.95
3 Oakland GWK	32.06	20.48	26.03	78.57
4 Evergreen Farmington	31.63	15.40	7.04	54.07
5 NE Wayne Co	18.13	9.85	14.42	42.40
6 Allen Park	0.74	0.27	0.32	1.33
7 Center Line	0.91	0.25	0.39	1.55
8 Dearborn East & West	13.38	7.98	9.98	31.34
9 Farmington	0.96	0.59	0.32	1.88
10 Grosse Pointe Park	1.32	0.80	1.02	3.15
11 Melvindale	1.33	0.59	0.48	2.40
12 Grosse Pointe Farms	1.68	1.37	1.48	4.53
13 M Total	217.26	99.17	85.30	401.73
14 D+	89.11	193.01	77.67	359.79
15 Total Allocation Units	306.37	292.17	162.98	761.52
16 Common Units		124.13	61.85	185.98
17 Grand Total	306.37	416.30	224.83	947.50

FY 2018 SHARE CALCULATIONS

Calculation of Allocation Units and Shares

					BOD	TSS	PHOS	FOG	
					176,697,300	255,289,900	4,910,400	27,112,600	
	Weighted Adj Influent Split								
1	Sanitary		9,661,500	79.9%	141,198,500	204,001,800	3,923,900	21,665,600	
2	DWII Ratio	5.0%	656,400	5.4%	9,593,000	13,859,800	266,600	1,472,000	
3	WW Ratio	25.0%	1,772,600	14.7%	25,905,800	37,428,300	719,900	3,975,000	
4	Total		12,090,500		176,697,300	255,289,900	4,910,400	27,112,600	
5	Sanitary Strength				234.2	338.4	6.5	35.9	
6	DWII Strength				11.7	16.9	0.3	1.8	
7	Wet Weather Strength				58.6	84.6	1.6	9.0	
8	Allocated Strength				111.2	160.7	3.1	17.1	
9	Total Strength				94.8	136.9	2.6	14.5	
	Allocation Units	Sanitary	DWII	Wet Weather	Total	BOD	TSS	PHOS	FOG
		Mcf	Mcf	Mcf	Mcf	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs
1	Adjusted OMID	2,181,200	524,900	244,900	2,951,000	33,155,600	47,902,800	921,400	5,087,400
2	Rouge Valley	1,449,200	786,700	506,100	2,742,000	23,603,400	34,101,800	655,900	3,621,700
3	Oakland GWK	1,011,100	645,800	820,800	2,477,700	18,247,600	26,363,800	507,100	2,799,900
4	Evergreen Farmington	997,400	485,600	222,100	1,705,100	15,742,900	22,745,100	437,500	2,415,600
5	NE Wayne Co	571,600	310,800	454,800	1,337,200	10,242,500	14,798,200	284,600	1,571,600
6	Allen Park	23,300	8,600	10,100	42,000	383,700	554,400	10,700	58,900
7	Center Line	28,700	7,800	12,400	48,900	470,400	679,700	13,100	72,200
8	Dearborn East & West	422,000	251,600	314,700	988,300	7,501,000	10,837,300	208,500	1,151,000
9	Farmington	30,400	18,700	10,100	59,200	494,800	715,000	13,800	75,900
10	Grosse Pointe Park	41,700	25,200	32,300	99,200	745,900	1,077,600	20,700	114,400
11	Melvindale	41,800	18,600	15,200	75,600	680,000	982,500	18,900	104,300
12	Grosse Pointe Farms	53,100	43,100	46,800	143,000	978,500	1,413,700	27,200	150,100
13	M Total	6,851,500	3,127,400	2,690,300	12,669,200	112,246,300	162,171,900	3,119,400	17,223,000
14	D+	2,810,000	6,086,600	2,449,500	11,346,100	54,464,000	78,688,800	1,513,500	8,357,000
15	Total Allocation Units	9,661,500	9,214,000	5,139,800	24,015,300	166,710,300	240,860,700	4,632,900	25,580,000
16	Common Flow		3,914,500	1,950,600	5,865,100	9,987,100	14,429,200	277,500	1,532,400
17	Total Flow	9,661,500	13,128,500	7,090,400	29,880,400	176,697,400	255,289,900	4,910,400	27,112,400
	Shares								
18	Adjusted OMID	22.58%	5.70%	4.76%	12.29%	19.89%	19.89%	19.89%	19.89%
19	Rouge Valley	15.00%	8.54%	9.85%	11.42%	14.16%	14.16%	14.16%	14.16%
20	Oakland GWK	10.47%	7.01%	15.97%	10.32%	10.95%	10.95%	10.95%	10.95%
21	Evergreen Farmington	10.32%	5.27%	4.32%	7.10%	9.44%	9.44%	9.44%	9.44%
22	NE Wayne Co	5.92%	3.37%	8.85%	5.57%	6.14%	6.14%	6.14%	6.14%
23	Allen Park	0.24%	0.09%	0.20%	0.17%	0.23%	0.23%	0.23%	0.23%
24	Center Line	0.30%	0.08%	0.24%	0.20%	0.28%	0.28%	0.28%	0.28%
25	Dearborn East & West	4.37%	2.73%	6.12%	4.12%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%
26	Farmington	0.31%	0.20%	0.20%	0.25%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%
27	Grosse Pointe Park	0.43%	0.27%	0.63%	0.41%	0.45%	0.45%	0.45%	0.45%
28	Melvindale	0.43%	0.20%	0.30%	0.31%	0.41%	0.41%	0.41%	0.41%
29	Grosse Pointe Farms	0.55%	0.47%	0.91%	0.60%	0.59%	0.59%	0.59%	0.59%
30	M Total	70.92%	33.94%	52.34%	52.75%	67.33%	67.33%	67.33%	67.33%
31	D+	29.08%	66.06%	47.66%	47.25%	32.67%	32.67%	32.67%	32.67%
32	Total Allocation Units	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Final SHARE Calculations

	Volume Share	Pollutant Share	SHARE
<i>Relative Cost Pool:</i>	50.0%	50.0%	
Shares			
1 Adjusted OMID	12.288%	19.888%	16.088%
2 Rouge Valley	11.418%	14.158%	12.788%
3 Oakland GWK	10.317%	10.946%	10.631%
4 Evergreen Farmington	7.100%	9.443%	8.272%
5 NE Wayne Co	5.568%	6.144%	5.856%
6 Allen Park	0.175%	0.230%	0.203%
7 Center Line	0.204%	0.282%	0.243%
8 Dearborn East & West	4.115%	4.499%	4.307%
9 Farmington	0.247%	0.297%	0.272%
10 Grosse Pointe Park	0.413%	0.447%	0.430%
11 Melvindale	0.315%	0.408%	0.361%
12 Grosse Pointe Farms	0.595%	0.587%	0.591%
13 M Total	52.755%	67.330%	60.042%
14 D+	47.245%	32.670%	39.958%
15 TOTAL	100.000%	100.000%	100.000%

EXHIBIT – 6

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Jim Nash

April 30, 2020

Ms. Melissa Marsh
City Manager
City of Madison Heights
300 W 13 Mile Road
Madison Heights, MI 48071

Re: George W. Kuhn Drain Drainage District 2020-21 Rate Change

Dear Ms. Marsh:

I have enclosed the Schedule of Rates and Charges for each community served by the George W. Kuhn Drain Drainage District. These rates and charges were approved at the April 28, 2020 Board meeting.

The combined sewage and stormwater charges will result in an overall 1.1 percent increase from the previous year. As you will see from the enclosed documents, this higher amount is attributable to increases in operating expenditures. I've also included related documents which provide a thorough overview of what was presented at the Drain Board meeting.

As with previous years, we will continue our practice of following the rate share calculation based on a five-year average of water volume to determine each community's monthly sewer charge. The stormwater charge continues to be based on the apportionment percentages previously adopted by the Board.

If you have any questions or would like additional detailed information, please contact Raphael Chirolla via email at Chirollar@oakgov.com.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jim Nash", is written over a light blue horizontal line.

Jim Nash

Enclosures

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Great Lakes Water Authority

Approved FY 2021 Sewage Disposal System Allocated Revenue Requirements and Service Charges

Approved by the GLWA Board on March 11, 2020

	Fixed Monthly <u>Charge</u> \$/mo	Annual Revenue <u>Requirement</u> \$
Suburban Wholesale		
1 OMID	6,400,000	76,799,400
2 Rouge Valley	4,575,900	54,910,700
3 Oakland GWK	3,821,000	45,851,800
4 Evergreen Farmington	2,944,100	35,329,000
5 SE Macomb San Dist	2,097,000	25,164,500
6 Dearborn	1,646,200	19,754,700
7 Grosse Pointe Farms	232,300	2,787,700
8 Grosse Pointe Park	153,000	1,835,600
9 Melvindale	129,600	1,554,600
10 Farmington	97,200	1,166,900
11 Center Line	87,300	1,047,900
12 Allen Park	72,200	866,300
13 Highland Park	478,900	5,747,300
14 Hamtramck	337,000	4,044,200
15 Grosse Pointe	75,400	904,300
16 Harper Woods	18,500	222,100
17 Redford Township	22,300	267,500
18 Wayne County #3	4,300	51,500
19 Subtotal "Regional Wholesale Revenues from Charges"		278,306,000
20 Industrial Specific Revenues		14,038,200
21 Subtotal "Regional Wholesale Revenues from Charges"		292,344,200
22 less: Highland Park Bad Debt		(1,294,200)
23 Total "Regional Wholesale Revenues" (a)		291,050,000
* Wholesale charges will be effective July 1, 2020		
Detroit Customer Class - \$		
24 Wholesale Revenue Requirement (c)		195,628,100
25 less: Ownership Benefit per Lease		(5,516,000)
26 Net Wholesale Revenue Requirement		190,112,100
27 Indirect Retail Revenue Requirements (d)		36,245,300
28 less: Use of Lease Payment for Debt Service		(3,257,200)
29 Net Indirect Retail Revenue Requirements (d)		32,988,100
30 Subtotal Subject to GLWA Board Approval (26) + (29)		223,100,200
31 Direct Retail Revenue Requirements (e)		72,771,700
32 Total Local System Revenue Requirement (29) + (31)		105,759,800
33 Net Requirement from Detroit Customer Class (a)		295,871,900

(a) Agrees with GLWA Budget "Schedule 3A"

(b) Reserved

(c) Wholesale revenue requirements for the Detroit Customer Class.

(d) Local System revenue requirements related to Master Bond Ordinance (local debt service, etc.)

(e) Local System operating expenses (net of shared services reimbursement) and I&E deposit. Not Subject to GLWA Board approval.

Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
 Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Page 3 of 13

Great Lakes Water Authority
 Approved FY 2021 Industrial Specific Retail Sewer Charges
 Approved by the GLWA Board on March 11, 2020

Industrial Waste Control Charges		Pollutant Surcharges	
Meter Size - inches	Charge \$/mo	Pollutant	Charge \$/lb
5/8	3.45	BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND (BOD) for concentrations > 275 mg/l	0.502
3/4	5.18		
1	8.63	TOTAL SUSPENDED SOLIDS (TSS) for concentrations > 350 mg/l	0.51
1-1/2	18.98		
2	27.60		
3	50.03		
4	69.00		
6	103.50	PHOSPHORUS (P) for concentrations > 12 mg/l	7.519
8	172.50		
10	241.50	FATS, OIL AND GREASE (FOG) for concentrations > 100 mg/l	0.484
12	276.00		
14	345.00		
16	414.00	SEPTAGE DISPOSAL FEE Per 500 gallons of disposal	48.00
18	483.00		
20	552.00		
24	621.00		
30	690.00		
36	759.00		
48	828.00		

Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

George W. Kuhn Sewage and Twelve Towns

58510 and 58530

Financial Summary

Page 4 of 13

	2020 Budget	2021 Forecast	Inc / (Dec)	% Variance
<u>Operating Revenues</u>				
Operating Rate Revenue	\$ 25,797,170.00	\$ 24,427,530.00	\$ (1,369,640.00)	-5.3%
Operating Non-Rate Revenue	99,950.00	134,120.00	34,170.00	34.2%
Operating Revenues	<u>\$ 25,897,120.00</u>	<u>\$ 24,561,650.00</u>	<u>\$ (1,335,470.00)</u>	<u>-5.2%</u>
<u>By Expense Category</u>				
Operating Expenses:				
Personnel	\$ 142,890.00	\$ 148,670.00	\$ 5,780.00	4.0%
Contractual Services	25,705,420.00	24,357,290.00	(1,348,130.00)	-5.2%
Commodities	8,430.00	5,210.00	(3,220.00)	-38.2%
Internal Services	40,380.00	50,480.00	10,100.00	25.0%
Other Expense	-	-	-	
Total Operating Expenses	<u>\$ 25,897,120.00</u>	<u>\$ 24,561,650.00</u>	<u>\$ (1,335,470.00)</u>	<u>-5.2%</u>
<u>Operating Expenses</u>				
Sewage Treatment	\$ 22,043,570.00	\$ 21,963,110.00	\$ (80,460.00)	-0.4%
Sewer System Maintenance	220,420.00	234,040.00	13,620.00	6.2%
Sewer System Engineering	59,550.00	68,750.00	9,200.00	15.4%
Water Purchases	-	-	-	
Water Maintenance Unit	-	-	-	
Water Systems Engineering	-	-	-	
Septage Unloading Facility	-	-	-	
Pump Maintenance Unit	51,960.00	31,930.00	(20,030.00)	-38.5%
Systems Control Unit	134,790.00	139,550.00	4,760.00	3.5%
Plan Review and Permitting	32,380.00	57,500.00	25,120.00	77.6%
Inspection	5,770.00	8,070.00	2,300.00	39.9%
IPP	-	-	-	
Laboratory	-	-	-	
Mapping Unit	12,810.00	13,370.00	560.00	4.4%
Miss Dig	3,720.00	2,740.00	(980.00)	-26.3%
Billing Services Unit	-	-	-	
General and Administrative	3,332,150.00	2,042,590.00	(1,289,560.00)	-38.7%
Total Operating Expenses	<u>25,897,120.00</u>	<u>24,561,650.00</u>	<u>(1,335,470.00)</u>	<u>-5.2%</u>
Net Income	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	
Depreciation	(23,760.00)	(22,100.00)	1,660.00	-7.0%
<u>Reserves</u>				
Non-Operating Revenue	\$ -	\$ 500,000.00	\$ 500,000.00	
Non-Operating Expense	-	-	-	
Major Maintenance Reserve Revenue	669,500.00	689,590.00	20,090.00	3.0%
Major Maintenance Reserve Expense	(399,180.00)	(496,250.00)	(97,070.00)	24.3%
Emergency Reserve Revenue	100,000.00	100,000.00	-	0.0%
Emergency Reserve Expense	-	-	-	
Capital Reserve Revenue	448,960.00	1,350,000.00	901,040.00	200.7%
Capital Reserve Expense	(700,000.00)	(700,000.00)	-	0.0%
Change in Net Assets	<u>\$ 95,520.00</u>	<u>\$ 1,421,240.00</u>	<u>\$ 1,325,720.00</u>	<u>1387.9%</u>
<u>Rate Revenue</u>				
Revenue Requirements:				
Operating Expense	\$ 25,897,120.00	\$ 24,561,650.00	\$ (1,335,470.00)	-5.2%
Non-Operating	-	500,000.00	500,000.00	
Major Maintenance	669,500.00	689,590.00	20,090.00	3.0%
Emergency Maintenance	100,000.00	100,000.00	-	0.0%
Capital	448,960.00	1,350,000.00	901,040.00	200.7%
Total Revenue Requirements	<u>\$ 27,115,580.00</u>	<u>\$ 27,201,240.00</u>	<u>\$ 85,660.00</u>	<u>0.3%</u>
Non-Rate Revenue	<u>\$ (99,950.00)</u>	<u>\$ (134,120.00)</u>	<u>\$ (34,170.00)</u>	<u>34.2%</u>
Rate Required Revenue	<u>\$ 27,015,630.00</u>	<u>\$ 27,067,120.00</u>	<u>\$ 51,490.00</u>	<u>0.2%</u>

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George W. Kuhn Pollution Control

58520

Financial Summary

Page 5 of 13

	2020 Budget	2021 Forecast	Inc / (Dec)	% Variance
<u>Operating Revenues</u>				
Operating Rate Revenue	\$ 25,892,510.00	\$ 26,416,560.00	\$ 524,050.00	2.0%
Operating Non-Rate Revenue	504,510.00	696,360.00	191,850.00	38.0%
Operating Revenues	<u>\$ 26,397,020.00</u>	<u>\$ 27,112,920.00</u>	<u>\$ 715,900.00</u>	<u>2.7%</u>
<u>By Expense Category</u>				
Operating Expenses:				
Personnel	\$ 1,173,290.00	\$ 1,206,650.00	\$ 33,360.00	2.8%
Contractual Services	24,865,210.00	25,524,350.00	659,140.00	2.7%
Commodities	135,870.00	141,260.00	5,390.00	4.0%
Internal Services	222,650.00	240,660.00	18,010.00	8.1%
Other Expense	-	-	-	
Total Operating Expenses	<u>\$ 26,397,020.00</u>	<u>\$ 27,112,920.00</u>	<u>\$ 715,900.00</u>	<u>2.7%</u>
<u>Operating Expenses</u>				
Sewage Treatment	\$ 23,289,390.00	\$ 23,976,540.00	\$ 687,150.00	3.0%
Sewer System Maintenance	251,040.00	299,460.00	48,420.00	19.3%
Sewer System Engineering	331,740.00	260,710.00	(71,030.00)	-21.4%
Water Purchases	-	-	-	
Water Maintenance Unit	-	-	-	
Water Systems Engineering	-	-	-	
Septage Unloading Facility	-	-	-	
Pump Maintenance Unit	1,417,620.00	1,519,290.00	101,670.00	7.2%
Systems Control Unit	96,200.00	105,210.00	9,010.00	9.4%
Plan Review and Permitting	-	-	-	
Inspection	-	-	-	
IPP	-	-	-	
Laboratory	5,520.00	8,450.00	2,930.00	53.1%
Mapping Unit	350.00	800.00	450.00	128.6%
Miss Dig	-	-	-	
Billing Services Unit	-	-	-	
General and Administrative	1,005,160.00	942,460.00	(62,700.00)	-6.2%
Total Operating Expenses	<u>26,397,020.00</u>	<u>27,112,920.00</u>	<u>715,900.00</u>	<u>2.7%</u>
Net Income	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	
Depreciation	(18,480.00)	(15,960.00)	2,520.00	-13.6%
<u>Reserves</u>				
Non-Operating Revenue	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	
Non-Operating Expense	-	-	-	
Major Maintenance Reserve Revenue	300,000.00	309,000.00	9,000.00	3.0%
Major Maintenance Reserve Expense	(327,150.00)	(460,470.00)	(133,320.00)	40.8%
Emergency Reserve Revenue	50,000.00	50,000.00	-	0.0%
Emergency Reserve Expense	-	-	-	
Capital Reserve Revenue	515,000.00	530,450.00	15,450.00	3.0%
Capital Reserve Expense	(4,215,000.00)	(215,000.00)	4,000,000.00	-94.9%
Change in Net Assets	<u>\$ (3,695,630.00)</u>	<u>\$ 198,020.00</u>	<u>\$ 3,893,650.00</u>	<u>-105.4%</u>
<u>Rate Revenue</u>				
Revenue Requirements:				
Operating Expense	\$ 26,397,020.00	\$ 27,112,920.00	\$ 715,900.00	2.7%
Non-Operating	-	-	-	
Major Maintenance	300,000.00	309,000.00	9,000.00	3.0%
Emergency Maintenance	50,000.00	50,000.00	-	0.0%
Capital	515,000.00	530,450.00	15,450.00	3.0%
Total Revenue Requirements	<u>\$ 27,262,020.00</u>	<u>\$ 28,002,370.00</u>	<u>\$ 740,350.00</u>	<u>2.7%</u>
Non-Rate Revenue	<u>\$ (504,510.00)</u>	<u>\$ (696,360.00)</u>	<u>\$ (191,850.00)</u>	<u>38.0%</u>
Rate Required Revenue	<u>\$ 26,757,510.00</u>	<u>\$ 27,306,010.00</u>	<u>\$ 548,500.00</u>	<u>2.0%</u>

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George W. Kuhn Drainage District, Effective July 1, 2020

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Monthly Charge Breakdown

SEWAGE CHARGE

Flat Rate Sewage Charge	Effective July 1, 2020 Annual Charge
GLWA Purchased Expense	\$ 21,963,110.00
OCWRC Operating Expense	2,598,540.00
Non-Operating	500,000.00
Major Maintenance Reserve	689,590.00
Emergency Maintenance Reserve	100,000.00
Capital Improvement Reserve	1,350,000.00
Less: Misc. Revenue	(134,120.00)
Total:	\$ 27,067,120.00

	Effective July 1, 2020 Annual Charge	Effective July 1, 2020 Monthly Charge
City of Berkley	\$ 1,088,368	\$ 90,697.33
Village of Beverly Hills	73,353	6,112.75
City of Birmingham	819,051	68,254.26
City of Clawson	804,705	67,058.75
City of Ferndale	1,476,240	123,019.99
City of Hazel Park	1,108,128	92,344.00
City of Huntington Woods	497,223	41,435.25
City of Madison Heights	2,782,229	231,852.41
City of Oak Park	2,093,100	174,425.00
City of Pleasant Ridge	240,087	20,007.26
City of Royal Oak	5,198,781	433,231.74
Royal Oak Twp	255,785	21,315.42
City of Southfield	1,788,054	149,004.51
City of Troy	8,507,466	708,955.49
Detroit Zoological Park	297,197	24,766.42
County of Oakland	-	-
Rackham Golf Course	37,353	3,112.75
State Of Michigan	-	-
Total	\$ 27,067,120	\$ 2,255,593.33

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George W. Kuhn Drainage District, Effective July 1, 2020
Monthly Charge Breakdown

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STORM CHARGE

Flat Rate Storm Charge	Effective July 1, 2020
	Annual Charge
GLWA Purchased Expense	\$ 23,976,540.00
OCWRC Operating Expense	3,136,380.00
Non-Operating	-
Major Maintenance	309,000.00
Emergency Maintenance	50,000.00
Capital Improvement	530,450.00
Less: Interest Income	(696,360.00)
Total:	\$ 27,306,010.00

	Effective July, 1 2020	Effective July 1, 2020
	Annual Charge	Monthly Charge
City of Berkley	\$ 1,772,025	\$ 147,668.76
Village of Beverly Hills	228,524	19,043.67
City of Birmingham	1,333,544	111,128.66
City of Clawson	1,618,210	134,850.84
City of Ferndale	2,809,377	234,114.75
City of Hazel Park	615,860	51,321.67
City of Huntington Woods	673,667	56,138.91
City of Madison Heights	1,786,086	148,840.50
City of Oak Park	3,724,074	310,339.49
City of Pleasant Ridge	365,628	30,469.00
City of Royal Oak	8,110,649	675,887.40
Royal Oak Twp	348,833	29,069.42
City of Southfield	2,106,822	175,568.49
City of Troy	677,162	56,430.16
Detroit Zoological Park	91,856	7,654.67
County of Oakland	417,073	34,756.09
Rackham Golf Course	52,237	4,353.08
State Of Michigan	574,383.00	47,865.26
Total	\$ 27,306,010	\$ 2,275,500.82

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George W. Kuhn Drainage District, Effective July 1, 2020

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Share & Monthly Charge Comparison

SEWAGE CHARGE

	FY 2019-20 (July - June)		FY 2020-21 (July - June)		% Change Mthly Charge
	Share % of System	Monthly Charge	Share % of System	Monthly Charge	
City of Berkley	3.911%	\$ 88,048.42	4.021%	\$ 90,697.33	3.0%
Village of Beverly Hills	0.273%	6,146.09	0.271%	6,112.75	-0.5%
City of Birmingham	3.034%	68,304.49	3.026%	68,254.26	-0.1%
City of Clawson	2.898%	65,242.75	2.973%	67,058.75	2.8%
City of Ferndale	5.374%	120,985.00	5.454%	123,019.99	1.7%
City of Hazel Park	4.108%	92,483.50	4.094%	92,344.00	-0.2%
City of Huntington Woods	1.811%	40,771.17	1.837%	41,435.25	1.6%
City of Madison Heights	10.759%	242,217.67	10.279%	231,852.41	-4.3%
City of Oak Park	7.837%	176,434.66	7.733%	174,425.00	-1.1%
City of Pleasant Ridge	0.887%	19,968.91	0.887%	20,007.26	0.2%
City of Royal Oak	19.306%	434,636.51	19.207%	433,231.74	-0.3%
Royal Oak Twp	0.957%	21,544.92	0.945%	21,315.42	-1.1%
City of Southfield	6.709%	151,039.91	6.606%	149,004.51	-1.3%
City of Troy	30.917%	696,035.17	31.431%	708,955.49	1.9%
Detroit Zoological Park	1.090%	24,539.16	1.098%	24,766.42	0.9%
County of Oakland	0.000%	-	-	-	-
Rackham Golf Course	0.129%	2,904.17	0.138%	3,112.75	7.2%
State Of Michigan	0.000%	-	-	-	-
Total	100.00%	\$ 2,251,302.50	100.00%	\$ 2,255,593.33	0.2%

Charges have been rounded

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George W. Kuhn Drainage District, Effective July 1, 2020

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Share & Monthly Charge Comparison

STORM CHARGE

	FY 2019-20 (July - June)		FY 2020-21 (July - June)		% Change Mthly Charge
	Share % of System	Monthly Charge	Share % of System	Monthly Charge	
City of Berkley	6.4895%	\$ 144,702.33	6.4895%	\$ 147,668.76	2.1%
Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%	18,661.09	0.8369%	19,043.67	2.1%
City of Birmingham	4.8837%	108,896.42	4.8837%	111,128.66	2.0%
City of Clawson	5.9262%	132,142.00	5.9262%	134,850.84	2.0%
City of Ferndale	10.2885%	229,412.18	10.2885%	234,114.75	2.0%
City of Hazel Park	2.2554%	50,290.75	2.2554%	51,321.67	2.0%
City of Huntington Woods	2.4671%	55,011.16	2.4671%	56,138.91	2.1%
City of Madison Heights	6.5410%	145,850.75	6.5410%	148,840.50	2.0%
City of Oak Park	13.6383%	304,105.75	13.6383%	310,339.49	2.0%
City of Pleasant Ridge	1.3390%	29,857.00	1.3390%	30,469.00	2.0%
City of Royal Oak	29.7028%	662,310.67	29.7028%	675,887.40	2.0%
Royal Oak Twp	1.2775%	28,485.67	1.2775%	29,069.42	2.0%
City of Southfield	7.7156%	172,041.84	7.7156%	175,568.49	2.0%
City of Troy	2.4799%	55,296.74	2.4799%	56,430.16	2.0%
Detroit Zoological Park	0.3364%	7,501.00	0.3364%	7,654.67	2.0%
County of Oakland	1.5274%	34,057.83	1.5274%	34,756.09	2.1%
Rackham Golf Course	0.1913%	4,265.58	0.1913%	4,353.08	2.1%
State Of Michigan	2.1035%	46,903.75	2.1035%	47,865.26	2.0%
Total	100.0000%	\$ 2,229,792.51	100.0000%	\$ 2,275,500.82	2.0%

Charges have been rounded

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Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal
OAKLAND COUNTY WATER RESOURCES COMMISSIONER
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT
SCHEDULE OF RATES AND CHARGES, EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2020

1. **Sewerage Disposal Charge**

<u>Municipality</u>	Effective July 1, 2020
	<u>Monthly</u>
City of Berkley	\$ 90,697.33
Village of Beverly Hills	6,112.75
City of Birmingham	68,254.26
City of Clawson	67,058.75
City of Ferndale	123,019.99
City of Hazel Park	92,344.00
City of Huntington Woods	41,435.25
City of Madison Heights	231,852.41
City of Oak Park	174,425.00
City of Pleasant Ridge	20,007.26
City of Royal Oak	433,231.74
Royal Oak Twp	21,315.42
City of Southfield	149,004.51
City of Troy	708,955.49
Detroit Zoological Park	24,766.42
County of Oakland	-
Rackham Golf Course	3,112.75
State Of Michigan	-
Toal:	\$ 2,255,593.33

Where communities have individual sewer customers with metered sewage, permitted and approved by the Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner (WRC), then each community shall also report within ten days following the end of each month, the total metered sewage within the community, in lieu of water consumption.

George W. Kuhn Drainage District
Schedule of Rates and Charges

2. Pollutant Surcharge - APPROVED BY GLWA

A Pollutant Surcharge shall be levied against industrial and commercial customers contributing sewage to the system with concentrations of pollutants exceeding the levels described as follows:

- A. 275 milligrams per liter (mg/l) of Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD)
- B. 350 milligrams per liter (mg/l) of Total Suspended Solids (TSS)
- C. 12 milligrams per liter (mg/l) of Phosphorus (P)
- D. 100 milligrams per liter (mg/l) of Fats, Oils & Grease (FOG)

<u>Pollutant</u>	Effective July 1, 2020 Total Charge Per lb. of Excess Pollutants
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD)	\$ 0.502
Total Suspended Solids (TSS)	0.510
Phosphorus (P)	7.519
Fats, Oils & Grease (FOG)	0.484

It is assumed that normal residential customers do not contribute sewage with concentration of pollutants exceeding the above levels, therefore, the Pollutant Surcharge shall not apply to residential customers. Further, restaurants shall also be exempt from Pollutant Surcharge per the federal court "Second Interim Order", dated July 10, 1981.

3. Industrial Waste Control Charge - APPROVED BY GLWA

Based on the reported number of water meter sizes for non-residential users of the System, each community shall pay a monthly Industrial Waste Control Charge (IWC) in accordance with the following schedule:

Non-Residential Meter Size in Inches	Effective July 1, 2020 \$/Month
5/8	\$ 3.45
3/4	5.18
1	8.63
1 1/2	18.98
2	27.60
3	50.03
4	69.00
6	103.50
8	172.50
10	241.50
12	276.00
14	345.00
16	414.00
18	483.00
20	552.00
24	621.00
30	690.00
36	759.00
48	828.00

Non-residential users shall be defined as all users other than those in single family houses, apartment buildings, condominiums, town houses, mobile homes, schools, churches and municipal buildings.

4. Flat Rate Storm Charge

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Effective July 1, 2020</u> <u>Monthly</u>
City of Berkley	\$ 147,668.76
Village of Beverly Hills	19,043.67
City of Birmingham	111,128.66
City of Clawson	134,850.84
City of Ferndale	234,114.75
City of Hazel Park	51,321.67
City of Huntington Woods	56,138.91
City of Madison Heights	148,840.50
City of Oak Park	310,339.49
City of Pleasant Ridge	30,469.00
City of Royal Oak	675,887.40
Royal Oak Twp	29,069.42
City of Southfield	175,568.49
City of Troy	56,430.16
Detroit Zoological Park	7,654.67
County of Oakland	34,756.09
Rackham Golf Course	4,353.08
State Of Michigan	47,865.26
Total:	<u>\$ 2,275,500.82</u>

George W. Kuhn Drainage District
Schedule of Rates and Charges

5. **Total Sewer and Storm Water Charge**

The following schedule identifies the total of the sewer charge and the storm water charge. The combined amount will be billed monthly to each customer:

Combined Monthly Sewer and Storm Charges

<u>Municipality</u>	Effective July 1, 2020
	<u>Monthly</u>
City of Berkley	\$ 238,366.09
Village of Beverly Hills	25,156.42
City of Birmingham	179,382.92
City of Clawson	201,909.59
City of Ferndale	357,134.74
City of Hazel Park	143,665.67
City of Huntington Woods	97,574.16
City of Madison Heights	380,692.91
City of Oak Park	484,764.49
City of Pleasant Ridge	50,476.26
City of Royal Oak	1,109,119.14
Royal Oak Twp	50,384.84
City of Southfield	324,573.00
City of Troy	765,385.65
Detroit Zoological Park	32,421.09
County of Oakland	34,756.09
Rackham Golf Course	7,465.83
State Of Michigan	47,865.26
Total:	<u><u>\$ 4,531,094.15</u></u>

EXHIBIT – 7

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BOD Pollutant Loading Calculations Per Exhibit 5 to Complaint

GWKDD SW total flows	SW% of GLWA SW total flows	Total BOD Allocated to SW	GWKDD portion of total SW BOD	Total GLWA BOD allocated to GWKDD	GWKDD SW BOD %
820,800 mcf	11.58	25,905,800 lbs	2,999,891 lbs	18,247,600 lbs	16.4%

TSS Pollutant Loading Calculations Per Exhibit 5 to Complaint

GWKDD SW total flows	SW% of GLWA SW total flows	Total TSS Allocated to SW	GWKDD portion of total SW TSS	Total GLWA TSS allocated to GWKDD	GWKDD SW TSS %
820,800 mcf	11.58	37,428,300 lbs	4,334,197 lbs	26,363,800 lbs	16.4%

PHOS Pollutant Loading Calculations Per Exhibit 5 to Complaint

GWKDD SW total flows	SW% of GLWA SW total flows	Total PHOS Allocated to SW	GWKDD portion of total SW PHOS	Total GLWA PHOS allocated to GWKDD	GWKDD SW PHOS %
820,800 mcf	11.58	719,900 lbs	83,364 lbs	507,100 lbs	16.4%

FOG Pollutant Loading Calculations Per Exhibit 5 to Complaint

GWKDD SW total flows	SW% of GLWA SW total flows	Total FOG Allocated to SW	GWKDD portion of total SW FOG	Total GLWA FOG allocated to GWKDD	GWKDD SW FOG %
820,800 mcf	11.58	3,975,000 lbs	460,305 lbs	2,799,900 lbs	16.4%

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EXHIBIT - 5

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

Honorable David M. Cohen

v.

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

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**GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND MCR 2.116(C)(8)**

FEE

George W. Kuhn Drainage District (“Drainage District”) moves pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) for dismissal of Plaintiff Jeffrey Eisenberg’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. In support of its motion, the Drainage District relies upon the facts, argument, and authority in the accompanying Brief. Counsel for the Drainage District sought, but did not obtain, Plaintiff’s concurrence in the relief requested, requiring this Motion and Brief.

WHEREFORE, the Drainage District respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order: 1) granting its Motion and Brief; 2) dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8); and 3) granting any further relief that the Court deems just under the circumstances.

Respectfully Submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/Peter H. Webster

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Dated: July 25, 2023

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

Honorable David M. Cohen

v.

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

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**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND MCR 2.116(C)(8)**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, through his attorneys Kickham Hanley PLLC, brings this putative class action against the Drainage District and City of Royal Oak (“Royal Oak”) asking for Millions based on claims that Royal Oak residents have allegedly paid more than their fair share for stormwater disposal services since May 18, 2017 forward (“Alleged Stormwater Overcharge”). This case is Kickham Hanley PLLC’s latest attack on the Drainage District involving Royal Oak. The prior case against the Drainage District was dismissed by the trial court, unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave.

More specifically, in 2014, Kickham Hanley PLLC filed a class action against Royal Oak, only, on two topics: (1) the “Kuhn Facility Debt Charge,” and (2) the “Alleged Stormwater Overcharge.” *Schroeder v City of Royal Oak*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case 2014-138919-CZ (J. Kumar) (“2014 Action”). Royal Oak filed a motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. Kickham Hanley PLLC moved for reconsideration. While the motion for reconsideration was pending for well over 1 year, Royal Oak, for some reason, settled the 2014 Action. The settlement terms included a \$2 Million payment by Royal Oak as to the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge theory, with almost half of the funds going to Kickham Hanley PLLC as class counsel. As to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge theory, plaintiffs received an assignment from Royal Oak of “any and all claims” (if any) Royal Oak “has or may have” against non-party Oakland County and its related affiliates “arising out of or relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater Overcharge.” Additionally, the settlement provided that the class “will **dismiss the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice,**” and that Royal Oak “**may continue to include the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harges in its calculation of the Rates.**” (Exhibit 1, Agreement, ¶¶15-

16) (emphasis added). The Named Plaintiff, in this case, – Jeffrey Eisenberg was a class member, and received \$6,032.18 as part of the settlement.

In 2017, based on the above-referenced assignment, Kickham Hanley PLLC brought Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims against Oakland County and the Drainage District for the purported benefit of the certified class from the 2014 Action, and Kickham Hanley PLLC. *Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District et al*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case 2017-159351-CZ (J. O'Brien) (“2017 Action”). The trial court dismissed the 2017 Action with prejudice, and the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. *Kickham Hanley PLLC v Oakland Co*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued May 2, 2019 (Docket No. 341076), 2019 WL 1965891 (**Exhibit 2**). Kickham Hanley PLLC tried the same scheme on the Drainage District involving Oak Park. The trial court dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals also unanimously affirmed. *Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan 14, 2021 (Docket No. 351317), 2021 WL 137773 (**Exhibit 3**).

Now, Kickham Hanley PLLC is, once again, trying to assert Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims, under circumstances which have been rejected by two different trial court judges in this circuit and six different appellate judges. In this 2023 Action, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the Great Lakes Water Authority (“GLWA”) “charges the Drainage District” to dispose of sewage flows (which include a sanitary and a stormwater component) “based on a formula” that includes a percentage allocated “to the costs to treat stormwater flows” from the Drainage District's service area, and the Drainage District, “in turn, allocates” it “among all of the municipalities in the district,” including Royal Oak. (Complaint, ¶¶16-17, ¶20). Plaintiff's Complaint then asserts that, instead of “allocating” GLWA's bills to the Drainage District's

communities (e.g. Royal Oak, Troy) in the same way that Kickham Hanley PLLC theorizes that GLWA allocated its charges to its approximately 20 sewer communities (e.g. Drainage District (GWKDD), Highland Park, OMID, Detroit), the Drainage District “improperly reallocate[s]” to Royal Oak “a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges[.]” (*Id.* at ¶¶ 25-26, ¶28). In short, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Drainage District communities like Royal Oak whose storm (pollution) percentage is greater than their sewage (sanitary) percentage pay too much toward the Drainage District’s GLWA bills which benefits Drainage District communities like Troy whose storm (pollution) percentage is less than their sewage (sanitary) percentage which such communities, in turn, pay too little toward the Drainage District’s GLWA bills.

In their latest effort, Kickham Hanley PLLC’s Plaintiff asserts two counts against the Drainage District: (1) Assumpsit (Count I); and (2) Unjust Enrichment (Count II). Neither count withstands scrutiny and should be dismissed for the following summary reasons:

1. Assumpsit is no longer a recognized cause of action;
2. There is no unjust enrichment because Plaintiff does not allege that the Drainage District retained any alleged overpayment;
3. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by claim and issue preclusion; and
4. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by release.

First, Michigan does not recognize an independent cause of action for assumpsit. See, e.g., *Midwest Valve & Fitting Co v City of Detroit*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued March 9, 2023 (Docket No. 358868), 2023 WL 2436483, at *5 (affirming dismissal of putative class action brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC alleging, among other causes of action, assumpsit based on certain annual charges assessed by the city, and reasoning that “Michigan no longer recognizes an independent cause of action for assumpsit.”).

Second, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against the Drainage District because it does **not** allege the Drainage District retained a benefit as to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge, and, thus, Plaintiff's requested disgorgement remedy is unavailable. See, e.g., *Liggett Rest Group, Inc v City of Pontiac*, 260 Mich App 127, 137; 676 NW2d 633 (2003) (requiring plaintiff asserting an unjust enrichment claim to plead facts to show the defendant "received a benefit from plaintiff, and that an inequity resulted to plaintiff as a consequence of defendant's retention of that benefit.") (emphasis added); *AFT Michigan v Michigan*, 303 Mich App 651, 677; 846 NW2d 583 (2014) ("Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he **has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.**") (emphasis added).

Additionally, claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bar Plaintiff from relitigating the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge, which Kickham Hanley PLLC, who is in privity with Plaintiff, unsuccessfully pursued in the 2017 Action. *Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley*, 259 Mich App 1, 12-13; 672 NW2d 351 (2003); *Monat v State Farm Ins Co*, 469 Mich 679, 683-84; 677 NW2d 843 (2004); (see also **Exhibit 2**). Moreover, Plaintiff's Complaint is also barred by release because Plaintiff was a class member in the 2014 Action. For these reasons, and as articulated more fully below, summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) is appropriate.

II. BACKGROUND

A. In the 2014 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC Represented a Class Asserting Alleged Stormwater Overcharge Claims Against Royal Oak.

On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff Andrew Schroeder, through his attorneys Kickham Hanley PLLC, filed a class action complaint against Royal Oak on two topics: (1) the "Kuhn Facility Debt Charge;" and (2) the "Alleged Stormwater Overcharge." Royal Oak filed a motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action with

prejudice. Kickham Hanley PLLC moved for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, Royal Oak settled the 2014 Action.

The settlement terms included a \$2 Million payment by Royal Oak as to the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge theory, with almost half of the funds going to Kickham Hanley PLLC as class counsel. (**Exhibit 1**, Agreement, ¶3). As to the alleged Stormwater Overcharge theory, Plaintiff received an assignment of purported claims from Royal Oak. Specifically, the settlement agreement stated:

Plaintiff believes that Oakland County has overcharged the City for the stormwater component of the total flow from the City that enters the Oakland County system for many years (the “Stormwater Overcharge”). As part of the settlement, the City will assign any and all claims it has or may have against Oakland County arising out of or relating to the Stormwater Overcharge to the Class or an entity formed for the benefit of the Class, and Class Counsel will pursue those claims through litigation and/or negotiation (the “Oakland County Action”). [(*Id.* at ¶17)].

The settlement included a release “from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017” related to Royal Oak’s rates or charges and its water and sewer fund balance. (*Id.* at ¶29). Additionally, the settlement provided that the class “will **dismiss the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice,**” and that Royal Oak “**may continue to include the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harges in its calculation of the Rates.**” (*Id.* at ¶¶15-16) (emphasis added). The Named Plaintiff, in this case, – Jeffrey Eisenberg was a class member, and received \$6,032.18 as part of the settlement. (See **Exhibit 5**, Mortgage dated June 30, 1995); (**Exhibit 6**, Redacted Excerpt Account Service Listing dated May 4, 2015) (Account Ending 0301 for Plaintiff’s property); (**Exhibit 7**, Redacted Excerpt Notice of Filing of Proposed Distribution Report, p 7 of 224) (Account Ending 0301).

The trial court entered a Final Judgment and Order dated June 14, 2017. (**Exhibit 8**). As to the assignment, the Final Judgment and Order states:

Pursuant to the Agreement, *[the City] will assign to the Class members or for their benefit any and all claims for refund of the [Alleged Stormwater] Overcharges* that it has or may have against Oakland County Michigan and its affiliates . . . , including, but not limited to . . . the George W. Kuhn Drainage District[], and any other entity that imposed or imposes the Overcharges. ***Kickham Hanley PLLC is hereby appointed trustee of a litigation trust hereby established for the benefit of the Class members.*** As trustee, Kickham Hanley PLLC is authorized to pursue the claim for a refund of the [Alleged Stormwater] Overcharges by lawsuit against Oakland County or its aforesaid agencies. [*Id.* at ¶6 (emphasis added)].

B. In the 2017 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC Attempted to Assert the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge Claims Against Oakland County and the Drainage District.

In 2017, Kickham Hanley PLLC brought the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims against Oakland County and the Drainage District for the purported benefit of the certified class from the 2014 Action and, of course, Kickham Hanley PLLC as class counsel. Kickham Hanley PLLC alleged that, as “part of the settlement agreement in a related case,” the 2014 Action, “the City assigned its claims against the County to Plaintiff to achieve a refund of the [Alleged] Stormwater [] Overcharges owed by the County to Royal Oak for disbursement to the Class members who submitted claims for refunds in the Royal Oak Class Action” (**Exhibit 9**, 2017 Action Complaint, ¶5).

Kickham Hanley PLLC alleged it was the “Trustee for the Class defined in the Final Judgment and Order approving Class Settlement Dated June 14, 2017, entered in” the 2014 Action, and that the Final Judgment and Order in the 2014 Action “authorized Plaintiff to institute and prosecute this action on behalf of the Class.” (*Id.* at ¶7). Kickham Hanley PLLC’s claims sought “a refund” of the Alleged Stormwater Overcharges. (See *id.* at p 2, pp 7-9).

In the 2017 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC claimed that the Drainage District's April 19, 2015 Resolution "creates an express contract between the County and the City[.]" and that the "County has breached the terms of the Resolution by failing to charge the City its proportionate share of 'DWSD charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow.'" (*Id.* at ¶25, ¶34, ¶36). In the alternative, Kickham Hanley PLLC alleged that, "in the event that the Court finds that there was no express contract between the City and the County governing stormwater charges, the County is still legally obligated to refund the [Alleged] Stormwater [] Overcharges." (*Id.* at ¶39).

Oakland County was dismissed by stipulation, and the Drainage District moved for dismissal of the case including on the following basis: (1) The Resolution did not constitute a contract; (2) Chapter 20 of the Drain Code, MCL 240.83, prohibited challenging the Resolution; and (3) Kickham Hanley PLLC, standing in the shoes of Royal Oak, suffered no damages. After receiving the Drainage District's motion, Kickham Hanley PLLC tried to amend its complaint.

On October 25, 2017, the trial court granted the Drainage District's motion and denied Kickham Hanley PLLC's attempt to amend. (**Exhibit 10**, Hearing Transcript); (**Exhibit 11**, October 27, 2017 Order). Exhaustively considering the legal and factual issues underlying the Drainage District's motion and, relatedly, Kickham Hanley PLLC's surreptitious scheme purporting to serve as the basis for the 2017 Action, the trial court concluded that Kickham Hanley PLLC's unconventional lawsuit was legally and factually improper. As to Kickham Hanley PLLC's purported breach of contract claim, the trial court held "the case does not sound in contract[.]" (**Exhibit 10**, Tr. at 91, 1-4). As to the assumpsit claim, the trial court "recognizing that it is in equity," and "excusing the arguments that the Court specifically found unpersuasive by the Defendant," "otherwise adopt[ed] the Defendant's arguments and f[ound]

the case not viable in assumpsit.” (*Id.* at 91, 6-12). The trial court dismissed the 2017 Action with prejudice.

Kickham Hanley PLLC appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. (**Exhibit 2**). The Court of Appeals ruled that Kickham Hanley PLLC’s breach of contract claim failed because “[t]he language of the Drainage Board’s resolution and its Final Order of Apportionment plainly establish that these two documents, neither individually, nor combined, constituted a binding contract between the [Drainage District] and Royal Oak.” (*Id.* at *8). The Court of Appeals also ruled that Kickham Hanley PLLC failed to state an assumpsit claim because it is unable to demonstrate that it suffered any damages:

Plaintiff did not dispute that Royal Oak passed through the alleged overcharges to its water and sewer ratepayers. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, as Royal Oak’s assignee, could not maintain the assumpsit claim because Royal Oak suffered no recoverable loss. The trial court did not err in this regard. [(*Id.* at *5)].

The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. (**Exhibit 12**, April 29, 2020 Order).

C. In this 2023 Action, Plaintiff’s Complaint Asserts Alleged Stormwater Overcharge Claims, Once Again, Against the Drainage District and Royal Oak.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges GLWA “charges the Drainage District” to dispose of sewage flows (which include a sanitary and a stormwater component) “based on a formula” that includes a percentage allocated “to the costs to treat stormwater flows” from the Drainage District’s service area, and the Drainage District, “in turn, allocates” it “among all of the municipalities in the district,” including Royal Oak. (Complaint, ¶¶16-17, ¶20). Plaintiff’s Complaint then asserts that, instead of “allocating” GLWA’s bills to the Drainage District’s communities (e.g. Royal Oak, Troy) in the same way that Kickham Hanley PLLC theorizes that GLWA allocated its charges to its approximately 20 sewer communities (e.g. Drainage District (GWKDD), Highland Park, OMID, Detroit), the Drainage District “improperly reallocate[s]” to

Royal Oak “a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges[.]” (*Id.* at ¶¶25-26, ¶28).

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes an “example” of Kickham Hanley PLLC’s version of how the Drainage District should determine sewage (sanitary) and storm (pollution) portions from Kickham Hanley PLLC’s version of GLWA’s “rate methodology” “for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021.” (*Id.* at ¶¶25-32). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “[b]ecause the Drainage District allocated to the City [Royal Oak] a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges ([which is subject to] 29.7%) than sanitary sewage disposal charges ([which is subject to] 19.3%), the more of the total Water Authority Charges [GLWA bills] that the Drainage District allocates to storm water charges, the more the City’s [Royal Oak’s] end-users pay in the aggregate.” (*Id.* at ¶28). For the 29.7% and the 19.3%, Plaintiff is relying on Exhibit 6. (Exhibit 6 to Complaint, pp 8-9 of 13) (providing “29.7028%” as Royal Oak’s storm (pollution) percentage and providing “19.306%” as Royal Oak’s sewage (sanitary) percentage for FY 2021). In short, Plaintiff’s theory is that Royal Oak pays too much of the Drainage District’s GLWA bills because Royal Oak’s storm (pollution) percentage is greater than Royal Oak’s sewage (sanitary) percentage and too much of GLWA’s bills are allocated to storm (pollution).

Thus, under Kickham Hanley PLLC’s version of the only reasonable way for the Drainage District to interpret GLWA’s bills and then to distribute GLWA’s bills to the Drainage District’s customer communities, the Drainage District undercharges its customer communities whose storm (pollution) percentage is less than their sewage (sanitary) percentage, for example, like Troy. (Exhibit 6 to Complaint, pp 8-9 of 13) (providing “2.4799%” as Troy’s storm (pollution) percentage and providing “31.431%” as Troy’s sewage (sanitary) percentage for FY 2021). Bottom-line, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Drainage District communities like Royal Oak (where the storm (pollution) percentage is greater than the sewage (sanitary)

percentage) pay too much toward the Drainage District's GLWA bills which necessarily benefits Drainage District communities like Troy (where the storm (pollution) percentage is less than the sewage (sanitary) percentage) who, in turn, pay too little.¹

Importantly, and logically so, Plaintiff's Complaint does **not** allege the Drainage District retained a benefit as to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge. Yet, Plaintiff's Complaint seeks from the Drainage District at least \$1,332,275 for FY 2021, and in excess of \$7 Million from May 18, 2017 forward, for the benefit of Kickham Hanley PLLC. In so doing, Kickham Hanley PLLC's Plaintiff asserts two counts against the Drainage District: (1) Assumpsit (Count I); and (2) Unjust Enrichment (Count II).

D. This 2023 Action is Kickham Hanley PLLC's Latest Attack on Governmental Agencies and Their Constituents.

This case is another example of Kickham Hanley PLLC's attempts to extract funds needed for the operation, maintenance, and administration of critical public infrastructure from financially strapped governmental agencies, for Kickham Hanley PLLC's gain in the form of attorney fees. Kickham Hanley PLLC has brought "unsuccessful" attacks, including related to Alleged Stormwater Overcharges, which still come at a great cost to governmental agencies' and

¹ Regardless, and not at issue to dispose of this lawsuit, "Michigan courts have long recognized the principle that municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable[.]" and have declined to second-guess governmental agencies' municipal utility rates and ratemaking practices. *Trahey v Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 594; 876 NW2d 582 (2015); *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich App 161, 218; 969 NW2d 570 (2021) (reversing judgment awarding over \$9 Million in monetary and equitable relief to plaintiff and plaintiff class, and remanding for entry of a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the Township in a class action styled-complaint challenging certain municipal utility rates and ratemaking practices, and reasoning, among other things, that plaintiff "bears the burden of both rebutting the presumption of reasonableness and proving that the disputed rates are unreasonable when viewed as a *whole*.")) (emphasis in original).

their constituents' limited resources.² To be sure, the Drainage District has already spent substantial resources in successfully defending the Drainage District in the 2017 Action related to Royal Oak. See *supra*. Similarly, in a 2019 Action related to Oak Park, Kickham Hanley

² See, e.g., (1) *Midwest Valve & Fitting Co*, 2023 WL 2436483 (affirming dismissal of putative class action brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC as plaintiff's counsel, alleging, among other causes of action, assumpsit and unjust enrichment, based on certain annual charges assessed by the city, and reasoning, among other things, that the charges were reasonable); (2) *Greenfield v City of Farmington Hills*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan 12, 2023 (Docket No. 357579), 2023 WL 174810 (affirming summary disposition of class action styled-complaint brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC challenging certain municipal utility rates and ratemaking practices, where, among other things, plaintiff failed to establish that the City collected the funds at issue for any improper purpose, and failed to rebut the presumption regarding reasonableness of the rates); (3) *Brunet v City of Rochester Hills*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Dec 2, 2021 (Docket No. 354110), 2021 WL 5750616 (affirming summary disposition of class action styled-complaint brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC challenging, among other things, certain municipal utility rates and ratemaking practices, where, among other things, plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness of the rates); (4) *Kickham Hanley PLLC*, 2021 WL 137773 (affirming dismissal of litigation trust styled-complaint claiming millions in damages brought against the Drainage District by Kickham Hanley PLLC as trustee for the purported benefit of a class in a prior action against the city of Oak Park for alleged overcharges for storm water disposal services); (5) *Youmans*, 336 Mich App 161 (reversing judgment awarding monetary and equitable relief to plaintiff and plaintiff class in a lawsuit brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC, and remanding for entry of a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the Township in a class action styled-complaint challenging certain municipal utility rates and ratemaking practices, where, among other things, plaintiff failed to establish the "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable" nature of those rates and the underlying ratemaking processes[] and ordering a judgment against plaintiff, including statutory costs and interest to the Township); (6) *Bohn v City of Taylor*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan 29, 2019 (Docket No. 339306), 2019 WL 360730, at *4 (affirming summary disposition of class action styled-complaint brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC challenging the city of Taylor's water and sewer rates as unreasonable, disguised taxes under the Headlee Amendment, where, among other things, plaintiffs failed to establish that any of the City's ratemaking practices were "improper or unreasonable"); (7) *Deerhurst Condo Owners Ass'n Inc v City of Westland*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan 29, 2019 (Docket No. 339143), 2019 WL 360725 (affirming summary disposition of class action styled-complaint brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC alleging that the city of Westland's water and sewer rates allocated charges for "grossly inflated" administrative costs and unspecified future capital improvements, where, among other things, plaintiffs failed to establish that "the [c]ity's overall allocation of administrative costs to the water and sewer department is unreasonable[.]" or that the creation of a reserve fund for future capital improvements to the city's water and sewer systems is "an improper ratemaking procedure.") (**Exhibit 4**).

PLLC unsuccessfully pursued millions of dollars from the Drainage District based on the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge. *Kickham Hanley PLLC*, 2021 WL 137773. Like in the 2017 Action, in the 2019 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC's case was dismissed on motion in the trial court, affirmed unanimously in the Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Standards of Review under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate on the basis of a “prior judgment” – including based on release, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. MCR 2.116(C)(7); *Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgmt, Inc*, 243 Mich App 28; 620 NW2d 657 (2000) (res judicata); *King v Munro*, 329 Mich App 594; 944 NW2d 198 (2019) (collateral estoppel).

Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), summary disposition is appropriate where plaintiff “has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” *Morden v Grand Traverse Co*, 275 Mich App 325, 331; 738 NW2d 278 (2007). In addition to the pleadings, Michigan courts may examine documents referenced in the pleadings when construing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). *Woody v Tamer*, 158 Mich App 764, 770; 405 NW2d 213 (1987). Moreover, the court may consider matters of public record. *Dalley v Dykema Gossett*, 287 Mich 296, 301 n 1; 788 NW2d 679 (2010). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) should be granted where the plaintiff's claims are unenforceable as a matter of law, regardless of any possible factual development. See *Rathburn v State Commonwealth For Boys*, 145 Mich App 303, 307-308; 377 NW2d 872 (1985).

B. Plaintiff Fails to State an Assumpsit Claim.

Plaintiff's assumpsit claim against the Drainage District must be dismissed because Michigan does not recognize an independent cause of action for assumpsit. See, e.g., *Midwest Valve & Fitting Co*, 2023 WL 2436483, at *5 (affirming dismissal of putative class action

brought by Kickham Hanley PLLC as counsel, alleging, among other causes of action, assumpsit based on certain annual charges assessed by the city, and reasoning that “**Michigan no longer recognizes an independent cause of action for assumpsit.**”) (emphasis added); *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013) (noting that “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, **assumpsit as a form of action was abolished.**”) (emphasis added).

C. Plaintiff Fails to State an Unjust Enrichment Claim.

For unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must allege the defendant “received a benefit from plaintiff, and that **an inequity resulted to plaintiff as a consequence of defendant[]’s retention of that benefit.**” *Liggett Rest Group, Inc*, 260 Mich App at 137 (emphasis added); *AFT Michigan*, 303 Mich App at 677 (“Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and **retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.**”) (internal citation omitted and emphasis added). See also *Ganson v Detroit Pub Sch*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan 21, 2021 (Docket No. 351276), 2021 WL 219225 (**Exhibit 4**).

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks “disgorge[ment]” of “revenues attributable to the [Alleged] Stormwater [] Overcharges imposed or collected by the Drainage District” (Complaint, p 13). Yet, based on Plaintiff’s Complaint, Drainage District communities like Royal Oak (where the storm (pollution) percentage is greater than the sewage (sanitary) percentage) pay too much toward the Drainage District’s GLWA bills which necessarily benefits Drainage District communities like Troy (where the storm (pollution) percentage is less than the sewage (sanitary) percentage) who, in turn, pay too little. Importantly, and logically so, Plaintiff’s Complaint does **not** allege the Drainage District retained a benefit as to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge. See, e.g., *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 213 (reasoning, in a Kickham Hanley PLLC led case, that

such an action “will not lie against one who has not been personally *enriched* by the transaction” because the fundamental “basis” of the action “is not only the loss occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment of the defendant by reason of having received the same.”) (citation omitted).

In short, Plaintiff’s requested disgorgement remedy is unavailable. See, e.g., *Ganson* 2021 WL 219225, at *3 (affirming summary disposition of unjust enrichment claim based on defendant former employer’s alleged retention of incentivized retirement benefits where, among other issues, plaintiff failed to allege “defendant retained a benefit – when defendant was not the holder of plaintiff’s retirement funds[,]” which were instead maintained by the state); *McLemore v Regions Bank*, 682 F3d 414, 426-27 (6th Cir 2012) (affirming dismissal of disgorgement claim where the district court found there were no specifically identifiable funds in defendant’s possession).

D. The 2023 Action Is Also Barred by Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Release.

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion).

Res judicata, which “Michigan courts have broadly applied[,]” bars a claim if: (1) there has been a prior decision on the merits, (2) the issue was either actually resolved in the first case or could have been resolved in the first case if the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, had brought it forward, and (3) both actions were between the same parties or their privies. See *Paige v Sterling Heights*, 476 Mich 495, 521-22 n 46; 720 NW2d 219 (2006) (citing *Baraga Co v State Tax Comm*, 466 Mich 264, 269; 645 NW2d 13 (2002)); *Dart v Dart*, 460 Mich 573, 586-87; 597 NW2d 82 (1999) (citations omitted). As to the first element, res judicata can be satisfied by summary disposition decisions. *Detroit v Nortown Theatre, Inc*, 116 Mich App 386, 392; 323 NW2d 411 (1982). The second element is satisfied by showing that “the claims in the instant

case arise as part of the same transaction” as the claims in the first case. *Adair v Michigan*, 470 Mich 105, 125; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). Finally, as to the third element, privity between a party to the first case and a “non-party” exists where there is “a substantial identity of interests and a working or functional relationship . . . in which the interests of the non-party are presented and protected by the party in the litigation.” *Phinisee v Rogers*, 229 Mich App 547, 553-54; 582 NW2d 852 (1998) (internal quotations omitted); *Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co*, 509 Mich 276, 283-84; 983 NW2d 401 (2022) (“In its broadest sense, privity has been defined as ‘mutual or successive relationships to the same right of property, or such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right.’”); *Peterson Novelties, Inc*, 259 Mich App at 12-13; (“[A] privity includes a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right, such as a principal to an agent”); see also, e.g., *Nelson v Consumers Power Co*, 198 Mich App 82; 497 NW2d 205 (1993) (applying principles of agency law to attorney-client matters).

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata based on the 2017 Action. The 2017 Action was decided by dispositive motion, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. *Nortown Theatre, Inc*, 116 Mich App at 392; (**Exhibit 2**). Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks Millions based on the same Alleged Stormwater Overcharge at issue in the 2014 Action, and the 2017 Action. (See, e.g., **Exhibit 1**, Agreement, ¶15) (“For settlement purposes, the Plaintiff and [Royal Oak] agree that the Final Judgment in this matter will dismiss the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice and thus, this portion of the Final Judgment . . . is a judgment on the merits.”); (**Exhibit 9**, 2017 Action Complaint, ¶24) (“For a number of years, the County has charged the City substantially more than the amount that DWSD/GLWA charges the County for the disposal of the portion of the County’s stormwater flow that originates in the

City. The County has therefore overcharged the City for stormwater disposal service for a number of years.”).

With the first two elements satisfied, as to the last element – privity, the 2017 Action also involved the Drainage District, and Kickham Hanley PLLC. To be sure, Kickham Hanley PLLC is in privity with Plaintiff. In the 2017 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC attempted to bring claims against the Drainage District for the purported benefit of the certified class from the 2014 Action. The Named Plaintiff, in this 2023 Action – Jeffrey Eisenberg was part of the certified class in the 2014 Action. In this 2023 Action, Kickham Hanley PLLC on behalf of Plaintiff Eisenberg is now attempting to assert, once again, Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims. The allegations in Plaintiff’s 2023 Action are not new, and Plaintiff’s instant lawsuit is simply an attempt to relitigate the Alleged Stormwater Overcharges from the 2017 Action against the Drainage District, and is, hence, barred by res judicata. *Peterson Novelty, Inc*, 259 Mich App at 12-13; *Nelson*, 198 Mich App 82.

2. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion).

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action when the proponent shows that (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) a party or its privity had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) there is mutuality of estoppel. *Monat*, 469 Mich at 683-84. Mutuality of estoppel is not required when collateral estoppel is used defensively. *Id.* at 691.

Plaintiff’s instant claims are barred by collateral estoppel. First, the question essential to this case³ is identical to the question from the 2017 Action – that is, whether the Alleged

³ Notably, courts have held that the circumstances surrounding the two actions (i.e., the parties involved and the procedural posture) do not need to be identical for collateral estoppel to apply. See, e.g., *Thomas v Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone*, unpublished opinion *per curiam* of the

Stormwater Overcharge at issue results in the Drainage District being enriched. The 2017 was dismissed with prejudice and constitutes a “valid and final judgment.” *Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit*, 478 Mich 412, 417-16; 733 NW2d 755 (2007).⁴

Second, Kickham Hanley PLLC, who is in privity with Plaintiff (see *supra* Section III.D.1.), had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge in the 2017 Action, and the trial court, and three appellate judges dismissed its lawsuit with prejudice. (**Exhibit 11**, October 27, 2017 Order); (**Exhibit 2**). Because the Drainage District is asserting collateral estoppel defensively, mutuality of estoppel is not required. *Monat*, 469 Mich at 691. Collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims.

3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Release.

A claim is barred where a valid release of liability exists. See, e.g., *Xu v Gay*, 257 Mich App 263, 266; 668 NW2d 166 (2003); MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges “Plaintiff has been assessed, and has paid, the [Alleged] Stormwater [] Overcharge at issue in this case” (Complaint, ¶4). Yet, Plaintiff’s Complaint ignores that Plaintiff was a class member in the 2014 Action, which included a release “dismiss[ing] the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice,” and provided that Royal Oak “may continue to include the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harges in its calculation of the Rates.”

(**Exhibit 1**, Agreement, ¶¶15-16); see also MCR 3.501(D)(5) (“**A judgment entered in an** Court of Appeals, issued Oct 21, 2014, 2014 WL 5358392, at *11 (Docket No 314374) (barring plaintiff in a legal malpractice action from relitigating an issue of fraud adjudicated in a prior arbitration where the “findings in that regard were actually litigated at arbitration,” and those “facts [wer]e relevant to determine whether defendant’s alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, which is a \$2.8 million arbitration award against it.”) (**Exhibit 4**).

⁴ The Alleged Stormwater Overcharge aspect of the 2014 Action was also a judgment on the merits. (See **Exhibit 1**, Agreement, ¶15) (“For settlement purposes, the Plaintiff and [Royal Oak] agree that the Final Judgment in this matter will dismiss the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice and thus, this portion of the Final Judgment . . . is a judgment on the merits.”).

action certified as a class action binds all members of the class who have not submitted an election to be excluded, except as otherwise directed by the court.”) (emphasis added).⁵

Plaintiff’s 2023 Action is barred by release.

⁵ In an effort to circumvent the release, Plaintiff’s Complaint claims that “[t]he Court of Appeals has explicitly recognized that end-users of the County System are the ‘actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge[,]’” and “[a]bsent a release, those end-users are ‘entitled to recover the overcharges’ from Drainage District and/or the City.” (*Id.* at ¶6) (emphasis added) (citing *Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District*, 2021 WL 137773). To be sure, Plaintiff’s Complaint misconstrues the Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed the dismissal of Kickham Hanley PLLC’s scheme against the Drainage District involving Oak Park – the 2019 Action. (**Exhibit 3**). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not reference the Court of Appeals’ decision in *Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District*, 2019 WL 1965891 (**Exhibit 2**), related to Kickham Hanley PLLC’s failed scheme involving Royal Oak in the 2014 Action. Regardless, neither decision “explicitly recognize[s]” or supports Kickham Hanley PLLC’s most recent scheme – this 2023 Action.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Drainage District respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Respectfully Submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/Peter H. Webster

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Dated: July 25, 2023

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 25, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MiFile TrueFiling system which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record.

/s/Peter H. Webster

Peter H. Webster (P48783)

Attorney for Defendant George W. Kuhn

Drainage District

pwebster@dickinsonwright.com

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

Honorable David M. Cohen

v.

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

**INDEX OF EXHIBITS TO BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND MCR 2.116(C)(8)**

Exhibit 1	Settlement Agreement in 2014 Action
Exhibit 2	<i>Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District</i> , unpublished opinion <i>per curiam</i> of the Court of Appeals, issued May 2, 2019 (Docket No. 341076), 2019 WL 1965891
Exhibit 3	<i>Kickham Hanley PLLC v George W Kuhn Drainage District</i> , unpublished opinion <i>per curiam</i> of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan. 14, 2021 (Docket No. 351317), 2021 WL 137773
Exhibit 4	Unpublished Authority
Exhibit 5	Mortgage dated June 30, 1995
Exhibit 6	Redacted Excerpt Account Service Listing dated May 4, 2015 in 2014 Action
Exhibit 7	Redacted Excerpt Notice of Filing of Proposed Distribution Report in 2014 Action

Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Exhibit 8	Final Judgment and Order dated June 14, 2017 in 2014 Action
Exhibit 9	2017 Action Complaint
Exhibit 10	Hearing Transcript in 2017 Action
Exhibit 11	October 27, 2017 Order in 2017 Action
Exhibit 12	April 29, 2020 Order in 2017 Action

Exhibit 1

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SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ANDREW SCHROEDER,
individually, and as representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons
and entities,

Case No. 2014-138919-CZ
Hon. Shalina Kumar

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made this 22nd day of March, 2017, by and between the following (all of which are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Parties"): Plaintiff Andrew Schroeder ("Named Plaintiff"), individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities (as more specifically defined in Paragraph 2 below, the

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

“Class”), acting by and through its counsel, Kickham Hanley PLLC and Ray M. Toma PC (“Class Counsel”), and Defendant City of Royal Oak (the “City”).

WHEREAS, Plaintiff commenced the above captioned lawsuit (the “Lawsuit”) in Oakland County Circuit Court challenging a mandatory debt service charge (the “Kuhn Facility Debt Charge”) and a mandatory stormwater disposal charge (the “Stormwater Charge”) (collectively the “Charges”) imposed by the City on users of its water and sanitary sewage disposal services. Plaintiff alleges that the inclusion of such Charges in the City’s water and sewer rates (“Rates”) are motivated by a revenue-raising and not a regulatory purpose, that they are disproportionate to the City’s actual costs of providing stormwater disposal services, and that (1) the Charges are therefore unlawful under the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution and (2) by collecting the Charges the City has been unjustly enriched.

WHEREAS, the Complaint alleges that the Lawsuit should be maintained as a class action on behalf of a class consisting of persons or entities who/which have paid the City for water and sanitary sewage disposal services after February 14, 2008. .

WHEREAS, on April 1, 2015, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification.

WHEREAS, on December 17, 2015, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting the City’s Motion for Summary Disposition and dismissing each of the two claims in the Lawsuit with prejudice.

WHEREAS, on January 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the December 17, 2015 Opinion and Order, which Motion remains pending before the Court.

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

WHEREAS, the City denies that the Charges are improper; denies that it has intentionally or negligently committed any unlawful, wrongful or tortious acts or omissions, violated any constitutional provision or statute, or breached any duties of any kind whatsoever; denies that it is in any way liable to any member of the Class; and states that the claims asserted in the Lawsuit have no substance in fact or law, and the City has meritorious defenses to such claims; but, nevertheless, has agreed to enter into this Agreement to avoid further expense, inconvenience, and distraction and risks of burdensome and protracted litigation, and to obtain total and final peace, satisfaction and protection from the claims asserted in the Lawsuit.

WHEREAS, the Named Plaintiff in the Lawsuit and Class Counsel have been provided with discovery and have conducted investigations into the facts of the Lawsuit, have made a thorough study of the legal principles applicable to the claims in the Lawsuit, and have concluded that a class settlement with the City in the amount and on the terms hereinafter set forth (the "Settlement") is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and is in the best interest of the Class.

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to compromise their differences and to resolve and release all of the claims asserted by the Named Plaintiff and the Class in the Lawsuit.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and agreements herein, and intending to be legally bound, the Parties hereby agree as follows:

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SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT

1. The Parties agree to cooperate in good faith, to use their best efforts, and to take all steps necessary to implement and effectuate this Agreement and the Settlement provided for herein.

CLASS CERTIFICATION

2. On April 1, 2015, the Court entered an order certifying a class of plaintiffs (the “Class”) consisting of all persons or entities who/which paid the City of Royal Oak (the “City”) for Water and Sanitary Sewer Service since February 14, 2008 (the “Class”). For settlement purposes, the Class shall include all persons or entities who/which paid the City for Water and Sanitary Sewer Service between February 14, 2008 and January 31, 2017. This Agreement is intended to settle all of the claims of the members of the Class (“Class Members”).

SETTLEMENT FUND

3. The City will create a Settlement Fund (the “Settlement Fund”) in the amount of Two Million Dollars (\$2,000,000) in order to resolve the claims relating to the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge. Within 14 days after entry of an order preliminarily approving this settlement, the City shall deposit One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000) of the Settlement Fund into the IOLTA Trust Account of Class Counsel, Kickham Hanley PLLC. No later than 7 calendar days before the hearing for final approval of this settlement, the City shall deposit the remaining One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000) of the Settlement Fund into the IOLTA Trust Account of Class Counsel. Such funds, upon final Court approval of this settlement, will be used to pay refunds to the Class and compensation and cost reimbursement to Class Counsel, as determined by the Court. The Settlement Fund shall be administered by Kickham Hanley PLLC (the “Claims-Escrow

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

Administrator”) with the assistance of the Garden City Group (“GCG”). The expenses the Claims-Escrow Administrator incurs to GCG shall be recoverable by the Claims-Escrow Administrator as a cost of the litigation under Paragraphs 30-33 of this Agreement (subject to Court approval) and payable out of the Settlement Fund. The Claims-Escrow Administrator may from time to time apply to the Court for instructions or orders concerning the administration of the Settlement Fund and may apply to the Internal Revenue Service for such rulings with respect thereto as it may consider appropriate. Disbursements from the Settlement Fund by the Claims-Escrow Administrator and the City shall be expressly conditioned upon an order of the Court permitting such disbursements.

4. Except as set forth in Paragraphs 30 through 33 of this Agreement, the Class and Class Counsel shall not claim any attorneys’ fees or costs.

5. Subject to Paragraph 34, distribution of the Settlement Fund shall occur no later than seven (7) days after the completion of the last of all of the following (the “Settlement Date”):

- a. entry of an order of final judicial approval by the Court approving this Agreement pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 3.501(E);
- b. entry of an order adjudicating Class Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs;
- c. entry of a final judgment of dismissal of the Lawsuit with prejudice with respect to the claims of the Named Plaintiff and all Class Members, except those putative Class Members who have requested to be excluded from the Class pursuant to MCR 3.501(D);
- d. the City’s deposit of the Settlement Fund described in Paragraph 3 above;

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e. the Court's entry of the Distribution Order described in Paragraph 11 below; and

f. the expiration of the 21-day time for appeal of all of the aforementioned orders and judgments and final resolution of any and all appeals of such orders and judgments, but only if any Class Member files a timely objection to any of the aforementioned orders and judgments.

6. As more specifically discussed below, and as provided in Paragraph 5, the Settlement Fund shall be distributed only pursuant to and in accordance with orders of the Court, as appropriate.

7. In the event that this Settlement fails to be consummated pursuant to this Agreement or fails to secure final approval by the Court for any reason or is terminated pursuant to Paragraph 34, the Settlement Fund shall immediately be returned to the City.

DISTRIBUTION OF SETTLEMENT FUND

8. The "Net Settlement Fund" to be distributed to the Class is the Settlement Fund less the combined total of: (a) attorneys' fees and any incentive award to the Class representative awarded pursuant to Paragraphs 30-33; and (b) Class Counsel and Claims-Escrow Administrator expenses reimbursed pursuant to Paragraphs 30-33.

9. Each Class Member's share in the Net Settlement Fund shall be referred to herein as his, her or its "Pro Rata Share," and each Class Member's Pro Rata Share of the Net Settlement Fund will be distributed via a refund payment. The Pro Rata Share to be allocated to each Class Member shall be determined according to Paragraph 10.

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

10. All Class Members may participate in the Settlement by receiving from the Net Settlement Fund a cash distribution Payment (as defined in Paragraph 10.b). The Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed as follows:

a. Within 7 days after the Court's entry of an order preliminarily approving this Settlement, the City shall provide the Claims-Escrow Administrator with billing and payment records in electronic form that, at a minimum, provide for the Class Period (February 14, 2008 through January 31, 2017) the service address, account number, and billing and payment history for each water and sewer customer account. The Claims-Escrow Administrator will provide notice to the Class Members through first-class mail. The Claims-Escrow Administrator is authorized to utilize the services of GCG in disseminating notices to the Class. Such forms of notice will not be required to be exclusive and the Claims-Escrow Administrator will be allowed to use any appropriate means to give notice to Class Members of the Settlement and the opportunity to obtain a refund.

b. To qualify to receive a distribution of cash via check (a "Payment") from the Net Settlement Fund, Class Members will be required to submit sworn claims (the "Claims") which identify their names, addresses, and the periods of time in which they paid the Charges in order to participate in the Settlement. Class Members who submit Claims will hereafter be referred to as the "Claiming Class Members." The Claiming Class Members will be required to submit those claims no later than 30 days prior to the hearing on the final approval of this settlement, as described in Paragraph 28 (the "Claims Period"). The Claiming Class Members also will be required to provide a unique identifying number printed on the Class notice, as an additional verification of their identity. The foregoing is a general outline. GCG will assist in

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

implementing a process designed to minimize fraud and maximize dissemination of the refunds to the appropriate parties. In the event that two or more parties claim to have paid or incurred Charges for the same water and/or sewer account, the Claims-Escrow Administrator shall have the absolute discretion to determine which party or parties are entitled to participate in the settlement, and the City shall cooperate by providing information in its possession concerning the disputed property.

c. The Claims-Escrow Administrator shall calculate each Claiming Class Member's pro rata share of the Net Settlement Fund (the "Pro Rata Share"). Only those Class Members who paid for water and/or sewer service during the Class Period and submit a timely Claim are entitled to distribution of a Pro Rata Share of the Net Settlement Fund. The Claims-Escrow Administrator is authorized to utilize the services of GCG to calculate the Pro Rata Shares distributable to the Claiming Class Members. The size of each Claiming Class Member's Pro Rata Share shall be determined by (1) calculating the total amount of Charges the Claiming Class Member paid during the Class Period and then (2) dividing that number by the total amount of Charges the City assessed during the Class Period against all Claiming Class Members and then (3) multiplying that fraction by the amount of the Net Settlement Fund. An example appears below:

Total Charges paid by Claiming Class Member during the Class Period -- \$2,000

Total Charges paid during the Class Period by all Claiming Class Members -- \$4,000,000

Net Settlement Fund -- \$1,300,000

Claiming Class Member's Pro Rata Share -- $2,000 / 4,000,000 \times 1,300,000 = \$650$

11. No later than fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing on the final approval of this settlement (as described in Paragraph 28), the Claims-Escrow Administrator shall submit to the

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

Court a report setting forth the proposed disposition of the Net Settlement Fund including, without limitation, a list of Claiming Class Members and the percentage of the Net Settlement Fund to be paid to each such Claiming Class Member (the “Distribution Report”). Upon filing of the Distribution Report, the Claims-Escrow Administrator shall serve copies of the Distribution Report on Counsel for the City.

a. The City shall have seven (7) days to object to the Distribution Report. All objections shall be resolved by the Court at or before the final approval hearing.

b. Class Counsel and Counsel for the City, within five (5) days after the resolution of any objections to the Distribution Report, or within five (5) days after the deadline for submission of objections if no objections are submitted, whichever is later, shall submit to the Court a stipulated Distribution Order authorizing distribution from the Settlement Fund to the Claiming Class Members entitled to a Pro Rata Share distribution of the Net Settlement Fund (“Stipulated Distribution Order”) in accordance with the Distribution Report, subject to the Court’s final approval of this Settlement.

d. The Parties acknowledge that, because Class Members may have moved or ceased doing business since February 14, 2008, complete and current address information may not be available for all Class Members. The City, Named Plaintiff, counsel for any Parties, the Claims-Escrow Administrator and GCG shall not have any liability for or to any member of the Class with respect to determinations of the amount of any distribution of the Settlement Fund to any Class Member or determinations concerning the names or addresses of the Class Members.

12. At a time consistent with Paragraph 5, following the entry of the Stipulated Distribution Order, the Claims-Escrow Administrator shall distribute from the Net Settlement

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

Fund the Pro Rata Share of each Claiming Class Member. The Claims-Escrow Administrator is authorized to send checks reflecting Payments due to Claiming Class Members to the address provided by each Claiming Class Member. The Claims-Escrow Administrator is further authorized to transfer its held portion of the Net Settlement Fund to GCG so that GCG can distribute Payments in accordance with this Agreement.

13. The amounts of money covered by checks distributing the Payment of the Pro Rata Shares which: (a) are returned and cannot be delivered by the U.S. Postal Service after the Claims-Escrow Administrator (i) confirms that the checks were mailed to the identified addresses, and (ii) re-mails any checks if errors were made or it becomes aware of an alternative address or payee; or (b) have not been cashed within six (6) months of mailing, shall be refunded to the City within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the six (6) month period; and the Class Members to whom such checks were mailed shall be forever barred from obtaining any payment from the Settlement Fund. The City shall deposit any refund in its water and sewer fund and utilize any refund monies solely for the operation, maintenance and improvement of its water and sewer system.

14. Within thirty (30) days after the date on which the remaining Net Settlement Fund is distributed back to the City, the Claims-Escrow Administrator shall file with the Court and serve on counsel for the Parties a document setting forth the names and addresses of, and the amounts paid to, each distributee of funds from the Settlement Fund together with a list of Claiming Class Members entitled to receive a Pro Rata Share but whose distribution checks have been returned or have not been cashed.

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AS TO CLAIMS FOR STORMWATER CHARGES

15. For settlement purposes, the Plaintiff and the City agree that the Final Judgment in this matter will dismiss the Class claims relating to the Stormwater Charge with prejudice and thus, this portion of the Final Judgment (along with this portion of the December 17, 2015 Opinion and Order) is a judgment on the merits.

16. As a result of the dismissal of the claims relating to the Stormwater Charges, and as part of the settlement, the Plaintiff and the City agree that the City may continue to include the Stormwater Charges in its calculation of the Rates.

ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST OAKLAND COUNTY

17. Plaintiff believes that Oakland County has overcharged the City for the stormwater component of the total flow from the City that enters the Oakland County system for many years (the “Stormwater Overcharge”). As part of the settlement, the City will assign any and all claims it has or may have against Oakland County arising out of or relating to the Stormwater Overcharge to the Class or an entity formed for the benefit of the Class, and Class Counsel will pursue those claims through litigation and/or negotiation (the “Oakland County Action”). Within five (5) days after the Settlement Date, the City shall execute an Assignment of Claims in the form attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

18. Any monetary recovery in the Oakland County Action will be distributed, after counsel fees and costs, to the Class based upon the same methodology for distributing the Settlement Fund. In the event the Oakland County Action is resolved through a settlement, that settlement, and any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses, will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund. In the event that

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

there is a monetary recovery in Oakland County Action by way of a litigated judgment, any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund.

PROSPECTIVE RELIEF

19. The City shall utilize its current methodology for setting Rates charged by the City through June 30, 2018. Beginning July 1, 2018, and ending December 31, 2024 or any date thereafter at the City's election (the "Prospective Relief Period"), the City shall adjust its Rates so that the amount Oakland County charges the City for the City's share of the cost of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements (i.e., the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge) is not a component of cost that is included in the Rates. During the Prospective Relief Period, the Parties agree that the City otherwise retains its discretion to adjust the Rates in accordance with Michigan law

20. The City may not levy a tax or other assessment against property owners or water or sewer customers to finance, in whole or in part, the Settlement Fund (unless such tax or assessment receives voter approval), nor may the City increase its Rates to finance, in whole or in part, the Settlement Fund. The Settlement Fund shall be financed solely from current assets of the City's Water and Sewer Fund. The City shall not include as a recoverable cost in the setting of the Rates any amounts that it has contributed to the Settlement Fund.

21. The Class Members shall release the City as provided in Paragraph 29 below. In addition to the release set forth in Paragraph 29 below, if the City complies with the prospective relief described above for the duration of the Prospective Relief Period, the Class Members who receive refunds as part of the settlement shall then release and waive any and all claims which arise during the FY 2017 (July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017) and FY 2018 (July 1, 2017 through June

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

30, 2018) Periods that could be brought challenging the City's inclusion of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge in establishing the Rates for the FY 2017 and FY 2018 Periods.

22. The Lawsuit will be dismissed with prejudice, subject only to the Court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. As stated in Paragraph 15, the December 17, 2015 Opinion and Order dismissing the claims in the Lawsuit will for all purposes relating to the Lawsuit and this Settlement Agreement constitute a judgment on the merits of the claims relating to the Stormwater Charge only.

CLAIMS-ESCROW ADMINISTRATOR

23. The Claims-Escrow Administrator shall not receive a separate fee for its services as Claims-Escrow Administrator. Because Class Counsel is acting as the Claims-Escrow Administrator, the fee awarded to Class Counsel shall be deemed to include compensation for its service as Claims-Escrow Administrator. The Claims-Escrow Administrator, however, shall be entitled to be reimbursed for its out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the performance of its duties (including but not limited to GCG's charges), which shall be paid solely from the Settlement Fund.

24. The Claims-Escrow Administrator, with the assistance of GCG, shall have the responsibilities set forth in this Agreement, including, without limitation, holding the Settlement Fund in escrow, determining the eligibility of Class Members to receive Payments, determining the Pro Rata Shares, distributing the Payments to Class Members receiving a Pro Rata Share, filing a Distribution Report consistent with Paragraph 11 and overseeing distribution of the remainder of the Net Settlement Fund as required by Paragraph 13. The Claims-Escrow Administrator, with the assistance of GCG, shall also be responsible for: (a) recording receipt of all responses to the notice; (b) preserving until further Order of the Court any and all written communications from

SCHROEDER V. ROYAL OAK

Class Members or any other person in response to the notice; and (c) making any necessary filings with the Internal Revenue Service. The Claims-Escrow Administrator may respond to inquiries, but copies of all written answers to such inquiries will be maintained and made available for inspection by all counsel in this Lawsuit. The Claims-Escrow Administrator may delegate some or all of these responsibilities to GCG.

25. Any findings of fact of the Claims-Escrow Administrator and/or GCG shall be made solely for the purposes of the allocation and distribution of the Pro Rata Shares, and, in accordance with Paragraph 38, shall not be admissible for any purpose in any judicial proceeding, except as required to determine whether the claim of any Class Member should be allowed in whole or in part.

NOTICE AND APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

26. As soon as practicable, but in no event later than five (5) days after the execution of this Agreement, Class Counsel and Counsel for the City shall submit this Agreement to the Court, pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 3.501, for the Court's preliminary approval, and shall request an Order of the Court, substantially in the form attached as Exhibit "B," including the following terms:

a. scheduling of a Settlement approval hearing to be held as soon as practicable after the entry of such Order but in no event later than ninety (90) days thereafter to determine the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of this Agreement and the Settlement; whether the Agreement and Settlement should be approved by the Court; and whether to award the attorneys' fees and expenses requested by Class Counsel;

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b. directing that notice, substantially in the form of Exhibit “C,” be given to the members of the Class advising them of the following:

i. the terms of the proposed Settlement consented to by the Named Plaintiff and the City;

ii. the scheduling of a hearing for final approval of the Agreement and Settlement;

iii. the rights of the members of the Class to appear at the hearing to object to approval of the proposed Settlement or the requested attorneys’ fees and expenses, provided that, if they choose to appear, they must file and serve written objections at least fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing that set forth the name of this matter as defined in the Notice, the objector’s full name, address and telephone number, an explanation of the basis upon which the objector claims to be a Class Member, all grounds for the objection including any known legal support for the objection, the number of times in which the objector has objected to a class action settlement in the past five years and a caption of each case in which an objection was filed, the identity of all counsel representing the objector at the hearing, a statement confirming whether the objector intends to appear and/or testify at the hearing (along with a disclosure of all testifying witnesses) and the signature of the objector (not just the objector’s attorney);

iv. the nature of the release to be constructively entered upon approval of the Agreement and Settlement;

v. the binding effect on all Class Members of the judgment to be entered should the Court approve the Agreement and Settlement; and

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vi. the right of members of the Class to opt out of the Class, the procedures for doing so, and the deadlines for doing so, including the deadline with respect to filing and/or serving written notification of a decision to opt out of the Class (such deadline must be at least fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing);

c. providing that the manner of such notice shall constitute due and sufficient notice of the hearing to all persons entitled to receive such notice and requiring that proof of such notice be filed at or prior to the hearing;

d. appointing Kickham Hanley PLLC as Claims-Escrow Administrator; and

e. appointing the Claims-Escrow Administrator as trustee of a litigation trust for the benefit of the Class Members with authority to pursue the Stormwater Overcharge claim and approving Kickham Hanley PLLC as counsel to the trust.

27. Notice to Class Members of the proposed settlement shall be the responsibility of Class Counsel pursuant to orders of the Court. Class Counsel shall be entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of such notice from the Settlement Fund, and Class Counsel shall make application for costs of notice to the Court at least seven (7) days before the Settlement approval hearing with the Court approving any costs at the time of the Settlement approval hearing. Such notice shall be substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C," and mailed by Class Counsel (or GCG) to the Class Members at the addresses provided by the City within fourteen (14) days of entry of the Order Regarding Preliminary Approval of this Agreement. Class Counsel will also provide publication notice to the Class, which shall be substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and shall be published in the Oakland Press and the Royal Oak Tribune newspapers on three occasions prior to April 5, 2017.

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28. After the notice discussed in Paragraphs 26 and 27 has been mailed, the Court shall, consistent with Paragraph 26, conduct a hearing at which it rules on any objections to this Agreement and a joint motion for entry of a Final Order approving of this Settlement and Agreement. If the Court approves this Agreement pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 3.501(E), a final judgment, substantially in the form of Exhibit "E," shall be entered by the Court: (a) finding that the notice provided to Class Members is the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies the due process requirements of the United States and Michigan Constitutions; (b) approving the Settlement set forth in this Agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (c) dismissing with prejudice and without costs to any Party any and all claims of the Class Members against the City, excluding only those persons who in timely fashion requested exclusion from the Class; (d) awarding Class Counsel attorneys' fees, costs and expenses; (e) reserving jurisdiction over all matters relating to the administration of this Agreement, including allocation and distribution of the Settlement Fund; and (f) retaining jurisdiction to protect and effectuate this judgment.

RELEASE AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE

29. On the Settlement Date, each Class Member who has not timely requested exclusion therefrom shall be deemed to have individually executed, on behalf of the Class Member and his or her heirs, successors and assigns, if any, the following Release and Covenant Not To Sue, and the Final Order and Judgment to be entered by the Court in connection with the approval of this Settlement shall so provide:

In executing the Release and Covenant Not To Sue, each Class Member, on behalf of himself, herself or itself, and his, her or its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, members, shareholders, predecessors, heirs, administrators, officers,

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directors, successors, assigns, and any person the Class Member represents, intending to be legally bound hereby, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby absolutely, fully and forever releases, relieves, remises and discharges the City, and each of its successors and assigns, present and former agents, elected and appointed officials, representatives, employees, insurers, affiliated entities, attorneys and administrators, of and from any and all manner of actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, understandings, contracts, agreements, controversies, judgments, consequential damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, claims, liabilities, and demands of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which arise from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017 concerning (a) the City's calculation or assessment of Rates or Charges; (b) the components of costs included in the Rates; and/or (c) the City's Water and Sewer Fund balance. This release is intended to include all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit concerning the City's Rates and/or Charges. In executing the Release and Covenant Not to Sue, each Class Member also covenants that: (a) except for actions or suits based upon breaches of the terms of this Agreement or to enforce rights provided for in this Agreement, he, she or it will refrain from commencing any action or suit, or prosecuting any pending action or suit, in law or in equity, against the City on account of any action or cause of action released hereby; (b) none of the claims released under the Release and Covenant Not To Sue has been assigned to any other party; and (c) he, she or it accepts and assumes the risk that if any fact or circumstance is found, suspected, or claimed hereinafter to be other than or different from the facts or circumstances now believed to be true, the Release and Covenant Not To Sue shall be and remain effective notwithstanding any such difference in any such facts or circumstances. The foregoing shall not affect the claims of any Class Member whose individual water and sewer bills were calculated in error on the basis of facts or circumstances unique to such class member and not based on the claims that were or could have been asserted by the Class in the Lawsuit.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES

30. Class Counsel shall be paid an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses from the Settlement Fund. For purposes of an award of attorneys' fees and costs, the Settlement Fund shall be deemed to be a "common fund," as that term is used in the context of class action settlements. Class Counsel shall not make an application for any attorneys' fees and costs which are in addition to the "common fund" attorneys' fees and costs contemplated by this Agreement.

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31. The amount of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to be paid to Class Counsel shall be determined by the Court applying legal standards and principles applicable to awards of attorneys' fees and costs from common fund settlements in class action cases. Class Counsel agrees that it will not seek an award of attorneys' fees in excess of Thirty-Three Percent (33%) of the Settlement Fund, and the City agrees that it will not oppose Class Counsel's fee request, provided it complies with this Agreement. The Parties agree that Class Counsel may seek Court approval of an incentive award on behalf of class representative Andrew Schroeder in an amount not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000) to be paid solely from the Settlement Fund. Further, if the pursuit of the Stormwater Overcharge claim results in the recovery of proceeds, Class Counsel may seek an award of attorneys' fees not exceeding 33% of such proceeds subject to approval by the Court.

32. The award of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to be paid from the Settlement Fund to Class Counsel pursuant to Paragraph 31 does not include any out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Kickham Hanley PLLC acting in its capacity as Claims-Escrow Administrator. The Claims-Escrow Administrator shall make a separate application for such expenses.

33. The Court shall determine and approve the award of attorneys' fees and costs to Class Counsel, reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the Claims-Escrow Administrator, and any incentive award to Andrew Schroeder in connection with the Final Approval hearing. The attorneys' fees, costs and expenses awarded to Class Counsel and the Claims-Escrow Administrator and any incentive award to Andrew Schroeder shall be paid from the Settlement Fund upon the Settlement Date.

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TERMINATION

34. If this Agreement and Settlement is disapproved, in part or in whole, by the Court, or any appellate court; if dismissal of the Lawsuit with prejudice against the City cannot be accomplished; if the Court does not enter an Order of Preliminary Approval substantially in the form attached as Exhibit “B” within twenty-eight (28) days after its submission to the Court; if a final judgment on the terms set forth in Paragraph 28 is not entered within ninety (90) days after the entry of the Order substantially in the form attached as Exhibit “B”; if the Settlement Date defined in Paragraph 5 does not occur prior to July 31, 2017; if the Court (or any appellate court) alters the terms of this Settlement in any material way not acceptable to the City or to Class Counsel; or if this Agreement and Settlement otherwise is not fully consummated and effected:

a. This Agreement shall have no further force and effect and it and all negotiations and proceedings connected therewith shall be without prejudice to the rights of the City, the Named Plaintiff and the Class;

b. The Claims-Escrow Administrator shall immediately return to the City the Settlement Fund;

c. The Parties shall return to the status quo ante in the Lawsuit as if the Parties had not entered into this Agreement, and all of the Parties’ respective pre-Settlement claims and defenses will be preserved; and

d. Counsel for the Parties shall inform the Court that the pending Motion for Reconsideration is ripe for disposition by the Court.

35. The City and Class Counsel may, in their sole and exclusive discretion, elect to waive any or all of the terms, conditions or requirements stated in Paragraph 34. Such waiver

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must be memorialized in a writing signed by the City and/or its Counsel and Class Counsel and delivered via certified mail to Class Counsel, or it will have no force or effect.

36. The City may, in its sole and exclusive discretion, elect to extend any or all of the deadlines stated in Paragraph 34. Such extension must be memorialized in a writing signed by the City and/or its Counsel and delivered via certified mail to Class Counsel, or it will have no force or effect.

37. In the event the Settlement is terminated in accordance with Paragraph 34, any discussions, offers, negotiations, or information exchanged in association with this Settlement shall not be discoverable or offered into evidence or used in the Lawsuit or any other action or proceeding for any purpose. In such event, all Parties to the Lawsuit shall stand in the same position as if this Agreement had not been negotiated, made or filed with the Court.

USE OF THIS AGREEMENT

38. Except to the extent required to enforce Paragraphs 15 and 22, this Agreement, the Class Period, the Settlement provided for herein (whether or not consummated), and any proceedings taken pursuant to this Agreement shall not be:

a. construed by anyone for any purpose whatsoever as, or deemed to be, evidence of a presumption, concession or an admission by the City of the truth of any fact alleged or the validity of any claims, or of the deficiency or waiver of any defense that has or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit, or of any liability, fault or wrongdoing on the part of the City; or

b. offered or received as evidence of a presumption, concession or an admission of any liability, fault, or wrongdoing, or referred to for any other reason by the Named Plaintiff, Class Members, or Class Counsel in the Lawsuit, or any other person or entity not a party

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to this Agreement in any other action or proceeding other than such proceedings as may be necessary to effectuate the provisions of this Agreement; or

c. construed by anyone for any purpose whatsoever as an admission or concession that the Settlement amount represents the amount which could be or would have been recovered after trial, or the applicable time frame for any purported amounts of recovery.

d. construed more strictly against one Party than the other, this Agreement having been prepared by Counsel for the Parties as a result of arms-length negotiations between the Parties.

WARRANTIES

39. Class Counsel further warrants that in its opinion the Settlement Fund represents fair consideration for and an adequate settlement of the claims of the Class released herein.

40. The undersigned have secured the consents of all persons necessary to authorize the execution of this Agreement and related documents and they are fully authorized to enter into and execute this Agreement on behalf of the Parties.

41. Class Counsel deems this Agreement to be fair and reasonable, and has arrived at this Agreement in arms-length negotiations taking into account all relevant factors, present or potential.

42. The Parties intend this Agreement to be a final and complete resolution of all disputes between them with respect to the claims arising in the Lawsuit.

43. The Parties have relied upon the advice and representation of counsel, selected by them, concerning their respective legal liability for the claims hereby released. The Parties have

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read and understand fully this Agreement, and have been fully advised as to the legal effect thereof by their respective Counsel and intend to be legally bound by the same.

BINDING EFFECT AND ENFORCEMENT

44. All covenants, terms, conditions and provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon, inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by the respective predecessors and successors, and past and present assigns, heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, trustees, subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates, parents (and subsidiaries thereof), partnerships and partners, and all of their officers, directors, agents, employees and attorneys, both past and present, of each of the Parties hereto. It is understood that the terms of this paragraph are contractual and not a mere recital.

45. This Agreement, with the attached Exhibits A through E, constitutes a single, integrated written contract and sets forth the entire understanding of the Parties. Any previous discussions, agreements, or understandings between or among the Parties regarding the subject matter herein are hereby merged into and superseded by this Agreement. No covenants, agreements, representations, or warranties of any kind whatsoever have been made by any Party hereto, except as provided for herein.

46. All of the Exhibits attached hereto are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

47. This Agreement shall be construed and governed in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan.

48. Before filing any motion in the Court raising a dispute arising out of or related to this Agreement, the Parties shall consult with each other and discuss submitting any disputes to

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non-binding mediation. The Parties shall also certify to the Court that they have consulted and either have been unable to resolve the dispute in mediation or are unwilling to submit the dispute to mediation and the reasons why.

49. The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the terms of this Agreement, and the Parties shall submit to jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of implementing and enforcing the settlement reflected in this Agreement.

MODIFICATION AND EXECUTION

50. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, all of which shall constitute a single, entire agreement.

51. Change or modification of this Agreement, or waiver of any of its provisions, shall be valid only if contained in a writing executed on behalf of all the Parties hereto by their duly authorized representatives.

52. This Agreement shall become effective and binding (subject to all terms and conditions herein) upon the Parties when it has been executed by the undersigned representatives of the Parties.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the Parties executes this Agreement through his, her
or its duly authorized representatives.


KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

In its capacity as Class Counsel and on behalf of
the Named Plaintiff in the Lawsuit and the Class

By: 
Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500

Dated: 3/22/17

CITY OF ROYAL OAK

By: 
Its: Mayor
Dated: 3.18.17

By: Melanie Halasz
Its: City Clerk
Dated: 3.16.17

Exhibit 2

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2019 WL 1965891

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OAKLAND COUNTY MICHIGAN, Defendant,

and

George W. Kuhn Drainage District, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 341076

|

May 2, 2019

Oakland Circuit Court, LC No. 2017-159351-CZ

Before: Murray, C.J., and Sawyer and Redford, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff, Kickham Hanley PLLC, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition of its claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8) and denying its motion for leave to amend its complaint. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants¹ after the settlement of a class action lawsuit brought by a water and sewer ratepayer against Royal Oak, Michigan. The class representative alleged Headlee Amendment violations, Const 1963, art 9, § 31, and challenged Royal Oak's mandatory debt service charge and mandatory stormwater disposal charge to users of its water and sanitary disposal services. The circuit court in that action dismissed both counts of the complaint and the class representative moved for reconsideration. While that motion pended, the parties settled. The circuit court approved the settlement and entered a final judgment.

During the class action litigation, the class representative came to believe that defendant, the George W. Kuhn Drainage

District (GWKDD), inflated Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) charges for stormwater disposal and overcharged for several years Royal Oak which passed on the charges to users. As part of the settlement in the class action lawsuit, Royal Oak paid a settlement to the class and assigned any claims it may have had for refund of the overcharges to plaintiff, as the trustee for a litigation trust. In its assignment, Royal Oak made no warranty or representation that it, in fact, imposed any overcharges or that any refunds were owed. The class members in turn released Royal Oak from any and all claims they had against Royal Oak concerning the city's rates and charges. The circuit court entered a final judgment and order approving the settlement and appointing plaintiff as the trustee of a litigation trust established for the benefit of the class members. The order authorized plaintiff to pursue a claim for refund of the GWKDD's alleged overcharges and ordered that any monetary recovery be distributed to the class members.

In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that Royal Oak's combined sewer system flows through the George W. Kuhn Drain, which is owned and maintained by Oakland County. The GWKDD is a component unit of Oakland County, comprised of several municipalities in the area, including Royal Oak, whose stormwater and sewerage flow into the Kuhn Drain. The GWKDD's stormwater flow is conveyed for ultimate disposal by Oakland County to a treatment plant operated by DWSD or the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA) for ultimate disposal. The DWSD charges the GWKDD a flat annual rate for stormwater disposal based on a formula tied to the amount of rainfall and the volume of surface water that enters the county's system for disposal. The GWKDD, in turn, proportionately allocates DWSD's stormwater charges among the municipalities in the district and charges each municipality that has a combined sewer system, including Royal Oak, a flat rate per month for stormwater disposal based on an apportionment formula stated in a resolution approved and adopted by the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain at a public meeting held on April 19, 2005, and specified in the Drainage Board's Final Order of Apportionment issued April 19, 2005, pursuant to the board's resolution. The Final Order of Apportionment provided for the apportionment of the costs of administration, operations, and maintenance of the George W. Kuhn Drain. The Drainage Board allocated 29.7915% of the costs to Royal Oak.

*2 Royal Oak, in turn, passed through the charges imposed by the GWKDD to its ratepayers by incorporating the charges into its water and sewer rates to recover the entire

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amount of the GWKDD's charge. The Drainage Board's Final Order of Apportionment provided that the charges to the municipalities, including Royal Oak, were comprised of two components: (1) the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total stormwater flow and (2) the administrative costs of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System.

Plaintiff, as Royal Oak's assignee, filed a two count complaint against Oakland County and the GWKDD alleging a breach of contract claim and an equitable claim in assumpsit for money had and received. Plaintiff alleged that the GWKDD charged Royal Oak in excess of the amount DWSD charged for disposal of the stormwater and that the Drainage Board's resolution contractually obligated the GWKDD to charge Royal Oak only its proportionate share of the DWSD's actual charges to the GWKDD. Plaintiff claimed that, by overcharging Royal Oak, the GWKDD breached the contract causing Royal Oak breach of contract damages. Alternatively, plaintiff alleged that, if no express contract existed, based on Royal Oak's assignment of its claims, plaintiff had entitlement to recover the GWKDD's overcharges through an action in assumpsit. The GWKDD, in lieu of filing an answer, moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). The GWKDD asserted that the Drainage Board's resolution that formed the basis of plaintiff's breach of contract claim did not constitute a contract. The GWKDD also asserted that plaintiff's claims in actuality alleged tort liability from which the GWKDD had governmental immunity. Regarding the assumpsit count, the GWKDD asserted that plaintiff stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee and had no right to any damages from the alleged overcharges because the city passed through the overcharges to the ratepayers and suffered no compensable loss.

While the GWKDD's summary disposition motion pended, plaintiff filed an amended complaint that added an unjust enrichment claim. Defendant moved to strike plaintiff's amended complaint and the trial court granted the motion prompting plaintiff to file a motion for leave to amend. At the conclusion of a hearing on the parties' motions, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), denied plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, and dismissed plaintiff's lawsuit with prejudice.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(8)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) to determine whether the opposing party failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *Dalley v. Dykema Gossett, PLLC*, 287 Mich. App. 296, 304; 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010). In *Dalley*, this Court explained:

A motion brought under subrule (C) (8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint solely on the basis of the pleadings. When deciding a motion under (C)(8), this Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the moving party. A party may not support a motion under subrule (C) (8) with documentary evidence such as affidavits, depositions, or admissions. Summary disposition on the basis of subrule (C)(8) should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. *Id.* at 304-305 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

*3 In a contract action the trial court may examine the contract attached to the complaint. *Liggett Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Pontiac*, 260 Mich. App. 127, 133; 676 N.W.2d 633 (2003). "The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo." *Kloian v. Domino's Pizza, LLC*, 273 Mich. App. 449, 452; 733 N.W.2d 766 (2006). Further, whether an equitable claim can be maintained presents a question of law subject to de novo review. *Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc.*, 273 Mich. App. 187, 193; 729 N.W.2d 898 (2006).

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of its breach of contract claim. We disagree.

The party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the other party's breach, and (3) damages to the party claiming breach. *Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc.*, 495 Mich. 161, 178; 848 N.W.2d 95 (2014). An express contract is “an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language either orally or in writing.” *Benson v. Dep't of Mgt. and Budget*, 168 Mich. App. 302, 307; 424 N.W.2d 40 (1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In *AFT Mich. v. Michigan*, 497 Mich. 197, 235; 866 N.W.2d 782 (2015), our Supreme Court summarized the principles of contract formation as follows:

A valid contract requires five elements: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation. The party seeking to enforce a contract bears the burden of proving that the contract exists. Contracts necessarily contain promises: a contract may consist of a mutual exchange of promises, or the performance of a service in exchange for a promise. [Citations omitted.]

Further, to create a contract, there must be an offer and acceptance by the parties signifying their unambiguous mutual assent or meeting of the minds on the essential terms.

Kloian, 273 Mich. App. at 452-253 (citations omitted).

In this case, plaintiff alleged one count of breach of contract based on the resolution adopted by the Drainage Board. It argued to the trial court that the resolution coupled with the Drainage Board's Final Order of Apportionment constituted an express contract that the GWKDD breached. The record reflects that plaintiff attached the resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment to its complaint as exhibits making them part of its pleadings and relied on those documents to allege the existence of a contract between the GWKDD and

Royal Oak. Therefore, the trial court could properly consider those documents for determination of defendant's summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). *Liggett*, 260 Mich. App. at 133.

Plaintiff argues as it did to the trial court that the resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment constituted a binding express contract between the GWKDD and Royal Oak that the GWKDD breached. We disagree.

The language of the Drainage Board's resolution and its Final Order of Apportionment plainly establish that these two documents neither individually, nor combined, constituted a binding contract between the GWKDD and Royal Oak. The documents expressed no offer or promises made by either party to the other that required acceptance. Nor did the documents express the five elements necessary for the creation of a valid contract in Michigan.

*4 The Drainage Board's resolution and its Final Order of Apportionment expressed independent determinations made by the Drainage Board, as statutorily required under Chapter 20 of Michigan's drain code of 1956, MCL 280.461 *et seq.* which governs intracounty drains. The GWKDD is a drainage district, a governmental body with powers conferred upon it by law. See MCL 280.5. The drain code authorizes recovery of the costs of county drains necessary for the public health, MCL 280.462, and makes drainage boards responsible for the operation and maintenance of such drains, MCL 280.478.² Under the drain code, drainage boards must establish percentages to apportion the costs of operating and maintaining drains to the public corporations assessed for the costs of the drain, considering the benefits that accrue to each public corporation and the extent to which each public corporation contributes to the conditions which make the drain necessary. See MCL 280.468; MCL 280.469; MCL 280.478. Drainage boards are statutorily required to determine, after notice and a hearing, the apportionment of the costs and confirm their determinations by issuance of a final order of apportionment. See MCL 280.469; MCL 280.478. The drain code, however, nowhere provides that a final order of apportionment issued by a drainage board constitutes a contract with the municipal entities to which the order applies. Nor does the drain code grant a right of action to such entities for an alleged breach of a final order of apportionment.

The resolution and Final Order of Apportionment at issue in this case, therefore, constituted a statutorily required determination that apportioned the costs of stormwater

disposal and treatment by the DWSD, and allocated to the municipalities in the GWKDD their proportionate share. Neither the resolution nor the Final Order of Apportionment, nor those documents combined constituted contracts on which Royal Oak could base a breach of contract claim. Plaintiff, therefore, failed and could not meet its burden of establishing the existence of a contract. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition of plaintiff's breach of contract claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).³

C. ASSUMPSIT

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant summary disposition because, in the absence of an express contract, it could recover the overcharges on equitable grounds in assumpsit for money had and received. We disagree.

A claim in assumpsit is “an equitable action, and can be maintained in all cases for money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff.” *Hoyt v. Paw Paw Grape Juice Co.*, 158 Mich. 619, 626; 123 N.W. 529 (1909) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The right to bring an action in assumpsit “exists whenever a person, natural or artificial, has in his or its possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff, and neither express promise nor privity between the parties is essential.” *Id.* at 626 (citation and emphasis omitted); see also *Trevor v. Fuhrmann*, 338 Mich. 219, 223-224; 61 N.W.2d 49 (1953). As our Supreme Court explained in *Moore v. Mandlebaum*, 8 Mich. 433, 448 (1860):

We understand the law to be well settled that an action of assumpsit for money had and received is essentially an equitable action, founded upon all the equitable circumstances of the case between the parties; and if it appear, from the whole case, that the defendant has in his hands money, which, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, belongs, or ought to be paid, to the plaintiff, he is entitled to recover; and that as a general rule, where money has been received by a defendant under any

state of facts which would in a court of equity entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the money, when that is the specific relief sought, the same state of facts will entitle him to recover the money in this action.

*5 “The basis of a common-law action for money had and received is not only the loss occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment of the defendant by reason of having received the same.” *Trevor*, 338 Mich. at 224-225.

In this case, plaintiff alleged a claim in assumpsit for money had and received on the ground that the GWKDD improperly overcharged Royal Oak contrary to the Drainage Board's resolution. Plaintiff based that alternative claim on its position as Royal Oak's assignee. Plaintiff did not dispute that Royal Oak passed through the alleged overcharges to its water and sewer ratepayers. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, as Royal Oak's assignee, could not maintain the assumpsit claim because Royal Oak suffered no recoverable loss. The trial court did not err in this regard.

Under Michigan law, an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and acquires only the same rights as the assignor and remains subject to the same defenses as the assignor.

Coventry Parkhomes Condo Ass'n. v. Fed. Nat'l. Mortg. Ass'n., 298 Mich. App. 252, 256-257; 827 N.W.2d 379 (2012). Therefore, as Royal Oak's assignee, plaintiff acquired no more rights than Royal Oak had at the time of the assignment and it remained subject to the same defenses as Royal Oak. In this case, plaintiff sought a refund of the alleged overcharges as Royal Oak's assignee. Royal Oak, however, passed through to its water and sewer ratepayers the GWKDD's charges by incorporating them into the water and sewer rates. Royal Oak suffered no loss because the funds it paid to the GWKDD were recovered from its ratepayers who paid their water and sewer bills. The record reflects that plaintiff conceded at the hearing that Royal Oak did nothing wrong and had authority to charge its ratepayers whatever amount the GWKDD charged Royal Oak, including the alleged overcharges, because Royal Oak was “purely a pass-through.” Thus, if the GWKDD overcharged and collected fees from Royal Oak for stormwater disposal, plaintiff can claim no right to recover from the GWKDD because Royal Oak suffered no loss from its payment of the alleged overcharges. Royal Oak passed on the charges

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and passed on the ratepayers' payments. Royal Oak recouped any excess payments from its water and sewer ratepayers. Royal Oak had no claim against the GWKDD that it had in its possession money which in equity and good conscience belonged to Royal Oak. Royal Oak, therefore, occasioned no compensable loss. *Trevor*, 338 Mich. at 224-225; *Hoyt*, 158 Mich. at 626. The trial court correctly discerned that Royal Oak had no claim in assumpsit. Consequently, plaintiff failed and could not state a claim in assumpsit.

Plaintiff argues that federal antitrust law principles articulated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Oakland Co. v. Detroit*, 866 F.2d 839 (CA 6, 1989) and the Supreme Court's decision in *Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720; 97 S. Ct. 2061; 52 L.Ed. 2d 707 (1977) should be considered and applied in this case. Both of those cases, however, are distinguishable because in *Oakland Co.*, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether counties had standing to bring a federal antitrust action and seek treble damages under the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and in *Illinois Brick*, the Supreme Court addressed who could seek recovery under the Clayton Act in an antitrust action. The courts considered who constituted an injured party within the meanings of RICO and the Clayton Act for federal antitrust violation claim purposes. The courts based their decisions on concerns that holding otherwise would lead to the filing of numerous antitrust actions and unmanageable antitrust class actions that presented enormous evidentiary complexities and uncertainties. We do not find the rationale for the courts' decisions applicable in this case. Further, neither case involved an equitable action in assumpsit. Accordingly, we decline to apply federal antitrust law principles in this case.

*6 Although the ratepayers may have had viable claims against a government entity for the overcharges they allegedly paid,⁴ the class members settled and released Royal Oak from any and all liability for refunds of their alleged overpayments. Under *Hoyt*, the right to bring an action for assumpsit must be held by the plaintiff who can establish that the defendant has in its possession money which, in equity and good conscience, belonged to the plaintiff. In this case, plaintiff sued as Royal Oak's assignee for recovery of money paid to the GWKDD. The money plaintiff sought did not belong to Royal Oak, its assignor, but to the ratepayers. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the GWKDD summary disposition of plaintiff's claim in assumpsit.⁵

III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Defendant argues that, in the absence of a contract, plaintiff's claims constituted negligence claims subject to government immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 *et seq.* Plaintiff counters by asserting that the trial court correctly decided that government immunity did not apply in this case. We agree that the trial court correctly determined this issue.

Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), "[s]ummary disposition may be granted when, among other things, a claim is barred by governmental immunity." *Dybata v. Wayne Co.*, 287 Mich. App. 635, 637; 791 N.W.2d 499 (2010). "When considering a motion brought under subrule (C)(7), the trial court must consider any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence submitted by the parties to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary disposition." *Id.* (citations omitted). "If no facts are in dispute, or if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, then the question whether the claim is barred by governmental immunity is an issue of law." *Id.* at 637. Further, this Court reviews de novo the application of governmental immunity. *Id.* at 638.

"The [GTLA] provides 'broad immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.' " *Milot v. DOT*, 318 Mich. App. 272, 276; 897 N.W.2d 248 (2016), quoting *Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing)*, 420 Mich. 567, 595; 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). There is no dispute that the GWKDD, a unit of Oakland County, a political subdivision of the state of Michigan, is a governmental entity generally immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407(1). *Milot*, 318 Mich. App. at 276. This Court explained in *Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. State of Michigan*, 231 Mich. App. 194, 203; 585 N.W.2d 762 (1998), rev'd on other grounds 464 Mich. 21 (2001), rev'd 537 U.S. 36; 123 S. Ct. 371; 154 L.Ed. 2d 377 (2002), that "[a]n action in assumpsit for money had and received is not an action in tort." "Therefore, governmental immunity from tort liability under MCL 691.1407 ... does not apply." *Id.* Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant's argument that, in the absence of a contract, plaintiff's assumpsit claim

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should have been construed as a negligence claim barred by governmental immunity. We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that governmental immunity did not apply in this case.

IV. AMENDED COMPLAINT

*7 Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to strike its first amended complaint and by denying its motion for leave to amend under MCR 2.118(A)(2) based on futility. We disagree.

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to strike a pleading.  *Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. Detroit*, 256 Mich. App. 463, 469; 666 N.W.2d 271 (2003). We also review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision regarding a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  *Kostadinovski v. Harrington*, 321 Mich. App. 736, 742-743; 909 N.W.2d 907 (2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision results in an outcome outside the range of principled outcomes. *Decker v. Trux R. U.S., Inc.*, 307 Mich. App. 472, 478; 861 N.W.2d 59 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.  *Kostadinovski*, 321 Mich. App. at 743. We review de novo a trial court's interpretation of a court rule.  *Acorn Investment Co. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass'n.*, 495 Mich. 338, 348; 852 N.W.2d 22 (2014). “[W]hether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law” subject to de novo review.  *Morris Pumps*, 273 Mich. App. at 193.

“The principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of the Michigan Court Rules.” *Decker*, 307 Mich. App. at 479. We look to “‘the plain language of the court rule in order to ascertain its meaning’ and the ‘intent of the rule must be determined from an examination of the court rule itself and its place within the structure of the Michigan Court Rules as a whole.’” *Id.*, quoting *Henry v. Dow Chem. Co.*, 484 Mich. 483, 495; 772 N.W.2d 301 (2009). “‘If the rule's language is plain and unambiguous, then judicial construction is not permitted and the rule must be applied as written.’” *Decker*, 307 Mich. App. at 479, quoting *Jenson v. Puste*, 290 Mich. App. 338, 342; 801 N.W.2d 639 (2010).

In this case, plaintiff filed the complaint on June 20, 2017. In lieu of answering, on August 18, 2017, the GWKDD

moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). Before responding to the GWKDD's summary disposition motion, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. That prompted the GWKDD to move to strike plaintiff's amended complaint under MCR 2.115(B) on the ground that its filing of a motion for summary disposition precluded plaintiff from filing an amended complaint without first obtaining leave from the trial court under MCR 2.118(B)(2). At the hearing on the GWKDD's motion to strike, the trial court held in abeyance its ruling. Nevertheless, the trial court later entered an order granting the GWKDD's motion and striking plaintiff's amended complaint.

MCR 2.118 governs amendment of a party's pleadings.

 *Lignons v. Crittenton Hosp.*, 490 Mich. 61, 80; 803 N.W.2d 271 (2011). MCR 2.118(A) provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 14 days after being served with a responsive pleading by an adverse party, or within 14 days after serving the pleading if it does not require a responsive pleading.

(2) Except as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.

*8 MCR 2.118(A)(1) permits a party to “amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 14 days after being served with a responsive pleading by an adverse party[.]”  *Lignons*, 490 Mich. at 80 (quotation marks and citation omitted). MCR 2.110(A) specifies that the term “pleading” includes only a complaint, a cross-complaint, a counterclaim, a third-party complaint, an answer, and a reply to an answer, and states that “[no] other pleading is allowed.” “[W]hen a court rule specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls.”  *Lignons*, 490 Mich. at 81 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The GWKDD's motion for summary disposition, therefore, was not a responsive pleading. *Huntington Woods v. Ajax Paving Indus., Inc.*, 179 Mich. App. 600, 601; 446 N.W.2d 331 (1989). Accordingly, plaintiff's right as a matter of course to amend its complaint under MCR 2.118(A)(1) was not triggered by GWKDD filing of its motion for summary disposition of plaintiff's claims in its original complaint. Plaintiff's filing without leave to amend did not comport with the requirements of MCR 2.118(A)(1). The trial court,

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therefore, did not abuse its discretion by striking plaintiff's improperly filed amended complaint.

The record reflects that plaintiff then moved for leave to amend its complaint to state two claims in assumpsit and to assert a new count for unjust enrichment. Under MCR 2.118(A)(2), "[a] court should freely grant leave to amend a complaint when justice so requires." *Lane v. Kindercare Learning Ctrs., Inc.*, 231 Mich. App. 689, 696; 588 N.W.2d 715 (1998). In *Lane*, this Court explained:

Ordinarily, a motion to amend a complaint should be granted, and should be denied only for the following particularized reasons: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or (5) futility of the amendment.

* * *

An amendment is futile if it merely restates the allegations already made or adds allegations that still fail to state a claim. [*Id.* at 697 (citations omitted).]

In this case, the record reflects that the trial court considered plaintiff's proposed amended complaint and determined that the amended allegations and proposed unjust enrichment claim failed to overcome plaintiff's original complaint's deficiencies and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's new unjust enrichment claim was futile for the same reasons that plaintiff's assumpsit claim failed.

The equitable right of restitution exists when a person has been unjustly enriched at another person's expense. *Morris Pumps*, 273 Mich. App. at 193. The law will imply a contract "to prevent unjust enrichment when one party inequitably receives and retains a benefit from another." *Id.* at 194; see also *Belle Isle Grill*, 256 Mich. App. at 478. To sustain a

claim of unjust enrichment, "a plaintiff must establish (1) the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant." *Morris Pumps*, 273 Mich. App. at 195. "In other words, the law will imply a contract to prevent unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the plaintiff's expense." *Id.*

In this case, plaintiff stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee. It alleged in its proposed amended complaint that the GWKDD was unjustly enriched by overcharging Royal Oak for the costs of stormwater disposal. Although plaintiff alleged that the GWKDD received a benefit and asserted that it would be unjust for the GWKDD to retain the alleged overcharges, plaintiff cannot establish any inequity resulting to Royal Oak from the GWKDD's retention of the overcharges because Royal Oak passed through to ratepayers the alleged overcharges and recouped from them the amount it allegedly overpaid. While the retention of the alleged overcharges collected by the GWKDD may have resulted in an inequity to the ratepayers, Royal Oak suffered no loss. The record reflects that plaintiff did not specifically allege in its proposed amended complaint that any inequity resulted to Royal Oak. Royal Oak could not state a claim for unjust enrichment under the circumstances presented in this case. Therefore, plaintiff, as Royal Oak's assignee, could not state a claim for unjust enrichment. Because Royal Oak admittedly passed through the charges to its water and sewer ratepayers, the GWKDD was not unjustly enriched at the expense of Royal Oak. *Id.* at 195. Accordingly, plaintiff's proposed unjust enrichment claim suffered from the same defect as its assumpsit claim and the trial court could properly deny plaintiff's motion to amend on the ground of futility. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend its complaint.

*9 Affirmed.

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 1965891

Footnotes

1 The trial court dismissed Oakland County based upon a stipulation of the parties.

- 2 MCL 280.462 provides: "County drains which are necessary for the public health may be located, established and constructed under the provisions of this chapter where the cost thereof is to be assessed wholly against public corporations." MCL 280.478 provides, in part: "Any necessary expenses incurred in the administration and in the operation and maintenance of the drain and not covered by contract shall be paid by the several public corporations assessed for the cost of the drain."
- 3 Defendant also argues that, because plaintiff's claims were premised on the resolution and Final Order of Apportionment, the claims challenged the propriety of the Final Order of Apportionment and the legality of apportioning the costs to Royal Oak. Defendant contends that plaintiff's claims were barred by the limitations period prescribed under MCL 280.483 which governs challenges to orders of apportionment. We find no merit to defendant's argument because plaintiff's complaint plainly did not challenge the apportionment decision. Further, we decline to review this issue because it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. See  *Fast Air, Inc v. Knight*, 235 Mich. App. 541, 549-550; 599 N.W.2d 489 (1999).
- 4 See  *Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor*, 383 Mich. 693; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970).
- 5 Defendant also argues that this action improperly imposed against it a certified class from the earlier settled action despite the fact that defendant was not a party to that action. Although defendant raised this issue before the trial court, the trial court did not decide the issue. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for review by this Court and we decline to review it. Further, the issue is not necessary for the disposition of this case.  *Fast Air, Inc.*, 235 Mich. App. at 549-550.

Exhibit 3

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2021 WL 137773

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC, as Trustee for
a Certified Class of Persons and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE
DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 351317

|

January 14, 2021

Oakland Circuit Court, LC No. 2019-172077-CZ

Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Cavanagh and Tukel, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff, assignee of the City of Oak Park and trustee for a certified class of persons defined in the final order approving a class settlement in Lower Court No. 15-149751-CZ, appeals as of right the trial court's opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Defendant is a drainage district, which is an independent corporate entity that has powers conferred upon it by law.¹ Drainage districts are governed by drainage boards.² Defendant maintains and operates the George W. Kuhn Drain (the drain), which operates in an area that includes Oak Park.

Oak Park has a combined sewer system that collects both sanitary sewage and stormwater. That sewer system flows to the system operated by defendant. Generally, defendant diverts all of the stormwater flow from Oak Park and the other communities within the operational area of the drain

to two water treatment plants respectively operated by the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department and the Great Lakes Water Authority. All of the subject stormwater flow travels through Detroit's Dequindre Interceptor, and there the flow is measured by a meter. Accordingly, the water treatment plants charge defendant an annual flat rate to dispose of stormwater based on the measured flow, and defendant allocates that charge among the communities within the operational area of the drain.

In February 2005, defendant's drainage board tentatively established an apportionment of the costs of the drain for stormwater disposal for the communities within the operational area of the drain. As part of the apportionment, the drainage board made an allocation on the basis of an assumption that all water purchased from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department would be returned as sanitary flow, and so only the difference between the purchased water and the "Master Meter Charges" would be considered stormwater flow. Thus, under the apportionment, two rates would be charged to the communities within the drain's operational area, one for the cost of sanitary sewage flow into the drain, and the other for stormwater flow, which would be apportioned among the communities on the basis of an engineering study that determined each community's contribution of stormwater.

In April 2005, the drainage board resolved to adopt the tentative apportionment of costs it established in February 2005. On the same day, the drainage board entered a Final Order of Apportionment that provided an apportionment of costs between the communities within the operational areas of the drain.

In February 2019, in Lower Court No. 2015-149951-CZ, the trial court entered a final judgment and order approving a class settlement between the plaintiffs, two persons acting as individuals and as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons (the class action plaintiffs), and the defendant, Oak Park.³ The instant trial court took specific notice of the assignment provisions of that settlement agreement according to which any claims Oak Park possessed against Oakland County or its agencies—including defendant—for storm water management services relating to overcharges for stormwater management services would be assigned to the class action plaintiffs "or for their benefit." Additionally, plaintiff was appointed trustee of a litigation trust to pursue the claims against defendant on behalf of the

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plaintiffs, and was also appointed counsel for the litigation trust.

*2 The trial court also noted that the class action plaintiffs and other members of the class who did not ask to be excluded from the class would be deemed to have executed a release of all claims against Oak Park relating to the assessment and costs of water and sewer rates “from the beginning of time through the date” of the final judgment and a period of time thereafter. Subsequently, Oak Park executed an assignment of claims to plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on the basis of the assignment of Oak Park's claims to plaintiff as a trustee for the class action plaintiffs. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant charged Oak Park approximately \$3 million dollars per year for the disposal of stormwater. It further alleged that Oak Park “passe[d] on that cost to its sewer Customers by imposing stormwater charges in its sewer rates to recover the entire \$3 million plus per year imposed upon the City by [defendant] on an annual basis.” According to the complaint, the amount defendant charged Oak Park for stormwater disposal should have been the same amount defendant was charged by the water treatment plants for stormwater disposal.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant charged Oak Park “substantially more than the amount” charged by the water treatment plants for the disposal of Oak Park's stormwater since at least 2011. According to the complaint, defendant improperly reallocated the sanitary sewage disposal costs imposed by the water treatment plants to stormwater disposal costs, and as a result defendant overcharged Oak Park. Thus, plaintiff raised claims of breach of contract, assumpsit, and unjust enrichment against defendant. The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff's claims.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion for summary disposition. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. *Zaher v. Miotke*, 300 Mich.

App. 132, 139; 832 N.W.2d 266 (2013). The trial court granted defendant's motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). “A court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if ‘[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.’ A motion brought under subrule (C) (8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint solely on the basis of the pleadings.” *Dailey v. Dykema Gossett*, 287 Mich. App. 296, 304; 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010) (alteration in original), quoting *Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.*, 470 Mich. 274, 277; 681 N.W.2d 342 (2004). “When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” *El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.*, 504 Mich. 152, 160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” *Id.*

“Generally, this Court reviews de novo ‘[t]he interpretation of statutes and court rules.’ ” *Simcor Constr., Inc. v. Trupp*, 322 Mich. App. 508, 513; 912 N.W.2d 216 (2018) (alteration in original), quoting *Estes v. Titus*, 481 Mich. 573, 578; 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008). “[T]he rules governing statutory interpretation apply with equal force to a municipal ordinance” *Bonner v. City of Brighton*, 495 Mich. 209, 222; 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014). The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo.” *Kloian v. Domino's Pizza L.L.C.*, 273 Mich. App. 449, 452; 733 N.W.2d 766 (2006). This Court reviews equity cases “de novo on the record on appeal.” *Tkachik v. Mandeville*, 487 Mich. 38, 44-45; 790 N.W.2d 260 (2010). “Whether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law that we review de novo.” *Karaus v. Bank of New York Mellon*, 300 Mich. App. 9, 22; 831 N.W.2d 897 (2012).

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT

*3 Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff failed to state a breach-of-contract claim. We disagree.

“A party claiming a breach of contract must establish (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach.” *Dunn v. Bennett*, 303 Mich. App. 767, 774; 846 N.W.2d 75 (2013) (quotation

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marks and citation omitted). “The party seeking to enforce a contract bears the burden of proving that the contract exists.” *AFT Mich. v. Michigan*, 497 Mich. 197, 235; 866 N.W.2d 782 (2015). “Michigan courts will not lightly presume the existence of an enforceable contract because, regardless of the equities in a case, the courts cannot make a contract for the parties when none exists.” *Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Daniel J. Aronoff Living Trust*, 305 Mich. App. 496, 508; 853 N.W.2d 481 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is a “strong presumption that statutes do not create contractual rights.” *Studier v. Mich. Pub. Sch. Employees’ Retirement Bd.*, 472 Mich. 642, 661; 698 N.W.2d 350 (2005). Thus, “absent an adequate expression of an actual intent of the State to bind itself, courts should not construe laws declaring a scheme of public regulation as also creating private contracts to which the state is a party.” *Id.* at 662 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

The elements required to create a valid contract are “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” *Thomas v. Leja*, 187 Mich. App. 418, 422; 468 N.W.2d 58 (1991). “In order for consideration to exist, there must be a bargained-for exchange—a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the other.” *Bank of America, NA v. First American Title Ins. Co.*, 499 Mich. 74, 101; 878 N.W.2d 816 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contracts necessarily contain promises: a contract may consist of a mutual exchange of promises, or the performance of a service in exchange for a promise.” *AFT*, 497 Mich. at 235-236 (citations omitted). “‘Before a contract can be completed, there must be an offer and acceptance. Unless an acceptance is unambiguous and in strict conformance with the offer, no contract is formed.’” *Kloian*, 273 Mich. App. at 452, quoting *Pakideh v. Franklin Commercial Mtg. Group, Inc.*, 213 Mich. App. 636, 640; 540 N.W.2d 777 (1995). “A basic requirement of contract formation is that the parties mutually assent to be bound.” *Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.*, 444 Mich. 107, 118; 507 N.W.2d 591 (1993). In other words, “the parties must have a ‘meeting of the minds’ on all the essential elements of the agreement.” *Huntington*, 305 Mich. App. at 508. Courts determine if there was a meeting of the minds by reviewing objective evidence such as “the expressed words of the parties and their visible acts.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the April 2005 resolution of the drainage board and the Final Order of Apportionment created a contract between defendant and Oak Park, and that defendant breached that contract when it overcharged Oak Park for stormwater disposal. The trial court ruled that those documents did not satisfy the elements of contract formation because they did not contain “any offer or promises or promises made by either party to the other that require[d] acceptance”

*4 In its brief on appeal, plaintiff does not explain how the April 2005 resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment satisfied the elements of contract formation, and instead argues that the April 2005 resolution was binding on defendant whether or not it was a contract. However, in its reply brief, plaintiff addressed for the first time whether the Final Order of Apportionment and the April 2005 resolution satisfied the elements of contract formation, arguing that the consideration between Oak Park and defendant consisted of defendant's promise to charge Oak Park “a particular allocated percentage of the total cost of stormwater disposal.”

“Reply briefs must be confined to rebuttal, and a party may not raise new or additional arguments in its reply brief.”

Kinder Morgan Mich., L.L.C. v. City of Jackson, 277 Mich. App. 159, 174; 744 N.W.2d 184 (2007). Further, “[a] party may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” *Wolfe v. Wayne-Westland Community Sch.*, 267 Mich. App. 130, 139; 703 N.W.2d 480 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a party fails to adequately brief a position, or support a claim with authority, it is abandoned.” *MOSES, Inc. v. SEMCOG*, 270 Mich. App. 401, 417; 716 N.W.2d 278 (2006).

Plaintiff did not raise any challenges regarding the elements of contract formation in its brief on appeal, and may not do so in its reply brief. Given that plaintiff failed to adequately brief this argument, we deem it abandoned. And even if plaintiff had properly presented its arguments regarding consideration, plaintiff failed to address the other elements of contract formation therefore plaintiff would have otherwise failed to expose error on the part of the trial court.

Regardless, even if plaintiff had properly argued that the April 2005 resolution and the Final Order of Apportionment satisfied the elements of contract formation, a brief review of

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the relevant portions of the Drain Code reveals that such an argument would have been meritless. Plaintiff is the assignee of Oak Park, and Oak Park is a public corporation that benefits from the drain that is operated and maintained by defendant. Under MCL 280.468, the drainage board was required to apportion the costs for the drain on the basis of the benefits accrued to each benefiting public corporation, and under MCL 280.478(1) and MCL 280.478(2) the drainage board was required to make an apportionment of costs for any necessary expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the drain. As a benefiting public corporation, Oak Park had the opportunity to object to the drainage board's apportionment of costs. See MCL 280.469.

Plaintiff's complaint did not raise any claim that the drainage board failed to comply with the Drain Code when it entered the Final Order of Apportionment, MCL 280.460, and plaintiff explicitly abandoned any such challenge in its brief on appeal. Given the requirements set by the Drain Code, the drainage board was in no way engaged in bargaining with Oak Park or any of the other benefiting public corporations when it entered the Final Order of Apportionment pursuant to its statutory obligations. The drainage board made no offer to Oak Park, there was no bargained-for exchange, or meeting of the minds, between Oak Park and defendant before the Final Order of Apportionment was entered, and none was required. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to overcome the strong presumption that the Final Order of Apportionment did not create a contract. See *Studier*, 472 Mich. at 661. And while the Drain Code authorizes a drainage board to enter into contracts with public corporations, MCL 280.471, plaintiff did not allege that Oak Park had a separate contract with defendant.

*5 Plaintiff also briefly contends that municipal resolutions are enforceable by their beneficiaries, citing our Supreme Court's holding in *Hardaway v. Wayne Co.*, 494 Mich. 423; 835 N.W.2d 336 (2013). In that decision, the Court held that this Court improperly applied the last antecedent rule when it interpreted a municipal resolution pertaining to the entitlement of retirement benefits, and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition of the plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim in favor of the defendant.

Id. at 425, 427-429. Given that *Hardaway* concerned a declaratory judgment claim disposed of by way of summary disposition, rather than a breach-of-contract claim premised on a municipal resolution, it is unclear why plaintiff relies on *Hardaway*.

C. ASSUMPSIT & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff failed to allege any damages in support of its assumpsit and unjust enrichment claims. We disagree.

The Michigan Supreme Court explained actions of assumpsit as follows:

"We understand the law to be well settled, that the action of *assumpsit* for money had and received is essentially an equitable action, founded upon all the equitable circumstances of the case between the parties, and if it appear, from the whole case, that the defendant has in his hands money which, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, belongs, or ought to be paid, to the plaintiff, he is entitled to recover. And that, as a general rule, where money has been received by a defendant under any state of facts which would in a court of equity entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the money, when that is the specific relief sought, the same state of facts will entitle him to recover the money in this action." [*Trevor v. Fuhrmann*, 338 Mich. 219, 223-224; 61 N.W.2d 49 (1953), quoting *Moore v. Mandlebaum*, 8 Mich. 433, 448 (1860).]

"Assumpsit may be upon an express contract or promise, or for nonperformance of an oral or simple written contract, or it may be a general assumpsit upon a promise or contract implied by law." *Kristoffy v. Iwanski*, 255 Mich. 25, 28; 237 N.W. 33 (1931). "The right to bring this action exists whenever a person, natural or artificial, has in his or its possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff, and neither express promise nor privity between the parties is essential." *Hoyt v. Paw Paw Grape Juice Co.*, 158 Mich. 619, 626; 123 N.W. 529 (1909). "The basis of a common-law action for money had and received is not only the loss occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment of the defendant by reason of having received the same." *Trevor*, 338 Mich. at 224-225 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Unjust enrichment is "the equitable counterpart of a legal claim for breach of contract." *AFT Mich. v. Michigan*, 303 Mich. App. 651, 677; 846 N.W.2d 583 (2014). A party may raise a claim of unjust enrichment "only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter." *Local Emergency*

Fin. Assistance Loan Bd. v. Blackwell, 299 Mich. App. 727, 734; 832 N.W.2d 401 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The complaining party must establish “(1) the receipt of a benefit by the other party from the complaining party and (2) an inequity resulting to the complaining party because of the retention of the benefit by the other party.”

█ *Karaus*, 300 Mich. App. at 22-23. Unjust enrichment “describes the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of or for property or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor.” █ *Id.* at 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

*6 In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that, even if there was no contract between Oak Park and defendant, defendant overcharged Oak Park for stormwater disposal by way of the Final Order of Apportionment. Plaintiff thus raised claims in assumpsit and unjust enrichment against defendant. The trial court granted summary disposition of those claims because it ruled that plaintiff “failed to show that Oak Park suffered any damages.” At the outset, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff’s claims in assumpsit and unjust enrichment, and it notes that those claims are essentially indistinguishable. We agree with the latter proposition and so will consider plaintiff’s arguments regarding its unjust enrichment and assumpsit claims together.

Following its recitation of why it believes that claims of unjust enrichment and assumpsit against defendant were proper if there was no contract between defendant and Oak Park, plaintiff does not directly address the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff failed to show that Oak Park was damaged by the stormwater disposal overcharges. Instead, plaintiff contends that Oak Park was the only entity that had standing to bring these claims against defendant, because the class action plaintiffs (i.e., Oak Park’s ratepayers) did not directly pay the assessed stormwater disposal costs to defendant. However, the trial court did not reach the issue of plaintiff’s standing by virtue of the assignment⁴ it received from Oak Park, having disposed of the case on the ground that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Oak Park was damaged by the stormwater disposal overcharges.

While the trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling, plaintiff alleged in its complaint that Oak Park “passe[d] on that cost to its sewer Customers by imposing stormwater charges in its sewer rates to recover the entire \$3 million plus per year imposed upon the City by [defendant] on an

annual basis.” Plaintiff attached a copy of the final judgment of the class action lawsuit to its complaint, in which the trial court for that case noted that, per the settlement agreement between Oak Park and the class action plaintiffs, the class action plaintiffs were deemed to have executed a release of all claims against Oak Park relating to the assessment and costs of water and sewer rates “from the beginning of time through the date” of the final judgment, as well as a period of time for future claims. And plaintiff concedes in its reply brief that the class action plaintiffs released their claims against Oak Park.

Given the foregoing, we surmise that the trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish that Oak Park was harmed by the stormwater disposal overcharges because Oak Park directly passed on that cost to the class action plaintiffs, who in turn released any claims they had against Oak Park. Because the actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge (i.e., the class action plaintiffs) released their claims against Oak Park, plaintiff cannot show that defendant either retained money that in “good conscience, belongs, or ought to be paid, to the plaintiff,” *Trevor*, 338 Mich. at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted), or that Oak Park suffered an inequity,

█ *Karaus*, 300 Mich. App. at 22-23, because the money at issue belonged to Oak Park’s ratepayers as opposed to Oak Park itself.

Plaintiff argues that any ruling that Oak Park was not harmed by the stormwater disposal overcharges because it passed through the overcharges to the class action plaintiffs runs afoul of a general rejection of “pass-through” defenses in all jurisdictions where such a defense has been raised. In support of its argument, plaintiff relies on a miscellany of decisions from a number of different contexts.

*7 The earliest decision upon which plaintiff relies, █ *Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.*, 245 U.S. 531, 533-535; 38 S. Ct. 186; 62 L. Ed. 451 (1918), arose from a judgment obtained against a number of railroad defendants (i.e., common carriers) after the Interstate Commerce Commission found that the rate they charged for transporting hardwood lumber was excessive, and where the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were permitted to collect a judgment against the defendants even if the plaintiffs may have passed on the excessive charge to their own customers. The Court explained that a common “carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from whom the carrier took the

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sum,” because “of the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result.” *Id.* Thus, that holding pertained to proceedings involving a decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and commercial transactions where it would be difficult to ascertain how the excessive rate affected the prices paid by customers of the affected businesses. Given that plaintiff readily alleged in its complaint that Oak Park passed the overcharges on to its ratepayers, and has not shown that there would be any particular complexity in determining how the overcharge directly affected the fees paid by Oak Park's ratepayers, plaintiff's reliance on *Southern Pacific Co.* is inapt.

Plaintiff also relies on decisions with similar holdings that pertain to claims based on federal antitrust violations:

 *Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.*, 392 U.S. 481, 488-489, 493-494; 88 S. Ct. 2224; 20 L. Ed. 2d 1231 (1968) (rejecting a “passing-on” defense while recognizing that a buyer who was charged an illegally high price for materials used for the buyer's business had established a prima facie case under federal antitrust law);  *Oakland Co. v. Detroit*, 866 F.2d 839, 844-846 (C.A. 6, 1989)⁵ (holding that the county plaintiffs would have standing to bring claims under federal antitrust and racketeering law and could demonstrate an injury even if they recouped the illegal overcharges by passing it on to their own customers). However, those decisions pertain to claims based on violations of specific federal statutes rather than claims in assumpsit or unjust enrichment. Because the rationale for their disavowal of a “pass-through” or “passing-on” defense is based on considerations directly related to the aforementioned federal statutes, those cases do not militate in favor of adopting those holdings in the wholly distinct context of claims in assumpsit or unjust enrichment. Moreover, plaintiff, by virtue of its representation of the class action plaintiffs, fully demonstrated that a class action claim could be brought against Oak Park by its ratepayers, even if that litigation ended with the class action plaintiffs agreeing to release their claims against Oak Park.

Plaintiff also cites  *Northern Arizona Gas Serv., Inc. v. Petrolane Transp., Inc.*, 145 Ariz. 467, 476; 702 P.2d 696 (Ariz. App., 1984), where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's “waiver of its claim for lost profits did not constitute an admission that none resulted from [the defendant's] activities,” because “it was based on the complexity of issues of proof—the very reason for the supreme court's rejection of the passing-on defense in

Hanover Shoe.” And the Arizona court also noted that the plaintiff was “the only party that can recover the overcharge from” the defendant. *Id.* Plaintiff has not shown that there is any complexity with issues of proof regarding the effect of the overcharges, and, as discussed above, Oak Park's rate-payers were entitled to recover the overcharges from Oak Park but they released those claims. Therefore, plaintiff's reliance on this decision is inapt.

For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Oak Park did not incur any damages in this matter.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion for summary disposition because plaintiff's allegation that defendant charged Oak Park an unreasonable rate for stormwater disposal presented a question of fact. Again, we are not persuaded.

*8 In its complaint, plaintiff supported its second claim in assumpsit and its claim of unjust enrichment by alleging that defendant's charge for stormwater disposal was unreasonable because it exceeded the costs set by the Final Order of Apportionment. The trial court did not specifically address that allegation in its ruling, having disposed of the case on the ground of the lack of damages suffered by Oak Park. Because we affirm the result below on that ground, we need not consider the question of reasonableness of the stormwater disposal charge.

Nonetheless, plaintiff fails to show that defendant was under some general duty of reasonableness in connection with its stormwater disposal charges. Plaintiff relies on  *Mapleview Estates, Inc. v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich. App. 412; 671 N.W.2d 572 (2003). The discussion of reasonableness in that decision was limited to whether a “tap-in fee” for connecting to a municipal water system was reasonable under the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, MCL 141.101 *et seq.*, where a municipality is permitted to set the rates for services falling under that act provided that those rates are reasonable.

 *Id.* at 417-418.⁶ But plaintiff provides no argument or explanation regarding how the RBA might be applicable in this situation.

And plaintiff did not raise an independent claim in its complaint that defendant charged unreasonable rates; rather, its allegation that the rates were unreasonable merely supported a claim in assumpsit and a claim of unjust

enrichment. Given that plaintiff has failed to cite legal authorities that establish defendant was required to charge a reasonable rate, or otherwise adequately brief how the trial court erred, plaintiff has abandoned this argument on appeal. See *MOSES, Inc.*, 270 Mich. App. at 417; *Wolfe*, 267 Mich. App. at 139.

Plaintiff also briefly contends that defendant asserts that Oak Park released its claims against defendant during the class action suit. There is no indication that defendant actually

raised this argument in the trial court. Because the trial court never considered any such contention, we decline to consider it.

Affirmed.

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2021 WL 137773

Footnotes

1 See MCL 280.5.

2 See MCL 280.464.

3 These class action plaintiffs were legally represented by plaintiff.

4 “Under general contract law, rights can be assigned unless the assignment is clearly restricted,” and an “assignee stands in the position of the assignor, possessing the same rights and being subject to the same defenses.”  *Burkhardt v. Bailey*, 260 Mich. App. 636, 653; 680 N.W.2d 453 (2004).

5 “Opinions of the lower federal courts and foreign jurisdictions are not binding but may be considered persuasive.” *People v. Patton*, 325 Mich. App. 425, 435 n. 1; 925 N.W.2d 901 (2018).

6 Plaintiff also cites two other decisions that do not show that defendant was required to charge a reasonable rate. See  *Trahey v. Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 594; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015) (where the city defendant challenged the trial court's finding that its water and sewer rates were unreasonable under the defendant's own city charter, which required the defendant's city council to set “just and reasonable rates” for public utility services provided by the defendant);  *Plymouth v. Detroit*, 423 Mich. 106, 111; 377 N.W.2d 689 (1985) (a breach of contract action where the municipal water contract between the parties required the defendant to set rates for the water that was reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the defendant).

Exhibit 4

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2019 WL 360730

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Leonard S. BOHN, Individually and as
Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated
Persons and Entities, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 339306

January 29, 2019

Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 15-013727-CZ

Before: Murray, C.J., and Servitto and Shapiro, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant's water and sewer rates were unreasonable and that they constituted disguised taxes in violation of the Const. 1963, art. 9, §§ 25-34, popularly known as the Headlee Amendment. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.¹

¹ A trial court's decision whether to grant summary disposition is reviewed de novo. *Pace v. Edel-Harrelson*, 499 Mich. 1, 5; 878 N.W.2d 784 (2016). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of

reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [*Bank of America, NA v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins Co*, 316 Mich. App. 480, 488; 892 N.W.2d 467 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant City of Taylor (the City) operates and maintains a water and sewer system. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging numerous improprieties in the City's water and sewer ratemaking. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the computation of the City's sewer rates as well as the fact that the City no longer directly pays for public fire protection costs.

Specifically, plaintiffs raise two issues relating to the determination of the City's sewer rates. The parties agree that the first step of ratemaking is to determine the utility's revenue requirements. The parties also agree that, as a general matter, a utility may recover depreciation expenses through its rates. However, plaintiffs maintain through their expert, Kerry Heid, that it is improper for the City to include depreciation as an expense when it uses the cash-basis approach to determining its revenue requirements. The City admits that it is improper to include depreciation when calculating cash-basis revenue requirements. But the City, relying on its expert, Eric Rothstein, contends that the term "depreciation" was improperly used in its calculations and that the term was merely used as a "proxy" to provide funding to calculate its capital expenditures.

Plaintiffs also take issue with the accumulation of a reserve fund which will be used to fund maintenance, repairs, and improvements to the City's sewer system. Plaintiffs contend that the sewer reserve fund, which now totals over \$ 10,000,000, shows that the City's sewer rates are in excess of the City's actual costs. Plaintiffs also maintain that it is improper for the City to use funds received from sewer rates to pay for future capital improvements to the sewer system. However, plaintiffs concede that it is appropriate for the City to maintain a reserve fund for the purposes of maintaining and repairing its sewer system, and the City argues that plaintiffs failed to establish that the amount in the City's fund is unreasonable. The City also contends that the reserve fund is properly maintained to address near-term needs and therefore does not raise concerns of "intergenerational inequity."

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*2 Lastly, plaintiffs claim that it is improper for the City to incorporate the cost of public fire protection into its service rates. Plaintiffs assert that the City should pay for those costs out of its general fund and that it is violating a City ordinance by failing to do so. Yet plaintiffs have not produced evidence that the City actually includes fire protection costs in its service rates. Further, the City contends that it is appropriate to pass the cost of public fire protection directly to consumers.

The parties filed competing motions for summary disposition. In a written opinion and order, the trial court determined that plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sewer rates constitute an unlawful tax and whether the rates were unreasonable. The trial court also determined that plaintiffs failed to establish that the City includes the cost of fire protection in its water rates.

II. ANALYSIS

A. REASONABLENESS OF SEWER RATES

The City's Charter provides that the city council "shall have the power to fix from time to time such just and reasonable rates and other charges as may be deemed advisable for supplying the inhabitants of the City and others with such public services as the City may provide...." Taylor Charter, § 17.3. The Charter does not provide any standards for determining "just and reasonable rates." But Taylor Ordinance, § 50-25(c), provides:

The rates and charges hereby established shall be based upon a methodology which complies with applicable federal and state statutes and regulations. The amount of the rates and charges shall be sufficient to provide for debt service and for the expenses of operation, maintenance and replacement of the system as necessary to preserve the same in good repair and working order. The amount of the rates and charges shall be reviewed annually and revised when necessary to ensure system expenses are met and that all users pay their proportionate share of

operation, maintenance and equipment replacement expenses.

It is well established that municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable. *Trahey v. Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 594; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015). "The determination of 'reasonableness' is generally considered by courts to be a question of fact." *Novi v. Detroit*, 433 Mich. 414, 431; 446 N.W.2d 118 (1989). "[T]he presumption of reasonableness may be overcome by a proper showing of evidence." *Trahey*, 311 Mich. App. at 594. It is a plaintiff's burden "to show that any given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable." *Id.* "Absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility's rates, a court has no authority to disregard the presumption that the rate is reasonable." *Id.* at 595.

Under the cash-basis method of utility ratemaking, a municipality first determines "the cash needs of the utility for a given period, *i.e.*, the dollars needed to pay the expense of operation, meet debt obligations, and make such capital improvements as would not require bond financing, *e.g.*, limited new plant construction, plus recurring replacements, renovation and extensions of existing plant." *Plymouth v. Detroit*, 423 Mich. 106, 115; 377 N.W.2d 689 (1985). Plaintiffs first argue that the City improperly includes depreciation when it calculates its expenses under the cash-basis method of ratemaking. Plaintiffs' expert, Heid, reached this conclusion by relying on ratemaking manuals which provide that depreciation is not to be included when determining cash-needs revenue requirements. The City's expert, Rothstein, agrees that depreciation, which is a non-cash expense, should not count as an expense under a cash-basis ratemaking approach. But Rothstein opined that the City had simply used the label of "depreciation expense" as a proxy for properly included costs, *i.e.*, for investment in infrastructure renewal and rehabilitation.

*3 To begin, we note that the City is not required by law or ordinance to adhere to any ratemaking approach. Nor must the City abide by any particular ratemaking manual or guideline. Thus, we decline to hold that the City's failure to strictly follow the cash-basis approach renders its rates unreasonable or that the inclusion of depreciation in its rates is illegal or improper. To the contrary, it is common for utilities to set rates to cover the costs of depreciation. See 64 Am Jur 2d, Public Utilities, § 125, p. 516. Further, it is permissible to include a capital investment component in utility rates. See

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Bolt v. Lansing, 459 Mich. 152, 160, 164-165; 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998).

That said, we agree with plaintiffs that the City should not be allowed to accomplish a “double recovery” by counting a single expense twice in determining its revenue requirements. However, plaintiffs have not provided evidence showing that the City has engaged in such a practice. While plaintiffs note that the City has included debt service payments as a budgeted expense in its sewer rates analysis, plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence that those payments are related to the depreciated items. Indeed, Heid admitted that he did not identify any specific items in defendant's budget that were funded through debt, that he did not identify any specific instances in which defendant collected for the same amount twice, and that he could not be aware of any such instances without going through each individual item of defendant's budget.

Thus, while plaintiffs argue that the City may have obtained a double recovery by including depreciated expenses in its sewer rates, they have failed to provide any supporting evidence on that matter. By contrast, Rothstein consulted with the City officials and determined that the City did not include depreciation expense and capital expenditure projections separately but rather used depreciation expense to inform its estimate of required capital expenditures. Heid also acknowledged that it is sometimes appropriate for utilities to use depreciation as a proxy for other expenses. Although the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, they have failed to offer specific evidence that would give rise to a factual dispute regarding the depreciated expenses. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to present clear evidence that the inclusion of depreciation costs in the City's sewer rates was improper or that this practice renders those rates unreasonable.

Next, plaintiffs challenge what they deem to be an excessive sewer reserve fund. Taylor Ordinances, § 50-24, provides that “[a]ll funds, including surplus funds, if any, shall be kept in separate accounts for the benefit of the bondholders, the operation and maintenance of the water and sewer divisions, and for no other purpose.” Heid agreed that the City should be allowed to maintain a reserve fund for maintenance and repair of the sewer system. Indeed, rate-based public utilities commonly maintain a capital reserve to provide fiscal stability. *Jackson Co v. City of Jackson*, 302 Mich. App. 90, 111; 836 N.W.2d 903 (2013). Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence as to how much money should actually be in

the City's sewer fund. Heid testified that he does not know what work needs to be done to the City's sewer system and does not know how much the City needs in reserves for sewer replacements. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not shown that the amount of the City's sewer reserve fund is unreasonable per se.

Instead, plaintiffs contend that the City must have a specific plan for capital improvements equivalent to the amount in the reserve fund and that without such a plan, the fund's existence is evidence that the rates are excessive. Plaintiffs do not provide any authority (legal or otherwise) to support this contention. Setting that aside, we note that numerous witnesses testified that the City has undertaken or initiated actions and processes to assess its aging sewer system and to prepare and pursue a plan to repair and rehabilitate that system. There was also testimony that the City's reserves are insufficient to meet its infrastructure renewal needs.

*4 Plaintiffs counter that this a “post-hoc” justification and the City did not accumulate the reserve pursuant to any kind of capital improvement plan. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that to be true. However, we do not see how the lack of a capital improvement plan renders the accumulation of a reserve fund improper. First, there can be no plan to address the City's *unexpected* maintenance and repairs costs, which is one of the purposes of the fund. Second, Heid opined that the size of the reserve fund is largely due to the City's inclusion of depreciated expenses in its rates. Thus, the reserve fund is inherently aimed toward the replacement and renewal of the sewer system. In other words, by including depreciation expenses in its rates, the City is saving for the day when the depreciated items will need to be replaced. This does not mean, however, that the City must at all times have a plan in place for infrastructure replacements. Presumably, large improvement projects are not continuously planned and executed. Rather, such projects occur periodically as the pipes and other infrastructure decays. The evidence shows that the City is currently inspecting its system and planning infrastructure improvements, for which it will use the reserve fund. Plaintiffs fail to explain why the City must constantly have a capital improvement plan to justify the accumulation of funds that will eventually be used to fund the renewal and replacement of the sewer system.

In sum, plaintiffs fail to establish that any of the City's ratemaking practices are improper or unreasonable. Nor have plaintiffs proffered any evidence that the City's sewer rates are unreasonable. Heid admitted that he does not know what

a reasonable rate is without performing a full cost of service study and that he would not be testifying concerning the amount of a reasonable rate. In general, “rate-making is a legislative function that is better left to the discretion of the governmental body authorized to set rates.” *Novi*, 433 Mich. at 427. “Courts of law are ill-equipped to deal with the complex, technical processes required to evaluate the various cost factors and various methods of weighing those factors required in rate-making.” *Id.* at 430. In the absence of a complete study of the rate structure and all of its components, it is speculative to suggest that the City's sewer rates are unreasonable. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on that matter, and the trial court correctly granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

B. THE HEADLEE AMENDMENT

The pertinent provision of the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31, states:

Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon.

The levying of a new tax without voter approval violates this section of the Headlee Amendment. *Jackson Co*, 302 Mich. App. at 99. However, a charge that constitutes a user fee is not subject to the Headlee Amendment. *Id.* The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the charge at issue. *Id.* at 98. A court decides, as a question of law, whether a charge is a permissible fee or an illegal tax. *Westlake Transp, Inc v. Public Serv Comm*, 255 Mich. App. 589, 611; 662 N.W.2d 784 (2003).

“There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment.” *Bolt*, 459 Mich. at 160. In general, “a fee is exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and some reasonable

relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit. A tax, on the other hand, is designed to raise revenue.” *Id.* at 161 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In *Bolt*, our Supreme Court identified three key criteria to use in distinguishing between a user fee and a tax: (1) a user fee serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose; (2) a user fee is proportionate to the necessary costs of the service; and (3) a user fee is voluntary in that property owners are able to refuse or limit their use of the service. *Id.* at 161-162. “These criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee.” *Wheeler v. Shelby Charter Twp*, 265 Mich. App. 657, 665; 697 N.W.2d 180 (2005) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

*5 Water and sewer rates are generally considered user fees rather than taxes because they represent a fee paid in exchange for a service. See *Bolt*, 459 Mich. at 162. Water and sewer rates are not always considered user fees, however, because they must be proportionate to the cost of the service. See *Bolt*, 338 Mich. at 162 n. 12. That said, as discussed above, plaintiffs have not presented evidence that the City's sewer rates themselves are unreasonable particularly in light of Heid's concession that he had not performed a rate study and that he held no opinion concerning the reasonableness of the rates. Considering that plaintiffs fail to overcome the presumption that the City's rates are reasonable, we find no basis from which to conclude that the those rates are not proportionate to the cost of service. Instead, the rates constitute a valid user fee because users pay their proportionate share of the expenses associated with the operation and maintenance of the sewer systems. See Taylor Ordinances, § 50-25(c).

Consideration of the other *Bolt* criteria does not alter the conclusion that the City's sewer rates constitute a user fee rather than a tax. The first *Bolt* factor indicates that the rates comprise a valid user fee because the rates serve a regulatory purpose of providing sewer services to the City's residents. Although the rates generate funds to pay for the operation and maintenance of the sewer system, this by itself does not establish that the rates serve a primary revenue-generating purpose. “While a fee must serve a primary regulatory purpose, it can also raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose.” *Graham v. Kochville Twp*, 236 Mich. App. 141, 151; 599 N.W.2d 793 (1999).

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Plaintiffs, relying on *Bolt*, 459 Mich. 152, contend that it is impermissible for the City to incorporate costs in its sewer rates which will be used to fund future capital improvements. In *Bolt*, the City of Lansing imposed a “storm water service charge” on property owners to fund the separation of the remaining portion of its combined sanitary and storm systems. *Id.* at 155. The Supreme Court determined that the storm water service charge failed to satisfy the first and second criteria because the charge did not correspond to the benefits conferred. *Id.* at 165. 75% of the property owners in Lansing were already served by a separate storm and sanitary sewer system, but those property owners would be charged the same amount as the 25% who would benefit most from the construction. *Id.* Further, the cost of this project was \$ 176 million over 30 years. *Id.* at 155. The Court noted that the charge was “an investment in infrastructure that will substantially outlast the current ‘mortgage’ that the storm water charge requires property owners to amortize. At the end of thirty years, property owners will have fully paid for a tangible asset that will serve the city for many years thereafter.” *Id.* at 164 (citation omitted).

Bolt is primarily distinguishable because it involved a rate increase to fund a completely new alteration to the existing sewer system that benefitted only 25% of the property owners. In this case, as discussed, the reserve fund is being used for maintenance and repairs of the existing system, and will be used to fund a large-scale project to replace and update much of that system which will benefit all users of the City's sewer services. Further, if one accepts the premise—as plaintiffs do—that the City may incorporate replacement costs into its rates, then we see no reason why surplus funds cannot be used to replace aging infrastructure. As for concerns that the City's ratepayers are funding improvements for future generations, we find Rothstein's reasoning on this point persuasive:

The practical reality is that Taylor's current customers, like all utility customers, benefit from prior customers' investments that put in place a (depreciating) system to which they can connect and receive service. Equitably, current users are asked to pay to renew and replace these assets, as well as pay their share of system upgrades. Future users are asked to pay for their shares of system capacity and

will likewise be responsible to pay for asserts renewals and replacements.

*6 The users of the City's sewer system contribute to that system's wear and tear, an expense that the City recoups by including depreciation as a revenue requirement in its rate analysis. Accordingly, the users pay a fee proportionate to the necessary costs of the service. And in order for the sewer system to serve its regulatory purpose, it must be maintained and periodically replaced and updated. For those reasons, we conclude that the first two *Bolt* criteria establish that the City's sewer rates constitute a user fee rather than a tax.

As for the third *Bolt* factor, plaintiffs contend that the City's sewer services are not voluntary under statute and the City's ordinances. Even assuming that the sewer charges were deemed effectively compulsory in this case, “the lack of volition does not render a charge a tax; particularly where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax.” *Wheeler*, 265 Mich. App. at 666. We are unconvinced, in the absence of showing that the sewer rates are unreasonable, that those rates should be considered a tax as opposed to a user fee. Considering the *Bolt* criteria in totality, we conclude that plaintiffs have not established that the City has imposed an unconstitutional tax.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact in support of their claims alleging violations of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91.² Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to the City pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).

2 MCL 141.91 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964.

C. FIRE PROTECTION

Plaintiffs claim that the City violated an ordinance by incorporating the costs of public fire protection into its service rates. Specifically, the water department, in addition to its primary task of providing potable water, maintains equipment

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and operations sufficient to assure necessary pressure for the functioning of fire hydrants. The cost paid to the water department for this service is known as “fire hydrant rental.” As a general matter, the experts agreed that it is appropriate for a municipality to recover this cost through water rates. Plaintiffs argue that this practice is nevertheless improper here because it violates Taylor Ordinance, § 50-25(g), which provides in relevant part:

The reasonable cost and value of all water and sewer service rendered to the city and its various departments by the water and sewer system, including rentals for fire hydrant service for each fire hydrant connected to the system, during all or any part of the fiscal year, shall be charged against the city and will be paid for as the service accrues for the city's current funds, including the proceeds of taxes which will be levied in an amount sufficient for that purpose.

It is undisputed that the City no longer pays \$ 44,000 a year in rental fees for all of the fire hydrants on public property as it did until 2010. However, plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that public fire protection costs are improperly passed on to plaintiffs through the City's water rates. Tellingly, Heid testified that “there is nothing to suggest that the customers are actually paying any amount for those public fire protection services.” Nor could Heid determine the amount of such a charge in the absence of a rate study. Further, Heid agreed that, at the end of the day, residents will

pay for public fire protection either on their water bills or on their tax bills. Given this testimony, plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the costs for public fire protection are improperly included in defendant's water rates or the amount of any such charge. For the same reasons, plaintiffs fail to establish that the City is receiving “free service” from the water and sewer department in contravention of MCL 141.118(1)³ by not paying for public fire protection costs.

³ MCL 141.118(1) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (2) [which is inapplicable here], free service shall not be furnished by a public improvement to a person, firm, or corporation, public or private, or to a public agency or instrumentality. The reasonable cost and value of any service rendered to a public corporation, including the borrower, by a public improvement shall be charged against the public corporation and shall be paid for as the service accrues from the public corporation's current funds or from the proceeds of taxes which the public corporation, within constitutional limitations, is hereby authorized and required to levy in an amount sufficient for that purpose, or both, and those charges, when so paid, shall be accounted for in the same manner as other revenues of the public improvement.

*7 Affirmed.

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
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UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Daniel BRUNET, Individually and as
Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated
Persons and Entities, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF ROCHESTER HILLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 354110

|

December 2, 2021

Oakland Circuit Court, LC No. 18-164764-CZ

Before: Murray, C.J., and Jansen and Riordan, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff Daniel Brunet, individually and as class representative, appeals as of right the trial court's opinion and order granting defendant City of Rochester Hills's motion for summary disposition and denying his motion for partial summary disposition. This case concerns charges imposed by defendant for municipal water and sewer services. Defendant asserts that these charges are unlawfully excessive, unreasonable, and in violation of MCL 141.91 and a now-amended municipal ordinance. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Defendant operates a municipal water supply system, of which plaintiff is a customer.¹ The water system has two central purposes: (a) supply treated or “potable” water to municipal water customers, and (b) provide excess capacity for public fire protection. In March 2018, plaintiff filed a 10-count complaint against defendant, generally alleging that the water charges imposed by defendant on its customers since 2012 have been unlawful for the following two principal reasons. First, defendant accumulated surplus funds

to allegedly pay for future capital improvements to its water system, and these surplus funds are unnecessary to provide service to the *present* water customers. According to plaintiff, defendant may only charge its water customers for the present costs of supplying water. Second, defendant charges its water customers for the fire protection component of its water system. However, because fire protection operates for the benefit of the general public, not only the water customers themselves, the general public should be charged for the fire protection.² Plaintiff also noted that defendant had an ordinance providing that the fire protection component would be paid by defendant itself from its general fund. Plaintiff requested that the trial court certify the instant action as a class action with plaintiff himself as the class representative of all persons or entities who paid the water charges at any time in the preceding six years. He further requested that defendant disgorge the excess funds that it had received to the putative class in equity and that the trial court declare that the water charges are unlawfully excessive to the extent outlined in the complaint.

1 To be precise, this case involves the water and sewer system, water and sewer customers, and water and sewer charges. For ease of discussion, we simply refer to the “water system,” “water customers,” and “water charges,” respectively.

2 Plaintiff refers to the future capital improvement component of the water charges as the “Reserve Charge” and the fire protection component as the “Fire Service Charge.” To be clear, however, defendant does not separately itemize or charge its water customers for these components. These terms are created by plaintiff for the purposes of this litigation.

In March 2019, the trial court certified the class, which it defined as “all persons and entities who/which have paid the City for water and/or sewage disposal service at any time since March 30, 2012 or who/which pay the City for water and/or sewage disposal service during the pendency of this action.”

*2 In December 2019, plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that the water charges were unreasonable as a matter of law until November 2018 because defendant had the following ordinance in effect concerning the cost of fire protection services:

(b) Fire Service Fee. As a fire service fee for providing a water system with extra capacity available for fighting fires and protecting property in the city, the city shall be charged based on a base-extra capacity approach attributing to fire protection the difference between total system capacity and capacity required by other customer classes. The fire service fee shall be required and adjusted annually to reflect actual versus budgeted revenue requirement for the water fund for the previous year.

(c) Quarterly billing. Charges against the City shall be payable in quarterly installments from the current city's fire fund or from the proceeds of taxes which the city, within constitutional limitations, is authorized and required to levy in an amount sufficient for this purpose. [Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124.]

Plaintiff argued that although Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 essentially required that the fire protection component be paid for by defendant itself, defendant violated the ordinance during the class period until November 2018 by charging its water customers for this service.³ Thus, plaintiff argued, he and the class were entitled to a refund for monies paid for the fire protection component.

³ Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 was amended in November 2018 to remove such language.

Defendant moved for summary disposition of the entire complaint.⁴ Defendant acknowledged that the fund for its water system had accumulated a substantial surplus of about \$46 million in recent years. However, defendant asserted, the majority of the water system will need to be replaced in the upcoming five to 10 years, and it will likely use substantially all of its surplus funds to do so. Defendant explained that it always has intended to use the surplus funds for these upcoming capital improvement projects and that paying for the projects with cash is more fiscally responsible than doing so with bonds. Defendant argued that it was authorized by MCL 141.121 to charge its customers for these future capital improvement projects and that its water charges were reasonable in all respects. Defendant also argued that a municipal regulation passed in 1999 authorized charging its water customers for the fire protection component, so its water charges were not unlawful to that extent.

⁴ The trial court dismissed two counts of the complaint months earlier, so defendant's motion concerned the remaining eight counts.

The parties presented competing evidence concerning the reasonableness of the water charges, with plaintiff's experts opining that the water charges were unreasonably excessive, and defendant's experts opining that the charges were reasonable. The trial court discussed this evidence in a 37-page opinion and ultimately granted summary disposition in favor of defendant. In relevant part, the trial court reasoned that the water charges did not violate MCL 141.91 because they were "user fees," not "taxes," under *Bolt v. City of Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998); that the water charges were reasonable because plaintiff "has submitted no evidence of anything illegal or improper" and otherwise failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness; and that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief with respect to the fire protection component of the water charges because his "sole evidence" in that regard was "an ordinance that was mistakenly left on the books and was arguably already overridden by lawful resolution."⁵ Plaintiff now appeals.

⁵ The trial court also ruled in favor of defendant on other issues that plaintiff does not challenge on appeal.

II. MCL 141.91

*3 Plaintiff first argues that the water charges are an unlawful tax in violation of MCL 141.91. We disagree.

We review de novo whether a municipal charge is a "tax." See *Mapleview Estates, Inc. v. City of Brown City*, 258 Mich.App. 412, 413-414, 671 N.W.2d 572 (2003). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. *PNC Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Dep't of Treas.*, 285 Mich.App. 504, 505, 778 N.W.2d 282 (2009). Finally, "[t]his Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition." *Hartfiel v. City of Eastpointe*, 333 Mich.App. 438, 444, 960 N.W.2d 174 (2020).

It is initially noted that plaintiff brought alternative claims for assumpsit and unjust enrichment.⁶ "At common law, assumpsit was a proper vehicle for recovering unlawful fees, charges, or exactions—including unlawful utility charges—that the plaintiff had paid to a municipality under

compulsion of local law.” *Youmans v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield*, — Mich.App. —, —, — N.W.2d —, 2021 WL 67885 (2021) (Docket No. 348614); slip op. at 27 (cleaned up). “With the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished. But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved.” *Id.* (cleaned up). “Hence, an assumpsit claim is modernly treated as a claim arising under quasi-contractual principles, which represent a subset of the law of unjust enrichment.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Unjust enrichment is a cause of action to correct a defendant’s unjust retention of a benefit owed to another.” *Wright v. Genesee Co.*, 504 Mich. 410, 417, 934 N.W.2d 805 (2019). Consequently, if plaintiff is correct that the water charges violated MCL 141.91 (or any other law), he and the class would arguably be entitled to equitable relief to recover the charges unlawfully paid.

⁶ Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief in his “Prayer for Relief.”

MCL 141.91 provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964.

MCL 141.121 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Rates for services furnished by a public improvement shall be fixed before the issuance of the bonds. The rates shall be sufficient to provide for all the following:

(a) The payment of the expenses of administration and operation and the expenses for the maintenance of the public improvement as may be necessary to preserve the public improvement in good repair and working order.

* * *

(d) Other expenditures and funds for the public improvement as the ordinance may require.

(2) The rates shall be fixed and revised by the governing body of the borrower so as to produce the amount described in subsection (1)....⁷

⁷ MCL 141.121 is part of the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, MCL 141.101 *et seq.* Although MCL 141.121 seems to contemplate only those situations in which bonds are issued, MCL 141.104 provides that “[t]he powers in this act granted may be exercised notwithstanding that no bonds are issued hereunder.” Thus, the parties do not dispute that MCL 141.121 may apply in this case, notwithstanding that defendant apparently does not intend to exclusively issue bonds to fund the future capital improvements. See *Seltzer v. Sterling Twp.*, 371 Mich. 214, 219, 123 N.W.2d 722 (1963) (“It was clearly the intention of the legislature to give townships the power and authority under the Revenue Bond Act of 1933 to purchase, acquire, construct, improve, enlarge, extend or repair a water supply system and a sewage disposal system, and to own, operate and maintain the same, notwithstanding no bonds are issued in connection therewith.”).

*4 MCL 141.121 places “the amount of the charge within the sound discretion of the city officials, especially when considered in relation to the objectives of the program in maintaining the system and paying off the bonds in the manner required by statute.” *Yurek v. City of Sterling Heights*, 37 Mich.App. 386, 390, 194 N.W.2d 474 (1971) (cleaned up).

In *Bolt v. City of Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998), our Supreme Court considered whether a “storm water service charge” was either a valid user fee or a tax that violated the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31, which generally prohibits the imposition of new municipal “taxes” that are not ratified by the voters. The charge was imposed on “each parcel of real property located in the city using a formula that attempts to roughly estimate each parcel’s storm water runoff,” and it was intended to fund the separation of combined sanitary and storm sewers within the city that had not already been separated. *Id.* at 155, 587 N.W.2d 264. In its analysis, the Court first observed that “a ‘fee’ is exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and some reasonable relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit. A ‘tax,’ on the other hand, is designed to raise revenue.” *Id.* at 161, 587 N.W.2d 264 (cleaned up). The Court then identified the following three

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factors to distinguish between a user fee and a tax: (1) “a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose,” (2) “user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service,” and (3) user fees contain an element of “voluntariness.” *Id.* at 161-162, 587 N.W.2d 264. The Court ultimately ruled that application of the three-factor test compelled the conclusion that the charge at issue was a tax for the purposes of the Headlee Amendment. *Id.* at 169, 587 N.W.2d 264.

In this case, plaintiff acknowledges in his brief on appeal that he is not maintaining a Headlee claim, but he argues that *Bolt* is persuasive authority for the proposition that the water charges at issue are unlawful “taxes” under MCL 141.91. In other words, because MCL 141.91 generally prohibits municipal taxes that are not otherwise authorized by law, and because application of the *Bolt* test indicates that the water charges here are “taxes,” it necessarily follows that the water charges violate MCL 141.91. However, plaintiff simply fails to address defendant’s argument that the water charges are authorized because they are fully consistent with MCL 141.121(1)(a) and (d). “An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of an argument constitutes the abandonment of an issue.” *In re Application of Detroit Edison Co for 2012 Cost Recovery Plan*, 311 Mich.App. 204, 214, 874 N.W.2d 398 (2015). Thus, this issue is abandoned.⁸

⁸ Recently, our Supreme Court noted in different circumstances that merely because a particular “charge” is a “tax” for the purposes of the Headlee Amendment does not necessarily render it unlawful. See *Gottesman v. City of Harper Woods*, 964 N.W.2d 365 (2021).

Regardless, plaintiff’s argument is meritless. In essence, plaintiff argues that because a municipality generally may not charge current ratepayers for future capital improvements—as recognized by older cases such as *Wolgamood v. Village of Constantine*, 302 Mich. 384, 4 N.W.2d 697 (1942), and newer cases such as *Bolt*—it follows that the water charges here are not permissible “rates” or “fees” but are instead “taxes” because defendant acknowledges that the cash reserve will be used for future capital improvements. In our view, plaintiff overstates the principle derived from such cases.

*5 In *Wolgamood*, our Supreme Court explained as follows:

A municipally owned utility is built and operated, not for a corporate profit, but for the purpose of providing utility services at a reasonable cost to the citizens of the municipality, who are generally identical with the customers. For a municipally owned light plant to charge rates which will, in addition to the necessary expenses of construction and operation, build up a reserve for depreciation equaling the replacement cost of the plant, is to require the citizens and customers not only to pay for construction of their own utility but also to provide the capital for the construction of a new plant to serve future users. [*Wolgamood*, 302 Mich. at 404-405, 4 N.W.2d 697.]

In other words, a municipality may not charge current ratepayers for the costs of constructing the original municipal utility (typically though bonds that must be paid over time) and the future costs of replacing that same utility. Doing so “is to ask the consumers to pay off the capital investment twice, once as a debt service and again in the establishment of a depreciation reserve.” *Id.* at 405, 4 N.W.2d 697 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Of course, there is nothing in *Wolgamood*, or any other case of which we are aware, to suggest that a municipality may not charge current ratepayers once for the cost of the municipal utility. Thus, there is no question that current ratepayers may be charged for the cost of servicing bonds that were issued years ago to pay for the costs of constructing the original municipal utility. It follows that if the municipality originally constructed its utility through cash and intends to replace the utility in a similar manner, then current ratepayers may properly be charged for accumulating that cash reserve. That is, there is no conceptual difference between requiring ratepayers to service bonds and requiring ratepayers to contribute to a cash reserve that will be used for future capital improvements to the utility.

Accumulating such a cash reserve by charging ratepayers based on depreciation is an appropriate way to do so. In *City of Detroit v. City of Highland Park*, 326 Mich. 78, 39 N.W.2d 325 (1949), Highland Park argued that the water and sewage rates charged by Detroit were unreasonable because, among

other reasons, Detroit included depreciation in its rates, and “to charge depreciation sufficient to amortize the cost over the service life of the system is to charge this generation for improvements to be used by the next generation.” *Id.* at 95, 39 N.W.2d 325. Our Supreme Court rejected that argument, explaining that Detroit advanced “huge sums ... as an investment in a utility on which Detroit may earn a reasonable return.” *Id.* Although Detroit issued bonds as well, “the bonds so issued were only for a small part of the total cost.” *Id.* “[O]n a utility basis where the city is not recovering its capital as part of the expense, depreciation charges sufficient to rebuild and restore the system over its service are proper items of expense in determining the rate to be charged.” *Id.* at 98, 39 N.W.2d 325. “It is incumbent on the city of Detroit, the owner, to keep up, repair or rebuild the system to the extent that it becomes necessary through depreciation in order to protect its large investment, the advance of almost \$12,000,000 in cash besides the issuance of the bonds.” *Id.* Simply put, our Supreme Court approved of depreciation charges “sufficient to rebuild and restore the system” because Detroit was entitled to “protect its large investment.”

*6 *Bolt* presented the same concern as *Wolgamood*. In *Bolt*, the Court reasoned that the charge at issue was a “tax” because, in relevant part, “[a]t the end of thirty years, property owners will have fully paid for a tangible asset that will serve the city for many years thereafter.... The revenue to be derived from the charge is clearly in excess of the direct and indirect costs of actually using the storm water system over the next thirty years and, being thus disproportionate to the costs of the services provided and the benefits rendered, constitutes a tax.” *Bolt*, 459 Mich. at 163, 587 N.W.2d 264. Thus, in *Bolt*, the ratepayers were expected to pay for the benefits of the improved system that they would enjoy and pay for the benefits of the improved system that future ratepayers, who would not pay the charge at issue, would enjoy. This constituted a similar “double charge” as in *Wolgamood*.

Accordingly, it is not enough for plaintiff to simply show that the water charges at issue are funding a reserve to pay for future capital improvements. Our Supreme Court approved of such a practice in *Highland Park*. Rather, at a minimum, plaintiff must also show that current ratepayers are being “double charged” for the water system, contrary to cases such as *Wolgamood* and *Bolt*. We consider that issue below.

III. REASONABLENESS

Plaintiff argues that the water charges are unreasonable. We disagree. We review de novo whether a municipal charge is reasonable. See *Mapleview Estates, Inc.*, 258 Mich.App. at 413-414, 671 N.W.2d 572.

It is a longstanding principle that municipal utility rates are presumed to be reasonable. See *Highland Park*, 326 Mich. at 100-101, 39 N.W.2d 325 (“The rate lawfully established by the plaintiff is assumed to be reasonable in absence of a showing to the contrary or a showing of fraud or bad faith or that it is capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable, and the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the rate is unreasonable.”). In *Meridian Twp. v. City of East Lansing*, 342 Mich. 734, 71 N.W.2d 234 (1955), Meridian Township challenged the water rates set by East Lansing, arguing that East Lansing violated a provision of the contract between the parties stating that “such rates shall always be reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the City for the supply of water.” *Id.* at 748, 71 N.W.2d 234. Our Supreme Court explained that the question before it was whether the water rates were “reasonable” as defined by the contract:

We are asked by the appellant to find that the rate charged is not reasonable as above prescribed. It will be noted that the clause under examination does not equate rates to costs. Identity is not required. Obviously there is elbow-room for adjustment. The requirement merely is that they shall be ‘reasonable’ in relation to costs. The word ‘reasonable’ with respect to rates charged by utilities is a word of the most universal employment. It may be provided by ordinance, statute, or constitution, that rates shall be ‘reasonable,’ or ‘fair and reasonable.’ Moreover, should the question of rate arise on a contract implied in law, the judicial requirement is that the rate to be paid shall be ‘reasonable.’ It may also be employed (as in the case at bar) in a contract. The determination of its meaning, in any case, is not subject to mathematical computation

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with scientific exactitude but depends upon a comprehensive examination of all factors involved, having in mind the objective sought to be attained in its use. Here it is related to the costs incurred by the city in the supply of water. [*Id.* at 749, 71 N.W.2d 234 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).]

Ultimately, our Supreme Court ruled in favor of East Lansing, stating that Meridian Township failed “to show that the rates charged were, in fact, unreasonable with relation to costs.” *Id.* at 753, 71 N.W.2d 234.

In *City of Plymouth v. City of Detroit*, 423 Mich. 106, 377 N.W.2d 689 (1985), Detroit increased water rates it imposed on suburban Detroit municipalities by 39 percent. *Id.* at 109, 377 N.W.2d 689. Plymouth sued Detroit, alleging that the increase was unreasonable. *Id.* Detroit argued that the increase was necessarily reasonable under the version of MCL 123.141 in effect at the time, which essentially provided that “the city may charge its outlying customers not more than twice what it charges its own users.” *Id.* at 123, 377 N.W.2d 689. According to Detroit, because it did not charge the suburban municipalities more than twice what it charged its own customers, and because MCL 123.141 “represents the only applicable standard of reasonableness,” it logically followed that the 39-percent increase was reasonable. *Id.* Plymouth responded that a contractual provision between the parties stated that “rates shall always be reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the Board for the supply of water.” *Id.* at 111, 377 N.W.2d 689. Thus, Plymouth argued, “the statute only provides for a statutory floor and ceiling of reasonableness and that the specific provisions of the contracts between the parties govern their relationship.” *Id.* at 124, 377 N.W.2d 689. In resolving the dispute, our Supreme Court agreed with our conclusion that “the statute does not render reasonable as a matter of law rates within its maximum and minimum provisions in the face of a contractual provision which states that rates shall be reasonable in relation to costs. Regardless of how the statute reads, [Detroit] has limited its discretion in setting rates by agreeing to the contractual provision.” *Id.* at 124-125, 377 N.W.2d 689 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Detroit, concluding that Plymouth failed to sustain its burden of showing that the water rates were unreasonable in violation of the contract:

*7 The plaintiff had ample opportunity to substantiate its claim on the theory with which it had chosen to prove that the rates in question were violative of the contract between the parties. The trial court concluded that the rates charged had not been shown to be unreasonable. We find no error in the trial court's conclusion.... [*Id.* at 137, 377 N.W.2d 689.]

In *City of Novi v. City of Detroit*, 433 Mich. 414, 446 N.W.2d 118 (1989), Novi challenged the water rates set by Detroit, arguing that they violated the newly enacted MCL 123.141(2), see 1981 PA 89, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

The price charged by the city to its customers shall be at a rate which is based on the actual cost of service as determined under the utility basis of ratemaking....

The trial court ruled in favor of Detroit, but we reversed, explaining that MCL 123.141(2) established the standard that water rates must “reflect the actual cost of providing the service,” and as a result, the concept of reasonableness was no longer relevant. *Id.* at 427-428, 446 N.W.2d 118 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court reversed this Court, stating as follows:

We acknowledge that the Legislature intended that municipal water rates more accurately reflect the actual cost of service when it eliminated the artificial limits imposed by the previous version of MCL 123.141. However, the Legislature's use of the phrase “based on the actual cost of service as determined under the utility basis of rate-making” cannot be construed to mean “exactly equal to the actual cost of service,” in light of the difficulties inherent in the rate-making process and the statutory and practical limitations on the scope of judicial review. The concept of reasonableness, as recognized by the courts of this state and other states in utility rate-

making contexts, must remain operable, in order to provide a meaningful and manageable standard of review.

* * *

For these reasons, we hold that 1981 PA 89 did not render inoperable the concept of reasonableness in the process of judicial review of municipal utility water rates. The burden of proof remains on the plaintiff to show that a given rate or rate-making method does not reasonably reflect the actual cost of service as determined under the utility basis of rate-making pursuant to MCL 123.141(2). [*Id.* at 430-433, 446 N.W.2d 118 (cleaned up).]

Our Supreme Court ultimately concluded that “the plaintiff City of Novi did not meet its burden of proving that the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department’s rate-making method, or the resulting rates charged, did not comply with the utility basis of rate-making.” *Id.* at 438, 446 N.W.2d 118.

More recently, in *Trahey v. City of Inkster*, 311 Mich.App. 582, 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015), this Court summarized the following pertinent principles concerning the presumption of reasonableness:

The determination of reasonableness is generally considered by courts to be a question of fact. Michigan courts have long recognized the principle that municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable. This presumption exists because courts of law are ill-equipped to deal with the complex, technical processes required to evaluate the various cost factors and various methods of weighing those factors required in rate-making. However, the presumption of reasonableness may be overcome by a proper showing of evidence. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that any given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable. [*Id.* at 594, 876 N.W.2d 582 (cleaned up).]

*8 Here, plaintiff argues that the water charges imposed by defendant are unreasonable for the following reasons: (1) “the

City has charged far more than necessary to operate its water and sewer systems,” i.e., that “the City has been operating its Water and Sewer Fund for a profit because its revenues have consistently exceeded its expenses”; (2) his experts opined that the water charges were unreasonable because, among other things, “[b]y including depreciation in setting its rates, the City’s rates double count certain capital expenses”; and (3) defendant did not accumulate the surplus *with the intent* of funding future capital improvements.

Plaintiff, however, does not identify the standard or authority for “reasonableness.” In other words, plaintiff does not identify a statute, contractual provision, or ordinance establishing the underlying basis for “reasonableness.” In *Meridian Twp.*, for example, the basis for “reasonableness” was a contractual provision stating that water rates must be “reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the City for the supply of water.” *Meridian Twp.*, 342 Mich. at 748, 71 N.W.2d 234. In *City of Plymouth*, the basis for “reasonableness” was a contractual provision stating that water rates “shall always be reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the Board for the supply of water.” *City of Plymouth*, 423 Mich. at 111, 377 N.W.2d 689. In *City of Novi*, the basis for “reasonableness” was a statute stating that “[t]he price charged by the city to its customers shall be at a rate which is based on the actual cost of service as determined under the utility basis of rate-making.” *City of Novi*, 433 Mich. at 419, 446 N.W.2d 118.⁹ And in *Trahey*, the basis for “reasonableness” was a municipal ordinance stating that water rates must be “just and reasonable.” *Trahey*, 311 Mich.App. at 594, 876 N.W.2d 582.

⁹ Although the statute did not expressly include the word “reasonable,” our Supreme Court explained that the concept must nonetheless be imposed within the statute. See *id.* at 433, 446 N.W.2d 118.

Plaintiff apparently is attempting to maintain a freestanding claim of “reasonableness” that is not grounded in any specific law nor in any type of cogent reasoning. A bald assertion of some type of unknown reasonableness standard is not consistent with the caselaw discussed above, in which “reasonableness” was linked to a statute, contractual provision, ordinance, or other source of authority. Of course, plaintiff is nominally correct that municipal utility rates must be “reasonable,” but he overlooks the fact that the standard for “reasonableness” is often uniquely determined by reference to the specific law, cost basis, or contract at issue. In one case, a “reasonable” water rate had to simply reflect the costs of supplying water, whereas in another case, a “reasonable”

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water rate had to reflect the costs of supplying water as determined under the utility basis of rate-making. Yet, in other cases, as in *Trahey*, the concept of “reasonableness” was that referred to by ordinance. Thus, in light of plaintiff’s failure to identify a basis for “reasonableness” here, we could consider this issue abandoned. See *In re Application of Detroit Edison Co. for 2012 Cost Recovery Plan*, 311 Mich.App. at 214, 874 N.W.2d 398.

Regardless, most of plaintiff’s arguments in regard to his understanding of reasonableness are meritless and we dispose of them quite briefly. First, plaintiff argues that the mere fact that defendant accumulated a reserve of about \$50 million shows that the water charges were unreasonable.¹⁰ However, as explained previously, our Supreme Court in *Highland Park* approved of such accumulated reserves to pay cash for future capital improvements. Second, plaintiff argues that his experts’ opinion created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the water charges were unreasonable, given that they opined that defendant “collected more than \$24 million in excess of the amounts it was entitled to collect.” However, one of those experts acknowledged during his deposition that he was unaware of the particular depreciating nature of defendant’s water system, the critical justification offered by defendant in support of its reserve.¹¹ Such a lack of knowledge fundamentally undermines the opinion of plaintiff’s experts. A plaintiff cannot proceed to trial simply because his or her expert was unaware of the pertinent facts. Compare *Pete v. Iron Co.*, 192 Mich.App. 687, 689, 481 N.W.2d 731 (1991) (concluding that summary disposition was properly granted to the defendant in a slip-and-fall case because, in relevant part, “[p]laintiff’s expert testified during deposition that he did not know what caused plaintiff’s fall, but opined that she may have ‘misstepped’ ”). In other words, where defendant argues that it accumulated its reserve to pay for substantial capital improvements in the upcoming five to 10 years and that its water charges are therefore reasonable, plaintiff’s experts cannot ignore that fact but nonetheless conclude that the water charges are unreasonable. Third, plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact as to whether defendant had a specific plan to use its reserve to fund future capital improvements before the instant action was filed. However, notwithstanding the testimony of defendant’s officers that defendant did have a specific plan for its reserve, and notwithstanding that plaintiff does not dispute that the reserve will actually be used to fund future capital improvements, plaintiff provides no authority for the proposition that defendant was obligated to have a specific plan for its reserve before the instant action was filed. See

Bohn v City of Taylor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 19, 2019 (Docket No. 339306, 2019 WL 360730) (“Instead, plaintiffs contend that the City must have a specific plan for capital improvements equivalent to the amount in the reserve fund and that without such a plan, the fund’s existence is evidence that the rates are excessive. Plaintiffs do not provide any authority (legal or otherwise) to support this contention.”).¹²

10 Plaintiff relies on *Mich. Ass’n of Home Builders v. City of Troy*, 504 Mich. 204, 934 N.W.2d 713 (2019), for the proposition that a municipal utility charge that consistently returns a profit is evidence (perhaps conclusive) that the charge is unreasonable. In that case, our Supreme Court favorably cited the dissenting opinion of Judge Jansen, who explained that consistent annual profits generated by the city’s building fees was evidence that the fees were unauthorized by statute. See *id.* at 220, 934 N.W.2d 713. According to plaintiff, the same reasoning should apply here. Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark because the statute at issue in that case provided that the building fees “shall be intended to bear a reasonable relation to the cost, including overhead.” MCL 125.1522(1)-(2). Thus, as Judge Jansen observed, consistent annual profits indicated that the building fees were not, in fact, intended to bear a reasonable relation to the cost of operating the regulatory scheme. Here, in contrast, plaintiff does not ground his argument of “unreasonableness” in a similarly worded statute.

We also note that municipal utilities are not necessarily precluded from generating a reasonable profit. See *Chocolay Charter Twp. v. City of Marquette*, 138 Mich.App. 79, 84, 358 N.W.2d 636 (1984) (“A municipality is not required to furnish utility services at cost, but may charge a rate which will yield a profit.”); McQuillin: The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 35:60 (“While in theory, water from a municipally owned plant should come to the consumer without profit to the municipality, this does not exclude the idea of profit in operation. A city is entitled to a reasonable profit and it may even use that profit for other valid municipal purposes.”).

11 Although the expert only testified in the first person, the most reasonable inference is that neither

expert was aware of the particular depreciating nature of defendant's water system. Tellingly, there is nothing in the experts' 27-page written opinion to suggest otherwise.

12 “Although unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding precedent, MCR 7.215(C)(1), they may, however, be considered instructive or persuasive.” *Adam v. Bell*, 311 Mich.App. 528, 533 n.1, 879 N.W.2d 879 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In any event, the law is contrary to plaintiff's argument that charges by a municipal utility are unreasonable if the municipality does not have a specific plan for use of its reserve before a lawsuit is filed. “A city has no duty to justify or explain its actions in setting rates until the party contesting their validity shows their invalidity by competent evidence.” McQuillin: The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 35:57. In other words, a party contesting the validity of municipal charges (i.e., rates) must *first* produce evidence that the charges are unreasonable, and *then* the municipality must justify its actions in setting those charges. As applied here, defendant does not have to justify its actions in setting the water charges at issue—its alleged lack of a preexisting specific plan for use of the reserve—unless plaintiff first shows that the charges are unreasonable. Plaintiff cannot simply demand a justification for the water charges and subsequently argue that the purported insufficiency of the justification establishes that the water charges are unreasonable.

Moreover, plaintiff's argument is illogical for the simple reason that “[m]unicipal utility rates may include a profit margin,” and “[t]he profit may be transferred to the general fund and used for purposes other than supplying the utility service.” *Id.* Thus, so long as the charges are reasonable, the municipality may use accumulating reserves from those charges (i.e., profit) for any municipal purpose whatsoever. See *id.* It therefore cannot be the case that defendant is obligated to have a specific plan providing that accumulated reserves from its water charges must be used for one particular municipal purpose, or future capital improvements, rather than for some other lawfully allowed purpose.

*9 Plaintiff's best argument for reversal is that defendant “double counted” both debt service and depreciation for six particular assets, such that water customers were charged for both the original construction of those assets (funded through bonds) and anticipated future construction (funded through depreciation as a proxy for anticipated costs). However, the trial court did not address this argument. In his lower court brief discussing this position, plaintiff summarily directed the trial court to the three particular exhibits:

[FN 14]: See Exhibit 23 hereto (City's Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's Fourth Interrogatories and Fourth Requests for Production of Documents).

[FN 15]: See Exhibit 24 hereto (excerpts from City's annual financial statements showing principal debt expense for the assets listed below). See also Budget documents (Exhibit 20 hereto).

With this glaring lack of analysis and citation to the record, the trial court cannot be reasonably faulted for its failure to consider plaintiff's “double counting” argument. Plaintiff submitted dozens of pages of detailed accounting statements and responses to interrogatories, but he did not inform the trial court how it should consider these documents or where the pertinent facts relating to plaintiff's argument could be found. While true that MCR 2.116(G)(5) provides that “[t]he affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties, must be considered by the court when the motion is based on subrule (C)(1)-(7) or (10),” this subrule does not mean that a party may submit hundreds of pages of documents to the trial court and expect that court to parse through the documents to find the relevant facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, this Court has explained that a trial court is “not obligated under MCR 2.116(G)(5) to scour the record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of fact to preclude summary disposition.” *Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Engineering, Inc.*, 285 Mich.App. 362, 381, 775 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is absurdly difficult for a judge to perform a search, unassisted by counsel, through the entire record, to look for such evidence.” *Id.* at 379, 775 N.W.2d 618 (citation omitted).

Similarly, MCR 7.212(C)(7), which concerns briefs filed in this Court, provides, in relevant part, that “[f]acts stated must be supported by specific page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial court.” Thus, the mere citation to a multipage exhibit is

insufficient. See *Derderian v. Genesys Health Care Sys.*, 263 Mich.App. 364, 388, 689 N.W.2d 145 (2004) (“In support of this claim, plaintiffs provide general citations from Dr. Derderian’s deposition, testimony from the profusionist in one patient’s case, and one patient’s medical records. Such general citations are insufficient.”). Accordingly, because plaintiff failed to cite supporting documentary evidence for his assertion that defendant engaged in improper “double counting,” both in the trial court and in this Court, he is not entitled to relief on this basis.

IV. VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE

Finally, plaintiff argues that the water charges were unreasonable as a matter of law before November 2018 to the extent that defendant included a component for fire protection, contrary to former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124.

Initially, we note that plaintiff appears to be arguing only that the violation of former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 resulted in the water charges being unreasonable. See *Trahey*, 311 Mich.App. at 595, 876 N.W.2d 582 (“Absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility’s rates, a court has no authority to disregard the presumption that the rate is reasonable.”). While plaintiff cites multiple cases for the basic proposition that a municipality is bound by its own ordinances, see, e.g., *Taber v. City of Benton Harbor*, 280 Mich. 522, 526, 274 N.W. 324 (1937), he does not challenge the basis for the trial court’s dismissal of the counts of the complaint seeking relief for a violation of former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 alone.¹³ To the extent that plaintiff intended to challenge that dismissal, his argument is waived. See *Houghton ex rel Johnson v. Keller*, 256 Mich.App. 336, 339-340, 662 N.W.2d 854 (2003) (“An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue.”). Thus, we need only address the argument that the alleged violation of the November 2009 version of Ordinance § 102-124 resulted in the water charges being unreasonable.

¹³ The trial court ruled that Rochester Hills’s ordinances are only enforceable by certain government officials and entities. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise on appeal.

^{*10} “This Court must presume the amount of the [municipal utility] fee to be reasonable, unless the contrary appears

upon the face of the law itself, or is established by proper evidence.” *Jackson Co. v. City of Jackson*, 302 Mich.App. 90, 109, 836 N.W.2d 903 (2013) (cleaned up). Here, the fire protection component of the water charges was substantively a component for “excess capacity” of the water system, i.e., water capacity that was beyond that necessary to service the ordinary needs of the water customers. In *Novi*, our Supreme Court explained that “excess capacity is includable in the rate base where it is reasonably necessary to fulfill contractual obligations.” *Novi*, 433 Mich. at 435, 446 N.W.2d 118. Moreover, the Court suggested that when “facilities that are arguably excess capacity are constantly in use,” the excess capacity is properly includable for that additional reason as well. See *id.* (“In the instant case, because the DWSD system is integrated, the facilities that are arguably excess capacity are constantly in use.”).

Assuming that plaintiff is correct that the language of former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 resulted in the water charges including an illegal component for excess capacity and thereby rebutting the presumption of reasonableness, the trial court correctly held that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief. In *Youmans*, another case involving a claim for equitable relief for allegedly inflated water charges, this Court explained that “[w]hether the Township would receive an unjust ‘benefit’ from retaining the disputed rate charges in this case depends on whether the water and sewer rates, viewed as a whole, were unreasonable inasmuch as they were ‘excessive,’ not on whether some aspect of the Township’s ratemaking methodology was improper.” *Youmans*, — Mich App at —, — N.W.2d —, slip op. at 30. Thus, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “in the face of illegal or improper expenses included in the disputed rates, she is not required to demonstrate that the rates actually *overcharged* for the related water and sewer services.” *Id.* (emphasis in original).

The same is true here. It would not be inequitable to allow defendant to retain the money for excess capacity because that excess capacity, i.e., the “fire service fee,” provided exclusive benefits to water customers. The fire service fee under former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124 was determined by “a base-extra capacity approach attributing to fire protection the difference between total system capacity and capacity required by other customer classes.” Simply, this means that the fire service fee was the difference between the capacity *required* by water customers and the overall water system capacity. This excess-capacity difference supported the fire protection services, which admittedly benefitted the general

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public, but also the water customers themselves. Defendant's public utilities engineering manager explained the benefits of the excess capacity in an affidavit as follows:

4. One benefit of the water system's capacity is that it ensures that the City will have sufficient water flow to fight fires. The system's capacity also provides numerous benefits to ratepayers who purchase and use City water, including meeting customers' minimum needs for average daily water flow.

5. The system's capacity also allows the City to provide service under emergency conditions, maintain service during an event that causes failure, and quickly recover from these events.

6. In addition, extra water system capacity allows system users to access sufficient water flow to irrigate their lawns. Many of the City's water ratepayers take advantage of this benefit and use sprinkler systems to irrigate their lawns in summer months.

Thus, the excess-capacity costs that plaintiff attributes entirely to the costs of fire protection services actually provide unique benefits to water customers alone. Similarly, for example, our Supreme Court in *Novi* explained that the “base-extra capacity method” in that case required separating “base costs,” which were “[t]hose costs associated with furnishing water at average annual rates of use,” with other costs, such as “[t]hose additional costs associated with meeting water demands on the day or days of maximum use” and “[t]hose additional costs associated with meeting demands during the peak hour of use.” *Novi*, 433 Mich. at 421-422, 446 N.W.2d 118. In *Novi*, as in this case, charging water customers for excess capacity provided exclusive benefits to those customers.

***11** It is impossible to disentwine the “fire protection” aspect of excess capacity with the “potable water” aspect of excess capacity. As noted, excess capacity is necessary to provide potable water during times of heightened demand or emergencies.¹⁴ Moreover, even when excess capacity is used to provide fire protection, i.e., the water supply is used to fight a fire, that excess capacity still benefits water customers because those customers are (typically) able to maintain ordinary water use. If the water system had no excess

capacity, then fighting a fire would result in water customers not having access to the ordinary water supply. Essentially, “fire protection” is but one example of heightened demand or emergency. If water customers may properly be charged for excess capacity to protect against heightened demand during a hot summer day—as plaintiff does not seem to dispute—it follows that they may also be charged for excess capacity to protect against fighting a large fire.

14 Compare *In re Reliability of Electric Utilities for 2017-2021*, 505 Mich. 97, 103 n 1, 949 N.W.2d 73 (2020) (“Regulators overseeing capacity calculate peak demand using the hottest days of the year and add a ‘reserve margin’—that is, some *extra* capacity—to ensure that suppliers meet even unexpectedly high spikes of demand.”) (emphasis in original).

At a minimum, even if plaintiff is correct that the “fire protection” aspect of excess capacity exclusively benefits the general public and does not provide any unique benefits to water customers themselves, which would perhaps raise *Bolt*-type concerns, it is apparent that “fire protection” is so intertwined with the concept of excess capacity itself that the two cannot be disentangled by this Court, at least where plaintiff has simplistically equated “fire protection” with excess capacity. Under these circumstances, equity does not entitle plaintiff and the class to relief.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant because plaintiff did not show that the water charges violated MCL 141.91 or were “unreasonable,” or that he was entitled to equitable relief for the alleged violation of former Rochester Hills Ordinance, § 102-124. Therefore, we affirm.

Jansen, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result only.

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
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UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

DEERHURST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Woodview
Condominium Association, Individually and as
Representatives of a Class of Similarly Situated
Persons and Entities, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WESTLAND, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 339143

January 29, 2019

Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 15-006473-CZ

Before: Murray, C.J., and Servitto and Shapiro, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant's water and sewer rates violated several provisions of law including MCL 123.141(1) and Const. 1963, art. 9, §§ 25-34, popularly known as the Headlee Amendment. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order granting defendant summary disposition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.¹

¹ Because the trial court considered materials outside the pleadings, we will review the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A trial court's decision whether to grant summary disposition is reviewed de novo. *Pace v. Edel-Harrelson*, 499 Mich. 1, 5; 878 N.W.2d 784 (2016).

In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a

trial. Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [*Bank of America, NA v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.*, 316 Mich. App. 480, 488; 892 N.W.2d 467 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant City of Westland (the City) operates and maintains a water and sewer system. By law, the rates charged to users of the system must be based on the water and sewer department's (the department) actual costs of providing those services to its inhabitants. Among the department's expenses is the amount it transfers to the City's general fund to cover its proportional share of the City's administrative costs.² Plaintiffs agree that the City may make such transfers to the general fund in order to compensate the City's other departments for the goods and services they render to the water and sewer department. However, plaintiffs maintain that the City has "grossly inflated" the costs of those goods and services by allocating a disproportionate amount of the City's administrative costs to the department. Plaintiffs allege that doing so violates the Headlee Amendment as well as MCL 123.141(3), common law ratemaking rules, and the City's Charter. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a refund of what they deem to be overcharges paid in the previous six years, in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief.

² For instance, the City transfers water and sewer funds to the City's general fund to pay for a percentage of the operation of the City's IT Department, which provides services to the department.

Plaintiffs' claim rests largely on the testimony of their expert witness, James R. Olson, an analyst for MGT of America Consulting Group. MGT specializes in "indirect cost allocation" and primarily works with municipalities to identify "overhead" costs that can be allocated to specific departments. Olson reviewed the City's cost allocation sheet, the deposition testimony of City officials, and the City's balance sheet and budget. He took issue with the City's allocation methodology, asserting that it is not based on

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“actual cost data.” For example, he pointed out that the City allocates 30% of its annual attorney fees to the department, but could not provide documentary support for that allocation. Similarly, Olson opined that the City improperly allocates 50% of the rent for the City's DPS garage to the water and sewer department and that the allocation should instead be based on the building's depreciation expense.

*2 The City responds that Olson's testimony, while criticizing some individual allocations, failed to address, let alone establish, that the final rate charged was inconsistent with the department's *total* expenses. The City points out that Olson conceded that he did not perform a “full cost allocation study,” meaning that, while Olson looked at certain individual categories of the City's cost allocation, he did not perform a complete analysis of the goods, services, and facilities provided by the City's general departments to the water and sewer department. Thus, Olson did not have an opinion as to whether the total amount of administrative costs allocated to the water and sewer department was reasonable. Nor did Olson perform a “rate study,” which would have required him to identify all the department's expenses and identify the revenue necessary to operate the utility in a sound financial manner. Thus, Olson did not express an opinion on whether the actual rates were unreasonable in relation to the necessary revenue. In addition, he conceded that a 10 to 15% variation between budgeted costs and actual costs is reasonable.

Plaintiffs also claim that the City's calculation of water and sewer rates is improper because it includes an expense of \$500,000 per year for future capital improvements and repairs. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the department's budgeting must include amounts to finance *current* capital improvements, but they assert that it is improper for the City to include sums for future, as yet unspecified capital improvements in its revenue requirements.

In the trial court, the parties filed competing motions for summary disposition. The City filed a response to plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition in which the City first disclosed Mark Beauchamp, president of Utility Financial Solutions, as an expert witness. In an affidavit, Beauchamp echoed Olson's conclusion that a full cost allocation study was necessary to verify the reasonableness of the administrative costs the City allocated to water and sewer department. He further averred that he reviewed and approved a revised cost allocation study performed by Deborah Peck, the City's budget director, which concluded that the department's actual administrative costs were always within 10% of the budgeted

administrative costs. Plaintiffs then filed a motion in limine to exclude Beauchamp's and Peck's proposed testimony arguing that the City failed to timely disclose Beauchamp as an expert witness and that Peck's testimony was inadmissible because her revised allocation study was not in the record.

In June 2017, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting the City's motion for summary disposition, denying plaintiffs' motions for summary disposition, and denying plaintiffs' motion in limine. The trial court determined that plaintiffs failed to overcome the presumption that the City's rates were reasonable. The trial court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the City's rates constituted a tax that was imposed in violation of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. Further, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs' Headlee Amendment claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in MCL 600.308a(3). In denying plaintiffs' motion for in limine, the court stated that plaintiffs could move for an order compelling production of Peck's analysis, which would be a more appropriate remedy than striking the evidence. The court also determined that Beauchamp's analysis was reliable and that his explanation of methods used by the City would assist the trier of fact. The court concluded that both Peck and Beauchamp could serve as rebuttal witnesses to Olson.

III. ANALYSIS

A. REASONABLENESS OF RATES

MCL 123.141, *et seq.*, governs the sale of water outside territorial limits. Because the City purchases its water from the Great Lakes Water Authority,³ it is a “contractual customer” under MCL 123.141(2). Accordingly, the City's water ratemaking⁴ must comply with MCL 123.141(3), which provides that “[t]he retail rate charged to the inhabitants of a city, village, township, or authority which is a contractual customer as provided by subsection (2) shall not exceed the actual cost of providing the service.” However,

*3 MCL 123.141 does not alter the general standard of reasonableness applied by courts when reviewing utility rates. Because of the difficulties inherent in ratemaking and the limitations on judicial review, the phrase “actual cost of providing the service” as used in the statute does not mean exactly equal to the actual costs of providing the service. Accordingly, while a utility fee must be reasonably

proportionate to the direct and indirect costs of providing the service for which the fee is charged, mathematic precision is not required. [*Trahey v. Inkster*, 311 Mich. App. 582, 597; 876 N.W.2d 582 (2015) (citations omitted).]

3 MCL 123.141(1) provides that “[a] municipal corporation, referred to in this act as a corporation, authorized by law to sell water outside of its territorial limits, may contract for the sale of water with a city, village, township, or authority authorized to provide a water supply for its inhabitants.” The City has historically purchased its water from the city of Detroit; the GLWA was formed during the city of Detroit's bankruptcy proceedings.

4 MCL 123.141 only applies to sale of water and therefore it does not govern the City's sewer ratemaking. However, the City's Charter requires reasonable sewer rates. Specifically, “[t]he City may fix and collect charges for such disposal services, tap-in fees and connection fees, the proceeds of which shall be exclusively used for the purpose of the sewage disposal system.” Westland Charter, § 16.10. Further, “The Council shall have the power to fix from time to time such just and reasonable rates and other charges as may be deemed advisable for supplying the inhabitants of the City and others with such public utility services as the City may provide.” Westland Charter, § 17.3.

“Michigan courts have long recognized the principle that municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable.” *Id.* at 594. In general, “rate-making is a legislative function that is better left to the discretion of the governmental body authorized to set rates.” *Novi v. Detroit*, 433 Mich. 414, 427; 446 N.W.2d 118 (1989). “Courts of law are ill-equipped to deal with the complex, technical processes required to evaluate the various cost factors and various methods of weighing those factors required in rate-making.” *Id.* at 430. “The determination of ‘reasonableness’ is generally considered by courts to be a question of fact.” *Id.* at 431. “[T]he presumption of reasonableness may be overcome by a proper showing of evidence.” *Trahey*, 311 Mich. App. at 594. It is a plaintiff's burden “to show that any given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable.” *Id.* “Absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility's rates, a court has no authority to disregard the presumption that the rate is reasonable.” *Id.* at 595.

As noted, plaintiffs argue that the City allocated too great a portion of certain administrative costs to the water and sewer department. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we agree that there is a question of fact regarding those particular allocations. Indeed, the City effectively conceded that there were errors in its cost allocation when it presented proposed testimony regarding a revised cost allocation study.

We disagree with plaintiffs' contention, however, that questions regarding particular administrative costs, by themselves, precludes summary disposition. It is plaintiffs' burden to establish the unreasonableness of the City's rates, and they have failed to present evidence that the City's overall allocation of administrative costs to the water and sewer department is unreasonable. Specifically, Olson testified that he did not prepare a full cost allocation plan in analyzing the administrative expenses allocated to the water and sewer department. He also admitted that other municipal departments could have provided more services to the water and sewer department than reflected in the budget and that a full cost allocation plan could indicate that the cost allocation should be higher than the amount that the City allocated in its budget. Olson further acknowledged that rates are set prospectively, that such prospective budgeting cannot be conducted with mathematical certainty, and that it would be reasonable if the budgeted amount of a cost allocation was off by about 15%.⁵

5 This testimony is consistent with established legal principles, including that “ratemaking is a prospective operation,” *Trahey*, 311 Mich. App. at 597, and that “mathematic precision is not required” when a court assesses whether a utility fee is “reasonably proportionate to the direct and indirect costs of providing the services for which the fee is charged,” *id.*

*4 Most significantly, plaintiffs failed to analyze the reasonableness of the City's overall rates by conducting a rate study. Olson agreed that if the rates cover the actual revenue requirements of the water and sewer department, then the rates are valid and customers will have suffered no damages. Yet Olson was not asked to review the overall expenditures of the water and sewer department, and he held no opinion overall concerning whether the total expenditures of the water and sewer department were reasonable. Thus, plaintiffs made no attempt to analyze the City's rates in lights of the department's revenue requirements. Nor have

plaintiffs explained how incorrect or improper administrative cost allocations in and of themselves renders the City's water and sewer rates unreasonable.

In sum, plaintiffs argue that their claims may proceed solely on the basis of certain selected individual expense components that they have chosen to address without a broader evaluation of whether such allegedly improperly estimated expenses in the City's original budget (1) resulted in an unreasonable variance from the actual overall costs and (2) affected the reasonableness of the rates. Given the lack of a more universal analysis, plaintiffs have failed to provide an evidentiary basis from which to conclude that the amount of the department's administrative costs renders the City's water and sewer rates unreasonable.

Plaintiffs also fail to cite any authority to support what would be a form of active court oversight that would amount to an exacting level of judicial auditing of only those individual expenses of a municipal utility that a plaintiff chooses to challenge without respect to whether the overall cost allocation is reasonably accurate and without respect to whether the actual water and sewer rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs' argument is at odds with the limited role of the judiciary in reviewing municipal utility rates. See *Novi*, 433 Mich. at 425-426, 428, 430. Nor have plaintiffs cited any authority for their implicit contention that they are entitled to the correction of every expense allocated to the water and sewer department that was allegedly overestimated.

Plaintiffs also argue that the City's rates are unreasonable because the City uses a portion of its revenue to create a reserve fund for future unspecified infrastructure improvements to its water and sewer systems. Plaintiffs fail to provide any legal authority to establish that this is an improper ratemaking procedure. To the contrary, rate-based public utilities commonly maintain a capital reserve to provide fiscal stability. *Jackson Co. v. City of Jackson*, 302 Mich. App. 90, 111; 836 N.W.2d 903 (2013). According to the affidavit of Steven Smith, the City's finance director, the City's water and sewer systems are comprised of nearly 674 miles of infrastructure and have a replacement cost of approximately \$674 million (i.e., it costs approximately \$1 million to rebuild each mile of infrastructure). The City has existed for 50 years, its infrastructure has an expected life of 50 to 70 years, and it experiences an average of 160 water main breaks a year. Given this un rebutted evidence, plaintiffs do not overcome the presumption that a \$500,000 annual addition to the City's

cash reserves to fund future improvements to the water and sewer system is a reasonable ratemaking practice.

In affirming the trial court, we are not relying on the proposed testimony of Beauchamp or Peck regarding the City's revised allocation study. Even if the trial court properly considered those affidavits, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, and there is clearly a question of fact regarding certain aspects of the City's administrative cost allocation. But Olson's own testimony establishes the necessity of an overarching analysis of the water and sewer department's revenue requirements. In the absence of a complete study of the rate structure and all of its components, it is speculative to suggest that some improper expenses have caused the rates to become excessive or unreasonable. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City's rates were unreasonable. And because we do not rely on Beauchamp's or Peck's proposed testimony, we need not address whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion in limine. See *B P 7 v. Bureau of State Lottery*, 231 Mich. App. 356, 359; 586 N.W.2d 117 (1998) ("As a general rule, an appellate court will not decide moot issues.").

B. THE HEADLEE AMENDMENT

*5 The pertinent provision of the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31, states:

Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon.

The levying of a new tax without voter approval violates this section of the Headlee Amendment. *Jackson Co.*, 302 Mich. App. at 99. However, a charge that constitutes a user fee is not subject to the Headlee Amendment. *Id.* The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the charge at issue. *Id.* at 98. A court decides, as a question of law, whether a

charge is a permissible fee or an illegal tax. *Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm.*, 255 Mich. App. 589, 611; 662 N.W.2d 784 (2003).

“There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment.” *Bolt v. Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 160; 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998). In general, “a fee is exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and some reasonable relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit. A tax, on the other hand, is designed to raise revenue.” *Id.* at 161 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In *Bolt*, our Supreme Court identified three key criteria to use in distinguishing between a user fee and a tax: (1) a user fee serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose; (2) a user fee is proportionate to the necessary costs of the service; and (3) a user fee is voluntary in that property owners are able to refuse or limit their use of the service. *Id.* at 161-162. “These criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee.” *Wheeler v. Shelby Charter Twp.*, 265 Mich. App. 657, 665; 697 N.W.2d 180 (2005) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

Water and sewer rates are generally considered user fees rather than taxes because they represent a fee paid in exchange for a service. See *Bolt*, 459 Mich. at 162.

The water rates paid by consumers are in no sense taxes, but are nothing more than the price paid for water as a commodity, just as similar rates are payable to gas companies, or to private water works, for their supply of gas or water. [*Bolt*, 459 Mich. at 162, quoting *Ripperger v. Grand Rapids*, 338 Mich. 682, 686; 62 N.W.2d 585 (1954).]

Water and sewer rates are not always considered user fees, however, because they must be proportionate to the cost of the service. See *Bolt*, 338 Mich. at 162 n. 12. That said, plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the rates themselves are unreasonable given the deficiencies in their proofs discussed above, particularly Olson's concession that he had not performed a rate study and that he held no opinion concerning the reasonableness of the rates. Considering that

plaintiffs fail to overcome the presumption that the City's rates are reasonable, we find no basis from which to conclude that the rates are not proportionate to the cost of service. Instead, the rates constitute a valid user fee because users pay their proportionate share of the expenses associated with the operation and maintenance of the water and sewer systems. See Westland Ordinances, § 102-61.⁶ The trial court aptly noted: “Those who use water and sewer services derive a benefit from paying the rates imposed. Moreover, the rates correlate directly with the amount and frequency of use by each particular user.”

⁶ Westland Ordinances, § 102-61 provides, in relevant part:

The amount of the rates and charges shall be reviewed annually and revised when necessary to ensure system expenses are met and that all users pay their proportionate share of operation, maintenance and equipment replacement expenses.

*6 Consideration of the other *Bolt* criteria does not alter the conclusion that the City's water and sewer rates constitute a user fee rather than a tax. The first *Bolt* factor indicates that the rates comprise a valid user fee because the rates serve a regulatory purpose of providing water and sewer services to the City's residents. Although the rates generate funds to pay for the operation and maintenance of the water and sewer system, this by itself does not establish that the rates serve a primary revenue-generating purpose. “While a fee must serve a primary regulatory purpose, it can also raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose.” *Graham v. Kochville Twp.*, 236 Mich. App. 141, 151; 599 N.W.2d 793 (1999).

Plaintiffs, relying on *Bolt*, 459 Mich. 152, contend that it is impermissible for the City to incorporate costs in its water and sewer rates which will be used to fund future capital improvements. In *Bolt*, the City of Lansing imposed a “storm water service charge” on property owners to fund the separation of the remaining portion of its combined sanitary and storm systems. *Id.* at 155. The Supreme Court determined that the storm water service charge failed to satisfy the first and second criteria because the charge did not correspond to the benefits conferred. *Id.* at 165. 75% of the property owners in Lansing were already served by a separate storm and sanitary sewer system, but those property owners would be charged the same amount as the 25% who would most benefit from the construction. *Id.* Further, the cost of this

project was \$176 million over 30 years. *Id.* at 155. The Court noted that the charge was “an investment in infrastructure that will substantially outlast the current ‘mortgage’ that the storm water charge requires property owners to amortize. At the end of thirty years, property owners will have fully paid for a tangible asset that will serve the city for many years thereafter.” *Id.* at 164 (citation omitted).

Bolt is primarily distinguishable because it involved a rate increase to fund a completely new alteration to the existing sewer system that benefitted only 25% of the property owners. Here, the City's reserve fund will be used for future capital projects that will benefits all users of the water and sewer services. Those users contribute to wear and tear of the water and sewer system and, by including the cost of future capital projects into its rates, the City ensures that the users will pay a fee proportionate to the necessary costs of service. And in order for the sewer system to serve its regulatory purpose, it must be maintained and periodically replaced and updated. For those reasons, we conclude that the first two *Bolt* criteria establish that the City's water and sewer rates constitute a user fee rather than a tax.

As for the third *Bolt* factor, plaintiffs contend that the City's water and sewer services are not voluntary under statute and the City's ordinances. Even assuming that the water or sewer charges were deemed effectively compulsory in this case, “the lack of volition does not render a charge a tax, particularly where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a

user fee and not a tax.” *Wheeler*, 265 Mich. App. at 666. We are unconvinced, in the absence of showing that the water and sewer rates are unreasonable, that those rates should be considered a tax as opposed to a user fee. Considering the *Bolt* criteria in totality, we conclude that plaintiffs have not established that the City has imposed an unconstitutional tax.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact in support of their claims alleging violations of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91.⁷ Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to the City pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Given our ruling, we decline to address whether plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

⁷ MCL 141.91 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964.

*7 Affirmed.

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 360725

2021 WL 219225

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Wesley GANSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 351276

|

January 21, 2021

Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 18-001363-CK

Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Stephens and Cameron, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff, Wesley Ganson, appeals as of right the trial court order granting defendant's, Detroit Public Schools, motion to dismiss under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1985. In June 2009, defendant decided not to renew plaintiff's contract. In December 2010, the Office of Retirement Services (ORS) informed plaintiff by letter that he did not meet the eligibility requirements for an incentivized retirement because plaintiff had not worked between November 1, 2009 and May 1, 2010. In February 2011, plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the decision of the ORS in the State of Michigan Administrative Hearing System. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff did not qualify for incentivized retirement benefits because plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was employed by the defendant during the six-month period ending on May 1, 2010. The ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by the Public School Employees' Retirement Board in September 2012.

In August 2016, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint for breach of fiduciary duty against defendant related to the nonpayment and retention of his retirement benefits in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. A federal district court magistrate recommended dismissal of the case in defendant's favor. When neither plaintiff nor defendant challenged the magistrate's recommendation, it was adopted by a federal district court judge.

In February 2018, plaintiff filed the instant case against defendant for breach of contract in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Plaintiff alleged that after his contract was not renewed in 2009, he was appointed by defendant's school board to the position of Executive Director of Student Affairs at Wayne State University. He alleged that this employment sufficed to qualify him as an employee performing out of system public education services pursuant to MCL 38.1306. Plaintiff alleged that upon retirement, he "was supposed to receive an early buyout package for the remainder of the Plaintiff's life and a multiplier for a period of six (6) years following the termination of his employment[.] ... Along with the early buyout incentive, the Plaintiff was supposed to receive a multiplier that would provide the Plaintiff \$100 per month for a period of six years.... [Plaintiff alleged that he] was informed that he would be provided with his early buyout retirement benefits if he worked for Detroit Public Schools for one day between the period of time between November 1, 2009 and May 1, 2010." Plaintiff pled that he had fulfilled that requirement when he "worked for Spain Elementary for three (3) days". According to the complaint, "[t]he Plaintiff was not provided with the aforementioned multiplier and thus has not received \$7,200 that he was supposed to receive." Further, "[b]etween the time that the Plaintiff attempted to collect on his early retirement benefits and the time that he was entitled to receive them, he has been damaged in the amount of approximately \$300,000." Relevant to this appeal, attached to the complaint was a one-page-document titled "CONTRACT FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR STUDENT ADVOCACY SERVICES" and that listed "PARTIES, PURPOSES, DUTIES, REPORTS, TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT, COMPENSATION AND REPRESENTATIONS" as subpoints 1.1 through 1.10. There was no signature page.

*2 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under MCR 2.116(C)(8) that argued plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because plaintiff failed to attach the complete contract to the complaint as required by MCR

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2.113(F)(1), and that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata. The court granted the motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to attach the whole contract as required under MCR 2.113(F) and under res judicata. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the application of the statute of limitations to his claim and whether the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint under MCR 2.113(F).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." *Maiden v. Rozwood*, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint. When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. [*El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.*, 504 Mich. 152, 159-160, 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019).]

"[W]hether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law, which we [also] review de novo." *Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc.*, 273 Mich. App. 187, 193, 729 N.W.2d 898 (2006). We also review de novo as a question of law whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations. *Parks v. Niemiec*, 325 Mich. App. 717, 719, 926 N.W.2d 297 (2018).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff first argues that defendant: 1) misled the court into believing that the accrual date for plaintiff's breach of contract claim was when the contract was signed, and 2) that the trial court erred in agreeing with defendant. The record does not

support either assertion. To the contrary, in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the period of limitations for breach of contract claims "accrue at the time of the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results" and that the statute of limitations began to run in this case in 2010 when plaintiff received a decision from the ORS. Defendant maintains that same theory on appeal.

The record also does not support plaintiff's assertion that the trial court agreed with defendant's statute of limitations argument. Rather, at the hearing for the motion to dismiss, the court declined to address the statute of limitations despite it having been pled and argued, as evidenced by the following colloquy:

Defendant: The second basis, Your Honor, is even assuming that the entire contract had been filed, one, the defendant Detroit Public Schools is not a party to it.

And even if it was filed again in its entirety. The statute of limitations would bar the complaint.

The court: So do we even need to address it when we know it wasn't filed completely?

Defendant: I was just giving all of the arguments.

The Court: I appreciate that. Yeah. And then you also have the issue of res judicata.

The record does not reflect a holding from the court regarding the statute of limitations issue. Neither was this issue a basis for the court's decision to dismiss.

Plaintiff next argues that his breach of contract claim is not barred by the statute of limitations and continues to accrue because the defendant's failure to pay plaintiff any retirement benefits constitutes a continuing breach where each failure to pay is a new breach. This argument was not raised before the trial court and is considered waived on appeal. See *Walters v. Nadell*, 481 Mich. 377, 751 N.W.2d 431 (2008) (citation omitted) ("Michigan generally follows the 'raise or waive' rule of appellate review."). While this Court "may overlook preservation requirements when the failure to consider an issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented," *Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury*, 290 Mich. App. 355, 387, 803 N.W.2d 698 (2010), we decline review of this issue because its

consideration is not necessary for a proper determination of the case. The court granted defendant summary disposition on the bases of the contract not being attached to the complaint in full and *res judicata* — not the statute of limitations. Consideration of this issue, even if determined to be in plaintiff's favor, would not disturb the trial court's ruling or change the end result.

*3 Plaintiff also argues that defendant's retention of all of plaintiff's retirement benefits constitutes unjust enrichment. We disagree. “Our Supreme Court has long recognized the equitable right of restitution when a person has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another.” *Morris Pumps*, 273 Mich. App. at 193, 729 N.W.2d 898 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When unjust enrichment exists, the law operates to imply a contract in order to prevent it.” *Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell*, 254 Mich. App. 300, 327–28, 657 N.W.2d 759 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, a contract will be implied only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.” *Barber v. SMH (US), Inc.*, 202 Mich. App. 366, 375, 509 N.W.2d 791 (1993). Like a claim of breach of contract, the statute of limitations period for a claim of unjust enrichment is six years. MCL 600.5813 (“All other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes.”); MCL 600.5815 (“The prescribed period of limitations shall apply equally to all actions whether equitable or legal relief is sought....”). To prove a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show “(1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff, and (2) an inequity resulting to plaintiff from defendant's retention of the benefit.” *Bellevue Ventures, Inc. v. Morang–Kelly Investment, Inc.*, 302 Mich. App. 59, 64, 836 N.W.2d 898 (2013).

Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment fails for multiple reasons. The claim would first be barred by the statute of limitations. Absent a date from plaintiff as to when the breach occurred, the ALJ's findings established that plaintiff knew as early as 2010 and as late as 2011 that he was being denied incentivized retirement benefits, however, he did not file the complaint in the instant matter until over six years later in 2018. MCL 600.5813; MCL 600.5815. Second, plaintiff's reliance on the continuing wrongs doctrine to extend the statute of limitations for his unjust enrichment claim is of no avail where the doctrine is no longer recognized in Michigan. *Marilyn Froling Revocable Living T. v. Bloomfield Hills Country Club*, 283 Mich. App. 264, 288, 769 N.W.2d 234 (2009). Third, plaintiff cannot prove the second element of an

unjust enrichment claim — that defendant retained a benefit — when defendant was not the holder of plaintiff's retirement funds. While it is true that defendant received the benefit of plaintiff's labor and length of employment, defendant is not the entity responsible to pay plaintiff's retirement benefits. According to the ALJ's proposal for decision, the ORS, acting on behalf of the Public School Employees' Retirement System denied plaintiff an incentivized retirement. Thus, plaintiff's retirement benefits were retained by the Public School Employees' Retirement System, which is in turn, maintained by the state of Michigan, not the defendant. See *AFT Michigan v. State of Michigan*, 497 Mich. 197, 202, 866 N.W.2d 782 (2015) (“the Public School Employees Retirement Act (Retirement Act), MCL 38.1301 *et seq.*, ... governs the Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System (MPERS).”).

Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint 1) under MCR 2.113(F) because the contract was attached to the complaint, and 2) because defendant failed to assert the defense of lack of an existence of an agreement in its first responsive pleading. Importantly, plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's additional basis for dismissal based on *res judicata*.

To prevail on his claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the breach resulted in damages to the party claiming breach.” *Bank of Am., NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.*, 499 Mich. 74, 100, 878 N.W.2d 816 (2016). “If a claim or defense is based on a written instrument, a copy of the instrument or its pertinent parts must be attached to the pleading” MCR 2.113(C)(1). “[T]he written contract becomes part of the pleadings themselves, even for purposes of review under MCR 2.116(C)(8).” *Laurel Woods Apartments v. Roumayah*, 274 Mich. App. 631, 635, 734 N.W.2d 217 (2007).¹

¹ MCR 2.113(F) has been redesignated MCR 2.113(C), and has been modified without substantive changes to accommodate “a statewide uniform e-Filing process,” effective September 1, 2018, 501 Mich. —, and again modified without substantive changes, effective August 14, 2019 and January 1, 2020. See 503 Mich. —, —.

*4 In his complaint, plaintiff referred to the contract as Exhibit E. According to the lower court record received by this Court and the certified copy of the lower court record

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submitted by defendant, exhibit E consisted of a letter from the Detroit Public Schools' superintendent recommending plaintiff for the position of director of student advocacy, a resolution from the Detroit Public Schools Board of Education to implement the student advocacy pilot program, and a document titled "Contract for Executive Director of the Center for Student Advocacy." This last document was one page, listed one section titled "Parties, Purposes, Duties, Reports, Terms of Employment, Compensation and Representations", and had subsections 1.1 through 1.10. It did not contain any other sections or pages. Upon receipt of the complaint, defendant's counsel twice alerted plaintiff by e-mail that the document was only one page. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff's counsel could not attest before the court as to whether he attached the contract in its entirety to the complaint. The court, in receipt of extensive communications between counsel in which the defendant repeatedly asked for the entire contract and plaintiff counsel's equivocation, found that the entire contract was not attached to the complaint.

Even if the trial court erred and the plaintiff either included the entire contract or supplemented his complaint with the additional page alleged to have been omitted, his breach of contract complaint would not have survived legal scrutiny and defeat. The second page contained subsections 1.11 through 1.17 and was signed by a school board representative, interim superintendent, plaintiff, two witnesses, and a notary. While the additional page stated that "The relationship of the Executive Director to the School District is that of an employee", it said nothing about the incentivized benefits plaintiff claims he was promised which would form the basis of the alleged breach. Plaintiff has failed to provide proof of the promises upon which his contractual claim was based: entitlement to an early buyout and a multiplier for six(6) years post retirement. if he worked for Detroit Public Schools for

one day between the period of time between November 1, 2009 and May 1, 2010. While plaintiff claims this information was conveyed to him, he offers no basis upon which to legally augment, supplement, or modify a written contract. Thus, even if the trial court erred in finding that the entire contract was not filed with the complaint and erred in affording him the opportunity to amend, the court reached the correct conclusion that the contract claim was fatally flawed.

Plaintiff next argues that defendant waived its right to assert the lack of an existence of an agreement because it did not plead the affirmative defense in its first responsive pleading. We disagree.

"A party generally must raise the affirmative defense of release in his first responsive pleading or be deemed to have waived the defense." *Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc.*, 242 Mich. App. 645, 647, 620 N.W.2d 310 (2000); See MCL 2.113(F)(3) ("Affirmative defenses must be stated in a party's responsive pleading, either as originally filed or as amended ..."). "[T]he primary function of a pleading in Michigan is to give notice of the nature of the claim or defense sufficient to permit the opposite party to take a responsive position." *Stanke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 200 Mich. App. 307, 317, 503 N.W.2d 758 (1993). According to the lower court record, defendant attached to its answer to plaintiff's complaint affirmative defenses that included: "Plaintiff has failed to plead the existence of a valid contract." and "Plaintiff has failed to attach a contract as required by Michigan law."

Affirmed.

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2021 WL 219225

2023 WL 174810

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Joan GREENFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 357579

|

January 12, 2023

Oakland Circuit Court, LC No. 2018-169707-CZ

Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Boonstra and Swartzle, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for class certification. We affirm the former and do not reach the latter.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2018, plaintiff filed a class action complaint against defendant, challenging the reasonableness of the rates defendant charged for water and sewer services. Defendant charges property owners in the city of Farmington Hills for water and sewer services based on their metered use of water. Plaintiff alleged that, from 2012 to 2018, defendant's water/sewer rates were set far in excess of the amount needed to pay for the actual cost of those services. Plaintiff noted that defendant's water and sewer rates included a component charge labeled "Reserves," and that defendant had accumulated a cash reserve from such billings of approximately \$79 million as of July 1, 2018. Plaintiff alleged that the reserve rate charges had resulted in defendant accumulating funds far in excess of the amount necessary to be held in reserve for repair and maintenance of the water and sewer system. Plaintiff's complaint challenged the reserve rate

charges in six counts: three counts alleging unjust enrichment and three counts alleging assumpsit. Of those six counts, one count of unjust enrichment and one count of assumpsit asserted that defendant's rates were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable under the common law; two corresponding counts asserted that defendant had violated MCL 141.91; and two other corresponding counts asserted that defendant had violated its own ordinances.

Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on March 6, 2019, asking the trial court to certify a plaintiff class comprised of every property owner who had paid or incurred defendant's water and sewer rates beginning in 2012. Plaintiff argued that the class was sufficiently numerous, that common questions of fact or law predominated, that plaintiff's claims were representative of the claims of the class members, and that plaintiff would fairly and adequately assert and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff also argued that maintenance of the action as a class action would be superior to other methods of adjudication because of the large number of class members, the fact that the class sought equitable relief, and the fact that while the aggregated claims would justify litigation of a class action, the damages suffered by individual class members would not warrant the cost of separate litigation.

Defendant responded, arguing that plaintiff could not satisfy the requirements of MCR 3.501(A)(1) for a class action. Defendant argued that its cash reserves were required to keep the system in good repair and working order, as well as anticipated capital replacements during the next five years; defendant also asserted that the reserve funds were restricted funds that could only be used to pay for water or sewer services. Therefore, defendant argued, plaintiff could not demonstrate that any members of the putative class had suffered any damages. Moreover, defendant argued that plaintiff's claims were not typical of the class, that plaintiff could not adequately protect the interests of the class, and that her claims were contrary to the best of interests of the other ratepayers.

*2 After a hearing on plaintiff's class certification motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court then issued an order denying plaintiff's motion for class certification in December 2019, stating in relevant part:

Class certification must be denied
because plaintiff has failed to satisfy

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the five factors required pursuant to MCR 3.50I(A)(I). Plaintiff has not shown that the proposed class members have suffered any actual injury. In addition, the court finds that under the facts presented, it is not probable that the amount which may be recovered by individual class members will be large enough in relation to the expense and effort of administering the action to justify a class action.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which this Court denied.¹

¹ See *Greenfield v City of Farmington Hills*, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 1, 2020 (Docket No. 353010).

Plaintiff's case continued as an individual action, and the parties conducted extensive discovery.² In March 2021, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Defendant argued that its rates were set as part of its Capital Improvements Plan (CIP) and that "substantial parts of the water and sanitary sewer system have reached or are nearing the end of their useful life" and would soon require extensive replacement and repairs. Defendant argued that, according to the city and county officials and professional engineers, its capital reserves were not only necessary, but were in fact insufficient to meet the next five years of capital investment required to maintain the water and sewer system. Further, defendant argued that its water and sewer rates were a fee and not a disguised tax. Defendant supported its motion with several affidavits. These included an affidavit from Carrie Ricker Cox, the Chief Engineer for the Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner's Office (OCWRC). In her affidavit, Cox averred that, as of April 2019, the replacement cost of defendant's water and sewer system's "horizontal" assets (e.g., water mains and sanitary gravity mains) exceeded \$1.225 billion, and the replacement cost of "vertical" assets (e.g., storage tanks) exceeded \$61 million. Cox also averred that

[a]s of April 22, 2019, the estimated capital expenditure for horizontal

assets, alone, required to maintain the desired level of service for the City's water and sewer systems over the five year time period of 2019-2023 is more than \$38 Million, over the ten year time period of 2019-2028 is more than \$65 Million, and over the twenty year time period of 2018-2037 is more than \$134 Million.

² In early 2021, counsel for nonparties Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner and County of Oakland filed an appearance in the case and sought a protective order related to some of plaintiff's nonparty discovery requests, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's discovery rulings regarding these nonparties, and they are not parties to this appeal.

Defendant's motion was also accompanied by an affidavit from Karen Mondora, the Director of defendant's Public Services Department. Mondora's affidavit provided an explanation of how defendant's water and sewer system operated and how its assets were managed, including federal grant funds. Mondora averred in her affidavit that the defendant had recognized that substantial repair and replacement of the water and sewer system would be needed in the next five-to-ten years and had adjusted its rates accordingly; she further noted that the reserve funds were earmarked and restricted for this purpose only. Mondora opined that, based on her experience "the practice of gathering reserves a little bit at a time to pay for a substantial amount of looming required capital improvements to the system that the City knows are on the not-too-distant horizon smooths the rates into more predictable bills and is therefore more desirable" to the users of the system, as compared to "foisting much larger fees on water bills whenever an emergency repair or major system capital improvement needs arise." Mondora further noted that defendant and the OCWRC were in the process of implementing necessary capital improvements to the system and opined that "[a]lthough we prefer and it is our plan to pay cash using the reserve fund for most of those projects, it is likely the City will also need to incur some bonded indebtedness." Steven Barr, defendant's Finance Director and Treasurer, similarly stated in an affidavit that "the City of Farmington Hills reserves as of June 30, 2018 were insufficient to cover the cost of known capital

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improvement requirements, along with required maintenance needs and necessary reserves to fund daily operational needs.”

*3 Defendant also accompanied its motion with a summary of its Wastewater Asset Management Plan, which includes the CIP, as well as numerous communications with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) concerning corrective action plans for defendant and Oakland County in order to comply with several administrative consent orders, and copies of those orders. Defendant also attached extensive documentation related to its water and sewer funds, city real property taxes, city ordinances related to the water and sewer system and associated charges, and Oakland County water and sewer regulations. Defendant also provided the report of its retained water and sewer financing expert, Eric P Rothstein, which contains Rothstein's opinions, as well as the data upon which he based those opinions, that (1) defendant's water and sewer rates were and are reasonable, (2) defendant's rates are in line with similar rates charged for similar water and wastewater systems in other communities in Michigan and nationwide, (3) defendant's use of a reserve system to finance the renewal and replacement of its water and sewer system lines was preferable to the use of debt financing, (4) defendant's “reserve practices are reasonable and appropriate” and the reserve levels were not excessive, and (5) plaintiff's allegations merely represented a personal opinion regarding the appropriate amount of reserve funds defendant should possess.

Plaintiff responded, arguing that the rates charged by defendant were unreasonable as a matter of law, or in the alternative that the determination of reasonableness was generally a question of fact to be left to the jury. Plaintiff also argued that her expert contradicted the opinions of defendant's experts, resulting in, at best, a question of fact. Plaintiff's motion was accompanied by a report prepared by John Farnkopf and Rick Simonson³ of HF & H Consultants, LLC (a water, wastewater, and stormwater consulting service). Plaintiff's experts opined that defendant had charged unreasonably high overall rates, and that the reserve fund balance had exceeded a reasonable target balance every year since 2012; further, plaintiff's experts opined that defendant had accumulated an unreasonably high reserve fund balance as of June 30, 2018. Plaintiff also argued that the alleged overcharge constituted a tax in violation of MCL 141.91.

3 Farnkopf and Simonson were also deposed during discovery.

The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion in June 2021. Plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, defendant's reserve rate charges were an impermissible tax, because defendant was not permitted to impose charges to finance capital improvements that would result in defendant fully recouping its investment in a period significantly shorter than the useful life of the improvements. Plaintiff also argued that she had shown that defendant's rates as a whole were excessive and therefore had established at least a genuine issue of material fact as to their reasonableness, noting that the parties had presented differing expert opinions on the issue. Defendant argued that it had demonstrated that the funds collected and the rates charged were reasonable and for a proper purpose. Defendant also noted that plaintiff's expert, in his deposition, had conceded that defendant's fees would be reasonable as long as they were necessary for capital improvements that were to be done over the next ten years.

The trial court took the matter under advisement. It subsequently issued a written opinion and order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. The trial court held that plaintiff had failed to provide proof that defendant had collected the funds at issue for any improper purpose. The court also noted that plaintiff's experts had failed to “review and consider the actual capital improvement needs of the City's water and sewer system and all of Defendant's asset management plans and materials, administrative consent orders and intended use of the reserve funds” and concluded that “[p]laintiff cannot create an issue of fact by having her expert review only a subset of facts to come up with an opposing opinion.” Further, the court noted that plaintiff's expert had concluded that defendant's reserve funds would be reasonable if used within ten years. The trial court therefore concluded that plaintiff had failed to support any of her claims.

This appeal followed. At the outset, we note that plaintiff's statement of questions presented on appeal consists of sixteen separately-numbered questions, but the argument section of plaintiff's brief does not contain separate sections or subsections for each question. Plaintiff's arguments fall into three broad categories: (1) the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's unjust enrichment and assumpsit claims, because defendant's water and sewer rates were unreasonable, (2) the reserve portion of defendant's water and sewer rates constituted an illegal tax, and (3) the trial court erred by denying class certification.

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II. PLAINTIFF'S COMMON-LAW UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND ASSUMPSIT CLAIMS⁴

⁴ As noted, all six counts of plaintiff's complaint are presented as unjust enrichment or assumpsit claims. Moreover, in opposing summary disposition in the trial court, plaintiff specifically acknowledged that all of her claims were "grounded in principles of assumpsit and unjust enrichment." This includes her claims that are premised on alleged violations of MCL 141.91 and defendant's ordinances. This section of our opinion is limited, however, to Counts I and IV of plaintiff's complaint, which allege unjust enrichment and assumpsit independent of any alleged violation of statute or ordinance. Further, on appeal, plaintiff does not present a separate argument concerning defendant's alleged violation of its own ordinances (Counts III and VI of her complaint); rather, plaintiff argues in a footnote that defendant's alleged violation of its ordinance requiring that sewer service rates be "sufficient to provide for debt service and for the expenses of operation, maintenance, and replacement as necessary to preserve the same in good repair and working order" demonstrates that its rates are unreasonable. Because plaintiff has not provided a detailed argument concerning defendant's alleged violation of its ordinance, we do not address this issue in depth, and leave the trial court's ruling concerning Counts III and VI undisturbed. See *Central Cartage v Fewless*, 232 Mich App 517, 529; 591 NW2d 422 (1998) (noting that this Court is not obligated to search for authority to support a party's argument on appeal).

*4 Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by holding that plaintiff had failed to establish at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding the unreasonableness of defendant's water and sewer rates. Specifically, plaintiff argues that she presented evidence that defendant's water and sewer rates during the relevant time period were in excess of the amounts necessary to finance the actual costs of providing those services, and that the cash reserves accumulated by defendant were far in excess of the amount necessary to support the city's water and sewer system, even accounting for necessary capital improvements. Plaintiff also argues that

the reasonableness of utility rates is generally a question of fact and that she met her burden of providing "clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses" included in defendant's rates. We disagree.

Plaintiff, in her complaint, presented claims of unjust enrichment and assumpsit related to defendant's water and sewer rates. These common-law claims are equitable claims that this Court reviews de novo. *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich App 161, 211; 969 NW2d 570 (2021). We also review de novo the trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. *Zarzyski v Nigrelli*, 337 Mich App 735, 740; 976 NW2d 916 (2021). A party is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when the evidence does not present a genuine issue of material fact. *Jewett v Mesick Consol Sch Dist*, 332 Mich App 462, 470; 957 NW2d 377 (2020). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." *MacDonald v Ottawa Co*, 335 Mich App 618, 622; 967 NW2d 919 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The reviewing court should evaluate a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by considering the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered in opposition to the motion." *Jewett*, 332 Mich App at 470 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This includes pleadings, affidavits, admissions, and depositions, along with other evidence submitted by the parties. *Walega v Walega*, 312 Mich App 259, 265-266; 877 NW2d 910 (2015). We review de novo the interpretation of statutes and ordinances. *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 211.

Historically, at common law, an action for assumpsit was "a proper vehicle for recovering unlawful fees, charges, or exactions—including unlawful utility charges—that the plaintiff had paid to a municipality under compulsion of local law." *Id.* at 213 (citation omitted). However, after assumpsit was abolished as a form of action in Michigan in 1963, an assumpsit claim became "modernly treated as a claim arising under 'quasi-contractual' principles which represent 'a subset of the law of unjust enrichment.'" *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 213-214, quoting *Wright v Genesee Co*, 504 Mich 410, 421; 934 NW2d 805 (2019). We therefore treat plaintiff's assumpsit claims as unjust-enrichment claims.

"Unjust enrichment is a cause of action to correct a defendant's unjust retention of a benefit owed to another." *Wright*, 504 Mich at 417. In order to sustain a claim for unjust enrichment, "a plaintiff must establish (1) the receipt

of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant.” *Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc.*, 273 Mich App 187, 195; 729 NW2d 898 (2006). The remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution, i.e. the return of the excessive or unjust benefits retained by defendant. *Wright*, 504 Mich at 419.

In cases involving municipal ratemaking, there is a rebuttable presumption that a municipality's utility rates are reasonable. *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 214. In order to succeed on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must rebut this presumption by both (1) presenting clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility's rates and (2) after presenting such evidence, demonstrating that the rates, viewed as a whole, are unreasonable, i.e., excessive. *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 217-218, citing *Trahey v. Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 594, 597-598; 876 NW2d 582 (2015). Absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility's rates, a court has no authority to disregard the presumption of reasonableness. *Trahey*, 311 Mich App at 595. Even if such an illegal or improper expense is included in a municipal utility's rates, a plaintiff is still required to demonstrate that “the disputed rates actually overcharged plaintiff... for the related water and sewer services.” *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 219.

*5 The heart of plaintiff's common-law claims is the allegation that defendant's water and sewer rates were unreasonable during the relevant time period (July 1, 2012 through July 1, 2018). We agree with the trial court that plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. Defendant's experts opined that defendant's water and sewer rates, as a whole, were proportionate to the rates charged by similarly-sized retail water and wastewater systems both in Michigan and nationwide. Plaintiff's experts did not address the issue of whether defendant's rates, as a whole, were excessive; in fact, plaintiff's experts admitted that they had not conducted a comprehensive rate study. Rather, plaintiff's experts based their conclusion that defendant's rates were unreasonable solely on their opinion that the rates had resulted in an excessively large reserve fund.

In *Youmans*, this Court noted that “without a comprehensive rate study—or some similar evidence demonstrating that the disputed rates excessively compensated the Township for the related utility services—one can at best speculate about whether the disputed rates were proportional to the underlying costs.” *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 220. This Court

also noted that several experts had reviewed the defendant's financial statements and determined that its “cash inflows and outflows over the disputed period were proportional.” *Id.* Although plaintiff argues that her experts provided evidence that the disputed rates excessively compensated defendant by analyzing the growth of the reserve fund, her experts specifically noted that they did not perform “a comprehensive review of the City's rate-making process.” The HF & H report only notes the actual costs incurred by defendant in operating its water and sewer system for one year, the fiscal year 2017-2018, and does not analyze cash inflows for any of the years in question. Further, the report does not analyze defendant's overall cash flow related to the water and sewer system; rather, plaintiff's expert's analysis is limited to the growth of defendant's reserve funds.

In plain language, plaintiff argues that defendant must be overcharging for water and sewer services because an account associated with that system has too much money in it. We are unconvinced that the former must necessarily be inferred from the latter. In the absence of a more comprehensive review of cash inflows and outflows associated with the water and sewer system, it appears that plaintiff is, at best, speculating about the proportionality of the rate as a whole. See *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 220. This Court in *Youmans* agreed with the defendant's position that “even if a specific expense that is included in formulating a challenged municipal utility rate is shown to be either illegal or improper, the plaintiff nevertheless bears the burden of both rebutting the presumption of reasonableness and proving that the disputed rates are unreasonable when viewed as a whole.” *Id.* at 218. Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment depend on “whether the water and sewer rates, viewed as a whole, were unreasonable inasmuch as they were “excessive,” not on whether some aspect of the Township's ratemaking methodology was improper.” *Id.* at 219. In the absence of a more holistic analysis of defendant's rates, we conclude that plaintiff, even if she could carry her burden of showing that the reserve portions of the challenged rates were illegal or improper, did not carry her burden of proving that the overall rates were unreasonable. The trial court therefore did not err by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition with respect to those claims.

Further, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff has not carried her burden of showing that the reserve portion of defendant's sewer rates was illegal or improper. We note at the outset that plaintiff's allegation that defendant lacks a written reserve fund policy, even if true, does not resolve

the issue. Defendant is not required by law or ordinance to have such a written policy, or to adhere to a particular ratemaking approach or guidelines. Moreover, defendant is not required by law or ordinance to have a specific plan for capital improvements equivalent to the amount in the reserve fund, so long as the funds are earmarked and restricted for use in maintaining the water and sewer system.

*6 Plaintiff's experts agree, in general, that defendant is permitted to maintain a reserve fund for maintenance and repair of its sewer system. Public utilities commonly maintain capital reserves to provide fiscal stability. See *Jackson Co v City of Jackson*, 302 Mich App 90, 111; 836 NW2d 903 (2013). Instead, plaintiff and her experts argue that defendant's reserve fund is excessively high. Plaintiff's experts base their opinion on expenses incurred by defendant for capital improvements in the years 2012 through 2018, and defendant's projections for capital improvement expenses through 2023. But, as noted by the trial court, plaintiff's experts did not review and consider the actual capital improvement needs of defendant's water and sewer system, and did not opine on necessary capital improvements over the next ten years. Further, Farnkopf agreed at his deposition that "reserves are all about managing risk and that is a subjective question" upon which opinions might differ. Defendant offered substantial evidence that its cash reserves were necessary to fund large-scale necessary maintenance, repair, and replacement of both the horizontal and vertical assets in its water and sewer system; this evidence was not refuted by plaintiff's experts, who focused much more narrowly on the balance of the reserve fund compared to *past* capital improvement expenditures and the limited amount of capital-improvement projects that were already in the process of being implemented in the near future and funded by the reserve fund.

On the whole, the evidence showed that defendant had inspected its water and sewer system and had determined that substantial repairs, maintenance, and replacement would be necessary in the near future. There was also testimony that defendant's reserves would possibly be insufficient to meet those needs. This testimony was not refuted by plaintiff; as the trial court noted, plaintiff's experts' narrow focus on the reserve fund balance failed to take into account numerous other factors that would impact the determination of whether defendant's reserve rates were illegal or improper.

In general, "rate-making is a legislative function that is better left to the discretion of the governmental body authorized to

set rates." *Novi v Detroit*, 433 Mich 414, 427; 446 NW2d 118 (1989). "Courts of law are ill-equipped to deal with the complex, technical processes required to evaluate the various cost factors and various methods of weighing those factors required in ratemaking." *Id.* at 430. In the absence of a complete review of defendant's rate-making process, or the need for large-scale repairs or replacement of assets in the near future, plaintiff's allegation that defendant's water and sewer rates are unreasonable is speculative. Mere speculation is insufficient to survive summary disposition. See *Skinner v Square D Co*, 445 Mich 153, 164; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, and the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary disposition on plaintiff's common-law assumpsit and unjust-enrichment claims. *Zarzyski*, 337 Mich App at 740.

III. VIOLATION OF MCL 141.91

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by not holding that the portions of defendant's water and sewer rates that represent what plaintiff alleged to be an overcharge were a disguised tax in violation of MCL 141.91. We disagree. We review *de novo* the interpretation of statutes and ordinances. *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 211.

MCL 141.91 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964." At the outset, we note that challenges to a utility fee on the ground that it is a disguised tax, rather than a fee, are generally brought under the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31, which provides in pertinent part:

Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the

qualified electors of that unit of Local
Government voting thereon

Plaintiff has not, however, brought a claim under the Headlee Amendment. Nor has she argued that MCL 141.91 provides a separate cause of action or provides her with a private right of action. Instead, she brings unjust enrichment and assumpsit claims premised on a claimed violation of MCL 141.91, yet relies upon Headlee challenge cases for her analytical framework. See *Bolt v Lansing*, 459 Mich 152; 587 NW2d 264 (1998). And, as defendant points out, plaintiff's complaint did not reference the Headlee Amendment or articulate the elements of a claim, even if cognizable, under MCL 141.91. But plaintiff did allege in her complaint that defendant had violated MCL 141.91 by imposing "disguised taxes that are not ad valorem property taxes" after 1964, and therefore was liable under unjust enrichment and assumpsit theories. Because, as we will discuss, plaintiff's claim fails in any event, we need not decide whether plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a valid cause of action in Counts II and V, but we note that plaintiff did not analyze or argue that MCL 141.91 provides a private right of action, and nothing in this opinion should be taken as this Court's holding that such a cause of action exists.

*7 Plaintiff argues that the analytical framework articulated in *Bolt* applies as easily to her claim as it does to a claim under the Headlee Amendment, while defendant argues that we should apply a pre-*Bolt* common-law analysis to plaintiff's claim. We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue, because even granting plaintiff the analytical framework of her choice, it is clear that the trial court did not err by rejecting her claims under MCL 141.91.

"Although the levying of a new tax without voter approval violates the Headlee Amendment, a charge that constitutes a user fee does not." *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 226 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In *Bolt*, our Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test for determining whether a municipal charge represents a user fee or a tax: (1) "a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose"; (2) "user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service"; and (3) a user fee is voluntary in that users are "able to refuse or limit their use of the commodity or service." *Bolt*, 459 Mich at 161-162. "These criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee." *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 226 (citation omitted). The party challenging a utility

rate bears the burden of establishing that it is a tax and not a user fee. *Id.* at 225. The presumption of reasonableness is a "pertinent" consideration when considering whether a user fee is proportionate to the necessary costs of the service. *Id.* at 227-228 (citation omitted).

As discussed in *Youmans*, this Court has held that a water and sewer rate that includes an assessment for future capital improvements, repairs, and maintenance "serves a regulatory purpose" notwithstanding the fact that it may generate revenue in support of that purpose, or even result in a surplus for the fiscal year. See *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 228, quoting *Shaw v Dearborn*, 329 Mich App 640, 666; 944 NW2d 153 (2019). Here, as in *Youmans*, there was undisputed evidence presented that the contested rates were assessed to fund the operation and capital improvements of defendant's water and sewer system, including defendant's obligations under various administrative orders and corrective action plans with the MDEQ. *Id.* at 606. We therefore similarly conclude that the challenged rates primarily serve valid regulatory purposes under the first *Bolt* factor.

Regarding the second *Bolt* factor, as discussed, plaintiff has not established even a question of fact regarding whether defendant's rates were disproportionate. As noted in *Bolt*, "[m]athematic precision is not required when reviewing the reasonable proportionality of a utility fee." *Bolt*, 459 Mich at 164-165. Further, a valid user fee can include "some capital investment component" as well as the actual costs of use. *Id.* The second *Bolt* factor also favors defendant's position.

Regarding the third *Bolt* factor, the challenged rates here are comprised of numerous component charges that are aggregated into an overall charge per 1,000 cubic feet of water used. However, there is also a minimum amount charged regardless of water usage; further, defendant's ordinances require all dwellings to be connected to the water and sewer system. Therefore, defendant's rates are not entirely "voluntary" because a property owner cannot entirely avoid them by refusing to use any water or disconnecting from the system. See *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 232. The rationale of *Youmans* is equally applicable to the challenged rate in this case; we conclude that "at least the fixed portion of the disputed rates ... is effectively compulsory." *Id.* at 232.⁵ The third *Bolt* factor therefore at least somewhat favors plaintiff's position. However, the mere "lack of volition does not render a charge a tax, particularly where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax." *Wheeler*

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v Shelby Charter Twp, 265 Mich App 657, 666; 697 NW2d 180 (2005).

5 It is, however, not clear from the record whether any portion of the fixed minimum charge goes to the reserve fund.

*8 Considered in their totality, *Youmans*, 336 Mich App at 226 (citation omitted), plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of showing that the challenged rates are impermissible taxes rather than valid user fees, even assuming that her chosen analytical framework applies to her claims asserting a violation of MCL 141.91. The trial court therefore did not err by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition on these claims.

In conclusion, the trial court did not err by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition and dismissing plaintiff's claims. *Zarzyski*, 337 Mich App at 740. Plaintiff did not carry her burden of showing that defendant's rates were unreasonable or constituted an illegal tax. Because we affirm the trial court's grant of summary disposition, we need not address plaintiff's arguments concerning the denial of class certification.

Affirmed. As the prevailing party, defendant may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A)(1).

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
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UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.

MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY, and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 358868

|

March 9, 2023

Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 18-014337-CZ

Before: Rick, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Riordan, JJ.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 Plaintiff-appellant, Midwest Valve & Fitting Company, appeals as of right the trial court's order that, after a bench trial, dismissed its remaining claims related to the legality of certain fees charged by defendant, City of Detroit. The appeal also involves the trial court's earlier opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on appellant's other claims.

This case involves appellant's challenge to the legality of certain annual charges that are imposed by defendant. The trial court determined that the charges are legal and dismissed appellant's claims, some in a pretrial motion for summary disposition and the remainder after a bench trial. Because its arguments have no merit, we affirm.

I. FACTS

Defendant imposes an annual charge on owners of commercial real property and multiunit residential real property located in Detroit. Although appellant initially claimed that the charges were “fire inspection charges,” appellant on appeal has acquiesced to the trial court's and defendant's position that they are “permit fees.”

Appellant received bills from defendant for these charges since at least 2013 and paid them. However, appellant maintained that it never received any fire safety inspection during this time.

Appellant filed a complaint, alleging numerous claims against defendant: Count I—violation of the Headlee Amendment, Count II—assumpsit/unreasonable charges, Count III—unjust enrichment/unreasonable charges, Count IV—assumpsit/violation of MCL 141.91, Count V—unjust enrichment/violation of MCL 141.91, Count VI—assumpsit/violation of city ordinance, Count VII—unjust enrichment/violation of city ordinance, and Count VIII—violation of equal protection.

Appellant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on Counts I, IV, and V. It argued that the charges constituted taxes, which were imposed in violation of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment¹ and MCL 141.91.² After analyzing the characteristics of the charges, the trial court ruled that the charges were fees, not taxes, and granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V.

¹ Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31.

² As will be discussed in greater detail below, § 31 of the Headlee Amendment “prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate,” *Durant v Mich*, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 (1997), and MCL 141.91 prohibits cities from imposing taxes other than ad valorem property taxes.

The trial court conducted a one-day bench trial on the remaining counts. In support of its position that the charges at issue were inspection fees, appellant primarily relied on (1) a fire marshal web page indicating that inspections get scheduled after payment of the fee, and (2) some internal city documents³ that used terminology, such as “safety inspection charges” or “fire permit safety inspection,” while referencing these charges. But, Fire Marshal Shawn Battle testified that those representations were factually incorrect because the fees were exclusively for permits, which allow businesses to operate, and have no relation to inspections.⁴ Although it was the department's goal to inspect every commercial property every year, Battle stated this was not feasible because of a lack

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of manpower. Battle also testified that his department did not utilize any of the documents appellant relied on and instead it used a system called MobileEyes, which identifies the charges as being for “permits.” Further, the actual invoices and permits relating to these charges were admitted into evidence via stipulation. Those documents specifically reference “industrial/business/mercantile occupancy permit[s],” with no mention of inspections.

3 The parties stipulated that these documents were created by an unknown city employee at some unknown time.

4 Battle also testified that 10 months before trial started, someone had put in a request to Detroit's Information Technology Department to have that information removed from the website, but apparently, the information was still present as of a few days before trial.

*2 Although defendant was unable to verify that the city council had approved the charges any time before May 2021, the council later approved them retroactively back to 2013.

In its closing argument, appellant argued that even if the charges were “permit fees,” they would be illegal because the city council never approved them, which was required by the city charter and ordinances. Appellant claimed that the city council's attempt to retroactively approve the charges was a legal nullity. Regarding its equal-protection claim, appellant argued that, with it not receiving any inspections, as opposed to other commercial property owners, it had not been treated objectively and reasonably.

The trial court found that the charges at issue are annual permit fees and not inspection fees. The trial court also noted that the burden was on appellant to prove that any fee or charge was unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Further, the trial court ruled that Counts II and VI were not viable because Michigan does not recognize an independent cause of action for assumpsit.

The trial court dismissed appellant's unjust enrichment claims in Counts III and VII. The court noted that Count III was premised on the allegation that the charges were for fire inspections when no inspections had taken place. The trial court rejected this claim because the charges are not for inspections, but are for permits. The trial court also ruled two additional arguments appellant raised relating to the claims of unjust enrichment were unpersuasive. First, the trial

court rejected appellant's contention that the charges were in violation of the city ordinance because they were in excess of the cost of the “issuance” of permits. The trial court noted that cities are allowed to recover all of their direct and indirect costs related to the regulation of those who are charged the fee and that courts are to give deference to a city's interpretation of its own ordinances. Second, the court rejected appellant's contention that defendant was unjustly enriched because the charges were never approved by the city council. The trial court then ruled that the city council's retroactive approval of the charges was permissible as a matter of law.

Finally, the trial court ruled that appellant failed to prove any of the essential elements of its equal-protection claim, including that defendant made a classification identifying a particular group, that defendant intentionally or purposefully treated that group differently from similarly situated individuals, and that there is no rational basis for defendant's disparate treatment.

II. HEADLEE AMENDMENT AND MCL 141.91

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V of its complaint. We disagree.

Whether a municipal charge is a “tax” is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. *Mapleview Estates, Inc v Brown City*, 258 Mich App 412, 413-414; 671 NW2d 572 (2003). This Court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. *Odom v Wayne Co*, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” *Maiden v Rozwood*, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties.” *Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed*, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). A motion under (C)(10) is properly granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Michalski v Bar-Levav*, 463 Mich 723, 730; 625 NW2d 754 (2001).

*3 In Counts I, IV, and V, appellant alleges violations of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment states, in pertinent part:

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Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any *tax* not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon. [Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31 (emphasis added).]

This section “prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit’s electorate.” *Durant v Mich*, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).

MCL 141.91 states:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a *tax*, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964. [Emphasis added.]

In concert, these provisions restrain a local government’s ability to assess taxes. If the charges levied are not taxes, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated and appellant’s claims here, based on violations of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91, would necessarily fail. See *Bolt v City of Lansing*, 459 Mich 152, 158-159; 587 NW2d 264 (1998) (stating that user fees are not taxes and are not affected by the Headlee Amendment).⁵

⁵ Although *Bolt* only concerned whether a particular charge was a “tax” for the purposes of the Headlee Amendment, we find it equally relevant for determining whether a particular charge is a “tax” for the purposes of MCL 141.91 as well.

“There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment.” *Id.* at 160. Three primary factors are considered in determining

whether a charge is a fee or a tax. “The first criterion is that a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose.” *Id.* at 161. “A second, and related, criterion is that user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service.” *Id.* at 161-162. A third criterion is voluntariness: fees generally are voluntary, while taxes are not. *Id.* at 162. “[T]hese criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee.” *Graham v Kochville Twp*, 236 Mich App 141, 151; 599 NW2d 793 (1999).

There is no question of fact that the charges at issue here were for the acquisition of permits, not inspections. Although appellant took the position below that the charges were “fire inspection charges” or “fire inspection fees,” it submitted no evidence to show that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving an inspection. Instead, the evidence showed that the charges were for obtaining occupancy permits. Thus, appellant’s arguments that rely on the charges being fees for receiving inspection services are misplaced and are without merit.

Considering the first *Bolt* factor, whether the charge serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose, it is understood that a fee can raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying purpose. *Merrilli v St Clair Shores*, 355 Mich 575, 583; 96 NW2d 144 (1959). Indeed, in *Merrilli*, our Supreme Court held that permit fees, as opposed to taxes, are regulatory in nature. *Id.* at 582. Fire Marshal Battle testified in his deposition that the charge at issue provides the property owner with a permit, which allows the owner to operate in Detroit. Further, in a response to appellant’s third set of interrogatories, defendant averred that those who pay the charge, and who do not receive an inspection, still receive the benefit of defendant’s Fire Protection Program, which includes the “training of [the fire marshal] staff, maintenance of Fire Marshal’s physical facility, public education, provision of information related to properties subject to the Fire Marshal’s programs, maintenance of information, capacity to continue provision of services, including but not limited to inspections, etc.”

*4 Appellant argues that the Fire Protection Program serves a public purpose, but ignores the primary benefit to a property owner who pays the charge—a permit, allowing the owner to operate on its premises. Undoubtedly, the public also benefits from the Fire Protection Program, but as this Court recognized in *Westlake Trans, Inc v Pub Serv Comm*, 255 Mich App

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589, 613; 662 NW2d 784 (2003), fees that benefit the general public still can maintain their regulatory nature.

In *Westlake*, the plaintiffs argued, in part, that fees assessed to trucking companies were an impermissible tax. *Id.* at 611. This Court stated:

[I]n exchange for the fees, a motor carrier receives the right to operate its trucks in Michigan, and the fees are used to enforce the provisions of the act that carry out the above-listed purposes. Thus, there is a direct benefit to the one who pays the fees. We recognize that promoting and regulating safe use of the highways benefits the general public as well. However, a regulatory fee can have dual purposes and still maintain its regulatory characterization. As long as the primary purpose of a fee is regulatory in nature, the fee can also raise money provided that it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose, and use benefit the general public. [*Id.* at 613 (citation omitted).]

The situation in *Westlake* is analogous to the circumstances before us. Like the plaintiffs in *Westlake*, who received the right to operate trucks in Michigan, appellant in the instant case receives a benefit by being allowed to operate its business in Detroit. Thus, appellant received “a direct benefit” from paying the charge. The fact that the general public also benefits from the Fire Protection Program does not negate the charge's regulatory nature. See also *Jackson Co v City of Jackson*, 302 Mich App 90, 108; 836 NW2d 903 (2013) (“[A] regulatory fee may confer a benefit on both the general public and the particular individuals who pay the fee and still maintain its regulatory character”). Therefore, the first of the factors we must consider weighs in favor of the charge being a fee and not a tax.

Secondly, the city's charge appears to be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service it is providing. Courts are to presume that the amount of the fee is reasonable. *Id.* at 109. Appellant's position is that the costs are not proportionate because, by not receiving any inspections, appellant received

nothing different from anyone else in the city who was not required to pay the charges. We disagree with this argument because the main benefit of the city's charge was the receipt of a permit, not an inspection. Thus, those who paid the charge did receive a benefit distinct from someone who did not pay the fee—the right to occupy the premises as a business. Furthermore, these charges funded the year-to-year operations of the Fire Marshal Department. This is an important distinction from *Bolt*, in which our Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the charge, which it found to be a tax, was to finance a multiyear construction of a large infrastructure project. There, the benefit gained—new infrastructure—would substantially outlast the time period for which the charge was to be in place. *Bolt*, 459 Mich at 163-164. Further, the amounts collected from the charges in the case before us historically were significantly less than the program's costs. Consequently, the charge is reasonably proportional.

*5 As to the third factor, we must consider whether the city's charge was voluntary. The trial court did not explicitly rule on this factor and instead simply assumed that the charge was not voluntary. We agree that the charge was not voluntary. Although, while technically, the charge is voluntary because a business could decline to pay and simply opt to not operate in Detroit, that option is highly impractical for a business. Indeed, our Supreme Court in *Bolt* rejected the argument that a charge was voluntary because property owners could relinquish their rights of ownership. *Id.* at 168.

After weighing these same factors, the trial court ruled the charge was a fee, not a tax. We agree with the trial court's analysis and find it did not err. Significantly, this Court has recognized that “the lack of volition does not render the charge a tax, particular where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax.” *Wheeler v Shelby Twp*, 265 Mich App 657, 666; 697 NW2d 180 (2005). Thus, even with the charge at issue being involuntary, that fact alone is not sufficient to overcome the other two factors that appellant received a benefit and that the fee is proportional.

Because the charge at issue is a fee, not a tax, appellant is precluded from succeeding on its claims alleging violations of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. As a result, the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V.

III. VIOLATION OF CITY CHARTER AND ORDINANCES

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its claims related to the violation of the city charter and ordinances. We disagree.

A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. *Walters v Snyder*, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *Id.* A trial court's interpretation of a municipal charter is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. *Save Our Downtown v Traverse City*, — Mich App —, —; — NW2d — (2022) (Docket No. 359536); slip op. at 5.

Initially, it should be recognized that after the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on some of appellant's counts, trial proceeded with respect to only Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII. The trial court dismissed Counts II and VI, which alleges independent causes of action of assumpsit. This was not erroneous because Michigan no longer recognizes an independent cause of action for assumpsit.⁶ *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). Notably, appellant does not challenge the dismissal of those counts. Instead, appellant focuses on its allegations that the charges were unlawful because they were imposed in violation of the city charter and ordinances. Thus, only appellant's claims pertaining to the alleged violations of the city charter and ordinances are before this Court.⁷

⁶ Although no independent cause of action for assumpsit exists, “the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved.” *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). In this instance, appellant's counts of assumpsit essentially were covered by its claims of unjust enrichment.

⁷ In Count III, appellant alleges that defendant unjustly enriched itself by collecting charges pertaining to fire inspections, while not providing

such fire inspections. However, the trial court found that the charges at issue were fees for permits, not inspections. That finding, precluding unjust enrichment, is not clearly erroneous. Fire Marshal Battle testified at trial that the fees were for the issuance of permits, not inspections. Indeed, even the invoices that appellant received stated that the charges were for “permits,” with no mention of “inspections.” While there were some internal city documents that used terms such as “fire inspection fee,” those documents could not be authenticated, and the trial court gave them little to no weight. The author of those documents is not known, and there is no evidence that defendant relied on them. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for that aspect of Count III.

*6 In Count VII, appellant asserted a claim of unjust enrichment premised on a violation of Detroit Ordinances, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11, which stated at the time, in pertinent part:⁸

In accordance with Section 9-507 of the 1997 Detroit City Charter, the Fire Commissioner is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of:

- (1) Inspection and consultation;
- (2) Issuance of permits and certificates;
- (3) Administrative appeals;
- (4) Issuance of reports; and
- (5) Copying of records.

⁸ The Detroit City Code was later recodified in December 2019. The content in this quoted portion was moved to Detroit Ordinances, § 18-1-22, Subsection 1.6.2. Although there are some minor modifications to the 2019 recodification, the content is substantially the same.

Appellant alleges in its complaint that this ordinance was violated because the charges could not be considered “necessary” when a property owner does not receive a fire inspection. This position again is premised on the assertion that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving fire inspections, but as already explained, that is not the case. The charges are a fee paid to obtain occupancy permits.

Although appellant's complaint only alleges that the ordinances were violated in this one respect in its proposed conclusions of law, appellant asserted that the charges were unlawful for two other reasons: (1) the city council never approved the charges, and (2) the charter provision cited in the ordinance does not allow for permit fees. The trial court rejected the former argument, but did not address the latter.

Regarding the former, the parties stipulated that there was no evidence of the city council approving the charges any time before May 2021. But the city council later retroactively approved the charges. Appellant argues that the retroactive approval is a nullity.

There is no per se prohibition on retroactive application of legislation. See *Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Bd of Trustees v City of Pontiac (On Remand)*, 317 Mich App 570, 578-579; 895 NW2d 206 (2016). However,

retrospective application of a law is improper where the law takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. [*In re Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit*, 416 Mich 558, 572; 331 NW2d 456 (1982) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also *LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC*, 496 Mich 26, 39; 852 NW2d 78 (2014).]

Appellant essentially argues that it had a vested right to not pay any of the charges until the city council approved them in May 2021. According to appellant, the retroactive imposition of those charges affected its vested right. Appellant's position is not persuasive. "Retroactive statutes curing defects in acts done, or authorizing or confirming the exercise of powers, are valid where the legislature originally had authority to confer the power or authorize the acts, except where it is attempted to impair vested rights." *Stott v Stott Realty Co*, 288 Mich 35, 45; 284 NW 635 (1939). As discussed below, the city council at all relevant times had the power or authority

to approve the charges, making its retroactive authorization permissible. Notably, appellant during the preceding years thought that the charges were legally due and paid them to defendant. This is significant because the reason vested rights are not to be affected by retroactive legislation is that "it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions." *LaFontaine*, 496 Mich at 38 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because appellant had no expectation to be free from paying the permit fee, the retroactive authorization of that very same permit fee did not affect appellant. In other words, the retroactive imposition of the charge did not affect appellant as it incurred no new obligations to defendant after the passing of the resolution.

*7 Additionally, a retroactive application must be a rational means of achieving a city's legitimate objective. *Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate*, 444 Mich 656, 667; 513 NW2d 807 (1994). In this case, the retroactive ratification of the charges was a rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose. The purpose was to maintain the Fire Protection Program, which certainly is a legitimate purpose, and the means to accomplish that was to simply authorize charges that property owners had already paid, which was reasonable.⁹

⁹ The only reason the charges had not been authorized earlier is that the Fire Marshal Department had thought that an authorization already was in place.

Appellant's latter argument not contained in its complaint was that the city council lacked the authority to approve the charges because they violate § 9-507 of the city charter. Section 9-507 provides:

Any agency of the City may, with the approval of the City Council, charge an admission or service fee to any facility operated, or for any service provided, by an agency. The approval of the City Council shall also be required for any change in any such admission or service fee.

This section allows for the imposition of a charge for (1) admission to an agency-operated facility or (2) a service provided by a city agency. Only the second clause is pertinent in this case. While appellant concedes that if the charge was

for a fire inspection, then the charge would be for a service, it argues that if the charge is truly a “permit fee,” then it is not a charge for a service. We disagree.

The city charter is to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. *Save Our Downtown*, — Mich App at —; slip op. at 5. “The provisions are to be read in context, with the plain and ordinary meaning given to every word. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is clear and unambiguous. Court apply unambiguous statutes as written.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a term is not defined in a statute, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. *Kent Co Aeronautics Bd v Dep’t of State Police*, 239 Mich App 563, 578; 609 NW2d 593 (2000). As evidenced by the 27 different definitions of the noun “service” in the dictionary, the term is defined broadly. See *Random House Webster’s College Dictionary* (1995). However, one of those definitions is most pertinent: “the duty or work of public servants.” *Id.* Although the work provided in this instance is not the provision of a fire inspection, it nonetheless still is a service because it is providing a permit. Consequently, the city’s imposition of a charge to a property owner to obtain a permit does not run afoul of the city charter.

Appellant also contends that it is improper for the charges to fund “all of the direct and indirect costs” of the Fire Prevention Program. Appellant avers that the ordinance only allows for defendant to recover the administrative costs associated with issuing the permits. Appellant provides no authority for this argument and merely quotes the applicable provision in the city code: “the Fire Commissioner is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of ... [i]ssuance of permits and certificates.” Detroit Ordinances, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11. Appellant focuses on the word “issuance” for its position. “Issuance” is defined as “the act of publishing or officially giving out or making available.” *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (11th ed.).

*8 The strictly literal interpretation of this provision lends support to the suggestion that a charge is allowable only for the “act” of “giving out” the permit. However, the concept of a “permit” encompasses much more than a physical piece of paper. The more reasonable interpretation is that the cost of the issuance of a permit includes all the work involved with a particular program which that permit represents.

When interpreting an ordinance, courts are to give some deference to a municipality’s interpretation. See *Macenas v Village of Michiana*, 433 Mich 380, 398; 446 NW2d 102 (1989). Battle testified that the Fire Marshal Department has been issuing the permit in the same manner since at least 1996, and that it would not be possible to issue these permits if all of the Fire Marshal’s related programs were not funded.¹⁰ Thus, the Fire Marshal Department has been interpreting the term “issuance” within the ordinance as encompassing the costs of the Fire Prevention Program, as well as the cost of physically issuing the permit itself. We defer to the Fire Marshal’s interpretation of the ordinance and similarly conclude that the ordinance allows for the recovery of the costs of the Fire Prevention Program in the issuance of the permits.

10 These also are findings of fact that the trial court made, which appellant does not challenge on appeal.

Therefore, given the above analysis, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action on appellant’s claims related to any alleged violations of city charter or ordinances.

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its equal-protection claim. We disagree.

A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. *Walters*, 239 Mich App at 456.

“The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.” *Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Twp*, 486 Mich 311, 318; 783 NW2d 695 (2010), citing Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 and U.S. Const., Am. XIV. “Michigan’s equal protection provision is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution.” *Grimes v Van Hook-Williams*, 302 Mich App 521, 532-533; 839 NW2d 237 (2013) (cleaned up). “The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment.” *Id.* at 533 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether there has been discriminatory

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intent or purposeful discrimination. *Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc.*, 218 Mich App 302, 308; 553 NW2d 377 (1996).

Appellant claims that its “group” has been discriminated against because it did not receive fire inspections, while others who paid the charges at issue did. Because no suspect classification is involved, such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or illegitimacy, the proper level of review is rational basis. See *Phillips v Mirac, Inc.*, 470 Mich 415, 434; 685 NW2d 174 (2004). “The rational basis test considers whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Fire Marshal Battle testified that the goal of his department is to inspect every property, but that the lack of funding and manpower makes it impossible to do so. Thus, while some properties in a given year received inspections, some did not, even though both inspected and uninspected properties pay the same charge. It is beyond dispute that a legitimate

governmental interest is to provide fire inspections. It also is rationally related to only perform as many inspections as is economically feasible. Knowing that it is impossible to inspect every property, defendant was left with two choices: (1) conduct as many inspections as it could, or (2) conduct zero inspections so everyone was treated equally. Defendant's choice to proceed with the first option is eminently rational.

*9 Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for appellant's equal-protection claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly ruled in favor of defendant on all counts. We affirm.

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Eugene J. THOMAS, Walter Jamil a/k/a Wisam Jamil
a/k/a Walter Thomas, SCD Enterprises, L.L.C., a/k/a
TBI Enterprises, L.L.C., CBW Technologies, Inc., a/
k/a TBI Technologies, Inc., CBW Enterprises, Inc., a/
k/a TBI Franchising, Inc., American Eagle Warranty
Corp., a/k/a TBI Warranty, Inc., and Time Square,
Inc., a/k/a TBI Marketing, Inc., Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.

MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK
& STONE, Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 314374.

|
Oct. 21, 2014.

Oakland Circuit Court; LC No.2010–112215–NM.

Before: METER, P.J., and K.F. KELLY and M.J. KELLY, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

*1 Defendant appeals by leave granted an order denying its motion in limine to assert a wrongful conduct defense in plaintiffs' legal malpractice action. Because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars plaintiffs' claims that arise from their own wrongful conduct, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a legal malpractice case. The underlying case giving rise to the malpractice litigation involved an action brought by Computer Business World, L.L.C., against plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Eugene J. Thomas and Walter Thomas were the owners of plaintiffs American Eagle Warranty Corporation, Times Square, Inc., CBW Enterprises, Inc., CBW Technologies, Inc., and SCD Enterprises, L.L.C.

(collectively referred to as “CBW”). CBW entered into an asset purchase agreement with Computer Business World, through which Computer Business World purchased the assets of CBW. Dr. Parviz (Perry) Daneshgari owned Computer Business World. The parties to the purchase agreed to a purchase price consisting of \$2 million payable at closing, \$700,000 payable by promissory note after closing and the assumption of an outstanding bank debt of nearly \$1.4 million. The purchase agreement allocated various amounts of the purchase price to specific categories: working capital, equipment, security deposits and good will, and they agreed to a post closing adjustment of the working capital. The purchase closed in July 2006.

In March 2007, Plante & Moran prepared the post closing adjustment of the working capital and determined that it should be adjusted downward by about \$677,500. In around May 2007, Daneshgari discovered that before the parties entered into the purchase agreement, CBW engaged in a practice of fabricating invoices and advertisements, and he immediately stopped the practice. By September 2007, the business failed and a creditor brought a lawsuit against Computer Business World to collect on the outstanding balance of its debt.

Computer Business World commenced an action against plaintiffs, and the matter proceeded to arbitration. In its decision, the arbitrator specifically concluded:

Prior to the sale of the business of the CBW Entities, the CBW Entities purchased a significant amount of their computer parts from Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) and Intel Corporation (“Intel”). Both AMD and Intel had a marketing development fund program (“MDF”) providing eligibility to purchasers of significant quantities of parts for reimbursement of advertising dollars. In order to qualify for reimbursement of advertising dollars, the purchasers had to meet specific requirements in their advertisements. The evidence reflected that the CBW Entities engaged in a practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices for the purpose of seeking reimbursement under the Intel or AMD MDF programs. Walter and Eugene Thomas authorized and approved this practice. The reimbursements were reported as rebates in the cost of goods sold, rather than advertising expenses, in the financial statements of the CBW Entities.

* * *

*2 The evidence reflected that the CBW Entities annually sold in excess of \$2,000,000.00 of computer parts to Viva Computers, which allowed the CBW Entities to purchase significant quantities of parts from AMD and Intel at discounted prices. Both Mr. JR Breslin and Mr. Daneshgari testified that AMD and Intel terminated the favorable pricing program with the CBW Entities, based on the fact that before the closing, products sold by the CBW Entities and purchased from AMD and Intel had been traced to products sold in foreign countries in violation of the policies of AMD and Intel. The loss of favorable pricing programs adversely affected the profitability of the company and the ability to participate in advertising rebate programs.

* * *

... The evidence does not support the Thomas' claims that they disclosed the practice of fabricating invoices and advertisements to Dr. Daneshgari before the closing, and I specifically find that Claimants could not have detected this practice through normal due diligence. In this regard, the evidence was conflicting as to whether an e-mail was sent to Dr. Daneshgari and Lindsey Stetson of Miller Canfield, who represented the CBW Entities, disclosing the practice of fabricating invoices and advertisements before the closing. [¹] Nevertheless, even assuming that the e-mail was sent to Dr. Daneshgari before the closing, the fact of the matter is that even Ms. Stetson did not conclude from reading the e-mail that the CBW Entities had fabricated invoices and advertisements. Accordingly, the e-mail itself does not provide sufficient disclosure of the practice before the closing.

¹ At issue was not an email, but a fax. The fax was from chief financial officer Sam Shabander to Daneshgari, and was forwarded to Lindsey Stetson:

Perry [Daneshgari],
Please find enclosed the Articles of Incorporation for the separate entity, Times Square, Inc. The sole purpose of this stand-alone/shell company is to create and provide advertising, marketing and consulting invoices to Computer Builders Warehouse, who in turn submits these invoices to vendors for Market Development Fund (MDF) reimbursements.

As you are aware from your discussion with Gene and Walter [plaintiffs] yesterday, due to the narrow nature of the Market Development Funds (MDF) system that was created and set-up by our vendors, these submitted invoices may not necessarily reflect what is actually advertised. However, this practiced structure allows CBW to draw 100% of its earned co-op funds from its vendors in which these funds are then reinvested back into Computer Builders Warehouse for market development and operations.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

* * *

I find that [the CBW Entities] had a legal duty to disclose the practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices for AMD and Intel, as well as the fact that they were purchasing a high volume of parts from Intel and AMD at discounted prices and selling them through improper market channels. I also find that [the CBW Entities] failed to disclose these facts in order to induce reliance by [Computer Business World], that the non-disclosure was misleading, that [Computer Business World] acted in reliance on the misimpression created by [the CBW Entities], and that [Computer Business World] was damaged as a result of [the CBW Entities'] failure to disclose. In this regard, I find that [the CBW Entities] inaccurately reported the reimbursements from the MDF programs as rebates in the cost of goods sold, rather than as advertising expenses, on the companies' financial statements.

The arbitrator awarded \$2.8 million in damages to Computer Business World.

Oakland County Circuit Court Judge Wendy Potts granted Computer Business World's motion to confirm the arbitration award on November 12, 2008. This Court affirmed the order confirming arbitration. *Computer Business World, LLC, v. Thomas*, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 2, 2010 (Docket Nos. 289396, 290366), lv den 488 Mich. 1047, 794 N.W.2d 610 (2011).

*3 Plaintiffs Eugene and Walter Thomas filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. Computer Business World filed an adversary proceeding against them, arguing that plaintiffs' debts were nondischargeable due to fraud. The bankruptcy court, relying on the arbitrator's finding that plaintiffs' acted fraudulently, applied the principle of collateral estoppel and

concluded that the debt was nondischargeable. *In re Jamil*, 409 B.R. 866, 871 (Bankruptcy Court, ED Mich.2009).

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant and others², alleging legal malpractice. They alleged that during the course of the representation, they told defendant about the AMD practices, as well as other matters, and that defendant failed to disclose this information to Computer Business World. Plaintiffs asserted that in the absence of defendant's "substandard representation, legal malpractice and breach of the standard of practice," the \$2.8 million arbitration award would not have been entered against them. They alleged 39 separate breaches of the standard of practice.

² The individual defendants were attorneys, some of whom worked for defendant. Plaintiffs alleged legal malpractice against them as well as defendant. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against all other defendants.

On January 20, 2012, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of all claims arising from or related to the MDF practices. It relied on collateral estoppel and the doctrine of *in pari delicto*. Also, on January 13, 2012, defendant moved in limine to preclude plaintiffs from introducing evidence to refute any factual issues resolved by the arbitrator. Defendant parsed the arbitrator's decision into 11 facts, which it asserted were established by virtue of the arbitrator's findings. It argued that pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiffs should not be permitted to relitigate those facts.

On March 27, 2012, the trial court issued an opinion and order, denying defendant's motion for summary disposition, but granting defendant's motion in limine to preclude evidence refuting factual issues decided in arbitration. The trial court determined that the following facts had been established:

- (1) That Plaintiffs engaged in a practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices for the purpose of seeking reimbursement under the Intel or AMD MDF programs;
- (2) That Walter and Eugene Thomas authorized and approved this practice;
- (3) That Daneshgari could not have detected the practice of fabricating invoices and advertisements through normal due diligence;

(4) That Plaintiffs failed to disclose the practice to Daneshgari;

(5) That Plaintiffs failed to disclose the practice of purchasing a high volume of parts from Intel and AMD at discounted prices and selling them through improper market channels;

(6) That the nondisclosure was misleading;

(7) That the nondisclosure of selling through improper market channels was misleading;

(8) That Plaintiffs knew the non-disclosures were misleading;

(9) That Daneshgari acted in reliance upon the non-disclosures; and

(10) That Plaintiff's inaccurately reported the reimbursements from the MDF programs as rebates in the cost of goods sold, rather than as advertising expenses on the companies' financial statements.

*4 However, the trial court went on to state the issue of defendant's malpractice was not litigated and defendant was not entitled to summary disposition:

Even with this ruling as to collateral estoppel, Defendants['] request for summary disposition to dismiss the allegations that Miller Canfield Defendants failed to disclose the MDF practices ..., failed to advise Plaintiffs to not sell their businesses if the MDF created liability ..., and failed to inquire into, use the information found in, or follow up on the information disclosed in Plaintiffs' fax of June 2, 2006 ... is unsupported because **these allegations** were *not* litigated in a prior litigation and are the crux of the alleged legal malpractice by Defendants.

In a May 25, 2012 opinion and order, the court also granted defendants' motion to deem additional facts—the valuation of

Computer Business World—admitted on the basis that they were litigated in the arbitration.

Trial commenced, but after several days of proceedings, the court granted defendant's motion for mistrial due, in significant part, to the confusion regarding application of collateral estoppel. The parties were essentially granted a “do over” in which they could re-argue previous motions.

Defendant again moved to deem certain facts established on the basis of collateral estoppel, arguing that plaintiffs were precluded from introducing evidence that contradicted the established facts. It argued that the arbitrator's finding that plaintiffs intentionally defrauded Daneshgari when they sold the business to him precluded plaintiffs from relitigating the issue. Defendant further argued that application of collateral estoppel in this case resulted in a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims based on the wrongful conduct rule and the principle of *in pari delicto*.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion. They argued that collateral estoppel had no application in a legal malpractice action so as to preclude litigation of issues that were decided in a prior arbitration proceeding between the former client and a third party. Plaintiffs maintained that defendant could not satisfy all of the requirements for application of collateral estoppel: (1) actual litigation of essential facts; (2) full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the previous lawsuit; and (3) mutuality. Plaintiffs claimed that the issues in the case at bar were different from those in the previous matter and therefore collateral estoppel did not apply.

The court held a hearing on defendant's motion on November 7, 2012. The trial court held that collateral estoppel did not apply:

Here, the Court finds that the issues of fact relied upon in the arbitration dealt with the conduct of the buyer and seller in the underlying asset purchase agreement and did not deal with the plaintiffs' attorneys [sic] alleged failure to disclose the MDF practices and/or failure by the lawyers, Miller Canfield defendants, to advise plaintiffs not to sell their business, the precise legal malpractice claims, or issues in this case. As argued by

plaintiff, the three issues at stake in this litigation were neither addressed in the underlying arbitration nor involved the same parties. Any prior ruling [sic] made by this Court were palpably wrong and based upon an erroneous reading of the doctrine here involved.

*5 The court entered an order denying defendant's motion to have certain facts deemed admitted on November 29, 2012. This Court denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on the collateral estoppel issue. *Eugene J Thomas v. Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC*, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 11, 2013 (Docket No. 313650).

While defendant's application was pending in this Court, defendant filed a motion in limine in the trial court, requesting that it be allowed to assert the wrongful conduct rule as a defense and that the trial court instruct the jury on the rule. Defendant argued that there were “two distinct frauds.” The first fraud was plaintiffs' act of defrauding their vendors—AMD—by submitting fake advertisements and fake invoices. “The narrow factual dispute for the jury to decide is whether the vendors authorized the scheme.” The second fraud was plaintiffs' act of defrauding their buyer—Daneshgari—by failing to disclose the fake invoices, failing to disclose “gray market” sales, and misrepresenting plaintiffs' financial records. Because the trial court previously ruled that collateral estoppel no longer applied, defendant was ready to present the same evidence as was presented at the arbitration hearing. Defendant argued that the wrongful conduct rule may be applied under the circumstances of this case and that the jury should have the opportunity to decide the issue.

In response, plaintiffs argued that the applicability of the wrongful conduct rule was not an issue to be presented to the jury; it was an issue of law to be determined by the judge. Plaintiffs further argued that the wrongful conduct rule did not apply because the alleged prohibited conduct was not a violation of criminal law. In addition, plaintiffs challenged application of the wrongful conduct rule on the ground that a sufficient causal nexus between their alleged conduct and their asserted damages did not exist.

The court addressed defendant's motion at a hearing on January 9, 2013. It explained, in part:

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Plaintiffs' legal malpractice claim against defendants [sic] is that defendants [sic] failed to disclose the MDF practices to the buyer under the buy/sell agreement. Defendants [sic] argue ... that plaintiffs' conduct was a proximate cause of their own illegal conduct under MCL 750.218 which makes it a crime for a person to defraud, cheat, or use false pretenses to obtain from a person money or the like. Again, [*Orzel v. Scott Drug Co.*, 449 Mich. 550, 537 N.W.2d 208 (1995),] states that a sufficient causal nexus must exist between plaintiffs' alleged conduct and plaintiffs' asserted damages.

Here, plaintiffs' allegation of damages against Miller Canfield is based on their failure to disclose the MDF practices that plaintiff admitted it incurred. Important—their being Miller Canfield. Importantly, this Court notes that plaintiffs' position in this case is that their vendor, AMD, allowed plaintiffs to present fake ads and false invoices contrary to defendants' allegations that plaintiffs intended to defraud both AMD and [Daneshgari].

*6 This case is about whether Miller Canfield failed to disclose the practices and plaintiffs' damages, if any, as a result. Based on the facts alleged, the Court finds that there is not—not a sufficient causal nexus between plaintiffs' MDF practices and the claimed damages in this legal malpractice case to warrant the defense. The Court also agrees and opines that whereas here [sic], a similar approach can be taken through comparative fault. The confusion to the jury would be almost insurmountable particularly where the Court would be—could be asked to draw parallels to a criminal statute in a civil proceeding. That confusion could be for example, the burden of proof, actual elements and the like.

On January 11, 2013, the court entered an order denying defendant's motion in limine requesting the court to permit it to assert the wrongful conduct defense and to instruct the jury accordingly. This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. *Eugene J Thomas v. Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC*, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 30, 2013 (Docket No. 314374).

II. ANALYSIS

At oral argument, we asked the parties to revisit the issue of collateral estoppel. After reviewing counsels' well-written supplemental briefs, we now conclude that collateral estoppel

applies to the facts of this case and that the wrongful conduct rule precludes plaintiffs from pursuing their malpractice action to the extent their claims touch upon their own misconduct.

The application of collateral estoppel is a legal question, which this Court reviews de novo. *Estes v. Titus*, 481 Mich. 573, 578–579, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008).

Under the wrongful conduct rule, a plaintiff's claim is barred when his claim is based entirely or partially on his own illegal conduct. *Orzel*, 449 Mich. at 558, 537 N.W.2d 208. The rule also encompasses the “doctrine of *in pari delicto*,” which applies to bar a claim between parties where the parties are equally in the wrong. *Id.*

The rationale that Michigan courts have used to support the wrongful-conduct rule are rooted in the public policy that courts should not lend their aid to a plaintiff who founded his cause of action on his own illegal conduct. If courts chose to regularly give their aid under such circumstances, several unacceptable consequences would result. First, by making relief potentially available for wrongdoers, courts in effect would condone and encourage illegal conduct. Second, some wrongdoers would be able to receive a profit or compensation as a result of their illegal acts. Third, and related to the two previously mentioned results, the public would view the legal system as a mockery of justice. Fourth, and finally, wrongdoers would be able to shift much of the responsibility for their illegal acts to other parties. As stated by the Court of Appeals, where the plaintiff has engaged in illegal conduct, it should be the “plaintiff's own criminal responsibility which is determinative.” [*Id.* at 559–560, 537 N.W.2d 208 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).]

*7 “To implicate the wrongful-conduct rule, the plaintiff's conduct must be prohibited or almost entirely prohibited under a penal or criminal statute.” *Id.* at 561, 537 N.W.2d 208. In addition, “[f]or the wrongful-conduct rule to apply, a sufficient causal nexus must exist between the plaintiff's illegal conduct and the plaintiff's asserted damages.” *Id.* at 564, 537 N.W.2d 208. The *Orzel* Court explained:

“[The plaintiff's] injury must have been suffered while and as a proximate result of committing an illegal act. The unlawful act must be at once the source of both his criminal responsibility and his civil right. The injury must be traceable to his own breach of the law and such breach must be an integral and essential part of his case. Where the

violation of law is merely a condition and not a contributing cause of the injury, a recovery may be permitted.” [*Id.* at 565, 537 N.W.2d 208, quoting *Manning v. Bishop of Marquette*, 345 Mich. 130, 136, 76 N.W.2d 75 (1956), quoting *Meador v. Hotel Grover*, 193 Miss. 392, 9 So.2d 782 (Miss, 1942).]

A plaintiff's conduct must only be “a” proximate cause of the damages; it need not be “the” proximate cause. *Orzel*, 449 Mich. at 566–567, 537 N.W.2d 208.

For the wrongful conduct rule to apply in this case, plaintiffs' conduct—their alleged fraud with regard to the asset purchase agreement—must be illegal.³ It must be prohibited by a penal or criminal statute. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs' conduct with regard to the sale of the businesses to Daneshgari and Computer Business World constituted false pretenses pursuant to MCL 750.218. The crime of false pretenses exists where a person, “with the intent to defraud or cheat makes or uses a false pretense to ... [o]btain from a person any money...” MCL 750.218(1)(c). The elements of the offense include: (1) a false representation as to an existing fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false; (3) use of the false representation with the intention to deceive; and (4) detrimental reliance on the false representation. *People v. Webbs*, 263 Mich.App. 531, 532, n. 1, 689 N.W.2d 163 (2004).

³ The parties improperly focus on plaintiffs' conduct as it relates to AMD when the proper focus is on plaintiffs' conduct as it relates to the asset purchase agreement. Plaintiffs submitted inaccurate financial statements, which included the false invoices, during the purchase agreement. Plaintiffs induced Daneshgari and Computer Business World to rely on inaccurate financial information.

We conclude that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from arguing that their conduct was non-fraudulent. Moreover, their fraudulent conduct satisfies the elements of false pretenses. Plaintiffs submitted false financial statements with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent to deceive Daneshgari and Computer Business World during the asset purchase agreement.

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties or their privies when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and

the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding.” *Ditmore v. Michalik*, 244 Mich.App. 569, 577, 625 N.W.2d 462 (2001). The purpose of the principle is “to ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.’” *Detroit v. Qualls*, 434 Mich. 340, 357 n. 30, 454 N.W.2d 374 (1990), quoting *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The principle of collateral estoppel “applies to factual determinations made during ... arbitration proceedings.” *Porter v. Royal Oak*, 214 Mich.App. 478, 485, 542 N.W.2d 905 (1995).

*8 Three elements must be established for application of collateral estoppel: “(1) ‘a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment’; (2) ‘the same parties must have had a full [and fair] opportunity to litigate the issue’; and (3) ‘there must be mutuality of estoppel.’” *Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co.*, 469 Mich. 679, 682–684, 677 N.W.2d 843 (2004), quoting *Storey v. Meijer, Inc.*, 431 Mich. 368, 373 n. 3, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988). “[W]here collateral estoppel is being asserted defensively against a party who has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, mutuality is not required.” *Monat*, 469 Mich. at 680–681, 677 N.W.2d 843.

The first requirement for application of collateral estoppel is that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment. “‘Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action.’” *Senior Accountants, Analysis & Appraisers Ass’n v. Detroit*, 399 Mich. 449, 458, 249 N.W.2d 121 (1976), quoting Restatement Judgments, § 68, p 293. Collateral estoppel applies only where the ultimate issue in the second proceeding is identical to that determined in the prior action, *Qualls*, 434 Mich. at 357, 454 N.W.2d 374; *Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564 v. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority*, 437 Mich. 441, 451, 473 N.W.2d 249 (1991). “The issue [] must be identical, not merely similar.” *Board of County Rd. Comm’rs v. Schultz*, 205 Mich.App. 371, 376, 521 N.W.2d 847 (1994). That issue must also be essential to the final judgment:

“The issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action. In the prior action, the issue must have been raised and litigated, and actually adjudged. The issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action. The determination made of

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the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.” [Qualls, 434 Mich. at 357, 454 N.W.2d 374, quoting 1B Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 0.443[1], p 759.]

The “issue” that is the focus of this matter is plaintiffs' fraud, as found by the arbitrator. The arbitrator made specific findings that plaintiffs engaged in misrepresentation and fraud and those findings must be considered established in this case. The arbitrator specifically concluded:

I find that [the CBW Entities] had a legal duty to disclose the practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices for AMD and Intel, as well as the fact that they were purchasing a high volume of parts from Intel and AMD at discounted prices and selling them through improper market channels. I also find that [the CBW Entities] failed to disclose these facts in order to induce reliance by [Computer Business World], that the non-disclosure was misleading, that [Computer Business World] acted in reliance on the misimpression created by [the CBW Entities], and that [Computer Business World was] damaged as a result of [the CBW Entities'] failure to disclose. In this regard, I find that [the CBW Entities] inaccurately reported the reimbursements from the MDF programs as rebates in the cost of goods sold, rather than as advertising expenses, on the companies' financial statements.

*9 The arbitrator also determined the amount of damages and awarded Daneshgari and Computer Business World \$2.8 million. These findings were essential to the arbitrator's judgment against plaintiffs in that action.

Oakland County Circuit Court Judge Wendy Potts granted Computer Business World's motion to confirm the arbitration award on November 12, 2008, rejecting CBW's claims that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding more

damages than the purchase agreement permitted and that its due process rights were violated because relevant evidence from an AMD representative would have revealed that there was no fraud:

Defendants have raised a multitude of issues. However, the Court finds every one of those issues was waived by the defendants because they never objected to these issues during the lengthy arbitration proceeding. Even with regard to defendants' claim that the arbitrator exceeded a contractual monetary cap on damage, ... the award reflects damages for a claim raised outside the contractual cap, and the defendants never objected to the plaintiff's request to amend its complaint to add a tort claim. Nor, did defendants object to the arbitrator considering this issue during the proceeding.

Based on defendants' failure to make any objections during the proceeding, looking at the face of the award, the Court cannot find any mistakes of fact or law that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or any conduct by the arbitrator which would justify vacating the award as provided in MCR 3.602(K).

Thus, after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds the award of the arbitrator should be confirmed and a judgment should be entered consistent with this award.

CBW moved for reconsideration, again arguing that the failure of certain witnesses to testify was the most significant factor that allowed the arbitrator to conclude that the defendants' advertising rebates were a fraud on AMD and that the damages award was inappropriate. The trial court denied CBW's motion for reconsideration:

Defendants' arguments concerning the witness testimony of whether Defendants defrauded AMD in their purchase of the chips goes to the merits of the case and ask this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, which this Court is not permitted to do. *Gordon Sel-Way, Inc. supra*, 438 Mich. 497. In the award, the arbitrator made specific factual findings concerning the AMD reimbursement for advertising dollars transactions based on the

evidence presented at the hearing. Moreover, no evidence has been presented in Defendants' motion for reconsideration, through a transcript of the arbitration hearing, that the arbitrator refused to allow Defendant to present evidence via specific witness testimony at the arbitration hearing.

This Court affirmed the order confirming arbitration. *Computer Business World, LLC, v. Thomas*, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 2, 2010 (Docket Nos. 289396, 290366). This Court rejected the claim that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding damages for CBW's fraud in the inducement claim. "Because the arbitration defendants' fraud in the inducement assertion presents an impermissible invitation to scrutinize the merits of the arbitration award, we decline to consider any purported error by the arbitrator in this regard." *Id.* at slip op, p 6. Importantly, this Court also rejected the claim that the arbitrator should have postponed the hearing in order to allow CBW to subpoena AMD account representative "Mr. Stein" who would have testified that the practice of fabricating invoices was authorized by AMD. CBW had argued that Stein's testimony would have established that they acted in good faith. This Court concluded otherwise:

*10 The arbitrator concluded that the arbitration defendants [CBW] had a legal duty to disclose their practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices relating to AMD and Intel, a practice that [Computer Business World] could not otherwise have detected. The arbitrator also found that the arbitration defendants did not disclose this practice "in order to induce reliance by [Computer Business World], [and] that the non-disclosure was misleading." In light of the arbitrator's findings and logic, it appears highly unlikely that he would have deemed integral or even relevant to his analysis whether an AMD representative had authorized the invoice fabrication practice. At a minimum, especially given the arbitration defendants' neglect to substantiate in any respect any purported information to which Stein could have testified, the record before us offers only speculation to bolster the arbitration defendants' averments that "the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, [or] refused to hear evidence material to the controversy." And as a general rule, courts will not vacate

an arbitrator's award on the basis of speculative concerns. [*Id.* at slip op, pp 8–9.]

The matter was visited again in plaintiffs' Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. *In re Jamil*, 409 B.R. 866, 871 (Bankruptcy Court, ED Mich.2009). The bankruptcy court looked to the arbitrator's decision and found all the elements necessary to establish non-dischargeability for reasons of fraud. It concluded that the debts to Computer Business World (the arbitration award) were nondischargeable.

In order to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor must prove the following elements: (1) the debtor obtained money through a material misrepresentation that, at the time, the debtor knew was false or made with gross recklessness as to its truth; (2) the debtor intended to deceive the creditor; (3) the creditor justifiably relied on the false representation; and (4) its reliance was the proximate cause of loss ...

In the arbitration proceeding, [Computer Business World] alleged fraud in the inducement and breach of contract against the defendants. "Fraud in the inducement occurs where a party materially misrepresents future conduct under circumstances in which the assertions may reasonably be expected to be relied upon and are relied upon." ... Following 13 days of hearings, the arbitrator issued his opinion in which he ... determined all of the necessary elements under § 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the debt of each debtor to the plaintiff is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). [*Id.* at 872.]

In the instant action, plaintiffs claim that defendant committed legal malpractice through defendant's representation of plaintiffs during the asset purchase agreement, which resulted in the unfavorable arbitration award. "To state a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff, (3) that the negligence was the proximate cause of an injury, and (4) the fact and the extent of the injury alleged." *Kloian v. Schwartz*, 272 Mich.App. 232, 240, 725 N.W.2d 671 (2006). To establish proximate cause, plaintiffs must show that defendant's alleged failures were a cause in fact of plaintiff's injury. *Manzo v. Petrella*, 261 Mich.App. 705, 712, 683 N.W.2d 699 (2004). This will require a showing that in the absence of defendant's alleged malpractice plaintiffs would have successfully defended the claims raised in arbitration. *Id.*

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*11 In support of their claim, plaintiffs allege in part that they revealed the MDF practices to defendant and that defendant did not disclose those practices or other irregularities to Computer Business World/Daneshgari. To prevail on their legal malpractice claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendant had knowledge of the MDF practices and other irregularities and that if it had disclosed those facts to Computer Business World/Daneshgari, Computer Business World/Daneshgari would not have prevailed in the underlying arbitration.

The arbitrator's findings of fact must be considered established in this action because the issue of plaintiffs' fraud during the asset purchase agreement was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment and was essential to that judgment. The basis of the claims asserted by Computer Business World and Daneshgari was plaintiffs' misrepresentation/fraud. The findings in that regard were actually litigated at arbitration and determined by the arbitrator. Those facts are relevant to determining whether defendant's alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injury, which is the \$2.8 million arbitration award against it. To the extent that plaintiffs' fraudulent conduct is an issue that must be resolved in the case at bar, relitigation of that issue is barred.

In support of their position that collateral estoppel does not apply, plaintiffs rely on *Computer Business World, LLC v. Simen*, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 13, 2012 (Docket No. 301082), 2012 WL 832847. *Computer Business World* involved Computer Business World and Daneshgari's legal malpractice claim against the attorneys who represented them during the asset purchase agreement transaction. This Court explained:

The arbitrator issued an opinion and award on August 4, 2008. The arbitrator found that prior to the purchase, the sellers had engaged in a scheme to fabricate advertisements and invoices in order to obtain advertisement reimbursement, which they then reported as rebates in the costs of goods sold. The arbitrator further concluded that plaintiffs became aware of the fabrication of invoices and advertisements nine months after the purchase, and that plaintiffs "could not have detected this practice through normal due diligence." The arbitrator also found that the sellers had a legal duty to "disclose the practice of fabricating advertisements and invoices" and the sellers' purchase of "a high volume of parts from Intel and AMD at discounted prices and selling them through improper market channels." Moreover, the arbitrator found

that two representatives of the sellers breached the contract when they walked out of a meeting concerning the company's working capital, threatened to bankrupt the company, and refused to work for the company for the agreed upon year after the sale.

Nevertheless, the arbitrator concluded that plaintiffs were "not entitled to rescission of the [asset purchase agreement] because they did not make a seasonable assertion of their rescission right." However, because of the fraudulent concealment and breach of contract by the sellers, the arbitrator awarded plaintiffs damages of \$2,800,000, plus interest. The circuit court confirmed the arbitration decision. It was plaintiffs' [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] belief that they "would have had a higher arbitration award [but Simen] missed the deadline for breach of contract suit." [*Id.* at slip op at 2–3.]

*12 The plaintiffs (Computer Business World/Daneshgari) alleged that the attorneys failed to (1) properly perform due diligence; (2) detect, warn or explain the implications of the CBW's failure to properly trademark their name and logo; (3) advise them that due diligence should be conducted regarding trademark issues; (4) negotiate their debt; (5) seek an extension of a lease; and (6) seek rescission and engaged in other acts of malpractice. *Id.*, slip op at 4.

The defendants in *Computer Business World* (attorney Sander Simen and his law firm) moved for summary disposition on collateral estoppel grounds. In rejecting the application of collateral estoppel in that case, this Court explained:

[T]he issues addressed in the arbitration are plaintiffs' [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] claims relating to the misrepresentations and fraudulent conduct of the sellers, not the conduct of Simen and his firm or their legal representation of plaintiffs in those transactions. Nowhere in the arbitrator's opinion is there any reference to intellectual property, intellectual property due diligence, or whether defendants bore any legal responsibility for the failure to perform intellectual property due diligence. The only mention of the term "due diligence" is a statement that plaintiffs [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] could not have discovered the fabrication of invoices and advertisements through due diligence, and plaintiffs [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] are not asserting any claim relating to the fabrication of invoices and advertisements in this lawsuit. Thus, the issue of defendants' [the attorneys] responsibility

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for intellectual property due diligence was not actually litigated and was not subject to any final judgment.

With regard to plaintiffs' [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] claim of legal malpractice relating to the Madison Heights lease, there is likewise no mention in the arbitration opinion of the lease or of the events surrounding plaintiffs' eviction. Thus, collateral estoppel does not bar this claim, because the issue has not been actually litigated and has not been subject to a final judgment. As for rescission, the arbitrator did state that rescission of the contract was not seasonably sought. However, the arbitrator made no findings of fact relating to why rescission was not sought, at what point rescission should have been sought, or the role defendants [the attorneys] played in failing to seek rescission. Moreover, as plaintiffs [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] acknowledge, even if collateral estoppel did apply, this would not justify granting defendants' [the attorneys] motion for summary disposition because a finding that rescission was not seasonably sought actually bolsters plaintiffs' [Computer Business World and Daneshgari] claim that defendants [the attorneys] committed legal malpractice. [*Id.*, slip op at 6.]

Computer Business World is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. Although the arbitrator did not address the issues that form the basis of plaintiffs' claim of legal malpractice in this action (i.e., defendant's representation leading up to the asset purchase agreement), the arbitrator *did* address the key issue of plaintiffs' fraud. Plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation are issues that must be determined in order to resolve plaintiffs' legal malpractice action because, under the wrongful conduct rule, plaintiffs are precluded from asserting a claim against defendant for their own misconduct. The trial court erred in denying defendant's request that it deem the facts as determined by the arbitrator as established for purposes of this action.⁴

⁴ We reject plaintiffs' attempt to reference an affidavit authored by their former attorney, Sander Simen. Plaintiffs sued Daneshgari, Computer Business World and others in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. *Thomas v. Daneshgari*, 997 F Supp 2d 754 (E.D.Mich.2014). They argued that Daneshgari perjured himself during the arbitration proceeding and, therefore, fraudulently procured a judgment against them.

In the affidavit, Simen avers that he was present when plaintiffs advised Daneshgari of the invoice practice. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' federal claims as without merit and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state claims. The district court noted:

Plaintiffs could theoretically return to state court and move to amend the state court judgment, or request relief from the judgment. The Michigan Court Rules authorize the state court to grant a new trial based upon "irregularity in the proceedings" or "misconduct ... of the prevailing party." MCR 2.611(A)(1)(a), (b). The Michigan Court Rules authorize "relief from judgment" based on "[n]ewly discovered evidence" or "[f]raud (intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a), (c). Plaintiff's counsel conceded at the hearing that this kind of relief was available. [*Thomas*, 997 F Supp 2d at 761, n. 4.]

Similarly, we conclude that the arbitration award (and prior judgments arising therefrom) continue to be valid absent an order setting it aside.

*13 Plaintiffs argue that, even if certain facts are deemed established, the wrongful conduct rule does not apply because there is no causal nexus between a plaintiffs' wrongful conduct and their claim for damages.

As noted by defendant, there is support for applying the wrongful conduct rule in the context of a legal malpractice action. In *Pantely v. Garriss & Garriss, PC*, 180 Mich.App. 768, 447 N.W.2d 864 (1989), which predated *Orzel*, this Court applied the doctrine of *in pari delicto* to bar the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim against the attorneys and law firm that represented her in her divorce proceedings. The plaintiff, on advice from her attorneys, perjured herself, claiming that she had lived in Livingston County for at least 10 days before filing her complaint. She obtained a divorce judgment, which was later set aside for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed a legal malpractice action against her attorneys, alleging that they were negligent by filing the action in Livingston County, alleging that she was a resident of Livingston County, and advising her to testify falsely that she lived in Livingston County. *Id.* at 770–771, 447 N.W.2d 864.

The defendants moved for summary disposition, asserting that the plaintiff was *in pari delicto* with them and may not profit from her unsuccessful fraud. *Id.* at 772, 447 N.W.2d 864. The plaintiff argued against application of the doctrine of *in pari delicto*, asserting that she lied at her attorneys' direction and was emotionally distraught and desperate to obtain the divorce. She asserted that "she acted 'under circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition' " and that her misconduct was not as reprehensible as that of the defendants. *Id.* at 775–776, 447 N.W.2d 864. The Court found the doctrine applicable. It held that because "all of the losses claimed resulted from the Supreme Court's decision to set aside the Livingston County judgment and since that decision was premised solely upon [the plaintiff's] perjury, that perjury bars all claims against [the] defendants...." *Id.* at 778, 447 N.W.2d 864. This Court wrote:

We can readily envision legal matters so complex and ethical dilemmas so profound that a client could follow an attorney's advice, do wrong and still maintain suit on the basis of not being equally at fault. But perjury is not complex; and telling the truth poses no dilemma. Even against the backdrop of a moral relativism that passes for intellectual sophistication in contemporary America, perjury is wrong. More pointedly, it is a crime. MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664. A law degree does not add to one's awareness that perjury is immoral and illegal, any more than an accounting degree adds to one's awareness that tax fraud is immoral and illegal. We agree with the views expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in *Evans [v Cameron]*, 121 Wis.2d 421, 360 N.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Wis, 1985)]:

"There may be circumstances in which the advice given by an attorney is so complex that the client would be unaware of the wrongfulness involved in following that advice. In such circumstances, more weight may be given to the influence an attorney will have over the client and the amount of reliance which the client can justifiably place in the attorney. The wrongfulness of lying while under oath, however, is apparent. Absent some allegation of special circumstances constituting an

exception to the rule of *in pari delicto* independent of the attorney-client relationship, the client's deliberate act of lying under oath places that client *in pari delicto* with the attorney who advised that client to lie."

*14 [*Pantely*, *supra* 180 Mich.App. at 776, 447 N.W.2d 864.]

The Court agreed that the attorneys' misconduct harmed the profession, the courts and the public. However, it noted that there exist means to account for those harms: discipline or disbarment; contempt proceedings; and criminal prosecution. *Id.* It commented, "To argue that an equal partner in the alleged perjury can clothe herself in the vicarious virtue of the public interest and recover damages caused by her own perjury is to willingly suspend disbelief." *Id.* at 777–778, 447 N.W.2d 864.

Plaintiffs brought this malpractice claim against defendant, alleging that defendant failed to disclose their MDF practices to Daneshgari and that as a result of that failure, they were held liable to Daneshgari and Computer Business World for a \$2.8 million judgment. Plaintiffs can only establish their malpractice claim against defendant by relying on their own misconduct. The arbitration award against plaintiffs was based on their fraud, and this legal malpractice claim is premised on the fact that they were held liable for fraud. Therefore, a sufficient causal nexus exists between plaintiffs' fraudulent activity and the damages they claim in this action.

In conclusion, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars plaintiff's claims against defendant to the extent those claims arise from their own wrongful conduct. Plaintiffs brought this legal malpractice action against defendant, arguing that defendant was negligent either because it knew about the false invoices and failed to include the information in the closing documents or because it did not know about the false invoices and failed to exercise due diligence in uncovering the practice and advising plaintiffs accordingly. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiffs' conduct has been found fraudulent and the wrongful conduct rule precludes their recovery. Because plaintiffs have admitted to fabricating false invoices and their conduct in the asset purchase sale was found fraudulent by the arbitrator, there are no issues of fact remaining. As a matter of law, plaintiffs cannot proceed

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on any of their malpractice claims that touch upon their own misconduct.⁵

⁵ Having found that collateral estoppel and the wrongful conduct rule apply, we need not address defendant's claim that the wrongful conduct rule is a matter of fact for the jury to decide. Nor need we determine whether comparative fault would adequately protect defendant in a manner similar to the wrongful conduct rule. Nor need we

consider whether the wrongful conduct rule was unnecessarily confusing for a jury.

We vacate the trial court's order denying defendant's motion in limine to assert a wrongful conduct defense and remand for further proceedings to determine what, if any, of plaintiff's claims remain. We do not retain jurisdiction.

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2014 WL 5358392

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Exhibit 5

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\$ 17.00 MORTGAGE
\$ 2.00 REMONUMENTATION
12 JUL 95 3:38 P.M. RECEIPT# 1218
PAID RECORDED - OAKLAND COUNTY
LYNN D. ALLEN, CLERK/REGISTER OF DEEDS

[Space Above This Line For Recording Data]

Loan No: 8017

MORTGAGE

THIS MORTGAGE ("Security Instrument") is given on June 30th, 1995
JEFFREY L. EISENBERG, and KAREN A. EISENBERG, Husband and Wife

The mortgagor is

whose address is

2040 FARROW, FERNDAL MI 48220
("Borrower"). This Security Instrument is given to
GROUP ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION

which is organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan
address is 19500 VICTOR PARKWAY SUITE 120
LIVONIA, MICHIGAN 48152
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100

("Lender"). Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of

Dollars (U.S. \$ 120000.00).

This debt is evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Security Instrument ("Note"), which provides for monthly payments, with the full debt, if not paid earlier, due and payable on July 01st, 2025. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note, with interest, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; (b) the payment of all other sums, with interest, advanced under paragraph 7 to protect the security of this Security Instrument; and (c) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower does hereby mortgage, warrant, grant and convey to Lender, with power of sale, the following described property located in OAKLAND County, Michigan:

LOCATED IN THE CITY OF ROYAL OAK, COUNTY OF OAKLAND, STATE OF MICHIGAN; DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
THE NORTH PART OF LOT 44, MEASURED 32.04 FEET IN FRONT AND 32 FEET IN REAR, ALSO SOUTH PART OF LOT 45, MEASURED 35.19 FEET IN FRONT AND 35 FEET IN REAR, KENSINGTON HIGHLANDS AS RECORDED IN LIBER 23, PAGE 10 OF PLATS, OAKLAND COUNTY RECORDS.
TAX CODE NO. 25-06-401-006

23010

17:00
2:00 PM
JL

which has the address of 4031 DUKESHIRE, ROYAL OAK
Michigan 48073 ("Property Address");

[Zip Code]

J.L. - J.H.

[Street, City],

MICHIGAN - Single Family - Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT

Page 1 of 6

Form 3023 6/90
Amended 5/91
Initials: JL

VMP - 6R(MI) (8105)

VMP MORTGAGE FORMS - (313)203-8100 - (800)521-7291

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property."

BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to mortgage, grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record.

THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property.

UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:

1. Payment of Principal and Interest; Prepayment and Late Charges. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal of and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note.

2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day monthly payments are due under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum ("Funds") for: (a) yearly taxes and assessments which may attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien on the Property; (b) yearly leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) yearly hazard or property insurance premiums; (d) yearly flood insurance premiums, if any; (e) yearly mortgage insurance premiums, if any; and (f) any sums payable by Borrower to Lender, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8, in lieu of the payment of mortgage insurance premiums. These items are called "Escrow Items." Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the maximum amount a lender for a federally related mortgage loan may require for Borrower's escrow account under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 as amended from time to time, 12 U.S.C. Section 2601 *et seq.* ("RESPA"), unless another law that applies to the Funds sets a lesser amount. If so, Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the lesser amount. Lender may estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with applicable law.

The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is such an institution) or in any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items. Lender may not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law permits Lender to make such a charge. However, Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for an independent real estate tax reporting service used by Lender in connection with this loan, unless applicable law provides otherwise. Unless an agreement is made or applicable law requires interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender may agree in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds, showing credits and debits to the Funds and the purpose for which each debit to the Funds was made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument.

If the Funds held by Lender exceed the amounts permitted to be held by applicable law, Lender shall account to Borrower for the excess Funds in accordance with the requirements of applicable law. If the amount of the Funds held by Lender at any time is not sufficient to pay the Escrow Items when due, Lender may so notify Borrower in writing, and, in such case Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency. Borrower shall make up the deficiency in no more than twelve monthly payments, at Lender's sole discretion.

Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. If, under paragraph 21, Lender shall acquire or sell the Property, Lender, prior to the acquisition or sale of the Property, shall apply any Funds held by Lender at the time of acquisition or sale as a credit against the sums secured by this Security Instrument.

3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applied: first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2; third, to interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note.

4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any. Borrower shall pay these obligations in the manner provided in paragraph 2, or if not paid in that manner, Borrower shall pay them on time directly to the person owed payment. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this paragraph. If Borrower makes these payments directly, Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing the payments.

Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender; (b) contests in good faith the lien by, or defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in the Lender's opinion operate to prevent the enforcement of the lien; or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above within 10 days of the giving of notice.

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

5. Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage" and any other hazards, including floods or flooding, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's approval which shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage to protect Lender's rights in the Property in accordance with paragraph 7.

All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower.

Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, insurance proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the Property damaged, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with any excess paid to Borrower. If Borrower abandons the Property, or does not answer within 30 days a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may collect the insurance proceeds. Lender may use the proceeds to repair or restore the Property or to pay sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. The 30-day period will begin when the notice is given.

Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or postpone the due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of the payments. If under paragraph 21 the Property is acquired by Lender, Borrower's right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage to the Property prior to the acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately prior to the acquisition.

6. Occupancy, Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower's Loan Application; Leaseholds. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence within sixty days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's control. Borrower shall not destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate, or commit waste on the Property. Borrower shall be in default if any forfeiture action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that in Lender's good faith judgment could result in forfeiture of the Property or otherwise materially impair the lien created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security interest. Borrower may cure such a default and reinstate, as provided in paragraph 18, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender's good faith determination, precludes forfeiture of the Borrower's interest in the Property or other material impairment of the lien created by this Security Instrument or Lender's security interest. Borrower shall also be in default if Borrower, during the loan application process, gave materially false or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with any material information) in connection with the loan evidenced by the Note, including, but not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as a principal residence. If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing.

7. Protection of Lender's Rights in the Property. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may significantly affect Lender's rights in the Property (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture or to enforce laws or regulations), then Lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property. Lender's actions may include paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing in court, paying reasonable attorneys' fees and entering on the Property to make repairs. Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have to do so.

Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph 7 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. Unless Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of disbursement at the Note rate and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.

8. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Security Instrument, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the mortgage insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the mortgage insurance coverage required by Lender lapses or ceases to be in effect, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the mortgage insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the mortgage insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer approved by Lender. If substantially equivalent mortgage insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall pay to Lender each month a sum equal to one-twelfth of the yearly mortgage insurance premium being paid by Borrower when the insurance coverage lapsed or ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain these payments as a loss reserve in lieu of mortgage insurance. Loss reserve

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Cross-Appellate

payments may no longer be required, at the option of Lender, if mortgage insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer approved by Lender again becomes available and is obtained. Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain mortgage insurance in effect, or to provide a loss reserve, until the requirement for mortgage insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement between Borrower and Lender or applicable law.

9. Inspection. Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at the time of or prior to an inspection specifying reasonable cause for the inspection.

10. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any condemnation or other taking of any part of the Property, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender.

In the event of a total taking of the Property, the proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with any excess paid to Borrower. In the event of a partial taking of the Property in which the fair market value of the Property immediately before the taking is equal to or greater than the amount of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the taking, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Security Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of the sums secured immediately before the taking, divided by (b) the fair market value of the Property immediately before the taking. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower. In the event of a partial taking of the Property in which the fair market value of the Property immediately before the taking is less than the amount of the sums secured immediately before the taking, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing or unless applicable law otherwise provides, the proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then due.

If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make an award or settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at its option, either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due.

Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or postpone the due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of such payments.

11. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of the original Borrower or Borrower's successors in interest. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any successor in interest or refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or Borrower's successors in interest. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.

12. Successors and Assigns Bound; Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers. The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17. Borrower's covenants and agreements shall be joint and several. Any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the Note: (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower's interest in the Property under the terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the Note without that Borrower's consent.

13. Loan Charges. If the loan secured by this Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the loan exceed the permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge under the Note.

14. Notices. Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method. The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or any other address Borrower designates by notice to Lender. Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender's address stated herein or any other address Lender designates by notice to Borrower. Any notice provided for in this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph.

15. Governing Law; Severability. This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with applicable law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision. To this end the provisions of this Security Instrument and the Note are declared to be severable.

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

16. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one conformed copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument.

17. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. If all or any part of the Property or any interest in it is sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrower is not a natural person) without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may, at its option, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if exercise is prohibited by federal law as of the date of this Security Instrument.

If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is delivered or mailed within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.

18. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earlier of: (a) 5 days (or such other period as applicable law may specify for reinstatement) before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument; or (b) entry of a judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which then would be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; and (d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that the lien of this Security Instrument, Lender's rights in the Property and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument shall continue unchanged. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security Instrument and the obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under paragraph 17.

19. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer. The Note or a partial interest in the Note (together with this Security Instrument) may be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower. A sale may result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects monthly payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument. There also may be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change in accordance with paragraph 14 above and applicable law. The notice will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer and the address to which payments should be made. The notice will also contain any other information required by applicable law.

20. Hazardous Substances. Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous Substances on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property that is in violation of any Environmental Law. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property.

Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law.

As used in this paragraph 20, "Hazardous Substances" are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances by Environmental Law and the following substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials. As used in this paragraph 20, "Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or environmental protection.

NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:

21. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration under paragraph 17 unless applicable law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender, at its option, may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by applicable law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this paragraph 21, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.

If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall give notice of sale to Borrower in the manner provided in paragraph 14. Lender shall publish and post the notice of sale, and the Property shall be sold in the manner prescribed by applicable law. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. The proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it.

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

22. Release. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall prepare and file a discharge of this Security Instrument without charge to Borrower.

23. Riders to this Security Instrument. If one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Security Instrument, the covenants and agreements of each such rider shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement the covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument.

[Check applicable box(es)]

☐ Adjustable Rate Rider	☐ Condominium Rider	☐ 1-4 Family Rider
☐ Graduated Payment Rider	☐ Planned Unit Development Rider	☐ Biweekly Payment Rider
☐ Balloon Rider	☐ Rate Improvement Rider	☐ Second Home Rider
☐ V.A. Rider	☐ Other(s) [specify]	

BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security Instrument and in any rider(s) executed by Borrower and recorded with it.

Witnesses:

Sharon Stewart
SHARON STEWART

Jeffrey L. Eisenberg (Seal)
JEFFREY L. EISENBERG
-Borrower

Wendy L. Johnson
WENDY L. JOHNSON

Karen A. Eisenberg (Seal)
KAREN A. EISENBERG
-Borrower

____ (Seal)
-Borrower

____ (Seal)
-Borrower

STATE OF MICHIGAN, OAKLAND

County ss:

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this June 30th, 1995

JEFFREY L. EISENBERG, and KAREN A. EISENBERG, Husband and Wife

(date)

by

(person acknowledging)

My Commission Expires:

SHARON STEWART
NOTARY PUBLIC - MACOMB COUNTY, MICH.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 2-1-99

Sharon Stewart
Notary Public, acting in Oakland County, Michigan

This instrument was prepared by

MARILYN J.F. GARRETT
GROUP ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION
19500 VICTOR PARKWAY SUITE 120
LIVONIA, MICHIGAN 48152

Record And Return To:
GROUP ONE MORTGAGE CORP
19500 VICTOR PKWY STE 120
LIVONIA MI 48152

Exhibit 6

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Account Service Listing

Monday, May 04, 2015

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

1/3347

Location ID	Account #	Cycle	Route / Book	Class
Status	Parcel Number	Service Address		
Service Name	Sequence #	Current Read	Previous Read	Current Usage
Meter Type	Meter Size	Meter ID	Serial Number	Install Date
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0
Water				
RADIO READ				
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0
Water				
RADIO READ				
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0
Water				
T-PAD				
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0
Water				
VISUAL				
Active				
Sewer				
Water				
T-PAD				
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0
Water				
RADIO READ				
Active				
Sewer		0	0	0

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Location ID	Account #	Parcel Number	Service Address	Route / Book	Class
Status					
Service Name	Sequence #	Current Read	Previous Read	Current Usage	
Meter Type	Meter Size	Meter ID	Serial Number	Install Date	
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water					
DUKE-004031-0000-01	0301	15	2	RES	
Active	72-25-06-401-006	4031 DUKESHIRE HWY			
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water	2820	0	3056	0	
VISUAL	58	84772059	84772059	11/27/1985	
Active					
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water					
Active					
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water					
Active					
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water					
VISUAL					
Active					
Sewer		0	0	0	
Water					
VISUAL					
Active					
Sewer					
Water					
VISUAL					
Active					
Sewer					

Exhibit 7

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ANDREW SCHROEDER,
individually, and as representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons
and entities,

Case No. 2014-138919-CZ
Hon. Shalina Kumar

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sonal Hope Mithani (P51984)
Caroline B. Giordano (P76558)
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Attorneys for Defendant

Ray M. Toma (P48840)
Ray M. Toma PC
2550 South Telegraph Road, Suite 255
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302
248-594-4544
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF FILING OF PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION REPORT

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 31, 2017 and in accordance with ¶ 11 of the Class Action Settlement Agreement in this matter, Plaintiff filed with the Court the proposed distribution report which contains the proposed disposition of the Net Settlement Fund. *See* Exhibit A.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

/s/ Gregory D. Hanley

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Counsel for Plaintiff

Date: May 31, 2017

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 31, 2017 I electronically filed the ***Notice of Filing of Proposed Distribution Report*** with the Clerk of the Court using the electronic filing system.

/s/ Kim Plets
Kim Plets

KH150958

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EXHIBIT A

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Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

City of Royal Oak Settlement

GCG ID No.	Account No.	Total Payment Amount	Pro Rata Percentage
		\$4,628.61	0.000054092
		\$5,043.25	0.000058937
		\$10,785.42	0.000126043
		\$4,274.68	0.000049956
		\$2,169.28	0.000025351
		\$3,584.15	0.000041886
		\$6,772.75	0.000079149
		\$8,204.35	0.000095879
		\$4,788.75	0.000055963
		\$7,880.82	0.000092098
		\$3,641.25	0.000042553
		\$7,929.68	0.000092669
		\$5,711.20	0.000066743
		\$3,027.92	0.000035385
		\$8,303.12	0.000097033
		\$11,102.13	0.000129744
		\$3,003.78	0.000035103
		\$2,847.43	0.000033276
		\$6,215.21	0.000072633
		\$3,045.12	0.000035586
		\$3,238.67	0.000037848
		\$3,092.02	0.000036135
		\$5,110.53	0.000059724
		\$6,439.69	0.000075257
		\$12,823.89	0.000149865
		\$4,124.83	0.000048204
		\$6,565.89	0.000076731
		\$10,536.86	0.000123138
		\$6,266.15	0.000073229
		\$7,239.40	0.000084602
		\$16,663.62	0.000194737
		\$3,447.05	0.000040284
		\$6,861.73	0.000080189
		\$2,618.70	0.000030603
		\$6,170.47	0.000072110
		\$1,524.70	0.000017818
		\$5,517.87	0.000064484
		\$13,221.72	0.000154514
		\$4,286.34	0.000050092
		\$7,517.62	0.000087854
		\$11,890.17	0.000138953
		\$8,066.54	0.000094269
1000640	0301	\$6,032.18	0.000070494
		\$5,926.25	0.000069256
		\$5,062.97	0.000059168
		\$7,588.65	0.000088684

Exhibit 8

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ANDREW SCHROEDER,
individually, and as representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons
and entities,

Case No. 2014-138919-CZ
Hon. Shalina Kumar

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sonal Hope Mithani (P51984)
Caroline B. Giordano (P76558)
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C.
101 North Main Street, Seventh Floor
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
(734) 668-7786
Attorneys for Defendant

Ray M. Toma (P48840)
Ray M. Toma PC
2550 South Telegraph Road, Suite 255
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302
248-594-4544
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER APPROVING CLASS SETTLEMENT

At a session of said Court held in the
City of Pontiac, County of Oakland
State of Michigan on 6/14/2017
PRESENT: HON. SHALINA KUMAR
Circuit Court Judge

WHEREAS, Plaintiff and Defendant in this action have moved this Court pursuant to MCR 3.501(E), for an order approving the settlement of this class action in accordance with the terms set forth in the Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") executed by counsel for the parties, and

WHEREAS, this Court having held a hearing, as noticed, on June 14, 2017 pursuant to the Order Regarding Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Notice and Scheduling, dated March 22, 2017 (the "Order"), to determine the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of a proposed settlement of the Class Action; and due and adequate notice (the "Notice") having been made by mailing in a manner consistent with Paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Order; and all such persons (excluding those who previously requested exclusion from the applicable Class) having been given an opportunity to object to or participate in the settlement; and the Court having heard and considered the matter, including all papers filed in connection therewith and the oral presentations of counsel at said hearing; and good cause appearing therefor,

WHEREAS, Defendant has funded the settlement by providing a check in the amount of Two Million Dollars (\$2,000,000), which has been deposited into and remains in the Kickham Hanley PLLC Client Trust Account pending this Court's final approval of the settlement, and which will be disbursed in accordance with the Agreement,

For the reasons stated on the record, IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The terms of the Agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the members of the Class and are hereby approved.
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered and directed to perform and consummate the settlement set forth in the Agreement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
3. The notification to the Class members regarding the Settlement is the best notice practicable under the circumstances and is in compliance with MCR 3.501(E) and the requirements of due process of law.

4. This Lawsuit is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and without costs to any party except as provided for in the Agreement. Insofar as this Final Judgment dismisses the Class claims relating to the Stormwater Charges (as that term is defined in the Agreement), this portion of this Final Judgment is a judgment on the merits.

5. Kickham Hanley PLLC, counsel for the Class and Claims-Escrow Administrator, is hereby awarded attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the amount of \$809,398.55, to be paid as set forth in the Agreement. Plaintiff Andrew Schroeder is granted an incentive award of \$10,000, to be paid as set forth in the Agreement.

6. The Court takes specific notice of provisions of the Agreement which identify certain alleged overcharges by Oakland County or its agencies for storm water management services provided to Defendant ("Overcharges"). Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendant will assign to the Class members or for their benefit any and all claims for refund of the Overcharges that it has or may have against Oakland County Michigan and its affiliates, political subdivisions, agents, employees or officers including, but not limited to, the Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner, the Southeast Oakland County Sewage Disposal District, the George W. Kuhn Drainage Districts, and any other entity that imposed or imposes the Overcharges. Kickham Hanley PLLC is hereby appointed trustee of a litigation trust hereby established for the benefit of the Class members. As trustee, Kickham Hanley PLLC is authorized to pursue the claim for a refund of the Overcharges by lawsuit against Oakland County or its aforesaid agencies. Kickham Hanley PLLC is approved as counsel to the trust. Any monetary recovery from pursuit of the claim will be distributed, after counsel fees and costs, to the Class members based upon the methodology used for distributing the Settlement Fund. In the event the Oakland County Action is resolved through a settlement, that settlement, and any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses, will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund. In the

event that there is a monetary recovery in Oakland County Action by way of a litigated judgment, any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund.

7. Without any further action by anyone, Plaintiffs and all members of the Class as certified by the Order dated April 1, 2015 who previously did not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion are deemed to have executed the following Release and Covenant not to Sue which is hereby approved by the Court:

In executing the Release and Covenant Not To Sue, each Class Member, on behalf of himself, herself or itself, and his, her or its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, members, shareholders, predecessors, heirs, administrators, officers, directors, successors, assigns, and any person the Class Member represents, intending to be legally bound hereby, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby absolutely, fully and forever releases, relieves, remises and discharges the City, and each of its successors and assigns, present and former agents, elected and appointed officials, representatives, employees, insurers, affiliated entities, attorneys and administrators, of and from any and all manner of actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, understandings, contracts, agreements, controversies, judgments, consequential damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, claims, liabilities, and demands of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which arise from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017 concerning (a) the City's calculation or assessment of Rates or Charges; (b) the components of costs included in the Rates; and/or (c) the City's Water and Sewer Fund balance. This release is intended to include all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit concerning the City's Rates and/or Charges. In executing the Release and Covenant Not to Sue, each Class Member also covenants that: (a) except for actions or suits based upon breaches of the terms of this Agreement or to enforce rights provided for in this Agreement, he, she or it will refrain from commencing any action or suit, or prosecuting any pending action or suit, in law or in equity, against the City on account of any action or cause of action released hereby; (b) none of the claims released under the Release and Covenant Not To Sue has been assigned to any other party; and (c) he, she or it accepts and assumes the risk that if any fact or circumstance is found, suspected, or claimed hereinafter to be other than or different from the facts or circumstances now believed to be true, the Release and Covenant Not To Sue shall be and remain effective notwithstanding any such difference in any such facts or circumstances. The foregoing shall not affect the claims of any Class Member whose individual water and sewer bills were calculated in error on the basis of facts or circumstances unique to such class Member and not based on the claims that were or could have been asserted by the Class in the Lawsuit.

8. If the City complies with the prospective relief described in the Agreement for the duration of the Prospective Relief Period as defined in the Agreement, the Class Members who receive refunds as part of the settlement shall then release and waive any and all claims which arise during the FY 2017 (July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017) and FY 2018 (July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018) Periods that could be brought challenging the City's inclusion of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge in establishing the Rates for the FY 2017 and FY 2018 Periods.

9. This Court retains continuing jurisdiction to effectuate the provisions of the Agreement and the terms of this Order.

10. The provisions of paragraph 9 hereof respecting the retention of jurisdiction shall not affect the finality of this judgment as to matters not reserved.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated: June 14, 2017.

/s/ Shalina Kumar
Oakland County Circuit Court Judge BB
SHALINA KUMAR

We hereby stipulate to the entry of the above order.

Approved as to form and substance:

/s/ Gregory D. Hanley
Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
KH151025

/s/ Sonal Hope Mithani
Sonal Hope Mithani (P51984)
Caroline B. Giordano (P76558)
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C.
101 North Main Street, Seventh Floor
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
(734) 668-7786
Attorneys for Defendant

Exhibit 9

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This case has been designated as an eFiling case. To review a copy of the
Notice of Mandatory eFiling visit www.oakgov.com/clerkrod/Pages/efiling.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC,
as Trustee for a Certified Class of Persons
Defined in the Final Judgment and Order
Approving Class Settlement Dated
June 14, 2017 Entered in Oakland County
Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ,

2017-159351-CZ

JUDGE DANIEL OBRIEN

Case No. CZ
Hon.

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation, and
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit,

Defendants.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham III (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

There was a pending civil action that is related to, but not arising out of, the transaction or occurrence alleged in this complaint. This prior case was a certified class action and styled *Schroeder v. The City of Royal Oak*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ. This action is no longer pending. BD

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Kickham Hanley PLLC, as Trustee for a Certified Class of Persons Defined in the Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Settlement Dated June 14, 2017 Entered in Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") states as follows for its Complaint against Defendants Oakland County, Michigan and the George W. Kuhn Drainage District (collectively "Oakland County"):

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action challenging the amount charged by Defendant Oakland County (hereinafter, the “County”) to the City of Royal Oak (the “City”) for stormwater disposal service (hereinafter, the “Stormwater Management Overcharge”).

2. The County has systematically overcharged the City for stormwater disposal services by imposing the Stormwater Management Overcharge for at least the last six years.

3. The City passed on the Stormwater Management Overcharge to its water and sewer customers (the “Class”) by incorporating it into the City’s water and sewer rate.

4. The City’s water and sewer customers then paid the City for the Stormwater Management Overcharge by virtue of paying their water and sewer bills.

5. As part of the settlement agreement in a related case, *Schroeder v. The City of Royal Oak* Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ (the “Royal Oak Class Action”), the City assigned its claims against the County to Plaintiff to achieve a refund of the Stormwater Management Overcharges owed by the County to Royal Oak for disbursement to the Class members who submitted claims for refunds in the Royal Oak Class Action (the “Class”). *See* Assignment, attached as Exhibit A.

6. Plaintiff, on behalf of the Class, seeks, among other things, a refund of all Stormwater Management Overcharges received by the County in the six years preceding the filing of this action and all such Overcharges collected during the pendency of this action.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. Plaintiff is the Trustee for the Class, defined in the Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Settlement Dated June 14, 2017 entered in Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ. Exhibit B hereto. Pursuant to the Final Judgment and Order Approving Settlement

dated June 14, 2017, this Court authorized Plaintiff to institute and prosecute this action on behalf of the Class.

8. Defendant Oakland County (the “County”) is political subdivision of the State of Michigan. Defendant George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the “District”) is a component unit of the County. The City lies within the geographical boundaries of the District.

9. Venue and jurisdiction are proper with this Court because all parties are present here and the actions which give rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in the County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

10. Like many older communities in Southeast Michigan, the City has a combined sanitary and storm sewer system, which is a system that is designed to collect both (i) snowmelt and rainwater (“stormwater”) runoff and (ii) domestic sewage and industrial wastewater (“sanitary sewage”), in the same pipe.

11. Sanitary sewage – i.e., spent water from a municipal water supply system which may be a combination of liquid and water-carried wastes -- enters a combined system directly from residences, commercial buildings, industrial plants, institutions and other structures. Owners and/or occupiers of such structures which generate the sewage are “users” of the sanitary sewage disposal services provided by the City.

12. Stormwater, in contrast, does not originate from any use of the water supply system or sanitary sewer system, and its presence in the combined system is wholly unrelated to the amount of tap water used, or sanitary sewage generated, by users of the system whose structures are physically connected to that system.

13. Stormwater collects on both private and public land, roads and other physical surfaces during rainfall events, and the runoff enters the combined sewer system through catch-basins and other collection devices.

14. Even though they have different origins, both sanitary sewage and stormwater collected in a combined sewer system need to be disposed of.

15. The City's combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the "County System"), which is owned and maintained by the County.

16. Except during heavy rainfall (when high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and stormwater exceed the outlet capacity causing excess flow to be diverted to the George W. Kuhn Retention Treatment Basin), the entire stormwater flow of the District, (*i.e.* the City's stormwater and the stormwater of various other communities in the area) is conveyed by the County to a treatment plant operated by (depending upon the year at issue) the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department ("DWSD") or the Great Lakes Water Authority ("GLWA") for ultimate disposal.

17. The County's stormwater flow (including the portion of stormwater flow that originates in the City) passes through Detroit's Dequindre Interceptor, which contains a master meter which measures the total flow passing from the County System into the DWSD/GLWA treatment plant.

18. The DWSD/GLWA charges the County a flat annual rate to dispose of the stormwater.

19. The County, in turn, allocates the annual DWSD/GLWA stormwater charge among all of the municipalities in the district, including the City, and charges each municipality a flat annual rate for stormwater disposal.

20. The County charges the City in excess of \$7 million per year for stormwater disposal services.

21. The City passes on that cost to its Water and Sewer Customers by imposing stormwater charges in its water and sewer rates to recover the entire \$7 million plus per year imposed upon the City by the County on an annual basis.

22. The DWSD/GLWA stormwater charge to the County, and the County's pass-through stormwater charge to the City, are based on a formula tied to the amount of rainfall and the volume of surface water that enters the County system for ultimate disposal by DWSD/GLWA.

23. Those municipalities which have a combined sewer system, including the City, are charged a flat rate per month for stormwater disposal per a formula determined by the County. Those municipalities serviced by separate sanitary and stormwater systems do not incur charges from the County for stormwater disposal, since the stormwater collected by those municipalities does not enter the DWSD system but rather is discharged into neighboring watercourses.

24. For a number of years, the County has charged the City substantially more than the amount that DWSD/GLWA charges the County for the disposal of the portion of the County's stormwater flow that originates in the City. The County has therefore overcharged the City for stormwater disposal service for a number of years.

25. The County's Final Order of Apportionment dated April 19, 2005 (Exhibit C hereto), provides that the stormwater charges to the City consist of two components: (1) the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow, and (2) the administrative costs of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. The Final Order of Apportionment was imposed pursuant to a Resolution of the Board of the District dated April 19, 2005 (the "Resolution"). Exhibit D hereto.

26. The Resolution obligated the County to pass through to the City the City's proportionate share of DWSD/GLWA's actual charges to the County for treating the storm water. The County has breached its obligations, and continues to breach its obligations, under the Resolution because, in assessing storm water charges to the City, the County has **not** passed on to the City the City's proportionate share of the actual costs the County has incurred to

DWSD/GLWA for storm water disposal. Instead, the County has grossly increased the DWSD/GLWA stormwater treatment charges. For example, for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2013:

DWSD charged the County **\$40.18** million in total disposal charges;

DWSD charged the County **\$24.31** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

DWSD charged the County **\$15.87** million in fixed charges for storm water and infiltration water disposal.

See Exhibit E. In contrast, the County represented to the City that, for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2013:

DWSD charged the County **\$41.38** million in total disposal charges;

DWSD charged the County **\$19.54** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

DWSD charged the County **\$21.84** million in fixed charges for storm water and infiltration water disposal. [Exhibit F hereto].

27. The County has reallocated the total charges imposed by DWSD to increase the amount of the storm water charges by almost \$6 million. Because the County allocated to the City a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges (29.7%) than sanitary sewage disposal charges (20.89%), the more of the total DWSD/GLWA charges that the County allocates to storm water charges, the more the City pays in the aggregate.

28. In other words, for each dollar of storm water disposal charges the County allegedly incurs, the City pays 29.7 cents. But for each dollar of sanitary sewage disposal charges the County allegedly incurs, the City pays only 20.89 cents.

29. Based upon the County's representations and the allocation percentage assigned to the City, the County charged the City aggregate disposal costs of **\$11.45** million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. This was calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$20.898 million (\$19.544 million in DWSD charges plus \$1.65 million in OCWRC operating expenses less \$298k in interest income) x .19098 = \$4.04 million

- Storm water -- \$24.96 million (\$21.847 million in DWSD charges plus \$3.317 million in OCWRC operating expenses less \$203k in interest income) x .297028 = \$7.41 million

30. Given DWSD's actual charges to the County, however, the County should have charged the City only **\$10.54** million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. This is calculated as follows:

- Sanitary -- \$25.665 million (\$24.31 million in DWSD charges plus \$1.65 million in OCWRC operating expenses less \$298k in interest income) x .19098 = \$4.90 million
- Storm water -- \$18.984 million (\$15.87 million in DWSD charges plus \$3.317 million in OCWRC operating expenses less \$203k in interest income) x .297028 = \$5.64 million

31. Based upon the foregoing, the County overcharged the City by \$910,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013.¹

32. There are similar overcharges for prior years and for the years since.

COUNT I BREACH OF CONTRACT

33. Plaintiff incorporates each of their preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

34. The Resolution creates an express contract between the County and the City.

35. The Resolution obligates the County to charge the City for stormwater disposal by passing through the City's proportionate share of "DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain treat the total storm water flow," and the City's proportionate share of "the administrative cost of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drainage System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges."

36. The County has breached the terms of the Resolution by failing to charge the City its proportionate share of "DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm

water flow.” The County has not passed through DWSD/GLWA’s actual charges for storm water disposal but instead has grossly inflated the amount of the DWSD/GLWA stormwater charges.

37. The City has been damaged by the County’s breach of the Resolution because the City has been required to pay the Stormwater Management Overcharges.

**COUNT II
ASSUMPSIT/MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED**

38. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

39. In the alternative, in the event that the Court finds that there was no express contract between the City and the County governing stormwater charges, the County still is legally obligated to refund the Stormwater Management Overcharges. This is because the Overcharges were imposed in violation of the April 19, 2005 Resolution.

40. The County is legally required to comply with the terms of the Resolution.

41. A claim to recover amounts paid to a governmental unit in excess of the amount allowed under law is properly filed as an equitable action in assumpsit for money had and received.

42. The County has collected amounts in excess of the amounts it was legally entitled to collect from the City for stormwater disposal services.

43. The City passed the Stormwater Management Overcharges onto its water and sewer customers in the City’s sewer rates.

44. The City assigned its claim against the County to Plaintiff on behalf of the Class. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to maintain an equitable action of assumpsit against the County to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction. *See, e.g., Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor*, 383 Mich. 693, 704, 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970).

¹ The foregoing calculations are given for illustration purposes only to describe the nature of the overcharge, and are not intended to limit the scope or size of the claim assigned to the Class.

45. The County should be required to disgorge the amounts it has illicitly collected through the imposition of the Stormwater Management Overcharges and refund the Class for this overcharge.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request that the Court grant the following relief:

A. With respect to Count I and Count II, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the County, and order and direct the County to disgorge and refund all Stormwater Management Overcharges collected during the six-year prior to commencement of this action and all Stormwater Management Overcharges collected during the pendency of this action, and order the County to pay into a common fund for the benefit of the Class the total amount of the Stormwater Management Overcharges to which the Class is entitled for this time period;

C. Permit Plaintiff, as Trustee, to manage and distribute in an orderly manner the common fund thus established, subject to this Court's oversight and approval; and

D. Grant any other appropriate relief.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

By: /s/ Gregory D. Hanley
Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham III (P70332)
Attorneys and Trustees for the Class
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073

Date: June 20, 2017
KH151048

Approved, SCAO

Original - Court
1st copy - Defendant2nd copy - Plaintiff
3rd copy - Return

STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL DISTRICT Sixth JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COUNTY PROBATE	SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT	CASE NO.

Court address

1200 N. Telegraph, Pontiac, Michigan 48341

Court telephone no.

(248) 858-1000

Plaintiff's name(s), address(es), and telephone no(s).

Kickham Hanley PLLC, as Trustee for a Certified Class of Persons Defined in the Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Settlement Dated June 14, 2017 Entered in Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ

Plaintiff's attorney, bar no., address, and telephone no.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204), Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
 Edward F. Kickham III (P70332)
 Kickham Hanley PLLC
 32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
 Royal Oak, Michigan 48073 (248) 544-1500

Defendant's name(s), address(es), and telephone no(s).

Oakland County, Michigan, a municipal corporation, and George W. Kuhn Drainage District, a component unit
 Oakland County Clerk
 1200 N. Telegraph, Building 12 East
 Pontiac, Michigan, USA, 48341
 (248) 858-0581

SUMMONS NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT: In the name of the people of the State of Michigan you are notified:

1. You are being sued.
2. **YOU HAVE 21 DAYS** after receiving this summons to file a written answer with the court and serve a copy on the other party or take other lawful action with the court (28 days if you were served by mail or you were served outside this state).
3. If you do not answer or take other action within the time allowed, judgment may be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

Issued	This summons expires	Court clerk

Family Division Cases (The following is information required in the caption of every complaint and is to be completed by the plaintiff.)

- ☐ This case involves a minor who is under the continuing jurisdiction of another Michigan court. The name of the court, file number, and details are on page ____ of the attached complaint.
- ☐ There is no other pending or resolved action within the jurisdiction of the family division of circuit court involving the family or family members of the parties.
- ☐ An action within the jurisdiction of the family division of the circuit court involving the family or family members of the parties has been previously filed in _____ Court.

The action ☐ remains ☐ is no longer pending. The docket number and the judge assigned to the action are:

Docket no.	Judge	Bar no.

Civil Cases (The following is information required in the caption of every complaint and is to be completed by the plaintiff.)

- ☐ This is a business case in which all or part of the action includes a business or commercial dispute under MCL 600.8035.
- ☐ There is no other pending or resolved civil action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as alleged in the complaint.
- ☒ A civil action between these parties or other parties arising out of the transaction or occurrence alleged in the complaint has been previously filed in Oakland County Circuit Court Court.

The action ☐ remains ☒ is no longer pending. The docket number and the judge assigned to the action are:

Docket no.	Judge	Bar no.
14-138919-CZ	Shalina D. Kumar	P56595

VENUE

Plaintiff(s) residence (include city, township, or village)	Defendant(s) residence (include city, township, or village)
Royal Oak, Oakland County, MI	Pontiac, Oakland County, MI
Place where action arose or business conducted	
Oakland County, MI	

June 20, 2017

Date

Signature of attorney/plaintiff

If you require special accommodations to use the court because of a disability or if you require a foreign language interpreter to help you fully participate in court proceedings, please contact the court immediately to make arrangements.

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Note to Plaintiff: The summons is invalid unless served on or before its expiration date.

SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT

Case No. _____

PROOF OF SERVICE

TO PROCESS SERVER: You are to serve the summons and complaint not later than 91 days from the date of filing or the date of expiration on the order for second summons. You must make and file your return with the court clerk. If you are unable to complete service you must return this original and all copies to the court clerk.

CERTIFICATE / AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE / NONSERVICE☐ **OFFICER CERTIFICATE**

OR

☐ **AFFIDAVIT OF PROCESS SERVER**

I certify that I am a sheriff, deputy sheriff, bailiff, appointed court officer, or attorney for a party (MCR 2.104[A][2]), and that: (notarization not required)

Being first duly sworn, I state that I am a legally competent adult who is not a party or an officer of a corporate party, and that: (notarization required)

☐ I served personally a copy of the summons and complaint.

☐ I served by registered or certified mail (copy of return receipt attached) a copy of the summons and complaint, together with

List all documents served with the Summons and Complaint

_____ on the defendant(s):

Defendant's name	Complete address(es) of service	Day, date, time

☐ I have personally attempted to serve the summons and complaint, together with any attachments, on the following defendant(s) and have been unable to complete service.

Defendant's name	Complete address(es) of service	Day, date, time

I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

Service fee	Miles traveled	Fee	
\$		\$	
Incorrect address fee	Miles traveled	Fee	TOTAL FEE
\$		\$	\$

Signature _____

Name (type or print) _____

Title _____

Subscribed and sworn to before me on _____, _____ County, Michigan.
Date

My commission expires: _____ Date Signature: _____
Deputy court clerk/Notary public

Notary public, State of Michigan, County of _____

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE

I acknowledge that I have received service of the summons and complaint, together with _____ Attachments

_____ on _____
Day, date, time

_____ on behalf of _____

Signature _____

EXHIBIT A

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ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS

THIS ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS (this "Assignment") is made this 19th day of June, 2017, by the City of Royal Oak, Oakland County, Michigan (the "City") based on the following recitals:

- A. A class action lawsuit is pending against the City entitled *Andrew Schroeder vs The City of Royal Oak* in Oakland County Circuit Court in which the plaintiff alleges that the City has overcharged for storm water management services (the "Lawsuit").
- B. The Court has certified a class consisting of all persons or entities who/which paid the City for Water and Sewer Service on or after February 14, 2008. For settlement purposes, the parties agreed that the Class will include all persons or entities who/which paid the City for Water and Sewer Service between February 14, 2008 and January 31, 2017 (the "Class" and/or the "Plaintiff").
- C. The City and the Class have resolved the lawsuit by entering into a Settlement Agreement, dated March 22, 2017, and the Court has approved the Settlement Agreement by Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Settlement dated JUNE 14, 2017.
- D. Counsel to the Plaintiff Class is Kickham Hanley PLLC ("Class Counsel").
- E. Plaintiff believes, based upon the advice of Class Counsel, that Oakland County has and continues to overcharge the City for the storm water component of the total flow of storm water and sanitary sewer discharge which flows into the Oakland County sewer system (the "Overcharges"). A more specific description of Plaintiff's position regarding the Overcharges and its illustration of the Overcharges is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff further believes that the City (and its water and sewer customers) are entitled to a refund of the amount of the Overcharges.
- F. The Court has appointed Class Counsel as Trustee of a litigation trust for the benefit of the Class members.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, the City makes the following assignment subject to the conditions stated herein:

1. The term "Oakland County" shall mean Oakland County, Michigan, and all of its affiliates, political subdivisions, agents, employees or officers, including, but not limited to, the Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner, the Southeast Oakland County Sewage Disposal District, the George W. Kuhn Drainage District, and any other entity that imposed or imposes the Overcharges.

2. The City hereby assigns and transfers to Kickham Hanley PLLC, as trustee ("Assignee"), the City's entire right, title and interest in and to any refund which may be owing to the City or to which the City is entitled by reason of Oakland County's Overcharges, including, without limitation, all past Overcharges and all Overcharges imposed upon the City (and its water and sewer customers) hereafter until the Assignee's intended suit against Oakland County for the Overcharges is resolved either by settlement or by a final nonappealable order of the Michigan Court having jurisdiction.

3. The City has not made and does not make any warranty or representation, express or implied, that Oakland County has, in fact, imposed any Overcharges or that any refund is owed. Through its counsel, the Assignee will rely solely on its own analysis of Oakland County's practices with regard to billing for the County's storm water and sanitary sewer disposal and management services. In determining to give this Assignment, the City has relied on the advice of its own consultants and not on any advice or information from the Class, Class Counsel, or Assignee.

4. The City does warrant and represent that (i) the City has not heretofore assigned or otherwise transferred its rights to a refund of Oakland County's Overcharges to any third party, (ii) the City has not entered into any express agreement with Oakland County by means of which the City for adequate consideration has surrendered or waived its claim for a refund of the County's Overcharges, (iii) the City will maintain and preserve its records of the Overcharges and make them available through a qualified record keeper to the Class in its litigation against Oakland County, and (iv) to the best of its knowledge, the City is duly and legally authorized to enter into this Assignment.

5. The City will hereafter take no action to waive, surrender or compromise its right to a refund of the Overcharges.

6. Assignee, through Class Counsel, intends to bring an action against Oakland County. The City will pay the invoices it receives from the County in the ordinary course, notwithstanding the Overcharges, until the Assignee completes its litigation by settlement or final nonappealed judgment. Such payments shall be made without intention to prejudice Assignee's rights against Oakland County and shall be deemed to be made "under protest."

7. This Assignment represents the Class Counsel's best judgment as to the proper and lawful way to give effect to the parties' intentions; to wit: that the Class members shall be the owners or beneficial owners through the Assignee of the right to a refund of the Overcharges and have standing and are otherwise entitled to assert the claim to a refund against Oakland County. If for any reason it appears that Assignee or the Class will be unable to assert the claim to a refund by reason of some defect in this Assignment or the failure to follow some other procedure, the City will cooperate in a modification of this Assignment and in the fulfilling of some alternate procedure to


give effect to the intentions hereof except to the extent that compliance with the alternative procedure would conflict with the terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement.

8. This Assignment, together with the Settlement Agreement, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous agreements, representations or warranties of the parties. No alteration, amendment, modification or waiver of any of the terms or provisions hereof, and no future representation or warranty by either party with respect to this transaction, shall be valid or enforceable unless the same be in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement of same is sought.

9. This Assignment may be executed and delivered by the parties in facsimile format and in any number of separate counterparts, all of which, when delivered, shall together constitute one and the same document

10. The Assignment given herein is irrevocable and unconditional except as expressly stated herein.

City of Royal Oak

By: 

Its: Mayor

City of Royal Oak

By: Melanie Halas

Its: City Clerk

ACCEPTED:

Kickham Hanley PLLC, Trustee

EXHIBIT A

PLAINTIFF'S DESCRIPTION OF OVERCHARGES

The City of Royal Oak's sanitary sewage and storm water are collected in a combined sewer system and need to be disposed of. The City's combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the "County System"), which is owned and maintained by Oakland County.

Except during heavy rainfall when high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and storm water exceed the outlet capacity to Detroit causing excess flow to be diverted to the Kuhn Facility, the entire flow from the County System is conveyed to the Detroit Water and Sewer Department ("DWSD") treatment plant.

DWSD charges Oakland County for disposing of the sanitary sewage and storm water. In turn, Oakland County charges the municipalities which contribute flow to the County System for such disposal. Those municipalities which have a combined sewer system, including the City, are charged a flat rate per month for storm water disposal per a formula determined by the County.

Based upon information made available to Plaintiff's counsel, it appears that Oakland County has overcharged the City for storm water disposal.

The County's Final Order of Apportionment dated April 19, 2005, provides that the storm water charges to the City consist of two components: (1) the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow, and (2) the administrative costs of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. The County, therefore, was obligated to pass through to the City the City's proportionate share of DWSD's actual charges to the County for treating the storm water.

For example, for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2013:

DWSD apparently charged the County **\$40.18** million in total disposal charges;

DWSD apparently charged the County **\$24.31** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

DWSD apparently charged the County **\$15.87** million in fixed charges for storm water and infiltration water disposal.

In contrast, the County represented to the City that, for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2013:

DWSD charged the County **\$41.38** million in total disposal charges;

DWSD charged the County **\$19.54** million for sanitary sewage disposal; and

DWSD charged the County **\$21.84** million in fixed charges for storm water and infiltration water disposal.

The County appears to have reallocated the total charges imposed by DWSD to increase the amount of the storm water charges by almost \$6 million. Because they allocated a higher percentage of the storm water disposal charges (29.7%) than sanitary sewage disposal charges (20.89%), the more of the total DWSD charges that the County allocates to storm water charges, the more the City pays in the aggregate.

Based upon the County's representations and the allocation percentage assigned to the City, the County charged the City aggregate disposal costs of **\$11.45** million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. This was calculated as follows:

Sanitary -- \$20.898 million x .19098 = \$4.04 million

Storm water -- \$24.96 million x .297028 = \$7.41 million

If the DWSD records accurately reflect the amounts charged by DWSD to the City, however, the County should have charged the City **\$10.54** million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. This is calculated as follows:

Sanitary -- \$25.665 million x .19098 = \$4.90 million

Storm water -- \$18.984 million x .297028 = \$5.64 million

Therefore, it appears that the County overcharged the City by \$910,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. There appear to be similar overcharges for prior years and for the years since. The foregoing calculations are given for illustration purposes only to describe the nature of the overcharge, and are not intended to limit the scope or size of the claim assigned to the Class.

EXHIBIT B

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ANDREW SCHROEDER,
individually, and as representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons
and entities,

Case No. 2014-138919-CZ
Hon. Shalina Kumar
:

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sonal Hope Mithani (P51984)
Caroline B. Giordano (P76558)
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C.
101 North Main Street, Seventh Floor
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
(734) 668-7786
Attorneys for Defendant

Ray M. Toma (P48840)
Ray M. Toma PC
2550 South Telegraph Road, Suite 255
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302
248-594-4544
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER APPROVING CLASS SETTLEMENT

At a session of said Court held in the
City of Pontiac, County of Oakland
State of Michigan on 6/14/2017
PRESENT: HON. SHALINA KUMAR
Circuit Court Judge

WHEREAS, Plaintiff and Defendant in this action have moved this Court pursuant to MCR 3.501(E), for an order approving the settlement of this class action in accordance with the terms set forth in the Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") executed by counsel for the parties, and

WHEREAS, this Court having held a hearing, as noticed, on June 14, 2017 pursuant to the Order Regarding Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Notice and Scheduling, dated March 22, 2017 (the "Order"), to determine the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of a proposed settlement of the Class Action; and due and adequate notice (the "Notice") having been made by mailing in a manner consistent with Paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Order; and all such persons (excluding those who previously requested exclusion from the applicable Class) having been given an opportunity to object to or participate in the settlement; and the Court having heard and considered the matter, including all papers filed in connection therewith and the oral presentations of counsel at said hearing; and good cause appearing therefor,

WHEREAS, Defendant has funded the settlement by providing a check in the amount of Two Million Dollars (\$2,000,000), which has been deposited into and remains in the Kickham Hanley PLLC Client Trust Account pending this Court's final approval of the settlement, and which will be disbursed in accordance with the Agreement,

For the reasons stated on the record, IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The terms of the Agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the members of the Class and are hereby approved.
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered and directed to perform and consummate the settlement set forth in the Agreement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
3. The notification to the Class members regarding the Settlement is the best notice practicable under the circumstances and is in compliance with MCR 3.501(E) and the requirements of due process of law.

4. This Lawsuit is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and without costs to any party except as provided for in the Agreement. Insofar as this Final Judgment dismisses the Class claims relating to the Stormwater Charges (as that term is defined in the Agreement), this portion of this Final Judgment is a judgment on the merits.

5. Kickham Hanley PLLC, counsel for the Class and Claims-Escrow Administrator, is hereby awarded attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the amount of \$809,398.55, to be paid as set forth in the Agreement. Plaintiff Andrew Schroeder is granted an incentive award of \$10,000, to be paid as set forth in the Agreement.

6. The Court takes specific notice of provisions of the Agreement which identify certain alleged overcharges by Oakland County or its agencies for storm water management services provided to Defendant ("Overcharges"). Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendant will assign to the Class members or for their benefit any and all claims for refund of the Overcharges that it has or may have against Oakland County Michigan and its affiliates, political subdivisions, agents, employees or officers including, but not limited to, the Oakland County Water Resources Commissioner, the Southeast Oakland County Sewage Disposal District, the George W. Kuhn Drainage Districts, and any other entity that imposed or imposes the Overcharges. Kickham Hanley PLLC is hereby appointed trustee of a litigation trust hereby established for the benefit of the Class members. As trustee, Kickham Hanley PLLC is authorized to pursue the claim for a refund of the Overcharges by lawsuit against Oakland County or its aforesaid agencies. Kickham Hanley PLLC is approved as counsel to the trust. Any monetary recovery from pursuit of the claim will be distributed, after counsel fees and costs, to the Class members based upon the methodology used for distributing the Settlement Fund. In the event the Oakland County Action is resolved through a settlement, that settlement, and any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses, will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund. In the

event that there is a monetary recovery in Oakland County Action by way of a litigated judgment, any request by Class Counsel for an award of fees and expenses will be subject to the same Court approval processes as those applied to the Settlement Fund.

7. Without any further action by anyone, Plaintiffs and all members of the Class as certified by the Order dated April 1, 2015 who previously did not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion are deemed to have executed the following Release and Covenant not to Sue which is hereby approved by the Court:

In executing the Release and Covenant Not To Sue, each Class Member, on behalf of himself, herself or itself, and his, her or its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, members, shareholders, predecessors, heirs, administrators, officers, directors, successors, assigns, and any person the Class Member represents, intending to be legally bound hereby, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby absolutely, fully and forever releases, relieves, remises and discharges the City, and each of its successors and assigns, present and former agents, elected and appointed officials, representatives, employees, insurers, affiliated entities, attorneys and administrators, of and from any and all manner of actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, understandings, contracts, agreements, controversies, judgments, consequential damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, claims, liabilities, and demands of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which arise from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017 concerning (a) the City's calculation or assessment of Rates or Charges; (b) the components of costs included in the Rates; and/or (c) the City's Water and Sewer Fund balance. This release is intended to include all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit concerning the City's Rates and/or Charges. In executing the Release and Covenant Not to Sue, each Class Member also covenants that: (a) except for actions or suits based upon breaches of the terms of this Agreement or to enforce rights provided for in this Agreement, he, she or it will refrain from commencing any action or suit, or prosecuting any pending action or suit, in law or in equity, against the City on account of any action or cause of action released hereby; (b) none of the claims released under the Release and Covenant Not To Sue has been assigned to any other party; and (c) he, she or it accepts and assumes the risk that if any fact or circumstance is found, suspected, or claimed hereinafter to be other than or different from the facts or circumstances now believed to be true, the Release and Covenant Not To Sue shall be and remain effective notwithstanding any such difference in any such facts or circumstances. The foregoing shall not affect the claims of any Class Member whose individual water and sewer bills were calculated in error on the basis of facts or circumstances unique to such class Member and not based on the claims that were or could have been asserted by the Class in the Lawsuit.

8. If the City complies with the prospective relief described in the Agreement for the duration of the Prospective Relief Period as defined in the Agreement, the Class Members who receive refunds as part of the settlement shall then release and waive any and all claims which arise during the FY 2017 (July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017) and FY 2018 (July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018) Periods that could be brought challenging the City's inclusion of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge in establishing the Rates for the FY 2017 and FY 2018 Periods.

9. This Court retains continuing jurisdiction to effectuate the provisions of the Agreement and the terms of this Order.

10. The provisions of paragraph 9 hereof respecting the retention of jurisdiction shall not affect the finality of this judgment as to matters not reserved.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated: June 14, 2017.

/s/ Shalina Kumar
Oakland County Circuit Court Judge BB
SHALINA KUMAR

We hereby stipulate to the entry of the above order.
Approved as to form and substance:

/s/ Gregory D. Hanley
Gregory D. Hanley (P51204)
Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham Jr. (P70332)
Kickham Hanley PLLC
32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
Royal Oak, MI 48073
(248) 544-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
KII151025

/s/ Sonal Hope Mithani
Sonal Hope Mithani (P51984)
Caroline B. Giordano (P76558)
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C.
101 North Main Street, Seventh Floor
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
(734) 668-7786
Attorneys for Defendant

EXHIBIT C

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FINAL ORDER OF APPORTIONMENT
OF COST OF ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

IN RE GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN

In accordance with a resolution adopted by the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain on the 19th day of April, 2005, the apportionments of the cost of administration, operations and maintenance of the George W. Kuhn Drain shall be borne by the several public corporations as follows:

The combined total volume of storm water and sewage disposal effluent flowing from the George W. Kuhn Drain into the City of Detroit treatment facilities is and will continue to be calculated through master meter charges ("Master Meter Charges") by the City of Detroit to the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.

In order to allocate the total costs of combined storm water and sewerage disposal and treatment by the City of Detroit, it is necessary to establish which portion of the flow from the George W. Kuhn Drain to the City of Detroit is sewage disposal and which portion is storm water runoff. This allocation will be made by assuming that all water purchased from the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) by the cities of Berkley, Birmingham, Clawson, Ferndale, Hazel Park, Huntington Woods, Madison Heights, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Royal Oak, Southfield and Troy, the Township of Royal Oak and Village of Beverly Hills (the "Local Public Corporations") located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District is returned as sanitary flow. Therefore, the difference between such purchased and metered water sales to the Local Public Corporations located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District and the Master Meter Charges is, by definition, storm water flow.

A sewage disposal rate will be used to charge the Local Public Corporations for their respective sanitary sewage disposal flow into the George W. Kuhn Drain. Such a charge will be composed of the administrative costs of the costs of the sewage disposal portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, together with the appropriate total sewage disposal rate per 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) of sewage flow for each Local Public Corporation.

The total storm water operation and maintenance component consists of two (2) categories. The first component is the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow. The second cost component is the administrative cost of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. An engineering study, utilizing area and land use, has been used to determine each Local Public Corporation's percentage of storm water contribution into the George W. Kuhn Drain System. These percentages will be utilized to apportion the storm water charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain communities. The percentages are finally apportioned as follows:


The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, excluding the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation (Community)</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Berkley	6.4895%
City of Birmingham	4.8837%
City of Clawson	5.9262%
City of Ferndale	10.2885%
City of Hazel Park	2.2554%
City of Huntington Woods	2.9061%
City of Madison Heights	6.5410%
City of Oak Park	13.6383%
City of Pleasant Ridge	1.3390%
City of Royal Oak	29.7915%
City of Southfield	7.7156%
City of Troy	2.4799%
Township of Royal Oak	1.2775%
Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.5274%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>2.1035%</u>
	100.0000%

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, inclusive of the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Madison Heights	94.4820%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.3065%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>4.2115%</u>
	100.0000%

DRAINAGE BOARD FOR THE
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN

By: 

John P. McCulloch, Chairperson

Dated and Filed: April 19, 2005

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EXHIBIT D

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**MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE DRAINAGE
BOARD FOR THE GEORGE W. KUHN DRAIN**

April 19, 2005

At a meeting of the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain held in the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner, Public Works Building, One Public Works Drive, Waterford, Michigan, on the 19th day of April, 2005.

The meeting was called to order by the Chairperson.

PRESENT: John P. McCulloch, Chairperson and
Oakland County Drain Commissioner

Bill Bullard, Chairperson of the
Oakland County Board of Commissioners

Chuck Moss, Chairperson of the
Finance Committee of the
Oakland County Board of Commissioners

ALSO

PRESENT: Joseph P. Kozma,
Deputy & Manager, Engineering & Construction

Philip Sanzica,
Chief Engineer

Eugene R. Snowden, Jr.,
Engineer

Lynn Sonkiss,
Chief of Fiscal Services

Shawn Phelps,
Fiscal Services

Jeremy Adams,
Fiscal Services

Joseph Colaianne,
Insurance Administrator

Chuck Lawhorn,
Civil Engineer

Elaine Van Dyke
Secretary

J. Bryan Williams, Bond Counsel
Dickinson Wright PLLC

John R. Axe,
Municipal Financial Consultants Incorporated

Howard Aube
City of Novi

Jon Austin
City of Madison Heights

Gary Nigro
Engineer

The Chairperson presented the minutes of the meeting of this Board held on March 22, 2005. Upon motion by Moss, seconded by Bullard, and unanimously adopted, the minutes were approved as presented.

There were no public comments.

The Chairperson offered proofs of the publication and mailing of notice of the public hearing. It was moved by Moss, seconded by Bullard and unanimously adopted that the proofs of publication and mailing be received and filed in the office of the Chairperson of the Drainage Board.

The Chairperson then opened the hearing and asked if there were any written objections. Ms. Van Dyke reported that there were no written objections on file. Mr. McCulloch noted for the record the receipt of a favorable letter from MDOT.

The Chairperson then asked if there were any comments or objections from those present at the hearing. Mr. Austin commented formally on the unanimous recommendation of the Advisory Committee with respect to the proposed final apportionments of cost with respect to administration, operations and maintenance of the George W. Kuhn Drain. On behalf of the members of the Advisory Committee, Mr. Austin thanked Mr. McCulloch and the staff of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner for their hard work in resolving serious issues and concerns related to such apportionment. Thereafter, the Chairperson declared the hearing closed.

After the hearing, the following resolution was offered by Moss and seconded by Bullard:

WHEREAS, the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain, on the 28th day of February, 2005, tentatively established apportionments of the cost of the George W. Kuhn Drain, to be borne by the several public corporations, as follows:

The combined total volume of storm water and sewage disposal effluent flowing from the George W. Kuhn Drain into the City of Detroit treatment facilities is and will continue to be calculated through master meter charges ("Master Meter Charges") by the City of Detroit to the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.

In order to allocate the total costs of combined storm water and sewerage disposal and treatment by the City of Detroit, it is necessary to establish which portion of the flow from the George W. Kuhn Drain to the City of Detroit is sewage disposal and which portion is storm water runoff. This allocation will be made by assuming that all water purchased from the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) by the cities of Berkley, Birmingham, Clawson, Ferndale, Hazel Park, Huntington Woods, Madison Heights, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Royal Oak, Southfield and Troy, the Township of Royal Oak and Village of Beverly Hills (the "Local Public Corporations") located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District is returned as sanitary flow. Therefore, the difference between such purchased and metered water sales to the Local Public Corporations located within the George W. Kuhn Drainage District and the Master Meter Charges is, by definition, storm water flow.

A sewage disposal rate will be used to charge the Local Public Corporations for their respective sanitary sewage disposal flow into the George W. Kuhn Drain. Such a charge will be composed of the administrative costs of the costs of the sewage disposal portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, together with the appropriate total sewage disposal rate per 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) of sewage flow for each Local Public Corporation.

The total storm water operation and maintenance component consists of two (2) categories. The first component is the DWSD's charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain to treat the total storm water flow. The second cost component is the administrative cost of operating and maintaining the balance of the George W. Kuhn Drain System not included in the sanitary sewage portion of the charges. An engineering study, utilizing area and land use, has been used to determine each Local Public Corporation's percentage of storm water contribution into the George W. Kuhn Drain System. These percentages will be utilized to apportion the storm water charges to the George W. Kuhn Drain communities. The percentages are finally apportioned as follows:

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, excluding the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation (Community)</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Berkley	6.4895%

City of Birmingham	4.8837%
City of Clawson	5.9262%
City of Ferndale	10.2885%
City of Hazel Park	2.2554%
City of Huntington Woods	2.9061%
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County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.5274%

State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>2.1035%</u>

100.0000%

The costs of administration, operations and maintenance for that portion of the George W. Kuhn Drain, inclusive of the separate storm drains constructed as a part of Contracts 1 and 4, to be located in the County of Oakland and to serve land located in the following public corporations, are finally apportioned as follows, to wit:

<u>Public Corporation</u>	<u>Tentative Percentage of Cost</u>
City of Madison Heights	94.4820%
County of Oakland, on account of Drainage of county highways	1.3065%
State of Michigan, on account of Drainage of state highways	<u>4.2115%</u>
	100.0000%

WHEREAS, after due notice the Drainage Board met on the 19th day of April, 2005, to hear any objections to the apportionments; and

WHEREAS, the apportionments of cost have been made by taking into consideration the benefits to accrue to each of the public corporations to be assessed and by taking into consideration the extent to which each public corporation contributes to the conditions which made the George W. Kuhn Drain necessary, limiting such

factors in the case of the County of Oakland and the State of Michigan solely to the drainage of county and state highways; and

WHEREAS, this Drainage Board has given due and full consideration to all objections offered thereto; and

WHEREAS, the George W. Kuhn Drain is necessary for the public health.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Drainage Board for the George W. Kuhn Drain:

1. The apportionments of cost as above set forth be and the same are fixed and confirmed.

2. The Chairperson of this Drainage Board is authorized and directed to issue on behalf of the Board its Final Order of Apportionment setting forth the several apportionments as herein fixed and confirmed.

3. All former resolutions and orders of this Board, insofar as the same may be in conflict with the terms of this resolution, are rescinded.

ADOPTED: Yeas: 3
Nays: 0

The Chairperson proceeded to sign the Final Order of Apportionment for the George W. Kuhn Drain as directed in the foregoing resolution. The order was dated April 19, 2005, and, upon motion by Moss, supported by Bullard and unanimously adopted, was filed with the Chairperson.

Invoices in the amount of \$108,305.17 (as attached) were presented for consideration. It was moved by Moss, supported by Bullard, that the invoices be approved for payment in the amount of \$108,305.17.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0

Construction Estimate No. 41 (Contract No. 4) in the amount of \$750,883.85 was presented for approval. Following discussion, it was moved by Moss, supported by Bullard, that Construction Estimate No. 41 (Contract No. 4) in the amount of \$750,883.85 be approved for payment to Walbridge Aldinger Company, Contractor.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0


Mr. Colaianne updated the Board with respect to issues involving the revocation and reissuance of the NPDES permit previously discussed at the February 28, 2005 meeting of the Drain Board. He reported that he had met with the attorneys for the various local communities in March, 2005 concerning the continuation of the practice of naming the individual communities as co-permittees. Mr. Colaianne indicated that the

Advisory Committee was prepared to take up the issue of the communities being named as co-permitees at its next meeting.

It was moved by McCulloch and supported by Moss, to certify attendance and authorize pro rata share payment of \$25 per day to both Mr. Moss and Mr. Bullard.

ADOPTED: Yeas - 3
Nays - 0

There being no further business to come before the meeting, the meeting was adjourned.


Chairperson


Date: April 19, 2005

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STATE OF MICHIGAN)
)SS.
COUNTY OF OAKLAND)

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the minutes of the George W. Kuhn Drain, Oakland County, Michigan, held on the 19th day of April, 2005 and that the said minutes are on file in the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner and are available to the public.

I further certify that notice of the meeting was posted at least 18 hours in advance of the meeting at the office of the Oakland County Drain Commissioner which is the principal office of the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.



John P. McCulloch, Chairperson

Dated: May 9, 2005

BLOOMFIELD 9007-328 688378v1 5/2/2005

EXHIBIT E

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Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

FY 2012-13 George W Kuhn Drainage Dist Sewer Rate Calculation

Part 1- Units of Service

<u>Line</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Metered Flow	Mcf	2,800,000		
2 Sanitary	Mcf	1,739,407	(1)-(3)-(5)	Metered less Local Community Infiltration/Inflow (Lns 3&5)
3 Local Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	142,160	GDRSS Data	Local Community only
4 Common Sewers Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	61,025	GDRSS Data	Represents share of common sewers "downstream" of connection
5 Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	918,432	GDRSS Data	
6 Overflow Credit		15.0%		Universal for all customers
7 Net Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	780,667	(5) x [1- (6)]	
8 Total Allocation Volume	Mcf	2,723,261	(2)+(3)+(4)+(7)	
9 System Volume	Mcf	28,160,902		
10 George W Kuhn Drainage Dist Share		9.67%	(8)/(9)	Represents Customer's share of "common" flow costs
11 BOD	lbs	16,720,902	98 mg/l	Based on 130 mg/l Sanitary, 43 mg/l DWIL, and 43 mg/l wet weather
12 TSS	lbs	26,075,392	153 mg/l	Based on 202 mg/l Sanitary, 67 mg/l DWIL, and 67 mg/l wet weather
13 PHOS	lbs	431,246	2.5 mg/l	Based on 3.3 mg/l Sanitary, 1.1 mg/l DWIL, and 1.1 mg/l wet weather
14 FOG	lbs	2,784,008	16.4 mg/l	Based on 21.6 mg/l Sanitary, 7.1 mg/l DWIL, and 7.1 mg/l wet weather
15 Wet Weather		2.26%	1999 RSA	Represents Customer's share of DWSD New CSO Facilities cost

Part 2 - Cost Allocation

<u>Line</u>	<u>(1) Units</u>	<u>(2) Unit Cost (a)</u>	<u>(3) Allocated Rev Req't (1)*(2)</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 City Only	0	3.342	0	Collection System Costs
2 Wholesale Only	2,723,261	0.423	1,151,271	Collection System Costs
3 Oakland Only	0	0.000	0	Collection System Costs
4 Macomb Only	0	1.283	0	Collection System Costs
5 Common	2,723,261	5.236	14,259,129	Common Collection & WWTP Costs
6 BOD	16,720,902	0.438	7,329,412	WWTP Costs
7 TSS	26,075,392	0.445	11,599,761	WWTP Costs
8 PHOS	431,246	6.564	2,830,839	WWTP Costs
9 FOG	2,784,008	0.422	1,176,119	WWTP Costs
10 New WW Facilities	2.26%	43,047,400	971,135	
11 Total			39,317,667	Represents Unadjusted Annual Revenue Requirement Allocated to Customer

(a) Unit Costs are uniform for every customer

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2/13/12

FY 2012-13 George W Kuhn Drainage Dist Sewer Rate Calculation

Part 3 - Adjustments and Rate Calculation

<u>Line</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Rev Req't Allocation	39,317,667		From Part 2
2 Adjustment A	864,850	1978 RSA	Indirect Benefits - allocates rev req'ts from Detroit to Suburbs
3 Adjustment B4	0	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs to Macomb Co. only
4 Adjusted Rev Req't	40,182,517		Represents Annual Revenue Requirement from Customer

Part 4 - Rate Calculation

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fixed</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Existing Charge</u>	<u>Comment / Percent Change</u>
5 Direct	0	0			Direct allocations and adjustments
6 New WW Facilities	971,135	971,135			From Part 2
7 Wholesale Only Costs	1,151,271	1,151,271			
8 Other	38,060,111				
9 Allocated to Sanitary	24,309,845		24,309,845		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 8) * [(Part 1, Line 2)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
10 Allocated to Infiltration	2,839,708	2,839,708			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 8) * [(Part 1, Lns 3&4)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
11 Allocated to Inflow	10,910,558	10,910,558			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 8) * [(Part 1, Line 7)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
12 Total	40,182,517	15,872,672	24,309,845		Total Lines 10 thru 16
13 Units		12	2,800,000		Months / Mcf
14 Fixed Charge		\$1,322,723		\$1,187,514	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 21.4%
15 Commodity Charge			\$8.68	\$8.77	(Line 16)/(Line 17) -1.0%
16 "All Commodity" Unit Cost			\$14.35	\$13.86	Total (Line 16)/(Line 17) 3.5%

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2/13/12

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

FY 2011-12 S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation

Part 1- Units of Service

<u>Line</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Metered Flow	Mcf	3,000,000		
2 Sanitary	Mcf	2,012,360	(1)-(3)-(5)	Metered less Local Community Infiltration/Inflow (Lns 3&5)
3 Local Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	155,695	GDRSS Data	Local Community only
4 Common Sewers Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	57,283	GDRSS Data	Represents share of common sewers "downstream" of connection
5 Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	831,946	GDRSS Data	
6 Overflow Credit		15.0%		Universal for all customers
7 Net Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	707,154	(5) x [1- (6)]	
8 Total Allocation Volume	Mcf	2,932,491	(2)+(3)+(4)+(7)	
9 System Volume	Mcf	28,172,527		
10 S.E. Oakland County Share		10.41%	(8)/(9)	Represents Customer's share of "common" flow costs
11 BOD	lbs	26,629,842	146 mg/l	Based on 176 mg/l Sanitary, 79 mg/l DWII, and 79 mg/l wet weather
12 TSS	lbs	34,449,573	188 mg/l	Based on 228 mg/l Sanitary, 102 mg/l DWII, and 102 mg/l wet weather
13 PHOS	lbs	758,070	4.1 mg/l	Based on 5.0 mg/l Sanitary, 2.3 mg/l DWII, and 2.3 mg/l wet weather
14 FOG	lbs	4,371,608	23.9 mg/l	Based on 28.9 mg/l Sanitary, 13.0 mg/l DWII, and 13.0 mg/l wet weather
15 Wet Weather		2.26%	1999 RSA	Represents Customer's share of DWSP New CSO Facilities cost

Part 2 - Cost Allocation

<u>Line</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Unit Cost (a)</u>	<u>Allocated Rev Req't (1)*(2)</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 City Only	0	3.063	0	Collection System Costs
2 Wholesale Only	2,932,491	0.424	1,244,205	Collection System Costs
3 Oakland Only	0	0.964	0	Collection System Costs
4 Macomb Only	0	1.440	0	Collection System Costs
5 Common	2,932,491	5.027	14,741,831	Common Collection & WWTP Costs
6 BOD	26,629,842	0.269	7,151,224	WWTP Costs
7 TSS	34,449,573	0.337	11,624,879	WWTP Costs
8 PHOS	758,070	3.716	2,816,912	WWTP Costs
9 FOG	4,371,608	0.257	1,125,528	WWTP Costs
10 New WW Facilities	2.26%	43,309,045	977,038	
11 Total			39,681,617	Represents Unadjusted Annual Revenue Requirement Allocated to Customer

(a) Unit Costs are uniform for every customer

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1/21/2010

FY 2011-12 S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation

Part 3 - Adjustments and Rate Calculation

<u>Line</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Rev Req't Allocation	39,681,617		From Part 2
2 Adjustment A	871,843	1978 RSA	Indirect Benefits - allocates rev req'ts from Detroit to Suburbs
3 Adjustment B4	(12,423)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs to Macomb Co. only
4 Adjusted Rev Req't	40,541,038		Represents Annual Revenue Requirement from Customer

Part 4 - Rate Calculation

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fixed</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Existing Charge</u>	<u>Comment / Percent Change</u>
5 Direct	0	0			Direct allocations and adjustments
6 New WW Facilities	977,038	977,038			From Part 2
7 Wholesale Only Costs	1,244,205	1,244,205			
8 Other	38,319,795				
9 Allocated to Sanitary	26,296,147		26,296,147		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 2)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
10 Allocated to Infiltration	2,783,043	2,783,043			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Lns 3&4)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
11 Allocated to Inflow	9,240,605	9,240,605			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 7)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
12 Total	40,541,038	14,244,890	26,296,147		Total Lines 10 thru 16
13 Units		12	3,000,000		Months / Mcf
14 Fixed Charge		\$1,187,074		\$759,417	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 56.3%
15 Commodity Charge			\$8.77	\$8.98	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 2.3%
16 "All Commodity" Unit Cost			\$13.51	\$12.02	Total (Line 16)/(Line 17) 12.4%

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1/21/2010

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation FY 2010-11 Rate Year

Part 1- Units of Service

<u>Line</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Metered Flow	Mcf	3,025,000		
2 Sanitary	Mcf	1,993,218	(1)-(3)-(5)	Metered less Local Community Infiltration/Inflow (Lns 3&5)
3 Local Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	178,306	GDRSS Data	Local Community only
4 Common Sewers Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	54,909	GDRSS Data	Represents share of common sewers "downstream" of connection
5 Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	853,475	GDRSS Data	
6 Overflow Credit		30.8%		Universal for all customers
7 Net Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	590,605	(5) x [1- (6)]	
8 Total Allocation Volume	Mcf	2,817,039	(2)+(3)+(4)+(7)	
9 System Volume	Mcf	27,588,045		
10 S.E. Oakland County Share		10.21% (8)/(9)		Represents Customer's share of "common" flow costs
11 BOD	lbs	20,395,042	116 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
12 TSS	lbs	27,084,910	154 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
13 PHOS	lbs	589,303	3.4 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
14 FOG	lbs	3,373,601	19.2 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
15 Wet Weather		2.26% 1999 RSA		Represents Customer's share of DWSD New CSO Facilities cost

Part 2 - Cost Allocation

<u>Line</u>	<u>(1) Units</u>	<u>(2) Unit Cost (a)</u>	<u>(3) Allocated Rev Req't (1)*(2)</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 City Only	0	2.190	0	Collection System Costs
2 Wholesale Only	2,817,039	0.390	1,099,206	Collection System Costs
3 Oakland Only	0	1.021	0	Collection System Costs
4 Macomb Only	0	1.246	0	Collection System Costs
5 Common	2,817,039	4.955	13,959,186	Common Collection & WWTP Costs
6 BOD	20,395,042	0.302	6,158,281	WWTP Costs
7 TSS	27,084,910	0.378	10,241,038	WWTP Costs
8 PHOS	589,303	4.140	2,439,982	WWTP Costs
9 FOG	3,373,601	0.233	786,098	WWTP Costs
10 New WW Facilities	2.26%	35,641,176	804,053	
11 Total			35,487,845	Represents Unadjusted Annual Revenue Requirement Allocated to Customer

(a) Unit Costs are uniform for every customer

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1/21/2010

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation
FY 2010-11 Rate Year

Part 3 - Adjustments and Rate Calculation

<u>Line</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Rev Req't Allocation	35,487,845		From Part 2
2 Adjustment A	808,708	1978 RSA	Indirect Benefits - allocates rev req'ts from Detroit to Suburbs
3 Adjustment B4	(12,252)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs to Macomb Co. only
4 Wayne Co. Adj	7,670	1982 RSA	15 Mile & Corridor Collapse - reallocates costs from Wayne Co. to all others
5 Adjusted Rev Req't	36,291,971		Represents Annual Revenue Requirement from Customer

Part 4 - Rate Calculation

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fixed</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Existing Charge</u>	<u>Comment / Percent Change</u>
6 Direct	0	0			Direct allocations and adjustments
7 New WW Facilities	804,053	804,053			From Part 2
8 Wholesale Only Costs	1,099,206	1,099,206			
9 Other	34,388,712				
10 Allocated to Sanitary	24,332,007		24,332,007		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 2)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
11 Allocated to Infiltration	2,846,958		2,846,958		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Lns 3&4)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
12 Allocated to Inflow	7,209,747	7,209,747			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 7)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
13 Total	36,291,971	9,113,006	27,178,965		Total Lines 10 thru 16
14 Units		12	3,025,000		Months / Mcf
15 Fixed Charge		\$759,417		\$545,256	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 39.3%
16 Commodity Charge			\$8.98	\$8.85	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 1.5%
17 "All Commodity" Unit Charge			\$12.00	\$11.06	Total (Line 16)/(Line 17) 8.4%

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1/21/2010

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation
FY 2009-10 Rate YearPart 1- Units of Service

<u>Line</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 Metered Flow	Mcf	2,950,000		
2 Sanitary	Mcf	2,053,341	(1)-(3)-(5)	Metered less Local Community Infiltration/Inflow (Lns 3&5)
3 Local Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	175,373	GDRSS Data	Local Community only
4 Common Sewers Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	54,115	GDRSS Data	Represents share of common sewers "downstream" of connection
5 Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	721,286	GDRSS Data	
6 Overflow Credit		30.8%		Universal for all customers
7 Net Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	499,130	(5) x [1- (6)]	
8 Total Allocation Volume	Mcf	2,781,959	(2)+(3)+(4)+(7)	
9 System Volume	Mcf	27,576,403		
10 S.E. Oakland County Share		10.09%	(8)/(9)	Represents Customer's share of "common" flow costs
11 BOD	lbs	20,350,529	116 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
12 TSS	lbs	26,786,546	154 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
13 PHOS	lbs	584,441	3.4 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
14 FOG	lbs	3,377,689	19.2 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
15 Wet Weather		2.26%	1999 RSA	Represents Customer's share of DWSD New CSO Facilities cost

Part 2 - Cost Allocation

<u>Line</u>	<u>(1) Units</u>	<u>(2) Unit Cost (a)</u>	<u>(3) Allocated Rev Req't (1)*(2)</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1 City Only	0	2.390	0	Collection System Costs
2 Wholesale Only	2,781,959	0.492	1,369,049	Collection System Costs
3 Oakland Only	0	0.512	0	Collection System Costs
4 Macomb Only	0	1.153	0	Collection System Costs
5 Common X C/O Mac	2,781,959	0.036	100,478	Collection System Costs
6 Common X Mac	2,781,959	0.238	662,936	Collection System Costs
7 Common	2,781,959	4.274	11,890,768	Common Collection & WWTP Costs
8 BOD	20,350,529	0.285	5,809,445	WWTP Costs
9 TSS	26,786,546	0.341	9,127,408	WWTP Costs
10 PHOS	584,441	3.862	2,256,976	WWTP Costs
11 FOG	3,377,689	0.255	860,159	WWTP Costs
12 New WW Facilities	2.26%	37,124,703	837,521	
13 Total			32,914,741	Represents Unadjusted Annual Revenue Requirement Allocated to Customer

(a) Unit Costs are uniform for every customer

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1/24/09

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation
FY 2009-10 Rate Year

Part 3 - Adjustments and Rate Calculation

Line	Amount	Reference	Comment
1 Rev Req't Allocation	32,914,741		From Part 2
2 Adjustment A	773,041	1978 RSA	Indirect Benefits - allocates rev req'ts from Detroit to Suburbs
3 Adjustment B1	7,033	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs away from all customers
4 Adjustment B2	(108,932)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs to Macomb Co. only
5 Adjustment B4	(957,820)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes/Garfield Interceptor- reallocates common costs to Macomb Co.
6 Wayne Co. Adj	9,975	1982 RSA	15 Mile & Corridor Collapse - reallocates costs from Wayne Co. to all others
7 Adjustment D	0	1999 RSA	Allocates revenue req'ts from Suburbs to Detroit (reverses prior implementation adj)
8 Adjusted Rev Req't	32,638,038		Represents Annual Revenue Requirement from Customer

Part 4 - Rate Calculation

	Total	Fixed	Commodity	Existing Charge	Comment / Percent Change
9 Direct	0	0			Direct allocations and adjustments
10 New WW Facilities	837,521	837,521			From Part 2
11 Other	31,800,517				
12 Allocated to Sanitary	23,471,698		23,471,698		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * ((Part 1, Line 2)/(Part 1, Line 8))
13 Allocated to Infiltration	2,623,273		2,623,273		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * ((Part 1, Line 3&4)/(Part 1, Line 8))
14 Allocated to Inflow	5,705,547	5,705,547			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * ((Part 1, Line 7)/(Part 1, Line 8))
15 Total	32,638,038	6,543,067	26,094,971		Total Lines 10 thru 16
16 Units		12	2,950,000		Months / Mcf
17 Fixed Charge		\$545,256		\$530,572	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 2.77%
18 Commodity Charge			\$8.85	\$8.75	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 1.14%
19 "All Commodity" Unit Charge			\$11.06	\$10.88	Total (Line 16)/(Line 17) 1.73%

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1/24/09

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Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation FY 2008-09 Rate Year

Part 1- Units of Service

Line	Unit	Amount	Reference	Comment
1 Metered Flow	Mcf	3,000,000		
2 Sanitary	Mcf	2,052,561	(1)-(3)-(5)	Metered less Local Community Infiltration/Inflow (Lns 3&5)
3 Local Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	226,153	GDRSS Data	Local Community only
4 Common Sewers Dry Weather Infiltration	Mcf	49,518	GDRSS Data	Represents share of common sewers "downstream" of connection
5 Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	721,286	GDRSS Data	
6 Overflow Credit		30.8%		Universal for all customers
7 Net Wet Weather Inflow	Mcf	499,130	(5) x [1- (6)]	
8 Total Allocation Volume	Mcf	2,827,362	(2)+(3)+(4)+(7)	
9 System Volume	Mcf	28,949,283		
10 S.E. Oakland County Share		10.09% (8)/(9)		Represents Customer's share of "common" flow cost
11 BOD	lbs	20,682,655	118 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
12 TSS	lbs	27,223,722	154 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
13 PHOS	lbs	593,983	3.4 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
14 FOG	lbs	3,432,811	19.2 mg/l	Lower than volume share due to higher strengths of monitored industries
15 Wet Weather		2.26% 1999 RSR		Represents Customer's share of DWSD New CSO Facilities cost

Part 2 - Cost Allocation

Line	(1) Units	(2) Unit Cost (a)	(3) Allocated Rev Req't (1)*(2)	Comment
1 City Only	0	2.084	0	Collection System Costs
2 Wholesale Only	2,827,362	0.298	843,904	Collection System Costs
3 Oakland Only	0	0.408	0	Collection System Costs
4 Macomb Only	0	0.919	0	Collection System Costs
5 Common X C/O Mac	2,827,362	0.031	86,746	Collection System Costs
6 Common X Mac	2,827,362	0.203	573,186	Collection System Costs
7 Common	2,827,362	5.018	14,188,042	Common Collection & WWTP Costs
8 BOD	20,682,655	0.254	5,249,913	WWTP Costs
9 TSS	27,223,722	0.324	8,833,791	WWTP Costs
10 PHOS	593,983	3.729	2,215,098	WWTP Costs
11 FOG	3,432,811	0.221	757,243	WWTP Costs
12 New WW Facilities	2.26%	32,692,037	737,521	
13 Total			33,485,446	Represents Unadjusted Annual Revenue Requirement Allocated to Customer

(a) Unit Costs are uniform for every customer

PRELIMINARY PROPOSED

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12/7/2007

Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

S.E. Oakland County Sewer Rate Calculation
FY 2008-09 Rate YearPart 3 - Adjustments and Rate Calculation

Line	Amount	Reference	Comment
1 Rev Req't Allocation	33,485,446		From Part 2
2 Adjustment A	755,940	1978 RSA	Indirect Benefits - allocates rev req'ts from Detroit to Suburbs
3 Adjustment B1	6,556	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs away from all customers
4 Adjustment B2	(108,453)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes Repairs - reallocates common costs to Macomb Co. only
5 Adjustment B4	(953,609)	1980 RSA	15 Mile & Hayes/Garfield Interceptor- reallocates common costs to Macomb Co.
6 Wayne Co. Adj	9,663	1982 RSA	15 Mile & Corridor Collapse - reallocates costs from Wayne Co. to all others
7 Adjustment D	(570,181)	1999 RSA	Allocates revenue req'ts from Suburbs to Detroit (reverses prior implementation adj)
8 Adjusted Rev Req't	31,625,363		Represents Annual Revenue Requirement from Customers

Part 4 - Rate Calculation

	Total	Fixed	Commodity	Existing Charge	Comment / Percent Change
9 Direct	0	0			Direct allocations and adjustments
10 New WW Facilities	737,521	737,521			From Part 2
11 Other	31,887,841				
12 Allocated to Sanitary	23,149,400		23,149,400		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 2)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
13 Allocated to Infiltration	3,109,101		3,109,101		Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Lns 3&4)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
14 Allocated to Inflow	5,629,340	5,629,340			Other allocated based on Part 1: (Line 12) * [(Part 1, Line 7)/(Part 1, Line 8)]
15 Total	32,625,363	6,366,862	26,258,501		Total Line 10 thru 16
16 Units		12	3,000,000		Months/Mcf
17 Fixed Charge		\$530,572		\$496,361	(Line 15)/(Line 16) 6.89%
18 Commodity Charge			\$8.75	\$8.31	(Line 16)/(Line 17) 5.29%
19 "All Commodity" Unit Charge			\$10.88	\$10.28	Total (Line 16)/(Line 17) 5.84%

PRELIMINARY PROPOSED

TFG
THE FOSTER GROUP

12/7/2007

EXHIBIT F

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Oakland County Water Resource's Commissioner's Office

Fixed Charge - Three Year Rolling Average

March 20, 2014

Flat Rate Sewage Charge (Budget)


	2013	2014	2015
DWSD Purchased Expense	\$ 19,544,502	\$ 20,926,794	\$ 21,378,450
OCWRC Operating Expense	1,653,169	1,616,614	1,670,306
Less: Interest Income	(298,820)	(280,163)	(253,357)
Total	\$ 20,898,851	\$ 22,263,245	\$ 22,795,399

Municipality	Three Year Rolling Average			2013	2014	2015
	08/09-10/11	09/10-11/12	10/11-12/13	Annual Charge	Annual Charge	Annual Charge
City of Berkley	4.0526%	4.0636%	3.9186%	\$ 846,951	\$ 904,681	\$ 893,253
Village of Beverly Hills	0.2937%	0.2850%	0.2983%	61,381	65,667	68,002
City of Birmingham	2.8833%	2.9525%	3.0061%	602,574	657,314	665,250
City of Clawson	2.9303%	2.9142%	2.8646%	612,390	648,806	657,557
City of Ferndale	5.3108%	5.3948%	5.1630%	1,109,905	1,201,085	1,176,929
City of Hazel Park	4.0285%	3.7899%	3.5346%	841,483	843,759	805,735
City of Huntington Woods	1.8983%	1.9039%	1.8998%	398,731	423,874	433,033
City of Pleasant Ridge	0.8759%	0.8751%	0.8827%	183,059	184,834	201,215
City of Madison Heights	11.6310%	11.2628%	11.2842%	2,430,755	2,511,921	2,572,275
City of Oak Park	8.4081%	8.2825%	8.2634%	1,757,187	1,843,950	1,883,679
City of Royal Oak	19.3610%	19.2214%	19.0980%	4,048,230	4,279,308	4,353,457
Royal Oak Twp	0.9601%	0.9098%	0.9087%	200,641	202,561	207,149
City of Southfield	6.9958%	6.9636%	6.8818%	1,462,034	1,550,331	1,568,728
City of Troy	28.7953%	29.6232%	30.5265%	6,017,882	6,595,094	6,958,637
Detroit Zoological Park	1.3441%	1.2961%	1.1888%	280,907	288,584	270,957
OC Evergreen-Farmington	0.1231%	0.1226%	0.1211%	25,730	27,284	27,607
Rackham Golf Course	0.1101%	0.1083%	0.1395%	23,010	24,115	31,818
Red Run Golf Course	0.0000%	0.0005%	0.0005%	-	117	119
State Of Michigan	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	-	-	-
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	\$ 20,898,851	\$ 22,263,245	\$ 22,795,399

Flat Rate Storm Charge (Budget)

	2013	2014	2015
DWSD Purchased Expense	\$ 21,847,374	\$ 20,911,801	\$ 21,378,450
OCWRC Operating Expense	3,317,617	3,635,673	3,705,465
Less: Interest Income	(203,450)	(254,200)	(63,772)
Total	24,961,541	24,293,274	25,020,144

Municipality	Allocation Percent	Same	Same	2013	2014	2015
				Annual Charge	Annual Charge	Annual Charge
City of Berkley	6.4895%	6.4895%	6.4895%	\$ 1,619,879	\$ 1,576,512	\$ 1,623,682
Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%	0.8369%	0.8369%	208,903	203,310	209,394
City of Birmingham	4.8837%	4.8837%	4.8837%	1,219,047	1,186,411	1,221,909
City of Clawson	5.9262%	5.9262%	5.9262%	1,479,271	1,439,668	1,482,744
City of Ferndale	10.2885%	10.2885%	10.2885%	2,588,168	2,499,413	2,574,197
City of Hazel Park	2.2554%	2.2554%	2.2554%	562,983	547,910	564,304
City of Huntington Woods	2.4671%	2.4671%	2.4671%	615,828	599,339	617,272
City of Pleasant Ridge	1.3390%	1.3390%	1.3390%	334,235	325,287	335,020
City of Madison Heights	6.5410%	6.5410%	6.5410%	1,632,734	1,589,023	1,636,568
City of Oak Park	13.6383%	13.6383%	13.6383%	3,404,330	3,313,180	3,412,322
City of Royal Oak	29.7028%	29.7028%	29.7028%	7,414,277	7,215,783	7,431,683
Royal Oak Twp	1.2775%	1.2775%	1.2775%	318,884	310,347	319,632
City of Southfield	7.7156%	7.7156%	7.7156%	1,925,933	1,874,372	1,930,454
City of Troy	2.4799%	2.4799%	2.4799%	619,021	602,449	620,475
Detroit Zoo	0.3364%	0.3364%	0.3364%	83,971	81,723	84,168
OC Evergreen-Farmington	1.5274%	1.5274%	1.5274%	381,263	371,055	382,158
Rackham Golf Course	0.1913%	0.1913%	0.1913%	47,751	46,473	47,864
Red Run Golf Course	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	-	-	-
State of Michigan	2.1035%	2.1035%	2.1035%	525,066	511,009	526,299
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	\$ 24,961,541	\$ 24,293,274	\$ 25,020,144



Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Combined Storm and Sewer Charge (Budget)

	2013	2014	2015
DWSD Purchased Expense	\$ 41,391,876	\$ 41,838,595	\$ 42,756,900
OCWRC Operating Expense	4,970,786	5,252,287	5,375,771
Less: Interest Income	<u>(502,270)</u>	<u>(534,363)</u>	<u>(317,128)</u>
Total	45,860,392	46,556,519	47,815,543

<u>Municipality</u>	2013	2014	2015	2013	2014	2015
	<u>Monthly Charge</u>	<u>Monthly Charge</u>	<u>Monthly Charge</u>	<u>Annual Charge</u>	<u>Annual Charge</u>	<u>Annual Charge</u>
City of Berkley	\$ 205,569	\$ 206,766	\$ 209,745	\$ 2,466,830	\$ 2,481,193	\$ 2,518,935
Village of Beverly Hills	22,524	22,415	23,116	270,285	268,978	277,398
City of Birmingham	151,802	153,844	158,930	1,821,621	1,843,725	1,907,159
City of Clawson	174,305	174,039	178,358	2,091,661	2,088,474	2,140,301
City of Ferndale	308,508	308,373	312,594	3,678,073	3,700,479	3,751,126
City of Hazel Park	117,039	115,972	114,170	1,404,468	1,391,670	1,370,039
City of Huntington Woods	84,380	85,268	87,525	1,012,557	1,023,214	1,050,305
City of Pleasant Ridge	151,316	148,855	153,149	1,815,793	1,783,857	1,837,782
City of Madison Heights	486,257	485,426	498,718	5,835,085	5,825,111	5,984,597
City of Oak Park	174,265	180,770	184,892	2,091,422	2,169,237	2,218,699
City of Royal Oak	955,042	957,924	982,095	11,460,506	11,495,091	11,785,140
Royal Oak Twp	43,284	42,742	43,898	519,525	512,907	526,781
City of Southfield	282,331	285,392	291,598	3,387,967	3,424,703	3,499,182
City of Troy	553,075	599,795	631,593	6,636,904	7,197,543	7,579,112
Detroit Zoo	30,408	30,857	29,594	364,877	370,287	355,125
OC Evergreen-Farmington	6,123	6,146	6,289	73,481	73,757	75,471
Rackham Golf Course	1,918	2,010	2,651	23,010	24,115	31,818
Red Run Golf Course	31,772	30,931	31,856	381,263	371,172	382,277
State of Michigan	43,756	42,584	43,858	525,066	511,009	526,299
Total	\$ 3,821,699	\$ 3,879,710	\$ 3,984,629	\$ 45,860,392	\$ 46,556,519	\$ 47,815,543

Exhibit 10

STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

KICKHAM HANLEY, PLLC,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2017-159351-CZ

vs

OAKLAND COUNTY MICHIGAN and
GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,

Defendants.

MOTION

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DANIEL PATRICK O'BRIEN

Pontiac, Michigan - Wednesday, October 25, 2017

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: EDWARD F. KICKHAM, III (P70332)
Kickham Hanley, PLLC
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Royal Oak, Michigan 48073
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For the Defendants: PETER H. WEBSTER (P48783)
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Videotape Transcription Provided By:
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Pontiac, Michigan

Wednesday, October 25, 2017

- - -

(At 8:48 a.m., proceedings begin)

THE CLERK: The Court calls Kickham versus
Oakland County, case number 2017-159351-CZ.

MR. KICKHAM: Edward Kickham for the Plaintiff.

MR. WEBSTER: May it please the Court, Peter
Webster on behalf of the Defendants.

THE CLERK: All rise. Circuit Court for Oakland
County is now in session; the Honorable Daniel Patrick
O'Brien presiding.

THE COURT: Good morning everyone. Be seated,
please.

THE CLERK: We called docket number 24, and the
attorneys' appearances are already on the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Gentlemen, is that you guys;
Kickham?

MR. KICKHAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Hi.

MR. WEBSTER: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, go ahead.

MR. WEBSTER: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
There are actually -- I think we have three

1 matters up before the Court this morning; that is the
2 Defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to
3 (C) (8), there is a motion to amend to allow first amended
4 complaint, and then there is a carryover per the Court's
5 direction --

6 THE COURT: Yeah.

7 MR. WEBSTER: -- motion to enlarge time --

8 THE COURT: The motion to amend is to add unjust
9 enrichment, correct?

10 MR. WEBSTER: Correct. There are actually
11 technically two counts --

12 THE COURT: Is there two?

13 MR. WEBSTER: -- but unjust enrichment is
14 probably perhaps the one large aspect of that.

15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead.

16 MR. WEBSTER: And so with respect to the (C) (8)
17 motion that we have filed in this case, the -- the Court
18 is aware that this complaint is brought by the Plaintiff
19 standing in the shoes of the City of Royal Oak. That
20 arises out of this 2014 class action in which the
21 Plaintiffs in this case were Plaintiff's counsel in the
22 prior action representing a class suing the City of Royal
23 Oak over two aspects. One is the retention facility
24 charge charged by the City of Royal Oak as to its users,
25 and the other is storm water charge charged by the City of

1 Royal Oak as to its users.

2 In that case, after motion for summary
3 disposition was granted in favor of Royal Oak against the
4 class, then there was a settlement, and the settlement
5 provided for payment by Royal Oak as to the facility debt
6 charge, but there was no payment by Royal Oak for the
7 storm water charge, and indeed the City of Royal Oak then
8 assigned any claims that it may or may not have against my
9 clients, George W. Kuhn Drainage District, the water
10 resource commissioner, and also obtained a release from
11 the class forever of any claim for any damages arising out
12 of that class. And so that Royal Oak then after the
13 assignment is here before the Court in the form of the
14 Kickham Hanley firm pursuant to that settlement agreement.

15 The complaint states two counts, breach of
16 contract, and a count for assumpsit/money add money
17 received, that with respect to the breach of contract
18 claim we state in our motion for summary disposition that
19 there is no contract here, and as a matter of law there
20 can't be a contract. There is no -- obviously, there is
21 no contract as one would normally envision it, it wasn't
22 attached to the complaint, there was no contractual
23 document signed by the George W. Kuhn Drainage District
24 and the City of Royal Oak. As happens oftentimes with
25 drainage districts, they actually enter into service

1 contracts with various communities. That was never done
2 here.

3 What was done is that the George W. Kuhn was
4 formed as a Chapter 20 drainage district under the Drain
5 Code, and that Royal Oak is part of the apportioned
6 communities pursuant to state law and to the formation of
7 the GWK under Chapter 20. That was done by virtue of a
8 resolution approving final apportionment, and that the --
9 the GWK was established as a separate legal entity.

10 Recognizing that there's not a contract between
11 the George W. Kuhn and City of Royal Oak, the theory here
12 is that somehow the resolution adopting the existence of
13 the GWK and the final order of apportionment acts as the
14 contract.

15 We provide the Court in our briefing significant
16 authority that says such a resolution is not a contract,
17 that it doesn't contain any indicia of any contract,
18 there's no offer made by the George W. Kuhn, there's no
19 acceptance by the City of Royal Oak, there's no separate
20 contract document, and indeed there's no consideration or
21 promises made. So where there is no contract, there can
22 be no breach of contract.

23 And in addition to a cause of action for a
24 breach of contract, I'm going to point out here, as I'll
25 discuss again, even if there were a breach of contract,

1 there is no damage here.

2 Recognizing that there's no breach of contract,
3 and pleading in the alternative, which is implicit
4 recognition that there is no contract to be breached,
5 there is this claim for assumpsit. Here with respect to
6 assumpsit, we identify to the Court that there is no
7 damage.

8 Recall that they're standing in the shoes now --
9 we now know they're standing directly and squarely -- they
10 admit that -- in the shoes of City of Royal Oak, and in
11 the response, they admit that there's no damage to the
12 City of Royal Oak, right? So where there's no damage,
13 then they don't have standing and there's no claim to be
14 made for assumpsit.

15 In addition, to the extent that they're arguing
16 that this claimed overcharge was the result of some
17 negligence or error, whether through calculation or
18 otherwise, by the operation of the GWK in improperly
19 charging a fee, that that negligence claim is barred by
20 governmental immunity as a matter of law.

21 As we know Royal Oak passed through all the
22 charges from the George W. Kuhn to its -- to the
23 constituents of the folks that utilize those services.
24 Royal Oak paid nothing to settle the class. Royal Oak is
25 now released and forever of any damages arising out of

1 that. Royal Oak has not been damaged and can never be
2 with respect to the storm water charge. And
3 interestingly, the settlement also allows Royal Oak to
4 continue charging that charge.

5 I wanted to identify that also with respect to
6 no damage, in response the Plaintiffs here assert the
7 legal theory -- and we identify this in our reply -- this
8 legal theory from antitrust law of Hanover and Illinois
9 Brick, right, and so on the outset, the whole concept of
10 applying antitrust law to this situation, there's no
11 authority for that. That, is the case law developed under
12 antitrust, in which Hanover is actually a horizontal
13 conspiracy, a price fixing, is not -- inapplicable here.
14 But even if the Court were to actually look at this, the
15 State of Michigan passed 30 years ago a repealer law
16 judicially overruling Hanover and its companion case
17 Illinois Brick, and so it's oftentimes called an Illinois
18 Brick repealer statute, not only in Michigan but
19 throughout the country, which legislatively undermined
20 this -- this defense, if you will, or allowance of a claim
21 that's being brought here.

22 Let me just explain. Hanover was brought forth
23 and it said -- and it said that our defense here in this
24 case, which is they don't have any damages because they
25 passed it through, Hanover says you can't do that because

1 under antitrust law we want is under -- for a number of
2 reasons, mostly judicial efficiency and evidentiary
3 issues, we want to consolidate all the damages into a
4 person or entity that's akin to the City of Royal Oak in
5 this case, right; instead of having all of the class
6 members make these claims, we just want it in an antitrust
7 context to be only Royal Oak. The State of Michigan said
8 no, and specifically allowed the -- the class members by
9 analogy to make the claim, and specifically said that the
10 defense to the claim, exactly what's being made here by
11 Royal Oak, can be made where Royal Oak didn't suffer any
12 damages because they passed it on. That's the law in the
13 state of Michigan, and that's -- you know, was not even
14 mentioned in the response here as part of the discussion,
15 and so we called that out as part of our reply.

16 And indeed we cite to the Zimmerman case that
17 says with respect to this claim that they can make this
18 allegation of damages, not because they suffered any
19 damages, but because someone else has, the Zimmerman case
20 that we cite to out of the First Circuit says that
21 argument is unpersuasive, and this is the antitrust
22 context; that it's unprecedented and rather a startling
23 premise, and that to institute an independent lawsuit
24 against different parties and never provide those parties
25 with an opportunity to challenge the propriety of the

1 class action mechanism, and to expose these new defendants
2 to a risk of a massive class action based damage award is
3 impermissible. The potential of use of the class action
4 tool of Plaintiff's theory, were it to be approved, is
5 prodigious. This simply cannot be permitted. That's the
6 thinking of the First Circuit. And also that's the policy
7 thinking behind the Michigan legislature when they adopted
8 the repealer statutes.

9 So as a consequence, the key element of the
10 assumpsit claim is that somehow they've been damaged. The
11 City of Royal Oak has not been damaged, nor can it be
12 relative to this case. Consequently, they failed to state
13 a claim.

14 That's the overview and the upshot. I'm happy
15 to answer any questions that the Court has.

16 THE COURT: Not right now. And let me invite
17 you to have a seat for a moment. I'll hear your response
18 and your -- your motion for leave to amend, recognizing
19 you still have the discovery motion. If the Court makes a
20 ruling, which -- which it expects it will, it might invite
21 you both to go get a cup of coffee and come on back in an
22 hour or something like that. But let me take them in that
23 -- in that particular sequence, okay?

24 MR. WEBSTER: Okay. It -- and if I may, if the
25 Court --

1 THE COURT: Yes.

2 MR. WEBSTER: I apologize. There was an element
3 as part of our briefing, and that relates to the Drain
4 Code here. We do brief that under Chapter 20, the
5 procedure for asserting that there's something illegal
6 going on here with respect to the order of apportionment,
7 is that the complaining entity, who was part of the
8 apportionment -- has to appeal that within 20 days --

9 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

10 MR. WEBSTER: -- right? Of course that was not
11 done, and it's not -- it's not pled --

12 THE COURT: You've -- you've read his response
13 that they're not complaining, in fact, they -- you read
14 his response?

15 MR. WEBSTER: Certainly. Right. And so --

16 THE COURT: He's taking no issue with the
17 concept of the method, but just that it's -- that's --

18 MR. WEBSTER: Yeah, and --

19 THE COURT: Go -- go ahead and speak to it, if
20 you want --

21 MR. WEBSTER: And so I was only going to say --
22 so -- so one, complaining about that is, you know, one, is
23 time barred. And then the assertion is somehow oh well,
24 we're not complaining about it, we're -- we're somehow
25 seeking to enforce it --

1 THE COURT: You called it semantics, I know --

2 MR. WEBSTER: It -- and it is semantics, and
3 indeed, they allege in the complaint a -- somehow a breach
4 of the resolution. But they say words that aren't in the
5 resolution. They just make them up with respect to it --

6 THE COURT: Sure.

7 MR. WEBSTER: -- and so it is indeed a -- you
8 know, a challenge to what that resolution is.

9 THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you.

10 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Counsel.

12 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor, we've got a -- there
13 are a lot moving parts on this hearing, and I'm not really
14 sure where to begin. I think our --

15 THE COURT: Start with your -- anything you have
16 to say in response to their reply about MCL 445, whatever
17 it is.

18 MR. KICKHAM: Right. Well, that's -- that
19 Illinois Brick repealer statute actually broadens the
20 conditions under which -- or it -- it broadens the parties
21 who can bring a claim. I mean, first of all, it is an
22 antitrust statute, and under -- un -- unlike the cases
23 we've cited which, were decided in the antitrust context
24 --

25 THE COURT: Give -- I'm sorry; make it simple

1 for me.

2 MR. KICKHAM: Well --

3 THE COURT: If -- no, here, put it this way. If
4 I was to look up on Shepard's, Hanover, would I see a stop
5 sign that says MCL 445?

6 MR. KICKHAM: I don't think so.

7 THE COURT: Okay. And would you say that I
8 would, Mr. Webster? Is it that stark? Because
9 admittedly, I didn't break any books open and look at it;
10 I just read your response that would cause me to think
11 that Shepard's would should Hanover has been overruled, if
12 you will, by MCL 445.

13 MR. WEBSTER: I don't -- I don't know about
14 Shepard's, but we provided you the case that -- that's
15 says that --

16 THE COURT: And -- and that -- that is -- you're
17 not -- you're not diluting your argument. You're saying
18 pointblank that's effectively what --

19 MR. WEBSTER: Yeah.

20 THE COURT: -- Hanover --

21 MR. WEBSTER: Yeah.

22 THE COURT: -- is reversed?

23 MR. WEBSTER: And the case that says that says
24 that if you're making a claim -- the statute specifically
25 says if you're making a claim, you are entitled to actual

1 damages, and the case law says the statute brings back to
2 life the common law rule that you have to prove actual
3 damages to state your claim.

4 THE COURT: Well, in the pre -- in the preamble
5 to 445 would it say this is an act to set aside the
6 holding in Hanover or something like that --

7 MR. WEBSTER: I -- I don't think so, but it is
8 -- it is -- and we presented to the Court significant
9 authority that says the -- the repealer of Illinois Brick
10 Hanover by the State of Michigan is also -- was part of a
11 national --

12 THE COURT: I -- I gotcha.

13 MR. WEBSTER: -- and so there is no doubt that
14 --

15 THE COURT: I've -- I've never heard the word --
16 I don't remember hearing the word repealer, so it's --
17 it's identified as a repealer act or -- or in some case,
18 it calls it a repealer act?

19 MR. WEBSTER: In -- not only in -- in a case,
20 but it in literature discussing the concept --

21 THE COURT: Okay.

22 MR. WEBSTER: -- that is exactly how it is
23 characterized.

24 THE COURT: Okay.

25 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor, here's what the

1 statute actually says. It says any other person injured
2 directly or indirectly. So what it does is in -- in the
3 antitrust context, it allows the people to whom the charge
4 has been passed on to bring a case or a class action, but
5 it does not foreclose the right of the person who
6 initially paid the charge. In -- in our case, Royal Oak
7 would be the analogy. It's -- it specifically says the
8 person injured directly may bring an action for actual
9 damages sustained. And --

10 THE COURT: What damages? Because you're -- the
11 premise of your theory is that there were no damages; that
12 they were just passed right through, right?

13 MR. KICKHAM: Right. But not passed through,
14 but that we -- that Royal Oak charged --

15 THE COURT: If they weren't -- okay, so -- all
16 right, all right. So your theory is that -- and -- and
17 we're going to get into this shortly, but -- but your
18 theory is that Kuhn gouged Royal Oak and Royal Oak ate it
19 and didn't in turn gouge your client, and -- and if of
20 course you maintain that, then there was no cause of
21 action -- there was no viable cause of action that you had
22 against Royal Oak?

23 MR. KICKHAM: No. We -- our position is Royal
24 Oak passed it on it the class members.

25 THE COURT: Okay. We're -- we're going to get

1 into bean counting in -- in a little bit, but --

2 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

3 THE COURT: -- go ahead with your -- go ahead
4 with your argument.

5 MR. KICKHAM: The -- this statute the Defendant
6 cites was enacted in 1984. The case I cite, the County of
7 Oakland versus Detroit, and this is a Sixth Circuit case
8 cited in 1989, held that where the municipalities who were
9 overcharged passed that overcharge on to the ultimate
10 consumers, the counties are indeed the proper parties to
11 bring suit in light of Hanover Shoe and the subsequent
12 case of Illinois Brick. So obviously, the Sixth Circuit
13 as of 1989 didn't believe that this statute that Mr.
14 Webster cites abrogated Hanover Brick and Illinois Shoe --
15 or Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick --

16 THE COURT: Sure. Okay.

17 MR. KICKHAM: And, you know, we think that case
18 is the most relevant law here; that -- and it -- and it
19 held that the counties, in our view, must be treated as
20 direct purchasers in their own right. And so Royal Oak,
21 analogous to the counties in the County of Oakland, was
22 the direct purchaser. And it -- it -- my analogy on the
23 last page of my brief about the widgets --

24 THE COURT: I -- I read that. I --

25 MR. KICKHAM: -- this explains our position

1 about why we can still sue. Even if some of that cost or
2 maybe all of the cost got baked into the cost of the
3 ultimate product --

4 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- the purchaser who has been
6 overcharged can still sue.

7 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

8 MR. KICKHAM: And I guess to try to address some
9 of the points Mr. Webster has raised, the cases we've
10 cited in our brief show that -- well, they -- they hold
11 that resolutions of a municipality or of a governmental
12 body should be construed like statutes. And the remedy
13 there seems to be the same remedy as for a breach of
14 contract; that they are enforceable by the parties who are
15 beneficiaries to the resolutions. That these cases say
16 over and over again that the beneficiaries can enforce the
17 resolution.

18 Resolution is not just an empty promise and it
19 -- that is performable at the whim of the governmental
20 body. The beneficiaries have a right to enforce it. And
21 even if that right -- you know, and we don't -- we're not
22 abandoning our breach of contract claim --

23 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

24 MR. KICKHAM: -- but let's say even if that
25 right doesn't sound in contract, it does sound in

1 assumpsit, and they've admitted as much in their reply
2 brief. They say the assumpsit claims are not barred by
3 governmental immunity, and nowhere have we said that we're
4 planning on having a negligence claim. This is a total
5 non sequitur and diversion from what we're trying to talk
6 about. If we don't have a breach of contract claim or
7 even if we do have a breach of contract claim, we also
8 have a claim in assumpsit, and under our amended
9 complaint, we'd also like to have a claim of unjust
10 enrichment.

11 As far as the -- the class action aspect of
12 this, and it -- it all kind of ties in together. This is
13 not an unfair back door class action, because when the
14 Kuhn Drainage District levied its charge, it didn't levy
15 it on a class of 10,000; it levied it one entity, Royal
16 Oak. Royal Oak then assigned that claim to a class of
17 people, but that's totally irrelevant as for -- to whether
18 that claim exists. I'm standing in the shoes of Royal
19 Oak. We -- we admit that. Mr. Webster seems to think
20 it's a damaging admission, but that's our posture in this
21 case.

22 As far as the Drain Code, I think Your Honor has
23 hit on the really relevant aspect of that, which is we're
24 not challenging how this resolution was enacted, we're
25 just trying to say do what you promised to do. And in my

1 brief, I show just based on one year how much they're
2 overcharging -- how much they're supposed to be charging
3 and how much they're actually charging, and it's not in
4 conformance with the resolution. There -- there's at a
5 minimum a question of fact regarding whether they've
6 overcharged beyond what they're allowed to charge under
7 the resolution.

8 THE COURT: As opposed to a question of law? If
9 it's just a mathematical equation, if it is simply that --
10 I -- I didn't look at the resolution and I didn't try to
11 mathematically formulate it, but I suppose it's just a --
12 it's a formula error that you're saying, or a formula
13 overlooking that you're alleging.

14 MR. KICKHAM: Right. We think it is --

15 THE COURT: And that sounds like the law. It
16 doesn't sound like fact. I don't know what facts would be
17 in dispute.

18 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I don't know either. And we
19 probably at some point will bring a motion for summary
20 saying this is what you were allowed to charge, this is
21 what you actually charged.

22 THE COURT: Sure.

23 MR. KICKHAM: What I'm saying is there's -- for
24 the purpose of this motion --

25 THE COURT: I gotcha.

1 MR. KICKHAM: -- we have stated a claim and
2 we've explained why the overcharge is an overcharge.

3 THE COURT: Sure. Okay.

4 MR. KICKHAM: As far as the motion to amend the
5 complaint, we're not entirely moving to amend a complaint
6 to try to cure defects in this motion. We are -- we've
7 identified some things that, you know, we're trying to
8 stay one step ahead of --

9 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

10 MR. KICKHAM: -- where we can say okay, well the
11 Court found that our claims failed because we did not
12 plead this allegation --

13 THE COURT: You need not worry about perceptions
14 the Court has by virtue of this motion that exists at the
15 same time of their (C)(8). Don't worry about that. I --
16 let me just talk barebones. You're seeking to add one
17 count, and that's unjust enrichment --

18 MR. KICKHAM: We're seeking --

19 THE COURT: -- or is there two?

20 MR. KICKHAM: We're adding two counts.

21 THE COURT: Okay. And what's the other one?

22 MR. KICKHAM: The other count is assumpsit for
23 -- well, really we're bifurcating our assumpsit claim.
24 What we have right now is just one assumpsit claim, and it
25 applies to both rate overcharges and an unlawful exaction

1 -- or really -- un -- un -- unreasonable rates and an
2 unlawful exaction. What we're trying to do is split that
3 assumpsit claim into two --

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- so that we have one focused on
6 unreasonable fees, one focused on unlawful exaction under
7 --

8 THE COURT: What is -- they're both unlawful,
9 aren't they?

10 MR. KICKHAM: They are.

11 THE COURT: So one's unlawful and unreasonable
12 and the other one's unlawful but it is reasonable?

13 MR. KICKHAM: Well, the other --

14 THE COURT: I -- I -- I'm not following.

15 MR. KICKHAM: Let me -- let me pull out our
16 amended complaint and see if I can clarify this.

17 Well, the one -- our -- our unlawful exactions
18 claim -- the proposed unlawful exaction claim arises from
19 the Kuhn District violation of the resolution and order of
20 apportionment. The unreasonable water and sewer rates
21 claim arises from the fact that the charges are arbitrary,
22 capricious, and reasonable. And we -- it's possible that
23 these could be combined in one claim. Our position
24 frankly is they were already both combined in our existing
25 assumpsit claim --

1 THE COURT: Got it. Okay.

2 MR. KICKHAM: -- but for the purpose of our
3 proposed amended complaint, we break them down.

4 THE COURT: Okay. I got it.

5 MR. KICKHAM: The other thing we seek to add in
6 the amended complaint is a claim for unjust enrichment
7 based on this new case that we discussed --

8 THE COURT: Sure.

9 MR. KICKHAM: -- last time we were here.

10 THE COURT: Right. Okay, thank you.

11 He says that there's a 1989 case that seems to
12 acknowledge the viability of Hanover Shoe.

13 MR. WEBSTER: Sure.

14 THE COURT: Is that something that you could --
15 some simple thing you could point to?

16 MR. WEBSTER: Sure.

17 THE COURT: I -- and I'll -- and I'll confess,
18 when I read your reply brief, the -- the thing the Court
19 said to itself was presumably out there is some explicit
20 statement by the legislature that I guess authoritatively
21 reverses a United States Supreme Court case.

22 I'm scratching my head about the procedure and
23 civics and so forth, but I didn't do any research.

24 MR. WEBSTER: Sure.

25 THE COURT: So --

1 MR. WEBSTER: So the -- the case that counsel
2 has identified, County of Oakland versus Detroit, the --
3 the key fact for the Court is that in the opinion -- the
4 opinion specifically identifies the County of Oakland is a
5 consumer, right, is a direct purchaser of the services.
6 It reflects that all county buildings are connected to the
7 sewer systems and where the communities are located, and
8 that Oakland County receives and pays regular sewer bills
9 like any other end user of those communities. And so that
10 is a key distinguishing feature.

11 I should also point that -- and so the facts are
12 completely different. I should also -- and so in essence,
13 the important part here is that the County of Oakland had
14 actual damages, right? In that same case, they also talk
15 about and identify a case called County of Oakland versus
16 City of Berkley, which acknowledged the opposite, and that
17 is where the county was simply a pass-through, right, it
18 could not raise that -- raise the claim because it didn't
19 have any damages.

20 Counsel stood here and read to the Court the
21 statutory language of -- the Illinois Brick repealer of --
22 of the statute that was adopted, and it said that for them
23 to bring a claim, they have to have actual damages, and
24 they admit that they don't have any. That's the problem
25 here.

1 THE COURT: Where did you get the title Illinois
2 Brick repealer? Where -- where did that phrase come from?

3 MR. WEBSTER: So -- so in the literature -- if
4 you Google --

5 THE COURT: What literature?

6 MR. WEBSTER: Law review articles --

7 THE COURT: Like Williston's on Contracts or --

8 MR. WEBSTER: -- law --

9 THE COURT: -- or Jones on Antitrust?

10 MR. WEBSTER: Yeah. So in law review articles
11 -- if you -- literally if you Google Illinois repealer --
12 Illinois Brick repealer, you're going to get hits. That's
13 just -- right?

14 THE COURT: So it's not a -- it's not phrase
15 that has been ordained by any governmental body --

16 MR. WEBSTER: No.

17 THE COURT: -- it's just the scholars are out
18 there --

19 MR. WEBSTER: It is the vernacular --

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. WEBSTER: -- using the phrase, correct.

22 THE COURT: Okay.

23 MR. WEBSTER: And so -- and is to recognize that
24 in this instance -- even assuming that the antitrust law
25 is applicable, in this instance, Michigan law specifically

1 allows me to say as a defense to a claim exactly like in
2 this case, you don't have a claim, whether it's in a
3 breach of contract -- I have all these other reasons, but
4 an element of that is no damages, and then the assumpsit
5 claim is you don't have any damages here. And that's --
6 that has been admitted, right? And so as a consequence,
7 they failed to state a claim.

8 The -- the case law and the statutes are
9 relatively clear on that as we have presented to the
10 Court. The citation to the County of Oakland case is --
11 you know, is -- is distinguishable indeed because of the
12 fact that there is an acknowledgement that Oakland County
13 in that particular case had specific actual damages.

14 I would also then point out that with respect to
15 the issue of adding an unjust enrichment claim, in the
16 citation of the Genesee County case, we point out that
17 just as Genesee County is a relatively new case, there's
18 actually another case, the Shears/Bingaman case, which
19 says -- and actually echoes what counsel just stated; the
20 resolution here is to be construed like a statute, and
21 then Shears also then talks about law that says it should
22 be construed as a statute or an ordinance, and that you
23 can't make a claim for unjust enrichment based upon those
24 concepts, as a matter of law. And so we present that
25 authority to the Court as well.

1 And so as a consequence, this unjust enrichment
2 claim here can't be made as a matter of law where it's
3 base -- not based on some contract, but rather based on a
4 governmental act, the George W. Kuhn Drainage District.

5 THE COURT: Thank you.

6 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

7 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor, if I may --

8 THE COURT: Go ahead. Go ahead.

9 MR. KICKHAM: -- just a brief rebuttal?

10 THE COURT: Yes.

11 MR. KICKHAM: First of all, their unjust
12 enrichment case is unpublished. Ours is published --

13 THE COURT: Okay.

14 MR. KICKHAM: -- and it's binding on the Court.

15 As far as whether -- if the issue comes down to
16 whether Royal Oak itself was a purchaser from the Kuhn
17 Drainage District, I believe it was, and I -- I don't have
18 proof with me today, I can submit that to the Court, but
19 I'm 99.9 percent sure that Royal Oak itself pays a water
20 and sewer bill to itself for its municipal buildings.

21 And in our complaint, we allege that the City
22 passed on the storm water management overcharge to its
23 water and sewer customers, and that the City's water and
24 sewer customers then paid the city for storm water -- for
25 the storm water management overcharge.

1 So we've pleaded the facts sufficient to make
2 the case that Royal Oak was itself a direct payer of the
3 overcharge.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. WEBSTER: And I would just say counsel just
6 makes my point. If the claim is how much the City of
7 Royal Oak for itself, that's a whole different kettle of
8 fish than trying to pass on class damages here.

9 THE COURT: If you were to quantify the damages
10 that were occasioned by the class on the one end of the
11 teeter-totter and the separate independent damages by the
12 City of Royal Oak, would they equate incidentally, or are
13 those two different pots of money, in fairness to what he
14 just said to your response? You're -- you're -- you're
15 contending well, we have standing because we -- Royal Oak
16 does have standing because Royal Oak does have damages,
17 but that's precisely what he just said, it's a separate
18 bag of money, correct? And which bag of money are -- is
19 -- are you targeting?

20 MR. KICKHAM: Well, we're targeting the entire
21 overcharge. And all I'm saying with my rebuttal was if --

22 THE COURT: Okay.

23 MR. KICKHAM: -- if the necessary element is
24 that Royal Oak have paid one dollar in order to have
25 standing to sue --

1 THE COURT: They they've got the dollar, okay.

2 MR. KICKHAM: -- then we've paid dollar.

3 THE COURT: All right. Do you have another case
4 up here today?

5 MR. KICKHAM: I do.

6 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you both come on up
7 here real quick for a second on -- on scheduling?

8 (At 9:20 a.m., bench conference)

9 (At 9:21 a.m., bench conference concluded;
10 proceedings passed)

11 (At 2:32 p.m., proceedings resumed)

12 THE CLERK: Court calls Kickham versus Oakland
13 County, 2017-159351-CZ.

14 MR. KICKHAM: Edward Kickham on behalf of the
15 Plaintiff.

16 MR. WEBSTER: May it please the Court, Peter
17 Webster on behalf of the Defendants.

18 THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated,
19 gentlemen.

20 The -- the Court's not so sure that its writings
21 here are an invitation to further argument, or exclusively
22 a court ruling. Admittedly, this Court hasn't rewritten
23 it, and it was preparing this at the airport for four
24 hours and in the air for four hours, and so it evolved
25 over time. I'm just going to start reading, and I may

1 invite counsel to chime in, or if something is confusing
2 to counsel, feel free to interrupt and I'll see if I can
3 clarify for you, because it is a work in progress, okay?
4 All right?

5 MR. WEBSTER: Yes, Your Honor.

6 MR. KICKHAM: I guess I'm unsure, Your Honor, is
7 this the ruling of the Court or is this --

8 THE COURT: It might ult -- it ultimately is
9 going to be a ruling of the Court, but presently it's just
10 some observations --

11 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

12 THE COURT: -- and thoughts that might be an
13 invitation to comment.

14 MR. KICKHAM: Okay. Fair enough.

15 THE COURT: Okay. And forgive the choice of
16 words here. When the Court refers to Kuhn, it's referring
17 to Defendant -- the Defendant.

18 If Kuhn gouged Royal Oak, meaning charged an --
19 an illegal amount, and Royal Oak in turn gouged the
20 Plaintiff class -- mind you, we're referring to the other
21 lawsuit -- query, did there occur two transgressions with
22 two victims, or one with two victims? And I trust counsel
23 knows what the Court means when it says transgression, or
24 do you need clarification?

25 MR. KICKHAM: No, Your Honor, I think I can

1 answer that. There was one transgression --

2 THE COURT: Before you do, hold the thought.

3 MR. KICKHAM: Okay. Sure.

4 THE COURT: If one transgression with one
5 victim, then who was the victim, Royal Oak or the
6 Plaintiff class? If one transgression and the Plaintiff
7 class was the victim, then Royal Oak, not being a victim,
8 had no claim to assign to the Plaintiff class.

9 If one transgression -- if one transgression and
10 Royal Oak was the victim, then is Royal Oak's purported
11 assignment to Plaintiff class valid? What is its
12 consideration for assigning its chosen action Kuhn?

13 Don't answer that by saying it was relieved of
14 liability to the Plaintiff class, because we are in the
15 option where there is but one transgression, Kuhn's, and
16 only one victim, being Royal Oak. In other words, Royal
17 Oak not being a transgressor has no liability to Plaintiff
18 class from which Royal Oak could enjoy relief in the form
19 of a release from liability as consideration for the
20 assignment. Ah, but Royal Oak could enjoy relief in the
21 form of release from the headache of defending a frivolous
22 lawsuit. The Court guesses that that would not be called
23 a release from -- a release from liability, but a release
24 from frivolity. Both are annoying and costly and valuable
25 to be free of.

1 You were going to chime in, Mr. Kickham, as to
2 the Court's -- I was characterizing it as a rhetorical
3 question, but I'll take an answer. Did there occur two
4 transgressions, if Kuhn gouged Royal Oak and Royal Oak in
5 turn gouged the Plaintiff class? If -- and if you want to
6 --

7 MR. KICKHAM: No, Your Honor. There was one
8 transgression. There was one direct victim, which was
9 Royal Oak. There was one indirect victim, which was the
10 Plaintiff class. Because Royal Oak is allowed to charge
11 the Plaintiff class in -- just talking about the
12 underlying Royal Oak litigation, they're allowed -- Royal
13 Oak is allowed to charge its rate payers based on what
14 Royal Oak itself pays.

15 THE COURT: Is there no claim cognizable in
16 Michigan if for example Kuhn, that body, that entity, read
17 its resolution, and the resolution said \$1.00 per gallon,
18 and chose to charge \$50.00 per gallon. So charges Royal
19 Oak \$50.00 per gallon, Royal Oak charges \$50.00 per
20 gallon, Royal Oak has committed no transgression is what
21 you're saying?

22 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct.

23 THE COURT: Then what was the lawsuit that your
24 class -- that the class had against Royal Oak that was
25 bargained for by dismissal?

1 MR. KICKHAM: We argued that there were unlawful
2 components in the City's rates, other than this charge by
3 the County --

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- and we argued that the City was
6 improperly charging for storm water disposal based on how
7 much water comes out of someone's tap.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. KICKHAM: And --

10 THE COURT: So we'll get to that option in a
11 moment then. So let me keep on thinking here for a
12 second.

13 Unless you wanted to chime in more?

14 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I -- one of the later things
15 you said -- but it -- it escapes me now, so maybe I'll
16 come back --

17 THE COURT: Okay. All right. If on the other
18 hand, there were two transgression, Kuhn gouged Royal Oak,
19 transgression number one, and Royal Oak gouged Plaintiff
20 class, transgression number two, then the Court supposes,
21 without ruling, that those two parties, Royal Oak, both a
22 transgressor and a victim, and class -- Plaintiff class, a
23 victim only, may engage in commerce and buy and sell
24 choses in action.

25 But, question; well, first how -- how could it

1 be two transgressions, for a transgression or illegal
2 parlance, any wrong is by definition occasioned by a
3 breach and its own damages; for if there is one damage
4 which is fungible and passed from one to another, then
5 there is only one legal wrong occasioned by the one who
6 was left holding the bag. The only one ultimately holding
7 the bag, and Plaintiff being that bag man, well that means
8 Royal Oak is no claimant with no claim to assign.

9 And this is not a ruling. These are just
10 musings.

11 Well, what if Kuhn gouged Royal Oak to the tune
12 of \$2.50, and Royal Oak gouged Plaintiff to the tune of
13 \$3.50? Well, if Plaintiff sued Royal Oak for only Royal
14 Oak's \$1.00 gouge, believing its additional \$2.50 gouge
15 was not from the hand of Royal Oak, but Kuhn's, then the
16 Plaintiff class could contend that it could barter with
17 Royal Oak, I'll give up my \$1.00 claim against you, and
18 you give me your \$2.50 claim against Kuhn. But alas, if
19 Plaintiff class so contends it is mistaken that Royal Oak
20 is the \$2.50 claimant, Plaintiff was -- class was the
21 \$2.50 claimant, for Plaintiff is the bag man, the last guy
22 holding the bag. And that's why Plaintiff class sued
23 Royal Oak for only \$1.00.

24 Such a theory includes the contention that Kuhn
25 is Plaintiff class's transgressor, not Royal Oak, and

1 therefore again, Royal Oak had no claim to assign the
2 Plaintiff class. Plaintiff class was the claimant all
3 along.

4 Again, not a ruling, just thoughts.

5 MR. KICKHAM: Well, and I think I can address
6 that, if you'd like.

7 THE COURT: Chime in. Sure.

8 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor, this goes to some of
9 the case --

10 THE COURT: By the way, save the thought,
11 because I'm -- I'm not going to read anything -- as the
12 Court was thinking over what I just read, which was -- I
13 call it number four, 2.50 from Kuhn, 3.50 -- yeah, 2.50
14 from Kuhn to Royal Oak, 3.50 from Royal Oak to the class,
15 I thought -- the Court thought to itself that can't be the
16 theory here, because that \$1.00 gouged from Royal Oak to
17 Plaintiff's class was a forsaken claim by virtue of your
18 dismissal and the release.

19 So that hypothetical can't be the situation
20 here, because you would have forsaken it by the release.

21 Now I'll give you the floor, and go ahead.

22 MR. KICKHAM: Right. And that -- that's what
23 we're saying here. It -- we're not saying that Royal Oak
24 charged the Plaintiff class too much for the charges at
25 issue here. We're saying they -- in -- in our underlying

1 case, we said they charged them too much for other
2 reasons, and in consideration for a release -- we -- you
3 know, we also got \$2 million for the class, which is not a
4 nuisance value, I would submit -- but in exchange for --
5 in addition to that, a release of claims by the class,
6 Royal Oak, assigned to the class in consideration of that,
7 Royal Oak's claim against Oakland County.

8 And I think if we -- what -- I feel like this
9 morning we got very sidetracked on this antitrust stuff,
10 and --

11 THE COURT: Don't worry about it. We'll come to
12 that later on.

13 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

14 THE COURT: I'm still -- I'm still in the very
15 -- I'm -- I'm in the very core of --

16 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

17 THE COURT: -- of the -- the theory here. I'm
18 not into all the antitrust defenses and all that other
19 stuff yet.

20 MR. KICKHAM: Nor should we be. And that's -- I
21 -- I think that --

22 THE COURT: Well, not yet.

23 MR. KICKHAM: -- I think that there's law in our
24 brief that goes to the very core of this. We start out --
25 and maybe I take this out of order in the brief -- but

1 we're talking about a case called Brogno versus City of
2 Ann Arbor --

3 THE COURT: I -- I don't want to prevent you
4 from speaking. But counsel, I'm still trying -- I'm
5 studying this piece of rock candy trying to figure out
6 what all its facets are. I'm trying to understand your
7 case. I would suggest hold off on giving me analogy to
8 other cases until I first understand what this case is
9 about.

10 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

11 THE COURT: And as you can tell here, I'm still
12 trying to figure it out. Is it a scenario with one
13 transgressor and two victims, two transgressors and two
14 victims, or is it exclusively is and always was be purely
15 a pass-through from Kuhn to Royal Oak to the -- to the
16 Plaintiff class. I've -- I've got a whole bunch of other
17 questions too.

18 MR. KICKHAM: Right. And I think the easiest
19 way to answer that is there's one transgressor, and that's
20 Kuhn, and really there -- there's one direct victim, which
21 is Royal Oak, and there's one incidental victim.

22 THE COURT: Well, can you -- can you help me
23 understand what is an incidental victim; is that someone
24 who suffers no damages? And if that's true, then how --
25 how does the law observe a victim who has suffered no

1 damages?

2 MR. KICKHAM: Well --

3 THE COURT: You used the phrase incidental
4 victim --

5 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

6 THE COURT: -- but I don't know if that's -- if
7 that has a real meaning.

8 MR. KICKHAM: Well, maybe -- maybe then the
9 answer is the -- the class was not a victim, because what
10 I'm trying to say that any cost incurred by a business --
11 and let's just think of Royal Oak as a business in this
12 sense -- is necessarily included in the price that
13 business charges to its customers. If that cost to the
14 business is inflated through illegality, then there are
15 many cases, and I've cited them in our brief, holding that
16 the business can recover that overcharge. Any other rule
17 would allow the wrongdoer to retain the ill-gotten gains
18 because the business's customers have no standing to sue.

19 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

20 MR. KICKHAM: So it -- and that's -- that's the
21 core of this issue. And unfortunately, it does get into
22 the cases I've cited in my brief, and -- other than the
23 antitrust cases, and we can into that, but that's --

24 THE COURT: Okay. Let -- let -- just -- just a
25 minute, gentlemen, I'm still -- I'm still musing here.

1 What if Kuhn gouges Royal Oak for \$2.50 and
2 Royal Oak gouges Plaintiff's class for .50 of that 2.50
3 and eats \$2.00 of Kuhn's \$2.50 gouge? Well again, one
4 transgression or two? Is Royal Oak a .50 transgressor and
5 Kuhn only a \$2.00 transgressor? Well, who is Kuhn's
6 victim? Royal Oak of course. But is .50 of Kuhn's quote,
7 day one \$2.50 transgression purged on day two when Royal
8 Oak sticks it to Royal Oak with a -- sticks it to
9 Plaintiff's class with a bill? What about day three when
10 Plaintiff pay -- Plaintiff class pays that .50 to Royal
11 Oak satisfying one-fifth of Kuhn's \$2.50 transgression
12 against Royal Oak?

13 This devolves into absurdity when you espouse
14 two transgressions. It was either one transgression, a
15 commensurate pass-through, if a transgression at all, then
16 go back to number one which the Court started out with,
17 Plaintiff loses there. Or if it was two transgressions,
18 meaning a pass-through plus some, seeing note four, that's
19 the 2.50 plus 1.00 to \$3.50, it would seem Plaintiff would
20 lose there, or meaning a pass-through minus sum, see
21 number five, which I'll -- which was -- which was what the
22 Court's talking about, 2.50 minus .50, because in fact it
23 cannot be two transgressions, but only one.

24 Go ahead, Mr. Kickham.

25 MR. KICKHAM: This -- this gets right into the

1 case law, and this is one of the cases I've cited in my
2 brief, it's Southern Pacific versus Darnell-Taenzer Lumber
3 Company, this is a U.S. Supreme Court Case, and what this
4 case held was as the law does not attribute remote
5 consequences to a defendant, so it holds him liable if
6 proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss.

7 THE COURT: That --

8 MR. KICKHAM: And I know that --

9 THE COURT: That -- that --

10 MR. KICKHAM: -- the syntax is terrible, but the
11 Court goes on to say the plaintiff suffered losses to the
12 amount of the verdict when they paid, their claim accrued
13 once in the theory of the law and it does not inquire into
14 later events.

15 THE COURT: I totally understand that; that's
16 where he starts chiming in about antitrust and everything
17 else --

18 MR. KICKHAM: Right, but that's not an antitrust
19 case.

20 THE COURT: That's not an antitrust --

21 MR. KICKHAM: No, it's not.

22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay.

23 MR. KICKHAM: And the only thing that the
24 Defendant has to say about that case in their reply brief
25 is that the Court there was motivated by the endlessness

1 and futility of following every transaction to its
2 ultimate result. And they say the ultimate result here is
3 easy to see, so we shouldn't have to follow Southern
4 Pacific, but that's nice dicta, but that's not the holding
5 of the case. The holding of the case is the immediate
6 bearer of the cost of the -- of the unlawful cost can sue
7 to recover that cost.

8 And by contrast, we've also cited another case,
9 Brogno versus City of Ann Arbor, where Ann Arbor had --

10 THE COURT: Then why -- why aren't you out for
11 issue preclusion, because you could have named Kuhn in
12 that earlier case? If what you're -- if I -- if I heard
13 you correctly -- and I think I'm following the bouncing
14 ball -- that you -- not you, the Plaintiff class, the bag
15 -- what I'll call the bag man, could have sued by virtue
16 of some case law Kuhn directly, you didn't, and coulda,
17 woulda, shoulda --

18 MR. KICKHAM: No, we should -- we could not have
19 sued Kuhn directly.

20 THE COURT: I thought you were just -- I thought
21 -- maybe I misunderstood your argument --

22 MR. KICKHAM: No, I -- I'm sorry, I think --
23 maybe I'm not being clear. What -- what -- the -- let me
24 back up and cite --

25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. KICKHAM: -- more completely from this
2 Southern Pacific case.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 MR. KICKHAM: This starts out saying the only
5 question before us, the U.S. Supreme Court, is that at
6 which we've hinted, whether the fact that the plaintiffs
7 were able to pass on the damage that they sustained in the
8 first instance by paying the unreasonable -- unreasonable
9 charge, and to collect that amount from the purchasers,
10 prevents their recovering the overpayment from the
11 carriers. And then it goes on and it says the answer is
12 not difficult. The general tendency of the law in regards
13 to damages at least is not to go beyond the first step.
14 As it does not attribute remote consequences to a
15 defendant, so it holds him liable if proximately the
16 plaintiff has suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered
17 losses to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their
18 claim accrued it once in the theory of law, and it does
19 not inquire into later events. And then it goes on later,
20 it says the carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his
21 illegal profit and the only one who can take it from him
22 is the one that alone was in a relation with him and from
23 whom the carrier took this sum. And there's a -- a
24 converse case, the Brogno, which I'm trying to get to,
25 where the City of Ann Arbor imposes a charge on Comcast

1 for cable services, Comcast passes that charge on to its
2 customers, the customers try to sue the City of Ann Arbor
3 to get that charge back. And there, the Court said in the
4 present case, plaintiffs are not the real parties in
5 interest, because the franchise fee at issue is imposed on
6 Comcast, and not on individual consumers. Thus, plaintiff
7 suffered no actual injury, loss or damage. Further, no
8 contractual relationship exists between plaintiffs and
9 defendant. Although plaintiffs may pay other taxes to the
10 City of Ann Arbor, they do not pay the alleged tax at
11 issue in this case. It is critical that the taxpayer to
12 whom standing is granted is one to whom the tax applies.
13 And there they said the tax applies to Comcast and only
14 Comcast, and not the ultimate payers of Comcast rates had
15 the right to sue.

16 Now, the Defendant, in addition to relying on
17 some dicta that talks about the reasons why Southern
18 Pacific held the way it did, talks about a case called
19 Bacchus Imports v Dias. That's another U.S. Supreme Court
20 case. But that case actually supports the Plaintiff's
21 position here. What happened there was the State of
22 Hawaii imposed an excise tax on the sale of liquor, and
23 the liquor wholesalers challenged the 20 percent state
24 excise tax, the Court held there that the wholesalers had
25 standing to sue, even though they passed that tax on to

1 retailers. And one reason the Court held that way was
2 because the wholesalers have to pay that tax regardless of
3 whether the retailers pay their bills to the wholesalers.
4 And when the wholesalers buy the liquor, they owe the
5 state the tax. They then sell the liquor on to retailers;
6 maybe some of them don't pay. The wholesalers have
7 already paid the tax. And that applies equally here,
8 because when the Drainage District charges Royal Oak X
9 amount of dollars for --

10 THE COURT: Let him go. Let him go. It's okay.

11 MR. KICKHAM: -- drainage, then Royal Oak splits
12 that up into 20,000 individual bills, some of those get
13 paid, some of them don't. Royal Oak is still on the hook
14 for 100 percent of what it gets charged by Kuhn Drainage
15 District.

16 THE COURT: What's your point in mentioning that
17 case --

18 MR. KICKHAM: My point is --

19 THE COURT: -- for -- for -- those other cases
20 are contained in your brief, I -- I -- I know about them,
21 and maybe even Hawaii was as well, but what you're -- what
22 I'm left with -- and maybe it's my fault -- that the bag
23 man has standing. The bag man being the ultimate person
24 left holding the bag, has standing to sue.

25 MR. KICKHAM: No, that's not --

1 THE COURT: Okay.

2 MR. KICKHAM: -- what the Hawaii case -- I only
3 mentioned the Hawaii case because Mr. Webster, the
4 Defendant --

5 THE COURT: I gotcha.

6 MR. KICKHAM: -- cited it in his brief and it's
7 the --

8 THE COURT: And you said that it actually
9 supports your position?

10 MR. KICKHAM: Yes. And it's the only authority
11 he cites to contradict the Supreme Court Case, Southern
12 Pacific versus Darnell-Taenzer Lumber.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see. Perhaps a very
14 inartful analogy. If there was a knife to Bill's throat,
15 and a threat to slice Bill's throat if Bill doesn't slice
16 Ted, and if Bill succumbs, Ted's blood is shed, not
17 Bill's. If Bill is a hero, he is cut and it is his blood
18 which is shed, not Ted's. If Bill succumbs and cuts Ted,
19 can he sue for Ted's blood? If Hanover and Southern
20 Pacific apply, then I guess so. Am I missing something?

21 MR. KICKHAM: I think that what you're missing,
22 you -- with all due respect --

23 THE COURT: Yes, please.

24 MR. KICKHAM: -- is that there's no Ted in this
25 analogy. Royal Oak was allowed to charge its water and

1 sewer rate payers based on what it -- Royal Oak itself
2 paid.

3 Royal Oak can -- they basically -- they have to
4 -- they have to charge with a reasonable administrative
5 cost. They can, you know -- say they buy water -- you
6 know, putting aside this -- if they buy water from the
7 City of Detroit and they pay the Detroit Water and Sewer
8 Department X cents per unit of water, Royal Oak then can
9 charge its customers X cents per unit of water plus a
10 reasonable administrative fee.

11 So here --

12 THE COURT: An X is the resolution that yields
13 the -- the -- the value of X, correct?

14 MR. KICKHAM: Exactly. But here --

15 THE COURT: And you're con -- go -- go ahead.

16 MR. KICKHAM: We're contending that the Drainage
17 District didn't charge X, which it was bound to do under
18 the resolution is charge X --

19 THE COURT: I trust -- I understand your theory.

20 MR. KICKHAM: -- plus 1.

21 THE COURT: I gotcha.

22 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

23 THE COURT: I gotcha.

24 MR. KICKHAM: Okay. So -- but even though it
25 charged X plus 1, Royal Oak was still allowed to pass on X

1 plus 1 to its water and sewer customers. So there's no
2 Ted bleeding on the floor. There are water and sewer
3 customers who are -- they are suffering, but they're not
4 suffering unlawfully. Royal Oak hasn't done anything in
5 this narrow instance.

6 Now, we've alleged in the underlying case that
7 Royal Oak did other unlawful things --

8 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

9 MR. KICKHAM: -- and that's why they ended up
10 settling with us and why they ended up assigning this
11 claim to us in consideration for release.

12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay. Let me --
13 let me think about that for just a second. You can have a
14 seat for a second.

15 That a wrong by Kuhn to Royal Oak, which is
16 passed along to Royal Oak's customers, is not a wrong to
17 the customers?

18 MR. KICKHAM: Not -- it's not an actionable
19 wrong by the customers against Royal Oak or against the
20 Kuhn Drainage District. As long as Royal Oak is charging
21 in accordance with the Headlee Amendment and its own
22 ordinances and --

23 THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's -- okay, let's
24 do it this way then. Let's do it this way --

25 MR. KICKHAM: But that's not the issue --

1 THE COURT: -- let's -- let's quantify the
2 resolution, and that's -- that's -- that truly is the --
3 the -- you say the resolution yield -- the resolution
4 requires -- simplify it for me, X per gallon.

5 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

6 THE COURT: And now we have to quantify X, and
7 you say X quantified is a \$1.00 per gallon, let's just
8 say.

9 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

10 THE COURT: Your issue is not with the
11 resolution which says X, but it's with someone's
12 formulation -- Kuhn's formulation that they're charging --
13 that they contend that X equals 6, not X equals 1, so they
14 charged 6, contending that it's X, and you're saying the
15 resolution which talks about X is actually 1, and that's
16 the issue that you're -- all along, that's the -- that's
17 the -- that's the heart of the onion; am I correct?

18 MR. KICKHAM: That is correct.

19 THE COURT: Okay. And you're saying that when
20 Kuhn maliciously or ignorantly quantifies X as 6, charges
21 Royal Oak 6, it does so in an actionable way that yields a
22 claim by Royal Oak against Kuhn. But when Royal Oak
23 passes the baton to the Plaintiff class charging X on the
24 premise that X equals 6, when in fact, if your theory is
25 correct, X equals 1, there is no cognizable claim that the

1 Plaintiff class has against Royal Oak.

2 MR. KICKHAM: That is correct. Royal Oak is --

3 THE COURT: They are -- they are excused of --
4 Royal Oak is excused of the error, malicious, or ignorant,
5 or innocent, that Kuhn foisted upon them?

6 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct, because it's not
7 Royal Oak's error. Royal Oak is allowed to charge in
8 accordance with law --

9 THE COURT: Royal Oak is allowed to --

10 MR. KICKHAM: -- based on what it pays.

11 THE COURT: -- charge in accordance with the
12 resolution, correct?

13 MR. KICKHAM: Well, no. Royal Oak is allowed to
14 charge based on what it itself is charged.

15 THE COURT: Okay. Got -- okay.

16 MR. KICKHAM: Royal Oak -- Royal Oak --

17 THE COURT: They don't have -- Royal Oak doesn't
18 have to think. In other words, Kuhn says X equals 6,
19 Royal Oak is under no obligation -- and I'm not
20 challenging you --

21 MR. KICKHAM: Oh, no.

22 THE COURT: -- I'm trying to learn.

23 MR. KICKHAM: No, that's -- that's exactly
24 correct. And it was only through the --

25 MR. WEBSTER: With all due respect --

1 MR. KICKHAM: -- underlying lawsuit that Royal
2 Oak ever --

3 MR. WEBSTER: -- that's just --

4 THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear from you.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- discovered that X wasn't equal
6 to 6; that X was equal to 1.

7 THE COURT: Say that again.

8 MR. KICKHAM: It was only through the underlying
9 lawsuit, and our discovery, that Royal Oak -- we believe
10 that Royal Oak ever discovered that X was not equal to 6,
11 that X was equal to 1; that they were being overcharged by
12 --

13 THE COURT: And your lawsuit recog -- your
14 lawsuit before the -- the earlier lawsuit, recognizing
15 that Royal Oak is excused from culpability, was not an
16 ingredient in your -- you didn't sue Royal Oak at that
17 time for that extra 5, because when you sued Royal Oak,
18 you're contending then that -- like you're contending now,
19 they're just a patsy. They don't have to think, they just
20 have to take their bill and forward it to the customers?

21 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct. As to --

22 THE COURT: And that was not your theory at all.
23 There was -- that wasn't a fac -- one of your theories?

24 MR. KICKHAM: No.

25 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Let's see. Maybe

1 we're beating a dead horse, but let me just finish my
2 thoughts here.

3 What if Kuhn gouges Royal Oak 2.50, Royal Oak
4 eats -- eats that 2 -- well, maybe this -- maybe this is
5 what you'll say your case was about. What if Kuhn gouges
6 Royal Oak 2.50, Royal Oak eats that 2.50, but gouges
7 Plaintiff class for a separate .75? I'll ad lib here that
8 that can't be your contention today, because you released
9 that .75 claim against Royal Oak. But nevertheless, let's
10 say that that was the -- the contention here. Now we have
11 two transgressions with two damages, two different
12 damages, because two independent victims. Plaintiff sues
13 Royal Oak for that .75, well now we've got a feasible
14 assignment, but in order for Plaintiff, the last bag man
15 to prove his formerly Royal Oak's case, Plaintiff, who is
16 now Royal Oak, will have to show that the \$2.50 was not
17 passed through, because if it was, Plaintiff standing in
18 Royal Oak's shoes, would not have suffered damages, and
19 therefore would not be a victim. He would not have a --
20 would not have a claim assign. And if Plaintiff, standing
21 in Royal Oak's shoes, could prove no quote Kuhn \$2.50
22 gouge, close quote, pass-through to Plaintiff, ought Kuhn
23 be able to join the class as a separate party, who is
24 already a party, but standing in the shoes of Royal Oak,
25 and offset its liability to Plaintiff, standing in Royal

1 Oak's shoes, to the amount of .75 for the class's failure
2 to mitigate damages by releasing its claim against Royal
3 Oak for .75 as consideration for the assignment of the 250
4 -- 250 -- \$2.50 claim?

5 I have no idea if you can follow any of that,
6 but --

7 MR. KICKHAM: I think I can.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. KICKHAM: It -- what I would say to that is
10 the .75 claim in your analogy stands on its own. That
11 there are the -- improper components in water and sewer
12 rate are actionable. So if this -- the rate payers, the
13 class members, released that .75 claim in exchange for the
14 assignment of the \$2.50 claim, they got something that
15 they never had before. They didn't have that \$2.50 claim.
16 They did have the .75 claim. And let's say they took .25
17 on the dollar, or .25 of every .75 and then they said,
18 okay, we'll -- we'll get -- you can refund .25 of that,
19 because we know that your fund balance is low and times
20 are tough, but we'll also take your claim --

21 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

22 MR. KICKHAM: -- against the Kuhn Drainage
23 District on this totally separate issue.

24 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

25 MR. KICKHAM: That's what happened here.

1 THE COURT: Well, what about -- what about the
2 question about the right of Kuhn to be able to join that
3 case as a separate party to con -- to challenge your
4 failure to mitigate damages by releasing your claim
5 against Royal Oak for .75, or to -- or some -- some
6 approximation thereof? Are you --

7 MR. KICKHAM: No, I'm following you.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. KICKHAM: I guess I'm thinking if they have
10 such a defense -- I don't think they have a defense of
11 failure to mitigate damages because I think they're two
12 totally separate things --

13 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

14 MR. KICKHAM: -- that they can raise that
15 defense in this case. They didn't need to be a party to
16 that case. You know, you -- I guess I go back to the
17 analogy I used a couple sessions ago about the house
18 painter and the paint supplier.

19 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

20 MR. KICKHAM: You know, you've got a house
21 painter who contracts with a homeowner to paint his house.
22 The day of performance comes and the house painter doesn't
23 show up. Why didn't he show up? Well, because his paint
24 supplier didn't deliver the paint on time. The homeowner
25 sues the painter and says I've been damaged -- I mean,

1 let's -- let's just imagine there are damages --

2 THE COURT: Sure.

3 MR. KICKHAM: -- says I've been damaged in X
4 amount --

5 THE COURT: I'm having a party and now I can't
6 have the party.

7 MR. KICKHAM: Yeah, exactly.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. KICKHAM: My house is going to look
10 terrible, I'm injured, my reputation. Painter says all
11 right, I'll tell you what, I'll pay you \$50,000.00 in
12 damages -- you say you've been damaged \$100,000.00 --

13 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

14 MR. KICKHAM: -- I'll pay you 50 in damages, and
15 I'll assign to you my claim against the paint supplier.
16 The painter's claim against the paint supplier is whatever
17 it is. It doesn't depend on -- although it may -- I
18 guess, yeah, it may --

19 THE COURT: What is the claim?

20 MR. KICKHAM: Well --

21 THE COURT: It's -- it is part and parcel of
22 it's not -- I -- I was -- in my seventh analogy -- was
23 endeavoring to treat them as apples and oranges, and your
24 .75 claim that Royal Oak was gouging was separate and
25 distinct and -- such that you can have a lawsuit for the

1 75 -- maybe it's -- maybe it's an issue with the analogy,
2 because your -- your analogy painter's claim against the
3 paint supplier is derivative of the homeowner's claim
4 against the painter.

5 MR. KICKHAM: No, it's not --

6 THE COURT: Okay. Help me.

7 MR. KICKHAM: -- because the painter has a claim
8 for his lost profits, injury -- I -- I mean, let's just
9 throw everything --

10 THE COURT: Sure. Of course.

11 MR. KICKHAM: -- every possible claim; injury to
12 the painter's reputation. Meanwhile the homeowner has a
13 claim against the painter for whatever the homeowner's
14 damages are --

15 THE COURT: The -- but for the homeowner's
16 damages, the painter would still have some claim against
17 the -- the paint supplier?

18 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct. He would have the
19 loss profits he would have made had he had the paint to --

20 THE COURT: No, no, no -- but if there -- if --

21 MR. KICKHAM: -- perform the contract.

22 THE COURT: -- if there -- if the painter
23 performed under the contract --

24 MR. KICKHAM: Correct.

25 THE COURT: -- the homeowner would have no claim

1 against the painter.

2 MR. KICKHAM: That's right.

3 THE COURT: If the painter performed under the
4 contract, what claim would the painter have against the
5 supplier? It is only by virtue of the painter breaching
6 the -- the contract with the homeowner that the painter
7 can have a claim against the paint supplier.

8 MR. KICKHAM: Not necessarily. Let me use --

9 THE COURT: Well, help me out.

10 MR. KICKHAM: I will. I -- let me use a
11 slightly different analogy.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. KICKHAM: Imagine there's a painter who has
14 a contract to paint the house and he has a contract to buy
15 the paint. The contract to buy the paint is for
16 \$25,000.00. The day of the performance, the paint is --

17 THE COURT: Of what, the painting?

18 MR. KICKHAM: I'm sorry, of the painting.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 MR. KICKHAM: The day of the painting, the paint
21 doesn't show up. So the painter goes to a different
22 supplier and he buys different paint for \$35,000.00. He
23 now would have a claim for \$10,000.00 against the original
24 supplier for breach of contract.

25 THE COURT: Okay. I -- I think that's actually

1 --

2 MR. KICKHAM: And you know --

3 THE COURT: -- precisely your example in your
4 motion; maybe the Ford car or something like that. But --

5 MR. KICKHAM: So --

6 THE COURT: -- let me -- let me keep thinking on
7 that.

8 MR. KICKHAM: -- my -- my point is that the
9 painter -- if the supplier doesn't deliver his supplies,
10 what happens between the painter and the homeowner doesn't
11 necessarily -- it's not necessarily dispositive of whether
12 there's a claim by the painter against the supplier.

13 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Okay. All right.

14 There's -- there's more to this, but let me -- I
15 know Brother Counsel was chomping at the bit here. So you
16 want to chime in so far? Go ahead.

17 MR. WEBSTER: If -- if I may, Your Honor.

18 I'm happy to address the -- the cases, but --
19 but let me just suggest this. The discussion and the
20 theory that's twisted in a bunch of knots here that you'd
21 need a marlinspike to unravel this thing, whereas the
22 complaint and what's been alleged to the Court is pretty
23 simple and straightforward. There was -- from the
24 underlying case, in which there was a dispute over the
25 storm water charge brought by the class against Royal Oak,

1 there was an assignment of then Royal Oak's commensurate
2 allegations against the GWK to the class. That's what
3 we're dealing with here.

4 And so it is admitted that the amount sought is
5 the pass-through amount that was alleged by the class,
6 right? So -- and I -- I don't know if I can recall all of
7 the numbers that the Court was presenting, but that there
8 is no plus or minus here. This is a pass-through of the
9 same amount. And that the assignment serves as the basis
10 of which counsel's standing here in court. The problem is
11 and the root cause is that the complaint before you has a
12 breach of contract and this assumpsit.

13 I've already stated position with respect to the
14 contract. So dealing with the assumpsit portion. The
15 main -- one of the main issues you have to grapple with is
16 this no damage claim. There is no damage to the City of
17 Royal Oak, so they can't present a claim. That's actually
18 admitted by the Plaintiff in their response.

19 What they do say to save the claim is they say
20 we don't need to have damages, we can state in this case
21 the damages of the class. They don't have any case law in
22 the context of storm water infrastructure in the Drain
23 Code to support that, so what they do then is they bring
24 in Hanover, Illinois Brick, and they argue by analogy.

25 So the first hurdle they have to overcome is

1 where is the case that says that case law is applicable to
2 this situation? It doesn't exist. But even if it were
3 analogous, we point out that in Michigan, right, Hanover/
4 Illinois Brick has been re -- repealed specifically by
5 policy and by statute, in that we can absolutely use as a
6 defense the fact that you didn't have any damages.
7 Hanover said you can't raise that as a defense and
8 Michigan says exactly that you can.

9 And importantly, the laws interpreting and
10 discussing that statute provision, which says we can use
11 that as a defense, it says that it is a statutory
12 codification of the common law requirement that you have
13 to have actual damages. They don't have that here.
14 That's just the fundamental basis of our claim.

15 And so what they were involved in in the
16 underlying case, they laid the table here, they're the
17 ones who set the -- set the stage, they're the ones who
18 brought the class claim, they're the ones who -- who
19 litigated the case. In that case, the judge actually
20 issued a motion for summary disposition as to Royal Oak
21 granting that. Then it was reconsideration --

22 THE COURT: That -- that -- let's pooh-pooh
23 that, because that's --

24 MR. WEBSTER: All right. I'll pooh-pooh that,
25 absolutely.

1 THE COURT: -- empirical and meaningless --

2 MR. WEBSTER: So then I'm going to get to the
3 next point, is then they draft the assignment --

4 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

5 MR. WEBSTER: -- right? It's their assignment.
6 It's their draft. The issue fact -- the -- the point of
7 it is, is that Royal Oak doesn't have the damage, because
8 they pass it on. I'm perfectly entitled to assert -- the
9 law specifically says that they have to plead as part of a
10 cause of action damages, and they've admitted that they
11 don't have any.

12 That's the problem with this case.

13 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor --

14 THE COURT: Go ahead.

15 MR. KICKHAM: The Brognio case is not a storm
16 water case, but it is a Headlee Amendment taxation case,
17 just like the underlying case was here, and it held that
18 the cable customers were not the real parties in interest,
19 that Comcast --

20 THE COURT: Right.

21 MR. KICKHAM: -- the pass-through entity was.

22 THE COURT: You -- you talked about that one.

23 MR. KICKHAM: Yeah.

24 THE COURT: Is that an Ann Arbor case?

25 MR. KICKHAM: Yeah, it's --

1 THE COURT: Yeah, I -- I'm familiar with that.

2 MR. KICKHAM: -- Brogno versus the City of Ann
3 Arbor. It is unpublished --

4 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- but I think it's persuasive.

6 THE COURT: Yeah. I gotcha.

7 Like I said, this is an evolving deliberations
8 by the Court, which might and probably will ultimately
9 yield into an opinion, so there is no -- there is no
10 structure to it, and I -- I won't apologize for it,
11 because I'm not drafting an opinion, but in no particular
12 order I'll just now go through the various briefs that
13 have been submitted.

14 I don't know if this is of any moment, but maybe
15 it is. The Plaintiff in this case is Kickham Hanley,
16 PLLC, as trustee for a certified class. That's -- that's
17 -- for what it's worth, the Court is struggling with the
18 -- with the -- with the -- what is the Plaintiff?
19 Plaintiff here is a trustee to a creature of a particular
20 lawsuit, specifically a class. That creature, the -- a
21 class, is real in the eyes of the court that it lives in,
22 the other lawsuit, and maybe that jury and that court
23 reporter and its adversary, it is real even in the eyes of
24 the adversary's bank, i.e. when the class goes to the
25 judgment debtor's bank to collect on its judgment.

1 And this -- this is silly, but is it real to
2 Ronald McDonald, would it be real in the eyes of the
3 drive-thru cashier at McDonalds? How about a marriage
4 counselor? I don't know. How about say a local drain
5 commissioner?

6 Before we identify how -- how one can be a
7 trustee to a class, let's figure out how this class can
8 exist independent from the lawsuit that it -- it became
9 certified in.

10 Are there documents -- even that's -- even
11 that's spoon-feeding. I'm not sure -- and it's -- in it's
12 -- in its manifest in Defendant's brief, and I don't agree
13 with the Defendant's characterization that the Plaintiff
14 is this law firm known as Kickham Hanley, because the
15 Plaintiff identifies itself not as Kickham Hanley, but
16 rather as a trustee to a class.

17 And maybe you can cite to examples out there in
18 jurisprudence where classes that become recognized as
19 entities -- they don't get recognized by filing something
20 with the Secretary of State, they don't get recognized by
21 some birth certificate at a hospital -- they become
22 recognized as entities by virtue of a certification within
23 a particular case number; how that entity maintains its
24 existence independent of that lawsuit is a curiosity that
25 I'm unfamiliar with, but I'm not saying that it can't be.

1 And now we extrapolate that that class can actually -- I
2 don't even -- I don't want to use the word assign, but --

3 MR. KICKHAM: Well, it can receive --

4 THE COURT: -- a trustee is a trustee of a
5 trust. But you're saying this trustee is the trustee of a
6 class. Can you help me in just --

7 MR. KICKHAM: Sure.

8 THE COURT: -- in the bare bones --

9 MR. KICKHAM: I don't have a case that's right
10 on point that says -- where another court has held that
11 you can do this, but here's -- the -- the way we did it is
12 in our final judgment and order approving the settlement
13 --

14 THE COURT: I -- I understand, you --

15 MR. KICKHAM: -- under Judge Kumar --

16 THE COURT: -- pur -- purported to give life to
17 this cause of action. I understand that.

18 MR. KICKHAM: Well, no, we -- we didn't purport
19 to do anything. Judge Kumar ordered that --

20 THE COURT: I -- she is a re -- she is a court
21 that serves -- and I've said this before -- we are -- we
22 are reaction -- we are mere reactionaries to the stimuli
23 that is presented to us. We don't create -- I can't
24 create life. I can react to someone saying will you
25 recognize this composite of people as -- as an entity, and

1 okay, stamp, class is certified.

2 I'm just asking how that oxygen continues down
3 the hall, upstairs, or downstairs a bit. Forget about the
4 fact that the court -- no offense to her, no offense to
5 her robes, but she doesn't breathe life into that class
6 and say I hereby declare that this class, which I have
7 certified in case ending in whatever, can live independent
8 of this lawsuit somewhere else.

9 That's not persuading the Court. Maybe there's
10 authority for that proposition that a trial court has that
11 kind of authority. But if you're relying on her, or shall
12 I say it, that trial court giving life to the class, that
13 one -- that gives me a great deal of pause.

14 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I'm not. The class isn't
15 here before you today. The trustee of the class is.

16 THE COURT: Okay, so time out --

17 MR. KICKHAM: And I -- and I know --

18 THE COURT: -- stop right there.

19 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

20 THE COURT: There's a trustee of a class who's
21 here today. If the trustee gets its life from the class,
22 similar to the pass-through --

23 MR. KICKHAM: No, they --

24 THE COURT: -- how can the class be -- if the
25 class isn't alive, how can the trustee be its trustee?

1 MR. KICKHAM: Because the trustee is -- I was
2 inartful -- we're the trustee of a trust, the
3 beneficiaries are which are the class.

4 THE COURT: Then maybe all -- maybe my curiosity
5 has been satisfied, because the caption is as trustee for
6 a certified class. But rather, it's as trustee for a
7 trust for a certified class; is that -- or is it -- there
8 -- a trust exists out there for which Kickham Hanley is
9 the trustee?

10 MR. KICKHAM: Yes.

11 THE COURT: Is there a trust out there?

12 MR. KICKHAM: I don't know that --

13 THE COURT: That has been created?

14 MR. KICKHAM: I don't know that there's a
15 written trust agreement, but there is a trust. There was
16 a trust created by order of Judge Kumar.

17 THE COURT: What is a -- a trust in the -- in
18 the layperson's vernacular; I trust you to go and
19 prosecute this case for me?

20 MR. KICKHAM: No, a -- a trust in the legal
21 sense of a trust with a -- a beneficiary and a trustee.

22 THE COURT: Okay. A trust has been established
23 --

24 MR. KICKHAM: Yes.

25 THE COURT: -- maybe not written. I'm -- I'm

1 surprised that it's not. But nevertheless, a trust --
2 there has -- the cymbals rang out there in the legal
3 universe and a trust was born --

4 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct.

5 THE COURT: -- and Kickham Hanley was appointed
6 as the trustee?

7 MR. KICKHAM: We were.

8 THE COURT: Anything to chime in on that? Not
9 -- nothing that you raised -- and this is just myself, but
10 -- this Court -- but you want to chime in on it at all?

11 If not, we don't need to waste time. It's just
12 me talking about this case belongs with Judge Kumar. If
13 you don't -- if you are not --

14 MR. WEBSTER: That issue --

15 THE COURT: -- following that one, then --

16 MR. WEBSTER: No, I -- I understand what the
17 Court is saying. I understand the court's inquiry. One,
18 I would point out it's not a basis for our motion, though
19 it -- it is an issue, like others, that we got to look at,
20 because --

21 THE COURT: This Court's not going to be up in
22 the Court of Appeals. It's just going to be you and him,
23 so --

24 MR. WEBSTER: I -- I understand, so I just
25 wanted to say that --

1 THE COURT: -- if it's not -- if it's an
2 appellate issue, then let's put it to rest right now.

3 MR. WEBSTER: So it's not part of our motion
4 now.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MR. WEBSTER: We're not necessarily conceding
7 that. We just pointed out that the creation of the trust
8 is along with the writing of this assignment in which
9 we're brought here today in the shoes of Royal Oak, hence
10 our motion.

11 THE COURT: Continuing. We're in Defendant's --
12 oh, you want to --

13 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I -- I -- I'd just like to --
14 -- maybe Your Honor already knows this, but in our -- in
15 the final order in the Royal Oak case, the court said
16 Kickham Hanley, PLLC is hereby appointed trustee of a
17 litigation trust --

18 THE COURT: I -- yeah.

19 MR. KICKHAM: -- hereby established for the
20 benefit of the class members. So --

21 THE COURT: I -- I understand that. And I'm
22 just curious what -- if -- if I -- if in this -- in the
23 context of this CZ case --

24 MR. KICKHAM: Mm-hmm.

25 THE COURT: -- I say Matt Spry over there is

1 hereby appointed as the legal guardian of Sister Counsel
2 back there. Do I have some kind of authority to do that?

3 It -- you're -- you're saying that in the
4 context of a cause of action of class versus Royal Oak,
5 that presiding trial judge had the power to create a trust
6 or -- and appoint a trustee?

7 MR. KICKHAM: Yes.

8 THE COURT: It -- okay. I thought trusts were
9 handled --

10 MR. WEBSTER: And now I'm a little --

11 THE COURT: -- by the probate court. But --
12 again, the -- the pleadings and the -- and the -- in that
13 case speak for themselves and nobody's -- nobody's running
14 with this. So I -- I'm --

15 MR. WEBSTER: I understand. I just wanted to
16 point out I have now heard two different things, because I
17 wrote a note down that admitted that there wasn't any
18 authority, this is just how the way they did it, and now I
19 hear that there is some authority. So we'll --

20 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I -- I'm sorry --

21 MR. WEBSTER: -- just leave that as an open --

22 THE COURT: He -- he said it was authority --

23 MR. KICKHAM: I said --

24 THE COURT: -- and that the authority was
25 through Judge Kumar. I -- I gotcha.

1 MR. KICKHAM: I said there was no case law that
2 I'm aware of that I can cite to the Court --

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 MR. KICKHAM: -- where another class action has
5 resulted in an assignment to a trust for the benefit of
6 the class.

7 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

8 MR. KICKHAM: But the -- the authority that
9 we're relying on in this case is Judge Kumar's order.

10 THE COURT: Sure. Okay. Yeah. Okay.

11 Continuing with Court's deliberations.

12 Again, in Plaintiff's -- Defendant's brief,
13 Plaintiff Kickham Hanley, PLLC filed this action, no it
14 didn't, it's not a law firm -- Plaintiff is not a law
15 firm, it purports to be a trust. Plaintiff represented a
16 class. Again, at least according to the pleadings, no it
17 didn't. Plaintiff -- a law firm represented a class and
18 the Plaintiff in this case is not a law firm, but it
19 purports to be the trustee. That's -- that's beating a
20 dead horse.

21 Page -- I don't know if you are gentlemen are
22 interested in following along -- page five onto six of
23 Defendant's brief. Well, this is just on the same -- the
24 -- what you're referring to Mr. Kickham about the
25 settlement or the pleadings signed by the trial court over

1 there that Kickham Hanley, PLLC is hereby appointed
2 trustee of a litigation trust, whatever that is, hereby
3 established, however that occurs, in the -- in the context
4 of that litigation for the benefit of the class members.

5 How does a court in some lawsuit appoint a
6 trustee? A court presiding over a lawsuit can establish a
7 litigation trust, quote, whatever that is? But, again,
8 that's just on that same subject.

9 Now onto Plaintiff's response brief, page three,
10 bullet point number four; no, this is -- this -- maybe
11 it's not pre -- precisely bullet point four, but maybe
12 it's just an idle thought. If you -- or if -- if
13 taxpayers sued Royal Oak -- maybe I'm repeating myself,
14 I'm not sure -- if taxpayers sued Royal Oak for a dollar,
15 which dollars was but a pass-through from Kuhn, and
16 taxpayer contends that in some other -- no, if you,
17 Plaintiff trust -- yeah, see I'm getting confounded
18 because I'm call -- I'm -- I'm equating Plaintiff with the
19 taxpayer, but that's not so.

20 Let me just -- if you, Plaintiff taxpayer sued
21 Royal Oak for a dollar, which \$1.00 was but a pass-through
22 from Kuhn and you taxpayer contend that in some other case
23 Royal Oak -- oh yeah -- in some other hypothetical case,
24 Royal Oak could sue Kuhn for that same \$1.00, despite it
25 having passed it through to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff gets

1 its \$1.00 back from Royal Oak for Royal Oak's -- well,
2 I'll call it quote, illegality, even though Mr. Kickham is
3 not calling it illegality -- and Royal Oak gets its \$1.00
4 back for Kuhn's illegality, what then if taxpayer does not
5 sure Royal Oak, but Royal Oak sues Kuhn? Royal Oak could
6 receive its \$1.00 back from Kuhn and keep it, despite
7 having received that very representative dollar from
8 plaintiff. That's a curiosity.

9 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I think the -- the way -- if
10 I can sum up what I think --

11 THE COURT: Please.

12 MR. KICKHAM: -- you're saying is if we prevail
13 in this case, Royal Oak will be unjustly enriched, because
14 it --

15 THE COURT: No. Let me put it -- let me put it
16 this way. Let's put it -- let's put it a different way.
17 Let's say that you never -- that these two lawsuits never
18 existed. Let's say in truth in that scenario Kuhn --
19 let's say Kuhn identified X as 6 --

20 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

21 THE COURT: -- with me so far?

22 MR. KICKHAM: Yes.

23 THE COURT: Let's assume that X in truth is --
24 equals 1 --

25 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

1 THE COURT: -- let's say Kuhn charged Royal Oak
2 6, Royal Oak charged tax -- the taxpayers 6, and let's now
3 add one other ingredient to that parallel universe. Royal
4 Oak sues Kuhn for 5 bucks. Royal Oak could, because it's
5 a real cause of action, you just got assigned it, Royal
6 Oak prevails -- that's maybe -- maybe mine's the long way
7 around what you just said -- Royal Oak gets 5 bucks, puts
8 it in its pocket, even though it received 5 bucks from the
9 taxpayers. No problem?

10 MR. KICKHAM: Royal Oak would have to distribute
11 that 5 bucks -- and it's not taxpayers -- just to be very
12 precise, it's rate payers --

13 THE COURT: Thank you. Rate pay --

14 MR. KICKHAM: -- but Royal Oak would have to
15 distribute that \$5.00 per rata to the rate payers.

16 THE COURT: Why? What -- what if there was no
17 lawsuit? Well, that's too -- that's too far of a
18 hypothetical --

19 MR. KICKHAM: Well, it -- then if -- if it
20 didn't, then there could be a lawsuit by the rate payers
21 against Royal Oak, because Royal Oak would no longer have
22 charged those rate payers based on what Royal Oak itself
23 was charged.

24 THE COURT: Then how do you square that reality
25 with the same notion that you contend that Royal Oak

1 suffered no damages?

2 MR. KICKHAM: I'm sorry. We don't contend that
3 Royal Oak suffered no damages. We -- we contend they did
4 suffer damages.

5 THE COURT: Then -- then the taxpayers -- okay,
6 then -- then that's my -- I'm starting to fall apart here
7 --

8 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I think where I see -- if I
9 may, where you're going with this is --

10 THE COURT: Okay.

11 MR. KICKHAM: -- the -- the solution is we're --
12 we, the trust, are going to distribute this money to all
13 of the class members, to the original rate payers to whom
14 it was passed on anyway.

15 THE COURT: I -- I -- I gotcha.

16 MR. KICKHAM: Royal Oak is not keeping this
17 money.

18 THE COURT: I gotcha. I'm --

19 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

20 THE COURT: -- you're -- you're -- you're kind
21 of doing like he did and giving me empirical, you know,
22 satisfaction. That -- I'm -- let's go back to my question
23 --

24 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

25 THE COURT: -- that these two lawsuits didn't

1 exist --

2 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

3 THE COURT: -- that a wrong -- a -- a
4 transgression occurred that -- that Kuhn wrongfully
5 charged \$5.00 per gallon too much --

6 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

7 THE COURT: -- to Royal Oak --

8 MR. KICKHAM: Royal Oak --

9 THE COURT: -- and Royal Oak sued on that --

10 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

11 THE COURT: -- and recovered. The only way the
12 universe could be at peace would be if Royal Oak took that
13 judgment proceeds and distributed it to the rate payers.

14 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

15 THE COURT: Yet they are -- okay. Okay.

16 Anything further that you want to chime in on
17 that little nugget? If not, that's okay.

18 MR. KICKHAM: No, I --

19 THE COURT: All right.

20 MR. KICKHAM: -- I think that's our position.

21 THE COURT: Okay.

22 MR. KICKHAM: The Court has --

23 THE COURT: Anything you want to chime in on
24 that nugget? Maybe not. I -- I don't know.

25 MR. WEBSTER: Well, I -- I don't -- with respect

1 to that, the fact is the colloquy with counsel is dealing
2 with a hypothetical that is not the allegations contained
3 in the complaint.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. WEBSTER: Right? So what we're dealing with
6 here is the reality is they're claiming not an amount
7 above or beyond, but the amount of the pass-through is the
8 claimed damages in this case. So -- and -- and
9 interestingly --

10 THE COURT: Well, if I -- let me -- let me just
11 make sure I'm not completely falling off the map here.

12 MR. WEBSTER: Sure.

13 THE COURT: Am I correct, Mr. Kickham, that
14 you're saying that there -- okay. No, you've -- you said
15 it before. Kuhn's gouge to Royal Oak and Royal Oak's pass
16 -- pass-through to the rate payers is not a gouge to the
17 rate payers?

18 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct. Not --

19 THE COURT: Gouge meaning a legal wrong.

20 MR. KICKHAM: It is not a legal wrong.

21 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

22 MR. KICKHAM: Not if Royal Oak itself has been
23 charged that amount.

24 THE COURT: If -- if, hypothetically, Kuhn's X
25 of 6 was wrong and that X is only 1, do you agree -- in --

1 not in this case, because you're taking that position --
2 in such a scenario, Kuhn's gouging of Royal Oak to 5 and
3 Royal Oak's pass-through of that 5 to the rate payers is
4 not a wrong by -- by Royal Oak to the rate payers, and the
5 rate payers have not suffered -- you know, I don't know if
6 that's the same thing to ask if the rate payers suffered
7 -- do you say the rate payers have been suffered -- have
8 suffered?

9 MR. WEBSTER: That's what the -- that's
10 specifically what the allegations were.

11 THE COURT: Are you saying that the rate payers
12 suffered?

13 MR. KICKHAM: Well, they -- they have, but it's
14 in --

15 THE COURT: They've -- they've occasioned no
16 wrong, but they've suffered a loss?

17 MR. KICKHAM: They have a suffered a loss, but
18 it's an incidental loss that's not actionable. It's --
19 it's the same thing --

20 THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree that it's not
21 actionable? Thank you. That's what I've been --

22 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

23 THE COURT: -- you said it more --

24 MR. KICKHAM: Not -- not actionable by the rate
25 payers.

1 THE COURT: Right. Do you agree in that
2 hypothetical that the rate payers have -- have no cause of
3 action?

4 MR. WEBSTER: No. I mean, that's specifically
5 the allegations that were complained of in the class
6 action matter.

7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks. Just a
8 second.

9 MR. WEBSTER: Your Honor?

10 THE COURT: Go ahead.

11 MR. WEBSTER: May we approach for just a minute?

12 THE COURT: Sure you may.

13 (At 3:31 p.m., bench conference)

14 (At 3:32 p.m., bench conference concluded)

15 THE COURT: Let me see. Let me see.

16 MR. WEBSTER: And then whatever transpires --

17 THE COURT: Let --

18 MR. WEBSTER: -- if the Court make a phone call.

19 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. Oh, yeah. Will you
20 call Judge Jarbou; tell her we still have Mr. Webster
21 here, who will be with them shortly.

22 I'm going to see if I can cut it short here.

23 Page 9 of Plaintiff's response -- I -- I think
24 I'm going to cut off -- no more colloquy, but just
25 observations and maybe ultimately a ruling.

1 Courts will construe and enforce government
2 resolutions in the same manner as statutes. Don't you
3 mean or wish to say contracts, Plaintiff? That's kind of
4 an -- an idle comment. I know you're analogizing it to
5 the contract claim.

6 It seems like Plaintiff what --

7 MR. WEBSTER: In -- in that regard I would just
8 point out, Your Honor, I mean, we did cite to the Court
9 the case law that identifies resolutions, statutes, and
10 ordinances --

11 THE COURT: I -- I understand. Right. Thank
12 you.

13 Your -- Plaintiff, it seems like you're saying
14 that because a contract -- we're -- we're on the topic of
15 breach of contract. It seems like Plaintiff is saying
16 that because a contract obligor is obliged to comply with
17 the contract, and is liable for breaching that contract if
18 he dishonors it, and similarly if a resolution obligor
19 breaches that resolution, he too is liable; therefore, a
20 resolution is a contract.

21 MR. KICKHAM: Well, that may be a way to put it.
22 I mean, what we're saying is that a resolution, once
23 legally adopted, becomes binding on all citizens; that --
24 and we have this published case, Hardaway versus Wayne
25 County, if the language of the resolution is certain and

1 unambiguous, courts must apply the resolution as written.
2 And these -- these are treating resolutions as if they're
3 enforceable like contracts --

4 THE COURT: I -- I gotcha.

5 MR. KICKHAM: -- so -- and that's why we have
6 our assumpsit claim, which we pleaded in the alternative,
7 because --

8 THE COURT: I got it. Yeah, don't worry about
9 the alternative --

10 MR. KICKHAM: Okay.

11 THE COURT: -- we're on the breach of contract
12 --

13 MR. KICKHAM: Right.

14 THE COURT: Just a second.

15 (At 3:35 p.m., off the record)

16 (At 3:35 p.m., on the record)

17 MR. WEBSTER: I appreciate it. Thank you, Your
18 Honor.

19 THE COURT: Well, if you're maintaining that
20 that is so -- if John has red hair and Bill has red hair,
21 therefore they are the same person, there is union and --
22 there is union out there, and then there's intersection
23 out there, there are common features, and there are
24 identical features. You're saying that these common
25 features renders the essence the same; a resolution

1 therefore is a contract, because breaching both requires
2 damages.

3 MR. KICKHAM: Well, I would say that it -- it's
4 -- would be binding on both sides. It's not only Royal
5 Oak who can sue for breach of this resolution. I submit
6 that if Royal Oak didn't pay as required, the Kuhn
7 Drainage District would sue Royal Oak, and it would say
8 Royal Oak has breached some sort of contract.

9 THE COURT: I gotcha.

10 MR. KICKHAM: What -- what other cause of action
11 -- I mean, I -- rhetorically, what other cause of action
12 would they have?

13 MR. WEBSTER: I can explain that if -- briefly.

14 THE COURT: If you want, go ahead.

15 MR. WEBSTER: I would just simply say -- so a
16 drainage district is a creature of -- this one is a
17 creature of Chapter 20. Chapter 20 authorizes the means
18 in which to effectuate the payment. In addition, Chapter
19 20 also allows -- which was -- which was not the case
20 here.

21 Chapter 20 could enter into a contract. You
22 could have a document that says hereby whereas, right, and
23 then it could do that. And so there are two means here.
24 What's notable is there is no contract.

25 THE COURT: Assumpsit per -- per Plaintiff, and

1 certainly, I think the Court would agree, as with
2 Defendant, is an equitable cause of action. Okay
3 Plaintiff, so long as you can show me how or that the law
4 authorizes double-dipping -- you're not going to contend
5 that it's double dipping here -- a middleman who passes
6 through an overcharge to a bag man may recover his
7 overpayment, despite having recouped his loss from the
8 pocket of another. And if that middle man who, from the
9 tenure if not explicit words of your pleadings here, and
10 in another case, though authored by you wearing a
11 different hat, has merely passed through, not passed
12 through plus some, neither profited nor lost any money,
13 ought, in equity, specifically assumpsit, as opposed to
14 law, to double-dip, then let me see it. But if the
15 authority for the double dipping is not borne in chancery
16 court, then don't you, Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak, come
17 here to this chancery court with two hands outreached.

18 I think you already spoke to that in your
19 answer, and the bottom line is no.

20 The trustee's claim is not barred by
21 governmental immunity, Defendant recognizes that.

22 Page 15 of the response. The Supreme Court
23 recognized two important principles that destroyed
24 Defendant's immunity argument here. One, dot, dot, dot,
25 and two, that a citizen's claim to recover the money is an

1 equitable action to recover an unlawful exaction. But
2 you, Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak, are here in equity
3 seeking return of money from -- well, my words, you don't
4 join -- from your thief which vacancy you have filled with
5 money you in turn exacted from someone else. Your coffers
6 have been refilled, your inventory of cash has been
7 restocked, your barn crops have been replenished. Equity
8 via assumpsit beckons not for you double-dipping, it would
9 seem. I -- I'm not --

10 MR. KICKHAM: Well, Your Honor, again --

11 THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. Go ahead.

12 MR. KICKHAM: -- it's not a double-dip, because
13 Royal Oak -- the trustee standing in the shoes of Royal
14 Oak is going to distribute this money to the class
15 members. Royal Oak is not going to keep a penny of it.

16 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

17 MR. KICKHAM: And this goes back again to the
18 Southern Pacific versus Darnell-Taenzer Lumber --

19 THE COURT: You're -- you're pre -- you're
20 implying that the Court is not looking at the trustee.
21 You're think -- you're thinking that the Court thinks that
22 the trustee is different than Royal Oak. Ad I'm not. I'm
23 not saying -- I'm say -- you -- I'm running with your
24 contention that you are Royal Oak.

25 So go -- go ahead --

1 MR. KICKHAM: But Royal Oak -- if -- if Royal
2 Oak -- again, going back to your hypothetical -- if Royal
3 Oak itself alone, without any prior suit by a class of
4 people, were suing on these overcharges, when it got the
5 money back, it would have to distribute that money to the
6 rate payers.

7 MR. WEBSTER: Royal Oak specifically is -- is
8 released here now and forever and for all time from the
9 class. That's the way this contract was created.

10 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Thank you. All
11 right. All right.

12 MR. KICKHAM: And, Your Honor, I'm not sure I
13 agree with that statement, and I'm looking for a copy of
14 the release we signed in the prior --

15 THE COURT: Okay. No problem. It -- it -- it's
16 not part of the Court's adjudication. I haven't even got
17 to an adjudication yet.

18 With respect to the 20 day limitations period,
19 Defend -- Plaintiff, you say that your beef is Kuhn's
20 failure to comply with the resolution. The resolution
21 says, for example, charge Royal Oak \$1.00 and instead,
22 Kuhn charged Royal Oak 2. Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak, was
23 obliged -- according to the Defendant -- to object within
24 20 days of the passage -- passing of that resolution, or
25 to the \$1.00 resolution.

1 This Court agrees with Plaintiff that it, a/k/a
2 Royal Oak, is not obliged to object within 20 days of the
3 passage of the \$1.00 resolution that Kuhn is actually
4 charging 2.

5 So that -- on that argument, the Court agrees
6 with the Plaintiff.

7 MR. WEBSTER: If -- if I may just point out --

8 THE COURT: Yes.

9 MR. WEBSTER: -- that the specific allegation in
10 the complaint is that the resolution obligated the County
11 to pass-through to the City the City's proportionate share
12 of the DWSE/GLWA action charges. That's the basis for
13 their claim. There is no such language in the resolution.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. WEBSTER: Okay?

16 THE COURT: Thank you.

17 MR. WEBSTER: And so -- and so they're arguing a
18 -- they're arguing about trying to insert language in
19 there trying to say what the resolution -- the resolution
20 should have said.

21 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

22 MR. WEBSTER: Chapter 20 says if you have any
23 problems with that resolution, you got to bring it within
24 20 days.

25 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

1 MR. WEBSTER: And the policy or the purpose
2 behind that is that based upon the adoption of the
3 resolution -- the district, oftentimes then financing is
4 put in place and -- and so it has to rely upon the
5 obligation then of the communities to -- to pay that.
6 That's why the short time frame is there.

7 Now they're saying we're not trying enforce a
8 resolution -- they're trying to put words in the
9 resolution, they're trying to say oh, we're just trying to
10 enforce it. The Court should recognize that aspect as we
11 outline in our brief.

12 THE COURT: If class is disqualified to recover
13 for Kuhn's thieving of Royal Oak, which Royal Oak foisted
14 upon the class, because the class wasn't directly robbed
15 by Kuhn and has no privity, or no standing against Kuhn,
16 if Royal Oak is disqualified to recover for Kuhn's
17 thievery of itself, because Royal Oak has recovered its
18 loss from the class, then Kuhn enjoys with impunity its
19 ill-gotten gains. Plaintiff here says that it could not
20 sue Kuhn. Kuhn is beholding only to Royal Oak.

21 MR. KICKHAM: No, that's -- that's exactly
22 right, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

24 MR. KICKHAM: That's the Southern Pacific case
25 --

1 THE COURT: I got it.

2 MR. KICKHAM: -- right there --

3 THE COURT: That's -- that's the -- I --

4 MR. WEBSTER: Well, even using though
5 Plaintiff's own analogy, the -- of the antitrust law, it
6 specifically allows for indirect purchaser allegations,
7 right --

8 THE COURT: I got it.

9 MR. WEBSTER: -- and so, you know, that
10 assertion and the conclusion of -- of that to serve as a
11 basis to undermine the fact that he doesn't have any
12 damages is not -- there's no authority for that.

13 THE COURT: The Plaintiff's final analogy about
14 Ford. Supplier number one contracts with Ford to supply
15 parts, Ford to pay \$30.00, supplier demands \$50.00 in
16 breach of the \$30.00 contract term. Supplier number two
17 contracts with Ford to supply the needed parts in exchange
18 for Ford to pay \$40.00. Ford contracts with a customer to
19 sell a car at X price plus \$10.00, representing the \$40.00
20 additional amount that Ford had to pay supplier number
21 two; Ford's original price of \$30.00 plus the added price
22 from supplier number two. What are Ford's damages from
23 supplier one? To compare apples with apples, we must
24 limit Ford's damages to compensatory not punitive,
25 liquidated, etcetera. So what did Ford quote, lose? It

1 lost sales. Say it lost three sales, \$150.00 profit,
2 \$50.00 times three cars. Those three customers sue Ford
3 for say false advertising. The price was -- price was X,
4 but it turned out to be X plus ten. In exchange for
5 Ford's dismissal from their lawsuit, Ford assigns them its
6 claim against supplier number one.

7 But the class in the earlier lawsuit claims what
8 against Royal Oak? If Royal Oak did no wrong against
9 Plaintiff, unlike Ford, which breached its price quote to
10 customer, then Royal Oak had nothing to obtain in exchange
11 for its claim assignment to Plaintiff. Oh, but it did
12 have something to obtain, freedom from defending a
13 frivolous lawsuit, question mark.

14 So let's say Plaintiff class frivolously sued
15 Royal Oak, let's say Kuhn was gouging Royal Oak, but Royal
16 Oak didn't care, because it was passing all -- passing it
17 all through to Plaintiff class. Plaintiff class can't sue
18 Kuhn directly, or can it? See Kuhn's reply brief
19 concerning MCL 445. If Plaintiff class could have sued
20 Kuhn directly, it didn't; query claim and issue
21 preclusion.

22 MR. WEBSTER: And I would -- I would also
23 identify that in addition to that concept the Court might
24 have just mentioned, in the context of the prior case,
25 Royal Oak, who's here today, didn't assert any claim to

1 bring GWK in that lawsuit.

2 THE COURT: That's empirical, but that -- it's a
3 fact, but it's --

4 MR. WEBSTER: And it -- it's a fact it didn't
5 happen, so --

6 THE COURT: -- empirical. Could have.

7 MR. WEBSTER: -- that's -- that is another --

8 THE COURT: Arguably.

9 MR. WEBSTER: -- that is another thing for the
10 Court's consideration here.

11 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

12 Go ahead. Go ahead.

13 MR. KICKHAM: Your Honor, as I've said before
14 probably more than once, the Kuhn District was not a
15 necessary party for the parties to the underlying case to
16 obtain complete relief.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 MR. KICKHAM: There was no need to join the Kuhn
19 District in that case.

20 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

21 MR. WEBSTER: And was not -- it may not have
22 been a necessary party, but then when they settle that out
23 under these terms and conditions, where they -- where they
24 create their own assignment, and they create this cause of
25 action with the trustee, right, then -- and then try to

1 pursue it where there is no damages, should've been
2 cognizant of that and brought them in if that was what
3 their intention was. That would have been the fair thing
4 to do.

5 THE COURT: Defendant's reply brief, page 1, II-
6 A, Plaintiff effectively concedes that the quote,
7 resolution contained a final order of apportionment that
8 is not a contract. This subject -- this topic seems to be
9 the heart of the issue; whether or not Kuhn complied with
10 or violated the resolution. If he -- I say he -- if it --
11 if the Defendant complied with it, then Plaintiff, also
12 known as Royal Oak, had 20 days from its passage to object
13 to it. But despite that time having passed, it's a moot
14 point, since Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak's only arrow in it
15 quiver is the application of the resolution to the
16 numbers.

17 If it is established that Plaintiff's, Royal
18 Oak, application of the resolution to the numbers was
19 wrong, and Kuhn did comply with the resolution, then
20 Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak's case is over with, since
21 Plaintiff, a/k/a Royal Oak did not object to the
22 resolution in the first place. And even if it, did or
23 upon learning that its application was wrong, didn't come
24 to object, well, it's way beyond 20 days and thus too
25 late.

1 You would agree, of course, that if you turn out
2 -- if it turns out to be that your application of the
3 resolution to actual dollars was wrong and that Kuhn's was
4 right, you have no cause of action.

5 MR. KICKHAM: That's correct.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 MR. KICKHAM: If our numbers are wrong.

8 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

9 Can we put to rest, Defendant, your effort to
10 characterize Plaintiff's cause of action as a negligence
11 claim? He has -- he has disavowed that vehicle of
12 recovery, so can we put it to rest?

13 MR. WEBSTER: I think we -- yeah, we originally
14 filed this in August --

15 THE COURT: Okay.

16 MR. WEBSTER: -- we didn't know the true nature
17 of it.

18 THE COURT: Fine. No problem. I'm not
19 criticizing. I just want to --

20 MR. WEBSTER: Understood.

21 THE COURT: -- make sure we can put it to rest.

22 The Court -- well, let's see. Hold on. Roman
23 numeral C in the reply brief, Plaintiff's attempt to
24 distinguish the words contest and enforce is an exercise
25 in semantics and does not excuse it from the requirements

1 in Chapter 20. Indeed, the courts have imposed Chapter
2 20's requirements on both contest to the language and the
3 enforcement or levying of assessments.

4 Example hypothetical number one, language.
5 Plaintiff, I object to the language of the resolution, to
6 wit \$1.00 per gallon. In such a scenario, the trial
7 court, if it was after 20 days, would say the case is
8 dismissed, Plaintiff's objection is greater than 20 days
9 after the resolution has passed.

10 Example number two, under the context of
11 enforcement of levying. Plaintiff is heard to say I
12 object to my bill of \$1.00 per gallon, trial court would
13 hold case dismissed, or maybe not trial court, but the
14 administrative agency, whatever, would hold that the case
15 or the objection is overruled, Plaintiff's objection to
16 the manifestation of the resolution is greater than 20
17 days after the resolution's passage. But here, for
18 example, Plaintiff contends ultra vires. Plaintiff, I
19 object to my bill of \$2.00 per gallon given the resolution
20 directs \$1.00 per gallon. The trial -- the court would
21 hold that the case proceeds. It's not mere semantics.

22 That is the position of the Plaintiff of course,
23 correct?

24 MR. KICKHAM: That's right.

25 THE COURT: The Court has considered the

1 arguments of counsel, considered the applicable law. The
2 Court finds the motion for summary disposition is to be
3 granted. The Court is -- finds that the case does not
4 sound in contract, for the reasons stated by the
5 Defendant, and adopts those reasons.

6 With respect to the assumpsit claim, the Court
7 recognizing that it is in equity consistent with the
8 Court's musings and limited to those arguments excusing
9 the arguments that the Court specifically found
10 unpersuasive by the Defendant, the Court otherwise adopts
11 the Defendant's arguments and finds the case is not viable
12 in assumpsit.

13 And it is without need for argument -- I don't
14 see how, but I'll give you a minute, Mr. Kickham -- with
15 respect to your motion to amend the pleadings, the Court's
16 analysis and -- and its ruling would seem -- I'm -- I'm
17 just going to call it -- is of the opinion that your
18 unjust enrichment claim would fall victim to the same
19 analysis, and it's for that reason the Court would
20 decline, without oral argument, the motion for the
21 amendment.

22 That also therefore moots the Defendant's
23 request for relief from the time for discovery compliance.

24 That's the rulings of the Court.

25 Thank you, gentlemen.

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MR. KICKHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. WEBSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(At 3:53 p.m., proceedings concluded)

- - -

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this transcript, consisting of 93 pages, is a true and accurate transcription, to the best of my ability, of the video proceeding in this case before the Honorable Daniel Patrick O'Brien on Wednesday, October 25, 2017, as recorded by the clerk.

Videotape proceedings were recorded and were provided to this transcriptionist by the Circuit Court and this certified reporter accepts no responsibility for any events that occurred during the above proceedings, for any inaudible and/or indiscernible responses by any person or party involved in the proceedings, or for the content of the videotape provided.

Deanna L. Harrison

/s/ Deanna L. Harrison, CER 7464
About Town Court Reporting, Inc.
248-634-3369

Exhibit 11

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC, as Trustee
for a Certified Class of Persons Defined
in the Final Judgment and Order Approving
Class Settlement Dated June 14, 2017
Entered in Oakland County Circuit Court
Case No. 14-138919-CZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

Honorable Daniel O'Brien

Case 2017-159351-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,

Defendant.

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Jamie K. Warrow (P61521)
Edward F. Kickham III (P70332)
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**ORDER (1) GRANTING THE DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, (2)
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE, AND (3) DEEMING MOOT THE
DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION TO EXTEND
REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY**

At a session of the Court, held in the City of
Pontiac, County of Oakland, state of Michigan on
10/27/2017.

Present: Honorable DANIEL PATRICK O'BRIEN
Circuit Court Judge

On October 25, 2017, (1) Defendant George W. Kuhn Drain Drainage District's (the "Drainage District") Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116 (C)(7) and MCR 2.116 (C)(8) ("Motion to Dismiss"), (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint ("Motion for Leave"), and (3) the Drainage District's Motion to Extend the Deadline to Respond to Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery Requests and All Other Discovery ("Motion to Extend Regarding Plaintiff's Discovery") were before the Court, briefing having been submitted and argument having been heard, and the Court being fully advised;

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Drainage District's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED for the reasons stated on the record.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave is DENIED for the reasons stated on the record.
3. The Drainage District's Motion to Extend Regarding Plaintiff's Discovery is MOOT as stated on the record because no discovery responses are due based on the above rulings.
4. Plaintiff's case is dismissed with prejudice.

This is a final order as it resolves the last pending claim and closes the case.

/S/DANIEL PATRICK O'BRIEN

Circuit Court Judge MRS

Approved as to form only:

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/Edward F. Kickham III (w/consent)

Edward F. Kickham III (P70332)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/Peter H. Webster

Peter H. Webster (P48783)

Scott A. Petz (P70757)

Attorneys for Defendant George W. Kuhn

Drain Drainage District

BLOOMFIELD I2840-401 I944837v1

Exhibit 12

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Order

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

April 29, 2020

Bridget M. McCormack,
Chief Justice

159758

David F. Viviano,
Chief Justice Pro Tem

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Justices

v

SC: 159758
COA: 341076
Oakland CC: 2017-159351-CZ

OAKLAND COUNTY MICHIGAN,
Defendant,
and

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.

_____/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 2, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.



10420

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 29, 2020

Clerk

Cross-Appx Page 411

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

Honorable David M. Cohen

v.

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

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NOTICE OF HEARING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant George W. Kuhn Drainage District's Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) will be brought on for hearing before the Honorable David M. Cohen on **Wednesday, August 30, 2023**, beginning at **8:30 a.m.** via Zoom.

Respectfully Submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/Peter H. Webster

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Dated: July 25, 2023

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 25, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MiFile TrueFiling system which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record.

/s/Peter H. Webster

Peter H. Webster (P48783)

Attorney for Defendant George W. Kuhn

Drainage District

pwebster@dickinsonwright.com

EXHIBIT - 6

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a
Class of similarly situated persons
and entities.

Case No 2023- 200422-CZ
Hon. David M. Cohen

Plaintiff,
v.

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
A component unit of Oakland County
with a separate legal existence, and
CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation.

HEARING DATE:
January 24, 2024 at 9:30 am

Defendant.

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**PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT GEORGE W. KUHN
DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
PURSUANT TO MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND (C)(8)**

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the “Drainage District”) wants the Court to think this case is the same as the 2017 case *Kickham Hanley PLLC v. George W. Kuhn Drainage District*, No. 341076; 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 (May 2, 2019) (the “2017 Action,” Exhibit 2 to Def. Br.), **and** that Plaintiff Jeffrey Eisenberg’s claims in this case are barred by a release in the 2014 case *Schroeder v. Royal Oak*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ.¹ Both of those notions are false. This case does not present “circumstances which have been rejected by two different trial court judges in this circuit and six different appellate judges.” Def. Br., p. 3. It presents new claims and new legal theories, aside from the basic allegation that the Drainage District overcharges Royal Oak’s residents for stormwater disposal.

Assumpsit has not been “abolished” as a cause of action. It is well settled that when there has been an illegal or excessive collection of fees, a plaintiff may maintain an “action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction.” *Bond v. Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.*, 383 Mich. 693, 704; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970). As Plaintiff will discuss in detail below, assumpsit is precisely the correct remedy for the overcharges at issue here.

The Drainage District’s res judicata argument fails because this case does not involve the same parties as the 2017 Action. That fact is obvious from the face of the pleadings, as discussed below. Res judicata also fails because this action is based on conduct by the Drainage District that occurred after the Court of Appeals’ 2019 opinion the 2017 Action. The facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims here had not yet arisen at the time the 2017 Action was resolved. Those facts could not have been litigated in the 2017 Action and are not barred by res judicata.

¹ *Schroeder* was resolved by settlement before the Circuit Court. A copy of the Settlement Agreement in *Schroeder* (without exhibits) is attached as Exhibit 1 to Def. Br. The relevant release language appears on pp. 17-18 of the Settlement Agreement, ¶ 29.

The Drainage District's collateral estoppel claim similarly fails because the Court of Appeals' holdings in prior unpublished cases favor Plaintiff. As Plaintiff will explain, the Court of Appeals twice expressly found that end user ratepayers, like Plaintiff, were the proper parties to bring suit against the Drainage District for its overcharges to Royal Oak, because Royal Oak passed on those overcharges to Plaintiff and the class.

Finally, the Drainage District's release argument fails because the release in the *Schroeder* Settlement Agreement (a) ran only between the *Schroeder* class and the City of Royal Oak, and did not extend to the Drainage District; and (b) the *Schroeder* release applied to claims "from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017", so even if the release did apply to the Drainage District it would not cover the portion of Plaintiff's claims that arose between February 1, 2017 and the present. These facts are obvious from the face of the *Schroeder* Settlement Agreement.

The following chart should help clarify the defects in the Drainage District's motion:

	2014 <i>Schroeder</i> Class Action	2017 Individual Action by Trustee Asserting Claims Assigned by Royal Oak	This Putative Class Action
Plaintiff	Andrew Schroeder, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities	Kickham Hanley PLLC as Trustee for a Certified Class of Persons Defined in the Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Action Settlement Dated June 14, 2017 Entered in Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ	Jeffrey Eisenberg, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities
Defendant	City of Royal Oak	Drainage District	Drainage District
Time Period Covered	1/14/18 – 1/31/17 (end date of release)	7/20/11 – 4/29/20 ²	5/18/17 – present

² The assignment of claims in connection with the *Schroeder* settlement conveyed to the trust "the City's entire right, title and interest in and to any refund which may be owing to the City or to which the City is entitled . . . hereafter until the Assignee's intended suit against Oakland County for the Overcharges is resolved either by settlement or by a final nonappealable order of the Michigan Court having jurisdiction." Assignment, Exhibit A to Exhibit 9 to Def. Br., ¶ 2. The 2017 Action was rendered final and nonappealable by the Michigan Supreme Court's order denying the trustee's application for leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court entered on April 28, 2020. *See* MSC Order, Exhibit 2 hereto. Thus, if the other elements of res judicata applied, which they do not, Plaintiff's

The Court should deny the Drainage District's motion for summary disposition.

II. BACKGROUND

A. *Schroeder v. Royal Oak* Challenged the City of Royal Oak's Apportionment of Stormwater Charges

In 2014, Plaintiff's counsel, Kickham Hanley PLLC ("KH"), brought a class action against the City of Royal Oak on behalf of a resident named Andrew Schroeder. The *Schroeder* case alleged that the City of Royal Oak had overcharged the payers of its stormwater management charges, including Mr. Schroeder, by imposing charges that were motivated by a revenue-raising and not a regulatory purpose, and that were disproportionate to the actual costs of providing stormwater management to Schroeder and the class. See Settlement Agreement, p. 2. Schroeder argued that Royal Oak's stormwater charges were unlawful under the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution, and that by collecting the charges the City had been unjustly enriched. *Id.*; see also *Schroeder* Complaint, Exhibit 1 hereto.

Schroeder did **not** allege that Royal Oak overcharged its ratepayers by including 100% of the Drainage District's charges to Royal Oak in the city's stormwater rates. Royal Oak's overall recoupment of the Drainage District's charges was "designed simply to defray the costs of a regulatory activity" and thus fell outside the scope of Schroeder's claims. *Schroeder* Complaint, ¶ 3. However, Schroeder alleged that Royal Oak had improperly **apportioned** the Drainage District's charges among the city's ratepayers "[b]y imposing the cost of the Stormwater Charges only on water and sanitary sewage disposal customers . . ." *Id.*, ¶ 44. In short, Royal Oak was charging ratepayers for stormwater management not based on how much rain and snow fell on their property but based on how much tap water each ratepayer used. See *Id.*, ¶¶ 41-48. That regime was obviously nonsensical, Schroeder argued, because tap water usage bears no relation to rainfall. A parking lot owner has a great deal of

claims in this action would be barred only as far back as April 29, 2020. But as described throughout this brief, res judicata is entirely inapplicable and does not bar any time period of Plaintiff's claims.

impervious surface, but he or she might use very little tap water, and thus pay very little for stormwater management. *Id.*, ¶ 47. Meanwhile, a large family in a small house might use a large amount of tap water for showers, laundry, etc., and thus pay a great deal for stormwater disposal despite their property having much less impervious surface area than the parking lot.

That Schroeder's claims did not challenged the City's right to recover – **in a fair and lawful manner** – 100% of the charges it paid to the Drainage District is evident from Schroeder's allegation that the City violated its own Ordinance Section 600-1, which provided that "[t]he City shall include each year in its tax budget an amount sufficient to pay for sewage disposal service of a general public nature furnished to the city at large" *Schroeder* Complaint, ¶ 56. The *Schroeder* Settlement Agreement's provision that "Plaintiff and the City agree that the City may continue to include the Stormwater Charges in its calculation of the Rates" (¶ 16) further demonstrates that Schroeder did not challenge Royal Oak's passing through of the Drainage District's charges per se, but only Royal Oak's apportionment of those charges among the *Schroeder* class members.

B. Royal Oak Settled the *Schroeder* Case and Assigned Claims Against the Drainage District to a Trust for the Benefit of the *Schroeder* Class

In 2017, Schroeder and the class settled with Royal Oak for \$2 million in cash plus the assignment of Royal Oak's claims against the Drainage District, which KH had discovered during the course of the *Schroeder* case. *See* Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Def. Br; Assignment of Claims, Exhibit A to Exhibit 9 to Def. Br. Plaintiff Jeffrey Eisenberg was, as the Drainage District states, a member of the *Schroeder* class, received a cash refund, and was a beneficiary of the trust that received the assignment of claims from Royal Oak.

The *Schroeder* Settlement Agreement included a release by "each Class Member" (and their successors, assigns, etc.) of "the City" (and its successors, assigns, etc.) covering claims "which arise from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017 concerning (a) the City's calculation or assessment of the Rates or Charges; (b) the components of costs included in the Rates; and/or (c) the

City's Water and Sewer Fund balance. This release is intended to include all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit concerning the City's Rates and/or Charges." Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Def. Br., ¶ 29. The release does not cover the claims at issue in this action. Here, Plaintiff challenges the Drainage District's charges to Royal Oak, which Royal Oak passes on to Plaintiff. The Drainage District was not a party to the release and the claims at issue here are not related to the claims that were or could have been asserted in *Schroeder* or the specific claims released regarding the City's calculation of its stormwater rates, inclusion of components in those rates, or accumulation of money in its Water and Sewer Fund.

C. The Trust Unsuccessfully Sued the Drainage District for its Overcharges to Royal Oak

Judge Shalina Kumar of this Court approved the settlement in *Schroeder*. Kickham Hanley, as trustee for a trust benefitting the class in *Schroeder*, then sued the Drainage District for breach of contract and assumpsit based on Royal Oak's assignment of claims. See *Kickham Hanley*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 at *2-5. It was undisputed that the 2017 Action, the trustee stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee. *Id.* at *22 ("In this case, plaintiff stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee."); * 5 ("the GWKDD asserted that plaintiff stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee and had no right to any damages from the alleged overcharges because the city passed through the overcharges to the ratepayers and suffered no compensable loss.").

The 2017 Action was not a case by the KH firm in its own capacity, or by Jeffrey Eisenberg, against the Drainage District. It was a case by a trust for which KH happened to be a trustee, and Eisenberg a beneficiary, asserting claims the trust acquired from Royal Oak, that arose from **the Drainage District's conduct towards Royal Oak**. The 2017 Action asserted no claims related to the Drainage District's conduct towards Eisenberg or KH. See *Id.*; see also 2017 Action Complaint, Exhibit 9 to Def. Br., ¶ 1 ("This is an action challenging the amount charged by Defendant Oakland County (hereinafter, the 'County') to the City of Royal Oak (the 'City') for stormwater disposal service

...”); ¶ 42 (“The County has collected amounts in excess of the amounts it was legally entitled to collect from the City for stormwater disposal services.”); ¶ 44 (“The City assigned its claim against the County to Plaintiff on behalf of the Class. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to maintain an equitable action of assumpsit against the County to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction.”).

The trust did not fare well in the 2017 Action. The Court of Appeals held that no contract existed between the Drainage District and Royal Oak. *Kickham Hanley*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 at *7-11. The court held that the trustee, standing in the shoes of Royal Oak, could not recover from the Drainage District for assumpsit because Royal Oak passed on the Drainage District’s charges to the city’s ratepayers. *Id.* at *11-16. The court specifically found that Royal Oak’s ratepayers – i.e., Eisenberg and the putative class in this case – had standing to sue for the Drainage District’s overcharges:

In this case, plaintiff alleged a claim in assumpsit for money had and received on the ground that the GWKDD [here called the “Drainage District”] improperly overcharged Royal Oak contrary to the Drainage Board’s resolution. Plaintiff based that alternative claim on its position as Royal Oak’s assignee. Plaintiff did not dispute that Royal Oak passed through the alleged overcharges to its water and sewer ratepayers. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, as Royal Oak’s assignee, could not maintain the assumpsit claim because Royal Oak suffered no recoverable loss. The trial court did not err in this regard.

Under Michigan law, an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and acquires only the same rights as the assignor and remains subject to the same defenses as the assignor. *Coventry Parkhomes Condo Ass’n v Fed Nat’l Mortg Ass’n*, 298 Mich App 252, 256-257; 827 NW2d 379 (2012). **Therefore, as Royal Oak’s assignee, plaintiff acquired no more rights than Royal Oak had at the time of the assignment and it remained subject to the same defenses as Royal Oak.** In this case, plaintiff sought a refund of the alleged overcharges as Royal Oak’s assignee. Royal Oak, however, passed through to its water and sewer ratepayers the GWKDD’s charges by incorporating them into the water and sewer rates. Royal Oak suffered no loss because the funds it paid to the GWKDD were recovered from its ratepayers who paid their water and sewer bills. The record reflects that plaintiff conceded at the hearing that Royal Oak did nothing wrong and had authority to charge its ratepayers whatever amount the GWKDD charged Royal Oak, including the alleged overcharges, because Royal Oak was “purely a pass-through.” Thus, if the GWKDD overcharged and collected fees from Royal Oak for stormwater disposal, plaintiff can claim no right to recover from the GWKDD because Royal Oak suffered no loss from its payment of the alleged overcharges. Royal Oak passed on the charges and passed on the

ratepayers' payments. Royal Oak recouped any excess payments from its water and sewer ratepayers. **Royal Oak had no claim against the GWKDD that it had in its possession money which in equity and good conscience belonged to Royal Oak. Royal Oak, therefore, occasioned no compensable loss.** *Trevor*, 338 Mich at 224-225; *Hoyt*, 158 Mich at 626. **The trial court correctly discerned that Royal Oak had no claim in assumpsit. Consequently, plaintiff failed and could not state a claim in assumpsit.**

* * *

In this case, plaintiff sued as Royal Oak's assignee for recovery of money paid to the GWKDD. The money plaintiff sought did not belong to Royal Oak, its assignor, but to the ratepayers. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the GWKDD summary disposition of plaintiff's claim in assumpsit. [*Kickham Hanley*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 at *12-16 (emphasis added).]

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the trust's claims – which it brought in the shoes of Royal Oak – against the Drainage District because the court found the trust passed on the cost of the Drainage District's overcharges to the end user ratepayers like Eisenberg.

D. KH Again Unsuccessfully Sued the Drainage District as Trustee of a Trust for the Benefit of Oak Park's Rate Payers

The KH firm, again as a trustee for a trust pursuant to an assignment of claims in connection with a class action settlement, brought a very similar case against the City of Oak Park captioned *Kish v. City of Oak Park*, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 15-149751-CZ. The primary difference between the Royal Oak-derived case and the Oak Park-derived case was that in the Oak Park-derived case, the trustee asserted a claim for unjust enrichment in addition to breach of contract and assumpsit.

In the Oak Park-derived case, the Court of Appeals held that no contract existed between Oak Park and the Drainage District, and that the trust's assumpsit and unjust enrichment claims failed because Oak Park had not suffered any damages. The court held that the end users, not Oak Park, were the "actual ratepayers of the alleged overcharge." *Kickham Hanley PLLC v. GWKDD*, No. 351317; 2021 Mich. App. LEXIS 234 * 16-17 (Jan. 14, 2021) (Exhibit 3 to Def. Br.). Absent a release, those end users are "entitled to recover the overcharges". *Id.* at *20. "For these reasons," said the court,

“plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Oak Park did not incur any damages in this matter.” *Id.*

E. Jeffery Eisenberg Brought Claims Against the Drainage District in this Action, Individually and as Representative of a Class of Royal Oak Stormwater Ratepayers

Plaintiff heard the Court of Appeals loud and clear. The claims against the Drainage District belonged to the end user ratepayers, not the cities who passed on the Drainage District’s charges, including the City of Royal Oak. Accordingly, at the Court of Appeals’ express invitation, Plaintiff brought this new, never-before-seen action by a Royal Oak ratepayer against the Drainage District alleging that he had been injured by the Drainage District’s unlawful failure to correctly apportion its stormwater charges among its member communities, resulting in Royal Oak’s ratepayers paying more than their fair share of the Drainage District’s cost of providing stormwater management services.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate when a claim is barred because of release. A motion under Section (C)(7) requires the court to accept as true the non-moving party’s well-pleaded allegations and construe them in the non-moving party’s favor. *Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Assn. v. Douglas Company*, 224 Mich. App. 335, 340; 568 N.W.2d 847 (1997). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must look to the parties’ pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. *Id.* Where a material factual dispute exists such that factual development could provide a basis for recovery, summary disposition is inappropriate. *Id.* Otherwise, where no material facts are in dispute, this Court may decide the question as a matter of law. *Id.*

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “tests whether the complaint states a claim as a matter of law, and the motion should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” *Feyz v. Mercy Mem. Hosp.*, 475 Mich. 663; 672, 719 N.W.2d 1 (2006). When deciding a motion for summary disposition, “all well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, and construed most

favorably to the nonmoving party.” *Wade v. Dep’t of Corrections*, 439 Mich. 158, 162-163; 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Assumpsit Remains a Proper Remedy for an Unlawful Governmental Exaction

The Drainage District claims that assumpsit has been abolished in Michigan as a cause of action. However, it is well settled that when there has been an illegal or excessive collection of fees, a plaintiff may maintain an “action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction.” *Bond v. Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.*, 383 Mich. 693, 704; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970). Indeed, “an action seeking a refund of fees paid to [a governmental entity] is properly characterized as a claim in assumpsit for money had and received.” *Service Coal Co v. Unemployment Compensation Comm*, 333 Mich. 526, 530-531; 53 N.W.2d 362 (1952); *Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v. Michigan*, 231 Mich. App. 194, 203; 585 N.W.2d 762 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 464 Mich. 21; 627 N.W.2d 236 (2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 36, 123 S. Ct. 371, 154 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2002).

The Drainage District misconstrues the prevailing law. *Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit*, No. 358868; 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 (March 9, 2023) (Exhibit 3 hereto), which the Drainage District cites on pp. 13-14 of its Brief, is unpublished and non-binding. Moreover, the *Midwest Valve* court recognized that “[a]lthough no independent cause of action for assumpsit exists, ‘the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved.’” *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). In this instance, appellant's counts of assumpsit essentially were covered by its claims of unjust enrichment.” *Midwest Valve*, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 at *15, n.6.

The binding, published authority supports Plaintiff’s right to recover in assumpsit. In *Fisher Sand & Gravel*, 494 Mich. at 564, which the Drainage District also cites in its Brief, the court observed that “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was

abolished. **But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]**” *Id.* (emphasis added); *see also Wright v. Genesee Cty.*, 504 Mich. 410, 431-37; 934 N.W.2d 805 (2019) (Markman, J., concurring) (discussing the law of assumpsit at length); *Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton*, No. 360116, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2259, at *26 (Mar. 30, 2023) (quoting *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich. App. 161, 213; 969 N.W.2d 570 (2021)) (Exhibit 4 hereto) (“Though plaintiff’s complaint contains a claim of ‘assumpsit,’ assumpsit has technically been abolished as a cause of action, but ‘the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]’”

Thus, as long as a plaintiff can demonstrate that money was obtained by a defendant in violation of the law, that plaintiff properly invokes the equitable doctrine of assumpsit to obtain a remedy. That is why the Michigan appellate courts have repeatedly recognized long after the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963 that a plaintiff who can establish that the government collected monies in violation of the law can properly invoke the remedy of assumpsit. Here, Plaintiff’s causes of action are based upon the common law requirement that the Drainage District’s charges be “reasonable.” *See* Complaint, ¶¶ 45-62. Assumpsit merely provides the **substantive remedy** for the Drainage District’s violation of the common law. **Assumpsit is not the source of Plaintiff’s substantive rights.**

In *Bond v. Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.*, 383 Mich. 693, 696-97; 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970), the plaintiffs sued the Ann Arbor public school district alleging that the district’s fees for books and supplies violated a provision of the Michigan Constitution that required “a system of free public elementary and secondary schools”. The plaintiffs claimed “that large amounts were illegally collected by defendant from its pupils as general fees, so-called, determined pursuant to a schedule adopted by the board of education of defendant.” *Id.* at 697. The plaintiffs thus sought a “judgment for the full amount of the general fees collected.” *Id.* at 698. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in their favor:

“We remand this cause to the circuit court for the entry of a judgment against defendant for the amount of the general fees collected by it in the sum of \$140,862, plus interest from date of collection of same . . .” *Id.* at 705. In *Bond*, as here, the plaintiffs sued because the defendant had imposed unlawful charges. The *Bond* court ordered the defendant to repay the amounts it had unlawfully collected, and the Court here should do likewise.

Again, Plaintiff's allegations in his Complaint must be taken as true. Because the Complaint alleges that the City imposed water and sewer charges in violation of the common law, statute, and Charter, Plaintiff has properly asserted assumpsit claims in order to provide a substantive remedy for the City's improper collection of the water and sewer charges.

B. Res Judicata Does Not Apply Here Because Plaintiff Was Not a Party to the 2017 Action and Because Plaintiff's Claims Are Based In Part on Conduct that Occurred After the 2017 Action

Res judicata bars a second, subsequent action when “(1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) **the matter contested in the second action was or could have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies.**” *Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgmt, Inc.*, 463 Mich. 569, 575; 621 N.W.2d 222 (2001). “Michigan courts have broadly applied the doctrine of res judicata. They have barred, not only claims already litigated, but every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” *Id.* at 575.

A cursory glance at the caption shows that this case does not involve the same parties as the prior action the Drainage District invokes, or their privies.³ The Drainage District was a defendant to

³ While its privity argument is somewhat unclear, to the extent that the Drainage District is arguing that Mr. Eisenberg was a party or privy to the 2017 Action, the Court should reject its arguments. As the Court of Appeals ruled, and the Assignment confirms, KH was standing in the shoes of the City of Royal Oak in the 2017 Action. While Mr. Eisenberg might have benefited if there had been any recovery from the Drainage District in the 2017 Action, that was not because Eisenberg was a party to that case, but rather because Royal Oak had agreed, as part of the settlement in the *Schroeder* case, to distribute any recovery to Royal Oak's ratepayers.

the 2017 Action, but the plaintiff there was “Kickham Hanley PLLC as Trustee for a Certified Class of Persons Defined in the Final Judgment and Order Approving Class Action Settlement Dated June 14, 2017 Entered in Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 14-138919-CZ.” *See* Complaint in 2017 Action, Exhibit 9 to Def. Brief. Here, the Plaintiff is Jeffrey Eisenberg, individually and as representative of putative class of similarly situated persons and entities. *See generally* Plaintiff's Complaint. Those are obviously two different persons or entities.

The Drainage District knows the Plaintiff here is not the same person or entity as the plaintiff in the 2017 Action. As the Drainage District states in its Brief, in the 2017 action KH “alleged that it was the ‘Trustee for a Class defined in the Final Judgment and Order approving Class Settlement Date June 14, 2017 entered in’ the 2014 Action, and that the Final Judgment and Order in the 2014 Action ‘authorized Plaintiff [i.e., KH] to institute and prosecute this action on behalf of the Class.’” Drainage District Brief, p. 7; *see also Schroeder v. Royal Oak* Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Def. Br., ¶ 17 (“the City will assign any and all claims it may have against Oakland County relating to the Stormwater Overcharge to the Class or an entity formed for the benefit of the Class”); Assignment of Claims, Exhibit A to Exhibit 9 to Def. Br., ¶ 2 (“The City [of Royal Oak] hereby assigns and transfers to Kickham Hanley PLLC, as trustee . . . the City’s entire right, title and interest in and any refund which may be owing to the City or to which the City is entitled by reason of Oakland County’s Overcharges . . .”).

In its opinion affirming this Court’s dismissal of the 2017 Action, Exhibit 2 to Def. Br., the Court of Appeals stated: “Regarding the assumpsit count, **the GWKDD asserted that plaintiff stood in the shoes of Royal Oak as its assignee** and had no right to any damages from the alleged overcharges because the city passed through the overcharges to the ratepayers and suffered no compensable loss.” *Kickham Hanley*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 at *5 (emphasis added).

In light of the pleadings in the 2017 Action, the parties' arguments on summary disposition and on appeal, and the Court of Appeals' holding, there is no question that in the 2017 action, KH stood in the shoes of Royal Oak. KH brought claims that belonged to Royal Oak, as if it **were** Royal Oak. That KH brought those claims as the trustee of a trust for the benefit of class members that included the Plaintiff in this action is irrelevant. The question before the Court of Appeals in the 2017 action was whether Royal Oak had a cause of action against the Drainage District, **NOT** whether Plaintiff or any other resident of Royal Oak or KH in its individual capacity had a cause of action. The Drainage District and its counsel want to shoehorn this case into an obviously meritless res judicata argument.

The Drainage District's argument that KH "is in privity with Plaintiff" is irrelevant and absurd. It is irrelevant because KH did not bring the 2017 Action on its own behalf, but as trustee of a trust for the benefit of persons and entities that included Plaintiff. KH was not a party in its own right. The argument is absurd because a lawyer is not in privity with his or her client for the purpose of res judicata. *See, e.g., Williams v. Logan*, 184 Mich. App. 472, 478; 459 N.W.2d 62 (1990) ("In this case, defendants were the attorney and law firm representing the decedent's estate in the wrongful death action. In that capacity, they did not acquire any interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment in that action. Although defendants had an interest in the sense that they were to receive fees for their services, we are not persuaded that such an interest made them privies; it merely made them independent contractors acting on behalf of their client, the estate.").

Finally, the 2017 Action was resolved on appeal in 2019. It is axiomatic that "res judicata is the doctrine that bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the facts or evidence essential to the maintenance of the two actions are identical. . . . However, if the facts change, or new facts develop, res judicata will not apply." *Labor Council v. City of Detroit*, 207 Mich. App. 606, 607-08; 525 N.W.2d 509 (1994) (quotations omitted); *see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wise*, 277 Mich.

643, 646-47; 270 N.W. 165 (1936) (regarding the rights of parties to contracts, “[t]his court cannot determine the rights of parties upon a state of facts which has not yet arisen”) (citations omitted); *Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co.*, 211 Mich. 592, 592, 179 N.W. 350, 350 (1920) (quoting *Wahl v. Brewer*, 80 Md. 237 (30 Atl. 654) (“It is well settled that a court will never entertain a suit to give a construction or declare the rights of parties upon a state of facts which has not yet arisen, nor upon a matter which is future, contingent and uncertain.”); *In re Hamlet (After Remand)*, 225 Mich. App. 505, 519; 571 N.W.2d 750 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341 (2000) (“If, however, the facts change or new facts develop, res judicata does not apply.”) (citations omitted); *Mazzeola v. Vineyard Homes, Inc.*, 54 Mich. App. 608, 613-14; 221 N.W.2d 406 (1974) (“In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.”) (quotations omitted).

Here, the Drainage District’s imposition and collection of the unlawful charges continued long after 2019. Even if Plaintiff were in privity with KH, he would still be entitled to sue to recover unlawful charges imposed between 2019 and the present. The Court should deny the Drainage District’s motion for summary disposition on the grounds of res judicata.

C. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claims Because the Court of Appeals’ Holdings in Prior Cases Favor Plaintiff

“Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same

parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.” *Radwan v. Ameriprise Ins. Co.*, 327 Mich. App. 159, 166; 933 N.W.2d 385 (2018) (quotation omitted).

Mutuality of estoppel is not required where a party attempts to use collateral estoppel defensively against another party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in another case – i.e., defensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel. *See Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co.*, 469 Mich. 679, 680-81; 677 N.W.2d 843 (2004) (“We hold that, where collateral estoppel is being asserted defensively against a party who has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, mutuality is not required.”).

The Drainage District acts as if Plaintiff was a party to the 2017 *Kickham Hanley* action, such that the same parties are present in this case, but as explained above, he was not. Moreover, how could any issue relevant to this case have been decided in either of the prior trustee versus Drainage District cases, in which the trustees stood in the shoes of Royal Oak and Oak Park?

Breach of Contract. The Court of Appeals held that there was no contract between Royal Oak and the Drainage District, or between Oak Park and the Drainage District. Plaintiff did not plead a breach of contract claim in this case.

Standing to Sue for Assumpsit and Unjust Enrichment. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs in the prior actions – who stood in the shoes of Royal Oak and Oak Park – lacked standing to sue for assumpsit or unjust enrichment because Royal Oak and Oak Park had not suffered an injury. Royal Oak and Oak Park passed on the Drainage District’s charges to ratepayers like Plaintiff, who now brings this case essentially by invitation of the Court of Appeals.

It does not matter that Plaintiff released Royal Oak, and the issue of release **could not have been decided by the Court of Appeals in the *Kickham Hanley* case**, because the Court of Appeals held that **there was no claim by Plaintiff against Royal Oak to release:**

Although the ratepayers may have had viable claims against a government entity for the overcharges they allegedly paid, the class members settled and released

Royal Oak from any and all liability for refunds of their alleged overpayments. Under *Hoyt [v. Paw Paw Grape Juice Co.]*, 158 Mich. 619, 626; 123 N.W. 529 (1909)], the right to bring an action for assumpsit must be held by the plaintiff who can establish that the defendant has in its possession money which, in equity and good conscience, belonged to the plaintiff. In this case, plaintiff sued as Royal Oak's assignee for recovery of money paid to the GWKDD. **The money plaintiff sought did not belong to Royal Oak, its assignor, but to the ratepayers.** Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the GWKDD summary disposition of plaintiff's claim in assumpsit. [*Kickham Hanley*, 2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 1550 at *15-16 (emphasis added).]

In other words, in the *Schroeder* Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff released Royal Oak from liability for certain claims he had against Royal Oak from the beginning of time through January 31, 2017. Plaintiff **did not** release the Drainage District from any claims, and the release of Royal Oak could not apply to any overcharges that occurred after January 2017 – which are the only overcharges at issue in this case. According to the Court of Appeals, Royal Oak did not have any claims against the Drainage District for the overcharges at issue in this case, because Royal Oak passed the overcharges on to Plaintiff and the class. Plaintiff therefore comes to this Court, as he must, alleging claims on his own behalf (and as representative of a class) against the Drainage District for the precise overcharges the Court of Appeals held that the Drainage District imposed against Plaintiff, albeit for a different time period.

If anything, collateral estoppel requires that this Court that as a matter of law, Plaintiff has standing to sue the Drainage District. The Court of Appeals expressly held in **two separate opinions** that an end user ratepayer, like Plaintiff, is the proper party to sue for the same overcharges Plaintiff complains of in this action. The Court should deny the Drainage District's motion for summary disposition.

D. Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Barred By Release Because the Drainage District Was Not a Party to the Release in *Schroeder v. Royal Oak*, and Because the Release Was Time-Limited And Could Not Apply To Conduct Occurring After January 31, 2017

The Drainage District's release argument is every bit as misplaced as its res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments. First, the Drainage District was manifestly not a party to the release in

Schroeder. On its face, the release was clearly between Royal Oak and the *Schroeder* class, including Plaintiff Eisenberg, but it did not extend to the Drainage District. Moreover, the release by its express terms only covered “the **City’s** Rates and Charges,” (emphasis added) and not the Drainage District’s charges to Royal Oak. Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Def. Br., ¶ 29.

Second, even if the Drainage District were a party to the *Schroeder* release (for example, under the “affiliated entities” language in the “friends and family” section of the release), the release only extended through January 31, 2017. The Settlement Agreement’s provision that “the City may continue to include the Stormwater Charges in its calculation of the Rates” (¶ 16) had no bearing on whether the Drainage District could continue to overcharge either the City (as the trust alleged in the 2017 *Kickham Hanley* case) or Plaintiff and the class (as this case alleges). Moreover, the release is expressly limited to claims “that were asserted or could have been asserted” in the *Schroeder* case. Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Def. Br., ¶ 29. Obviously, claims against the Drainage District based on new overcharges occurring after January 2017 could not have been asserted in the *Schroeder* case.

But even if the release did cover the Drainage District, Plaintiff would still be entitled to recover for charges it imposed between February 1, 2017 and the present. Consider a plaintiff who sues for a wrong that began outside the statute of limitations may sue for the same acts that occurred within the limitations period. *See Tnp. of Fraser v. Haney*, 509 Mich. 18, 28-30; 983 N.W.2d 309 (2022) (“plaintiff does not seek a remedy for violations outside the limitations period . . . Plaintiff’s action is timely because it was commenced while defendants’ unlawful conduct was ongoing.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny the Drainage District’s motion for summary disposition.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

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Date: January 9, 2024

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 9, 2024, I electronically served the foregoing document on all counsel of record using the court's electronic filing system.

/s/ Kim Plets
Kim Plets

4884-5276-9947 v.2

EXHIBIT - 1

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This case has been designated as an eFiling case. To review a copy of the Notice of Mandatory eFiling visit www.oakgov.com/clerkrod/efiling.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ANDREW SCHROEDER,
individually, and as representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons
and entities,

Case No. ~~2014-138919-CZ~~ 2014-138919-CZ

Hon. JUDGE KUMAR

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

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**PLAINTIFF'S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT BASED ON DEFENDANT'S
VIOLATION OF HEADLEE AMENDMENT TO THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
AND ROYAL OAK ORDINANCE SECTION 600-1**

Plaintiff Andrew Schroeder ("Plaintiff"), by his attorneys, Kickham Hanley PLLC, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities, states as follows for his Complaint against Defendant City of Royal Oak (the "City"):

INTRODUCTION

1. “When virtually every person in a community is a ‘user’ of a public improvement, a municipal government’s tactic of augmenting its budget by purporting to charge a ‘fee’ for the ‘service’ rendered should be seen for what it is; a subterfuge to evade constitutional limitations on its power to raise taxes.” *Bolt v. City of Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 166, 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998).

2. This is an action challenging the City’s creative yet impermissible financing of its stormwater management obligations through purported “user fees” foisted upon a particularized subset of its citizenry. Plaintiff challenges a mandatory debt service charge (the “Kuhn Facility Debt Charge”) and a mandatory stormwater disposal charge (the “Stormwater Charge”) imposed by the City on users of its water and sanitary sewage disposal services. The City persists in the exaction of these charges even though “the nature of a stormwater management system, which benefits the public without providing any individualized, measurable benefit to individual property owners, does not lend itself to a system of funding based on user fees.” *Dekalb County v. U.S.*, 108 Fed. Cl. 681 (U.S. Court of Claims 2013).

3. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charge, which is incorporated into the water and sanitary sewage disposal rates charged by the City, constitutes a “tax” that has not been authorized by the City’s voters in violation of Article 9, Section 31 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 (the “Headlee Amendment”). The City uses the revenues generated by the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge – approximately \$2.5 million per year -- to pay for its share of the costs of the construction of a major infrastructure improvement (a combined sewer overflow (“CSO”) facility) designed to benefit the general public and which should be financed through general taxation. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charge finances an investment in infrastructure and is not a fee designed simply to defray the costs of a regulatory activity. Therefore, the charge is precisely the type of exaction the Michigan Supreme Court found was an unconstitutional tax in the seminal case of *Bolt v. City of Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998).

4. Further, the Stormwater Charge – totaling approximately \$7 million per year – also constitutes an unlawful tax under the *Bolt* decision because it imposes upon one subset of residents – water and sanitary sewage disposal customers – the financial burden of a governmental activity – stormwater disposal – which benefits the community at large. Indeed, through payment of the water and sewage disposal charges, Plaintiff and the Class are paying the City’s entire cost of stormwater management and disposal.

5. Both the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge and the Stormwater Charge are motivated by a revenue-raising and not a regulatory purpose, the charges to Plaintiff and the Class are grossly disproportionate to the City’s actual costs of providing to Plaintiff and the Class the purported benefits for which the charges are purportedly imposed, and payment of the charges is not voluntary.

6. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charge and the Stormwater Charge also are unlawful because those charges are specifically prohibited by the City Ordinance Section 600-1.

7. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities, seeks, among other things, a refund of all Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges received by the City in the six years preceding the filing of this action and all such charges collected during the pendency of this action. The total amount of the refund required exceeds \$50 million.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. Plaintiff owns improved real property situated in the City of Royal Oak, Oakland County, Michigan, has paid the charges at issue in this case, and seeks to act as a class representative for all similarly situated persons.

9. Defendant City of Royal Oak (the “City”) is a municipality located in Oakland County, Michigan.

10. Venue and jurisdiction are proper with this Court because all parties are present here and the actions which give rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this County. Venue and

jurisdiction also are proper with this Court under Article 9, Section 31 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and MCL 600.308a.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

11. The City maintains and operates a water supply system (the “Water Supply System”) to provide fresh water to inhabitants of the City. The City purchases its water at wholesale from a regional authority known as Southeast Oakland County Water Authority (“SOCWA”). Per its ordinance (Section 752-12), the City assesses water rates (the “Water Rates”) against the “land or premises” receiving water service, and obligates the owner or occupant of such land or premises to pay the Water Rates. Plaintiff has received water service from the City and paid the Water Rates imposed by the City. The City characterizes water service as an “essential service” (Royal Oak Ordinance Section 770-8) and the City’s ordinances and other applicable laws and regulations require or effectively require the structures used by its citizens to be connected to the City’s Water Supply System.

11. Pursuant to its statutory authority, MCL 141.104, the City maintains and operates a sewer system (the “Sewer System”) to provide sanitary sewage treatment and disposal services to inhabitants of the City and to collect snowmelt and rainwater (“stormwater”) runoff. The City contracts with Oakland County (the “County”) for the treatment of sewage and the County, in turn, contracts with the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”) for treatment of the sanitary sewage and ultimate discharge of the effluent. The City also contracts with the County for stormwater disposal and the County, in turn, contracts with DWSD for disposal of the stormwater. The County’s stormwater disposal services are of a general public nature and are furnished to the City at large.

12. Plaintiff, at all relevant times, has received sanitary sewage disposal service from the City and paid the sewage disposal rates (“Sewage Disposal Rates”) imposed by the City. Plaintiff is required or effectively required by Michigan law, the City’s ordinances, and other laws and regulations to utilize the City’s Sanitary Sewer System. *See, e.g.*, MCL 333.12753.

13. The City establishes Water and Sewage Disposal Rates from time to time through legislative action, and revenues generated by the Water and Sewage Disposal Rates are deposited into the City's Water and Sewer Fund. A copy of the City's Water and Sewer Ordinances are attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. The Sewage Disposal Rates are based directly and exclusively on the units of water the sewer customer uses from the City's water supply system.

14. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charge is included in the Water and Sewage Disposal Rates imposed by the City, and for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2013, the City collected Charges in excess of \$2,500,000. The Stormwater Charge also is included in the Water and Sanitary Sewer Rates imposed by the City, and for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2013, the City collected charges in excess of \$7 million.

15. Even after taking into account payments to the County for its obligations relating to the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements and stormwater disposal, the City has consistently experienced an operating profit in its Water and Sewer Fund as a result of imposing Water and Sewer Charges which generate revenues far exceeding the City's actual costs of supplying water and sanitary sewer services to its inhabitants. For example, in FY 2013 (July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013) the City's Water and Sewer Fund had net cash provided by operating activities of **\$7.3 million**, and had net operating income of **\$4.2 million**. See Exhibit B. The total operating income is calculated net of depreciation expenses. As of June 30, 2013, the Water and Sewer Fund had over \$13.9 million in cash and other current assets. See Exhibit B hereto.

**THE CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SANITARY SEWAGE AND STORMWATER**

16. Like many older communities in Southeast Michigan, the City has a combined sanitary and storm sewer system, which is a system that is designed to collect both (i) snowmelt and rainwater ("stormwater") runoff and (ii) domestic sewage and industrial wastewater ("sanitary sewage"), in the same pipe.

17. Sanitary sewage – i.e., spent water from a municipal water supply system which may be a combination of liquid and water-carried wastes -- enters a combined system directly from residences, commercial buildings, industrial plants, institutions and other structures. Owners and/or occupiers of such structures which generate the sewage are “users” of the sanitary sewage disposal services provided by the City.

18. Stormwater, in contrast, does not originate from any use of the water supply system or sanitary sewer system, and its presence in the combined system is wholly unrelated to the amount of tap water used, or sanitary sewage generated, by users of the system whose structures are physically connected to that system. Stormwater collects on both private and public land, roads and other physical surfaces during rainfall events, and the runoff enters the combined sewer system through catch-basins and other collection devices. As a result, “surface run-off cannot be fairly ascribed to individual land-owners' 'use' of the treatment system.” *Hotel Employers Ass'n v. Gorsuch*, 669 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).

19. Even though they have different origins, both sanitary sewage and stormwater collected in a combined sewer system need to be disposed of. The City’s combined sewer system flows to the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System (the “County System”), which is owned and maintained by the County. Except during heavy rainfall when high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and stormwater exceed the outlet capacity to Detroit causing excess flow to be diverted to the Kuhn Facility (as described below), the entire flow from the County System is conveyed to the DWSD treatment plant through Detroit’s Dequindre Interceptor, which contains a master meter which measures the total flow passing from the County System into the DWSD treatment plant. DWSD charges the County for disposing of the sanitary sewage and stormwater and, in turn, the County charges the municipalities who contribute flow to the County System for such disposal. Those municipalities which have a combined sewer system, including the City, are charged a flat rate per month for stormwater disposal per a formula determined by the County. Those municipalities serviced by separate sanitary and stormwater systems do not incur charges from the County for stormwater disposal,

since the stormwater collected by those municipalities does not enter the DWSD system but rather is discharged into neighboring watercourses.

**THE CITY'S USE OF WATER AND SANITARY SEWER REVENUES TO FINANCE
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW FACILITY**

20. Most of the time, combined sewer systems transport all of their sanitary sewage and stormwater to a sewage treatment plant, where it is treated and then discharged to a water body. During periods of heavy rainfall or snowmelt, however, the sanitary sewage and stormwater flow rate in a combined sewer system can exceed the capacity of the sewer system or treatment plant. For this reason, combined sewer systems were designed to overflow occasionally and discharge excess sanitary sewage and stormwater directly into nearby streams, rivers, or other water bodies. Historically, combined sewer overflows ("CSOs") were among the major causes of beach closings and other water quality impairments.

21. Following the passage of the Federal Clean Water Act, the Federal Government developed a nationwide CSO Control Policy and required local communities to implement interim and long-term control plans for combined sewer overflow events.

22. There are two recognized forms of corrective action to address CSOs: (1) separate the sewer system into two separate types of sewers: (a) sanitary sewers designed to carry only sanitary sewage to a wastewater treatment plant, and (b) storm water sewers designed to convey stormwater to nearby rivers, lakes or streams, or (2) install a retention and treatment system ("RTF"), which is designed to capture and treat the combined sanitary sewage and stormwater that would otherwise flow to surface waters untreated. The City is serviced by an RTF, the "Kuhn Facility", as described below.

23. The City is a member of the George W. Kuhn Drainage District (the "District"), which was originally established in 1942 (it was then called the Twelve Towns Drain District), and now includes the City and the cities of Berkley, Birmingham, Clawson, Ferndale, Hazel Park, Huntington Woods, Madison Heights, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Southfield, Troy, and

Royal Oak Township and the Village of Beverly Hills. The District encompasses a drainage area of 24,500 acres upstream of the Red Run Drain, a tributary of the Clinton River.

24. The original RTF servicing the members of the District was constructed in the early 1970s in the bed of the former Red Run Drain. This RTF runs 2.2 miles from Twelve Mile and Stephenson Highway in a northeastern direction to Dequindre Road south of Whitcomb where it empties into the Red Run Drain. The sole purpose of this RTF is to ameliorate the environmental effects of CSOs.

25. During dry weather, all flow from the combined sewer systems of the communities in the District is routed directly to the DWSD Waste Water Treatment Plant, but during heavy rainfall, high volumes of combined sanitary sewage and stormwater (typically more than 93 percent stormwater) exceed the outlet capacity to Detroit causing excess flow to be diverted to the RTF, where it is stored, screened, and disinfected prior to discharge to the Red Run Drain. Thus, the RTF is utilized only when CSO events occur, and the vast majority of the flow treated (approximately 93%) constitutes stormwater runoff. Indeed, it is stormwater, not sanitary sewage, which causes the CSO events and thereby creates the need for the RTF.

26. By the 1990s the RTF could no longer meet more stringent environmental regulations. As part of an agreement with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ"), the City and the other communities in the District were required to plan and construct infrastructure improvements to the RTF aimed at reducing the volume and frequency of the overflows from the RTF into the Red Run Drain, and providing adequate treatment of the overflows when they did occur. By this time, the RTF was known as the George W. Kuhn Retention Treatment Basin (hereinafter, the "Kuhn Facility"). The cost of these improvements to the Kuhn Facility (the "Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements") was originally expected to exceed \$140 million.

27. Construction of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements commenced in 2000, and included the expansion of the existing retention treatment basin, the removal and re-routing of storm drains discharging into the basin (providing more volume to control combined

sewer flows), and the installation of new screens and disinfection facilities. Construction was substantially complete by 2006 at a cost in excess of \$130 million.

28. Consistent with their purpose, the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements have provided significant environmental benefits to the public, both within and without the District. The expansion of the retention treatment basin by 30 million gallons has reduced overflow volume by an average of 875 million gallons per year. It has also eliminated the release of untreated combined sanitary sewage and stormwater by rerouting two combined sewers into the basin which would have otherwise entered the basin downstream of the new screens and disinfection facilities. All discharge is now screened, in addition to being settled and disinfected, to reduce pollutants prior to release. These improvements were undertaken in order to comply with the conditions of various wastewater discharge permits issued by the MDEQ, and have greatly enhanced the environmental quality of the Clinton River watershed.

29. The Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements were administered and initially financed by the County through various debt obligations. Pursuant to contracts with the County, the City and the other communities in the District each agreed to pay to the County, over 20 years, with interest, their *pro rata* share (based upon contributed flow) of the costs of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements. As of June 30, 2013, the City was obligated to pay the County \$23,125,588 in principal, plus interest, pursuant to a payment schedule that would pay off this obligation by 2029. *See Exhibit C* hereto. The City paid the County over \$1.9 million in principal and approximately \$600,000 in interest for the City's share of the cost of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013. *Id.* at p. 49.

30. Various of the communities in the District appropriately and correctly concluded that the costs associated with the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements should be a general fund obligation financed by general taxation. Certain communities did precisely what the Headlee Amendment requires by seeking and obtaining voter approval for new taxes to pay for the Improvements. For example, the City of Birmingham collects the funds necessary to pay its obligations to the County for the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements via a millage

increase approved by Birmingham voters for that specific purpose. Similarly, Clawson collects the necessary funds pursuant to 2.35 mill tax increase approved by its own residents in 2010 for that specific purpose. Southfield, Huntington Woods and Troy did not increase taxes through voter millages, but nonetheless have treated their obligations for the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements as general obligations of their respective cities, and have funded those obligations from their respective general funds.

31. In contrast, the City has elected to finance its obligations to the County by charging only water and sanitary sewer users the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge as a component of the Water and Sanitary Sewer Rates paid by those users.

32. By virtue of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge, the City has imposed and plans to continue to impose upon users of the water supply system and the sanitary sewer services, all or virtually all of the \$38 million cost of a major infrastructure improvement which should be financed by bonds, new property taxes and/or general fund revenues.

33. The use the City has made of the revenues generated by the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges constitute an investment in infrastructure as opposed to a fee designed simply to defray the costs of a regulatory activity. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charges are being used to fund public improvements designed to provide a long term benefit to the City and all its citizens. The revenues being derived from the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges are clearly in excess of the direct and indirect costs of the current "use" of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements by the persons paying those exactions.

34. By imposing the cost of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements only on water and sanitary sewage disposal customers, the City's charges do not correspond to the benefits conferred for at least three reasons. First, the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements do not confer a unique benefit upon Plaintiffs or the Class based upon their status as users of the water supply system and sanitary sewer services. While public water used, and sanitary sewage generated by, Plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, be routed through the Kuhn Facility, the purpose of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements is to address CSO

events during heavy rainfall by providing a facility to receive combined sewer flows which exceed the outlet capacity to DWSD, and to store, screen, and disinfect that flow prior to discharge to the Red Run Drain. Significantly, up to 93% of the flow treated at the Kuhn Facility in the course of those events is stormwater that originates not from public water supply or sanitary sewer usage, but rather from runoff from impervious surfaces during rain events. Indeed, the stormwaters collected in a combined sewer system are not “used” in any meaningful sense by any particular landowner or user.

35. Any “benefit” of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements conferred on users of the City’s water supply and sanitary sewer services is no different than the benefit conferred on the general public in the form of enhanced environmental quality. In fact, as the Michigan Supreme Court stated in *Bolt v. City of Lansing*, 459 Mich. 152, 166, 587 N.W.2d 264 (1998), in striking down fees the City of Lansing imposed to finance the construction of its own CSO facilities, “[i]mproved water quality ... and the avoidance of federal penalties for discharge violations are goals that benefit everyone in the city, not only property owners.”

36. The City’s use of the revenues generated by the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge to pay for the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements has the effect of forcing one subset of the citizenry (water and sanitary sewage disposal customers) to bear all of the costs of the construction of those public facilities, even though there are other “users” of those facilities and even though the facilities benefit the general public. Importantly, the Water and Sewer Rates are based exclusively on the volume of water each user extracts from the water supply system. A property owner’s “use” of the Kuhn Facility, however, is not dependent upon the volume of tap water the owner extracts from the water supply system, but rather by a number of other factors, including the amount of rainfall and the area of impervious surface that is present on his or her property. Accordingly, by incorporating the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges, the Water Rates and Sanitary Sewer Rates do not reflect the actual costs of use of the Kuhn Facility, metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology and including an appropriate capital investment component.

37. Second, imposing the costs of the CSO facilities only on water and sanitary sewage disposal customers also allows other “users” of those facilities, including more intensive “users,” to receive the benefit of those facilities without cost. In fact, the City’s method of financing these costs fails to distinguish at all between those responsible for greater and lesser levels of runoff, which represents 93% of the flow processed by the Kuhn Facility. For example, a property owner with a parking lot with no water or sanitary sewer service incurs no charge for stormwater management or the Kuhn Facility, yet the impervious surface of a parking lot contributes much higher volumes of rainwater run-off to the stormwater system than does the same sized residential parcel. The City’s method of financing these costs also fails to take into account the high volumes of rainwater run-off generated by public and private road surfaces. For these reasons, “the actual use of [the Kuhn Facility] by each [water and sanitary sewer user] is not accounted for with the requisite level of precision necessary to support a conclusion that the charge is proportionate to the costs of the services provided.” *See County of Jackson v. City of Jackson*, 2013 Mich. App. LEXIS 1786 (2013).

38. Third, under *Bolt*, the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge is impermissibly designed to amortize the expense of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements and to enable the City to fully recoup its investment in a period significantly shorter than the actual useful service life of the Improvements. The City must pay the County for the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements over a 20 year program, and that debt will be repaid by 2029. However, the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements will have an actual useful service life of more than 50 years. Nonetheless, the City has made no effort to allocate even that portion of the City’s cost of the Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements that will have a useful service life in excess of the financing period to the City’s general fund.

39. The Kuhn Facility Infrastructure Improvements constitute an investment in infrastructure that will substantially outlast the current “mortgage” that the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge requires water and sanitary sewage disposal customers to amortize. At the end of 20

years, those persons and entities will have fully paid for a tangible asset that will serve the City for many years thereafter.

40. By virtue of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge, the City's Water and Sanitary Sewer Rates do not reflect the actual costs of use of the City's water supply and sanitary sewer systems, metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology and including an appropriate capital investment component. This is true even if the Kuhn Facility is "used" in some fashion by users of the City's water and sanitary sewer services.

**THE CITY FORCES WATER AND SEWER CUSTOMERS TO FINANCE THE
CITY'S ENTIRE COST OF STORMWATER MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL**

41. The City's stormwater (and the stormwater of other communities in the District) is conveyed by the County to the DWSD for ultimate disposal. The DWSD charges the County a flat annual rate (currently in excess of \$20 million) to dispose of the stormwater. *See* Exhibit D hereto. The County, in turn, allocates the annual DWSD stormwater charge among all of the municipalities in the District, including the City, and charges each municipality a flat annual rate for stormwater disposal. *Id.* The DWSD stormwater charge to the County, and the County's pass-through stormwater charge to the City, are based on a formula tied to the amount of rainfall and the volume of surface water that enters the County system for ultimate disposal by DWSD.

42. While the charges for sanitary sewage disposal are based upon tap water usage and sanitary sewage volumes, the charges for stormwater disposal have no connection to usage of the City's water supply system or sanitary sewage disposal. The County charges the City in excess of \$7 million per year for such services. *See* Exhibit D. The City charges all of that cost to the Water and Sewer fund and imposes Stormwater Charges in order to recover the entire amount of that cost on an annual basis. *See* Exhibit E hereto. By virtue of the Stormwater Charges, the City has imposed and plans to continue to impose upon water and sanitary sewage disposal customers, all of the cost of stormwater treatment.

43. The Stormwater Charges are being used to fund costs for services which provide a benefit to the City and all its citizens. The revenues being derived from the Stormwater Charges

are clearly in excess of the direct and indirect costs of the current “use” of the stormwater disposal services by the persons paying those exactions.

44. By imposing the cost of the Stormwater Charges only on water and sanitary sewage disposal customers, the City’s charges do not correspond to the benefits conferred for at least two reasons. First, stormwater disposal services do not confer a unique benefit upon Plaintiff or the Class based upon their status as water and sanitary sewage disposal customers. Stormwater obviously does not originate from the use of the water supply system. It collects on land, roads and other physical surfaces, and the runoff enters the combined sewer system through catch-basins and other collection devices. Indeed, the storm waters collected in a combined sewer system are not “used” in any meaningful sense by any particular landowner or user.

45. Any “benefit” of stormwater disposal conferred on the City’s water and sanitary sewage disposal customers is no different than the benefit conferred on the general public. Storm water systems help prevent erosion, collect contaminated water for cleansing, keep roadways from flooding, and prevent the formation of standing pools of stagnant water. The benefits resulting from this management are shared by nearly every member of the public.

46. The City’s use of the revenues generated by the Stormwater Charges to pay for stormwater disposal has the effect of forcing one subset of the citizenry (water and sanitary sewage disposal customers) to bear all of the costs of a public service, even though there are other “users” of those services and even though the services benefit the general public. Importantly, the Water and Sanitary Sewer Rates are based exclusively on the volume of water each user extracts from the water supply system. A property owner’s “use” of stormwater treatment services, however, is not dependent upon the volume of tap water the owner extracts from the water supply system, but rather by a number of other factors, including the amount of rainfall and the area of impervious surface that is present on his or her property. Accordingly, by incorporating the Stormwater Charges, the Water and Sanitary Sewer Rates do not reflect the actual costs of stormwater disposal services, metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology and including an appropriate capital investment component.

47. Second, imposing the stormwater disposal costs only on water and sanitary sewage disposal users also allows other “users” of those facilities and services, including more intensive “users,” to receive the benefit of those facilities and services without cost, including the City itself. In fact, the City’s method of financing these costs fails to distinguish at all between those responsible for greater and lesser levels of runoff, which determine the volume of stormwater which enters the combined sewer system. For example, a property owner with a parking lot with no water or sanitary sewer service incurs no charge for stormwater management, yet the impervious surface of a parking lot contributes much higher volumes of rainwater run-off to the combined system than does the same sized residential parcel. The City’s method of financing these costs also fails to take into account the high volumes of rainwater run-off generated by public and private road surfaces. For these reasons, “the actual use of [stormwater disposal services] by each [water and sanitary sewage disposal user] is not accounted for with the requisite level of precision necessary to support a conclusion that the charge is proportionate to the costs of the services provided.” *See County of Jackson v. City of Jackson*, 2013 Mich. App. LEXIS 1786 (2013).

48. By virtue of the Stormwater Charge, the City’s Water Rates and Sanitary Sewer Rates do not reflect the actual costs of use of the City’s water supply and sewage disposal services, metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology and including an appropriate capital investment component. This is true even if stormwater disposal services are “used” in some fashion by users of the City’s water and sanitary sewer system.

PAYMENT OF THE CHARGES IS MANDATED BY THE CITY’S ORDINANCES

49. Payment of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charge and the Stormwater Charges are not voluntary because Plaintiffs and the Class are actually or effectively required to connect to the City’s water supply and sanitary sewer system and, by virtue of that connection, are required to pay the charges at issue in this case.

50. Royal Oak Ordinance Section 752-12 provides in pertinent part with respect to Water Rates as follows:

A. The owner or occupant of any land or premises against which water rates shall be assessed shall pay same to the City Treasurer quarter-annually or more frequently as may be required according to such rules and regulations as may be adopted from time to time by the City Commission.

B. All water charges shall be a lien upon the premises from and after the due date thereof and a five-percent penalty shall immediately attach thereto. All unpaid water charges which upon the 31st day of December have remained delinquent for a period of two months shall be placed on the delinquent water roll and shall have appended thereto a five-percent penalty charge. If the items on the delinquent water roll remain unpaid as of February 28, they shall be reported by the City Clerk to the City Commission, and the City Commission may require such charges to be transferred by the City Treasurer to the delinquent tax rolls. In the process thereof, an additional five-percent penalty charge shall be added. Said delinquent charges shall then be dealt with by the City Treasurer and enforced in the same manner and by the same means as are similar lien interests.

51. Similarly, Royal Oak Ordinance 660-2 provides in pertinent part with respect to Sanitary Sewer Charges.

A. All sewage disposal charges shall be a lien upon the premises from and after the due date thereof, and a penalty of 5% shall immediately attach thereto. All unpaid sewage disposal charges which upon the 31st day of December have remained delinquent for a period of two months shall be placed on the delinquent water roll and shall have appended thereto a five-percent penalty charge. If the items on the delinquent water roll remain unpaid as of February 28, they shall be reported by the City Clerk to the City Commission, and the City Commission may require such charges to be transferred by the City Treasurer to the delinquent tax rolls. In the process thereof, an additional, five-percent penalty charge shall be added. Said delinquent charges shall then be dealt with by the City Treasurer and enforced in the same manner and by the same means as are similar lien interests. In this regard, the City's Ordinance Section 22-62 provides that "[a]ny person being the owner, occupant or interested party in any property, building or dwelling wherein any sewer or drain has been constructed adjacent to, or adjoining said property shall within 60 days after said sewer or drain has been constructed, connect or cause to be connected to said sewer or drain any and all sewerage of any kind and nature from said lot or parcel of land, and from any and all buildings in connection therewith."

**THE CITY'S IMPOSITION OF THE KUHN FACILITY DEBT CHARGES
AND THE STORMWATER CHARGES ALSO IS UNLAWFUL
BECAUSE THE CITY'S ORDINANCE PROHIBITS SUCH CHARGES**

52. The scope of the City's authority to charge for sewer services, and the sources of the funds, is defined and limited by the City's Ordinances.

53. City Ordinance Section 600-1 (Rates;billing) states in pertinent part:

The rates for **sewage disposal services** furnished by the City of Royal Oak shall be applied uniformly to all water consumers within its corporate limits whose premises have available a sewer or sewers from which **the sanitary sewage** is finally discharged into the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System. ... [emphasis added].

54. The City's Ordinance only empowers the City to charge for the disposal of "sewage" and requires the City to establish a rate for sewage disposal that bears "a reasonable relationship to the obligation imposed upon the City for sewage disposal."

55. Stormwater is not "sewage" within the meaning of Section 600-1, and therefore the City is not authorized to charge sanitary sewage disposal customers for the City's cost of stormwater disposal. The City's Sewer Ordinance expressly defines "sewage" to exclude stormwater. *See, e.g.*, City Ordinance 600-15.

56. In the alternative, if stormwater is "sewage" within the meaning of Section 600-1, the City's Stormwater Charge still is unlawful because the City is required to finance its stormwater disposal costs through use of tax revenues. In this regard, City Ordinance 600-1 further states in pertinent part:

The City shall include each year in its **tax budget** an amount sufficient to pay for sewage disposal services **of a general public nature furnished to the city at large**, which charges shall be at the foregoing rate and shall be based upon water consumption, which shall be estimated by the legislative body of the City where the water is not actually metered. *Id.* [emphasis added].

57. The City has a legal duty to comply with its own ordinances.

58. While Ordinance Section 600-1 authorizes the City to impose user fees for sewage disposal services furnished to premises which contribute sanitary sewage to the City's combined sewer system, that Ordinance requires sewage disposal services "of a general public nature furnished to the City at large" to be funded by taxes, not by fees imposed on Plaintiffs and the Class.

59. The services provided by the Kuhn Facility and County's disposal of the City's stormwater both are services "of a general public nature furnished to the City at large."

60. The purpose of the Kuhn Facility is to address CSO events during heavy rainfall by providing a facility to receive combined sewer flows which exceed the outlet capacity to DWSD, and to store, screen, and disinfect that flow prior to discharge to the Red Run Drain. Significantly, up to 93% of the flow treated at the Kuhn Facility in the course of those events is stormwater that originates not from public water supply or sanitary sewer usage, but rather from runoff from impervious surfaces during rain events. The benefit of the Kuhn Facility is conferred on the general public in the form of enhanced environmental quality. Accordingly, the costs the City incurs relating to the Kuhn Facility must be funded by taxes, not by the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges.

61. Further, storm water systems help prevent erosion, collect contaminated water for cleansing, keep roadways from flooding, and prevent the formation of standing pools of stagnant water. The benefits resulting from the County's disposal of the City's stormwater are shared by nearly every member of the public. Accordingly, the cost the City incurs to the County for disposing of the City's stormwater therefore must be funded by taxes, not by Stormwater Charges imposed on Plaintiffs and the Class.

62. The Stormwater Charges are illegal and void because they have been imposed, and continue to be imposed, in violation of City Ordinance Section 600-1.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

63. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to MCR 3.501, individually and on behalf of a proposed class consisting of all persons or entities which have paid the City for water service and/or sewer service during the relevant class periods.

64. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

65. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class he seeks to represent, and Plaintiff was injured by the same wrongful

conduct that injured the other members of the Class.

66. The City has acted wrongfully in the same basic manner as to the entire class.

67. There are questions of law and fact common to all Class Members that predominate over any questions, which, if they exist, affect only individual Class Members, including:

- a. whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges imposed by the City are taxes;
- b. whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges imposed by the City violate the Headlee Amendment;
- c. whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges have a revenue-raising purpose;
- d. whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are disproportionate to the benefits conferred upon the payers of those charges;
- e. Whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are voluntary;
- f. Whether the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are authorized by the City's ordinances; and
- g. Whether the City has been unjustly enriched by its collection of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges.

68. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action, and has retained competent and experienced counsel to prosecute this action.

69. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. The prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. Furthermore, the prosecution of separate actions would substantially impair and impede the ability of individual class members to protect their interests. In addition, since individual refunds may be relatively small for most members of the class, the burden and expense of prosecuting litigation of this nature makes it unlikely that members of the class would prosecute individual actions. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.

COUNT I
VIOLATION OF THE HEADLEE AMENDMENT

70. Plaintiff incorporates each of their preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

71. The City is bound by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, including those portions commonly known as the Headlee Amendment.

72. In particular, the City may not disguise a tax as a fee under Article 9, Section 31 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, which provides:

Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon. [Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31.]

73. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are disguised taxes and intended to avoid the obligations of the Headlee Amendment, including the requirement that the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges, as taxes, be approved by a majority of the electorate.

74. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges have all relevant indicia of a tax:

- a. They have no relation to any service or benefit actually received by the taxpayer;
- b. The amount of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges is disproportionate to the cost incurred by the City in providing water and sewage disposal services;
- c. The Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are designed to generate revenue;
- d. The payers of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges benefit in no manner distinct from any other taxpayer or the general public;
- e. Payment of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges are not discretionary, but actually or effectively mandatory;
- f. Various other indicia of a tax described in *Bolt v. City of Lansing* are present.¹

75. As a direct and proximate result of the City's implementation of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges, Plaintiff and the Class have been harmed.

76. Plaintiff seeks his attorneys' fees and costs as allowed by Article 9, Section 32 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and MCL 600.308a.

77. Plaintiff seeks damages in the form of a refund of all amounts to which he and the Class are entitled, including all Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges they paid to the City during the Headlee Class Period, as defined below.

¹ Pursuant to MCR 2.1112(M), Plaintiff identifies subparts (a) through (f) of Paragraph 74 as "factual questions that are anticipated to require resolution by the Court."

COUNT II
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

78. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 69 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

79. The City is not authorized by its ordinances to impose or collect the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges or the Stormwater Charges, and its actions with respect to the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges are ultra vires. The City's collection of the Stormwater Charges therefore was unlawful.

80. The City is prevented from retaining the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges by the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.

81. As a direct and proximate result of its imposition of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges, the City has collected millions of dollars to which it is not entitled. By paying the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges, Plaintiff and the Class conferred a substantial monetary benefit upon the City.

82. The City has been unjustly enriched because it received and retained the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges to which it is not entitled. It would be inequitable to allow the City to retain the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges.

83. As a direct and proximate result of the City's retention of the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges, Plaintiff and the Class have been injured. The City should be required to disgorge the amounts by which it has been unjustly enriched, including all Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges paid by Plaintiff and the Class during the Unjust Enrichment Class Period, as defined below.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request that the Court grant the following relief:

A. Certify this action to be a proper class action with Plaintiff certified as Class Representative and Kickham Hanley PLLC designated Class Counsel;

B. With respect to Count I, define the Class to include all persons or entities which have paid the City for water or sewer service at any time in the one year preceding the filing of this lawsuit and/or at any time during the pendency of this action (the "Headlee Class Period");

C. With respect to Count I, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against the City, and order and direct the City to disgorge and refund all Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges collected during the Headlee Class Period, and order the City to pay into a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and all other members of the Class the total amount of Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges to which Plaintiff and the Class are entitled;

D. With respect to Count II, define the Class to include all persons or entities which have paid the City for water or sewer service at any time in the six years preceding the filing of this lawsuit and/or at any time during the pendency of this action (the "Unjust Enrichment Class Period");

E. With respect to Count II, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against the City, and order and direct the City to disgorge and refund all Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges collected during the Unjust Enrichment Class Period, and order the City to pay into a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and all other members of the Class the total amount of Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges to which Plaintiff and the Class are entitled;

F. Appoint a Trustee to seize, manage and distribute in an orderly manner the common fund thus established;

G. Find and declare that the Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and the Stormwater Charges violate the Headlee Amendment and the City's ordinances and permanently enjoin the City from imposing or collecting Kuhn Facility Debt Charges and Stormwater Charges;

H. Award Plaintiff and the Class the costs and expenses incurred in this action, including reasonable attorneys', accountants', and experts' fees; and

I. Grant any other appropriate relief.

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC

By: /s/Gregory D. Hanley
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Jamie Warrow (P61521)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

Date: February 14, 2014
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EXHIBIT A

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City of Royal Oak, MI
Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Chapter 752. WATERWORKS

[HISTORY: Adopted by the City Commission of the City of Royal Oak 6-18-1917 by Ord. No. 72; amended 8-18-1926 by Ord. No. 157. Subsequent amendments noted where applicable.]

CHARTER REFERENCES

Water supply — See Ch. 13.

GENERAL REFERENCES

Southeastern Oakland County Water Authority — See Ch. 160.

Flood damage prevention — See Ch. 351.

Sewers and sewage disposal — See Ch. 600.

Stormwater detention — See Ch. 644.

Wastewater — See Ch. 740.

Water — See Ch. 745.

§ 752-1. Rules and regulations.

The rules and regulations hereinafter named shall be considered a part of the contract with every person, company or corporation that is supplied with water through the water system of the City of Royal Oak, Michigan.

§ 752-2. Permit required for service connections.

Before any service connection shall be made or any work performed upon old or new connections, a permit shall be obtained from the City Clerk. No permit shall be issued to any person who is not licensed as a master plumber in the City of Royal Oak.

§ 752-3. Fees.

[Amended 3-16-1942 by Ord. No. 404]

The City Commission shall, from time to time, establish fees to be charged for services rendered by the officers, agents and employees of the City incident to the granting of the permit herein provided for, which fees shall be paid before the permit is issued. Such fees shall include the cost of tapping the main, installing the curb stop and laying the pipe to the curb stop, which curb stop and pipe shall be and remain the property of the City of Royal Oak.

§ 752-4. Supplying water to others; unnecessary waste.

No owner or occupant of any building or premises shall be allowed to supply water to other persons or families, firm, company or corporation except by permission of the City Manager,

or permit any unnecessary waste of water. If found doing so, the supply of water may be shut off at the option of the City.

§ 752-5. Installation of service pipes; supervision.

All service pipes connecting with the distributing pipes of the Royal Oak water mains shall be laid in accordance with the provisions of this article and rules and regulations of the City of Royal Oak pertaining to its waterworks and shall be under the supervision of the proper officers of said City.

§ 752-6. Connections supplying more than one building.

In all cases where the connection is intended to supply more than one tenement, shop, store or building, it shall be the duty of the person making such connection or causing the same to be made to lay down a branch with a stop cock for each branch outside the line of premises so to be supplied, to be suitably protected and marked as to be easily found. In no case shall one service supply more than one lot unless occupied by a single building used for a single industry or enterprise.

§ 752-7. Meters.

[Amended 3-16-1942 by Ord. No. 404]

Meters shall be installed by the City upon all premises supplied with water. Any damage sustained by said meter resulting from the neglect or carelessness of the agent, owner or tenant to properly secure and protect the same shall be paid by the owner to the City. It shall be unlawful for any person to interfere with or remove the water meter from any service where it has been attached without permission from the proper officers of the City, and it shall be unlawful for anyone to interfere with the reading of said meters by duly authorized officers of the City.

§ 752-8. Disconnection; discontinuance of service.

Any premises may be disconnected from the distribution pipes of the Royal Oak water system and the supply of water withheld from said premises when the ordinances, rules and regulations of the City pertaining to the water system have in any manner been violated by the owner or occupant of said premises.

§ 752-9. Fire hydrants.

Proprietors of manufacturing institutions, lumberyards, hotels, stores, elevators, warehouses, halls and other public buildings wishing to lay large pipes with hydrant and hose coupling to be used only in case of fire will be permitted to connect with the street main at their own expense, upon application to the City Manager and under his direction, and will be allowed to use all water for fire purpose free of charge, but all such pipes must be provided with suitable valve which must be sealed by the City when building. When the seal is broken for the extinguishments of fire, such owner or party or proprietor shall immediately give notice to the City Manager, and in case the said seal shall have been broken for any other purpose, the owner or proprietor of such property shall be liable to the penalties prescribed herein for the

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breach of any of the provisions of this article. No standpipe will be allowed on any premises where the water is not taken for other than fire purposes.

§ 752-10. Inspections; authority to require repairs and make repairs.

The duly constituted authorities of the City of Royal Oak shall have power and authority at all reasonable hours to enter upon any premises where water service is established for the purpose of inspecting and making an examination of all pipes and fixtures connected with the said waterworks, and they shall have power and authority to require any pipes or fixtures to be repaired, removed, replaced or changed where the same are defective or not in compliance with the provisions of the ordinances of said City, or the rules and regulations in relation to the waterworks of said City, and they may make such alterations and repairs or do such other acts with relation thereto as they shall deem necessary.

§ 752-11. Fee to turn water on.

Whenever the water is turned off from any premises at the request of the owner or because of default of the owner or occupant thereof, the same shall not be turned on again until the owner has deposited with the City Manager the sum of \$1 to cover the labor cost, and in cases where extraordinary labor is required such additional sum as will compensate for such additional labor.

§ 752-12. Payment of water rates; delinquent water roll; penalty charge.

[Amended 5-18-1936 by Ord. No. 302; 1-5-1976 by Ord. No. 76-3]

- A. The owner or occupant of any land or premises against which water rates shall be assessed shall pay same to the City Treasurer quarter-annually or more frequently as may be required according to such rules and regulations as may be adopted from time to time by the City Commission.
- B. All water charges shall be a lien upon the premises from and after the due date thereof and a five-percent penalty shall immediately attach thereto. All unpaid water charges which upon the 31st day of December have remained delinquent for a period of two months shall be placed on the delinquent water roll and shall have appended thereto a five-percent penalty charge. If the items on the delinquent water roll remain unpaid as of February 28, they shall be reported by the City Clerk to the City Commission, and the City Commission may require such charges to be transferred by the City Treasurer to the delinquent tax rolls. In the process thereof, an additional five-percent penalty charge shall be added. Said delinquent charges shall then be dealt with by the City Treasurer and enforced in the same manner and by the same means as are similar lien interests.

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City of Royal Oak, MI
Thursday, January 16, 2014

Chapter 600. SEWERS AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL

Article I. Sewage Disposal Charges

[Adopted 4-17-1944 by Ord. No. 446]

§ 600-1. Rates; billing.

[Amended 1-5-1976 by Ord. No. 76-2; 8-12-2013 by Ord. No. 2013-13]

The rates for sewage disposal services furnished by the City of Royal Oak shall be applied uniformly to all water consumers within its corporate limits whose premises have available a sewer or sewers from which the sanitary sewage is finally discharged into the Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System. Such rates shall be applied on the basis of the quantity of water used in or on said premises regardless of the purpose for which the water is used or the character or concentration of the sewage delivered from the property to the sewage disposal system. The amount thereof shall be measured by the water meter installed on the premises, or, if there be no such water meter, then for the purpose of determining sewage disposal charges the water consumption thereon shall be estimated in a manner prescribed or approved by the Detroit Board of Water Commissioners. The rate per quarter shall be an amount determined by the City Commission and established by Commission resolution taking into account all necessary and related costs of sewage disposal and bearing a reasonable relationship to the obligation imposed upon the City for sewage disposal. If the character of sewage from any manufacturing or industrial plant, building or premises is such that it imposes an unreasonable additional burden upon the sewage system of the City or upon said Southeastern Oakland County Sewage Disposal System or upon the sewage disposal system of the City of Detroit, then an additional charge shall be made over and above the regular rates, or it may be required that such sewage be treated by the person, firm or corporation responsible therefor being emptied into any public drain or sewer, or the right to so empty such sewage be denied, if necessary, for the protection of any of the above systems or the public health or safety. The City shall include each year in its tax budget an amount sufficient to pay for sewage disposal service of a general public nature furnished to the City at large, which charges shall be at the foregoing rate and shall be based upon water consumption, which shall be estimated by the legislative body of the City where the water is not actually metered. Charges for sewage disposal shall be billed and collected quarterly except where water charges are billed monthly, in which cases sewage disposal charges shall be billed monthly, according to such rules and regulations as may be adopted from time to time by the City Commission. Where possible, sewage disposal charges shall be billed along with the charges for water service.

§ 600-2. Enforcement of charges; penalty; charge to turn on water.

[Amended 1-5-1976 by Ord. No. 76-2]

- A. All sewage disposal charges shall be a lien upon the premises from and after the due date thereof, and a penalty of 5% shall immediately attach thereto. All unpaid sewage disposal charges which upon the 31st day of December have remained delinquent for a period of two months shall be placed on the delinquent water roll and shall have appended thereto a five-percent penalty charge. If the items on the delinquent water roll remain unpaid as of February 28, they shall be reported by the City Clerk to the City Commission, and the City Commission may require such charges to be transferred by the City Treasurer to the delinquent tax rolls. In the process thereof, an additional, five-percent penalty charge shall be added. Said delinquent charges shall then be dealt with by the City Treasurer and enforced in the same manner and by the same means as are similar lien interests.
- B. If any premises to which sewage disposal charges shall be made shall constitute a part only of any parcel of land assessed as a single unit upon the tax roll, then any such delinquent charges shall be entered against the entire parcel.
- C. Whenever the water is turned off from any premises at the request of the owner or because of default in payment of the water charges and/or sewage disposal charges by the owner or occupant thereof, the same shall not be turned on again until the owner has deposited with the City the sum estimated by the Department of Public Service for such actual labor. That portion of the deposit in excess of the actual labor costs to the City shall be refunded to the owner. The owner shall be liable for labor costs not covered by the deposit.

[Amended 1-24-2005 by Ord. No. 2005-01]

§ 600-3. Disposition of monies.

[Amended 1-5-1976 by Ord. No. 76-2]

All monies received from the collection of sewage disposal charges shall be used to pay the expenses in connection with the collection thereof and the charges rendered by the County of Oakland to the City for sewage disposal services. Any excess monies may be used for such purposes as the legislative body of the City shall determine.

§ 600-4. Administration by City Manager.

It shall be the duty of the City Manager of said City to carry out and enforce the provisions of this article, except where otherwise designated.

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EXHIBIT B

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City of Royal Oak, MI

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Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2013

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Statement of Net Position
Proprietary Funds
June 30, 2013

	BUSINESS-TYPE ACTIVITIES - Enterprise Funds				Governmental Activities
	Water Service	Sewer Service	Electricity	Gas	General Fund
Assets					
Current assets:					
Cash and investments	\$ 6,612,156	\$ 6,213,793	\$ 881,686	\$ 13,707,635	\$ 17,661,304
Receivables, net of uncollectibles	7,162,314	10,543	108,692	7,281,549	80
Prepaid items	-	-	-	-	917,846
Inventories	161,608	45,624	-	207,232	236,756
Total current assets	<u>13,936,078</u>	<u>6,269,960</u>	<u>990,378</u>	<u>21,196,416</u>	<u>18,815,986</u>
Noncurrent assets:					
Receivables, net of uncollectibles	3,165,160	-	-	3,165,160	-
Due from other governmental units	463,488	-	-	463,488	-
Capital assets	120,754,774	31,268,537	12,188,315	164,211,626	17,738,343
Accumulated depreciation	(34,543,509)	(10,178,533)	(4,722,070)	(49,444,112)	(12,631,294)
Total noncurrent assets	<u>89,839,913</u>	<u>21,090,004</u>	<u>7,466,245</u>	<u>118,396,162</u>	<u>5,107,049</u>
Total assets	<u>103,775,991</u>	<u>27,359,964</u>	<u>8,456,623</u>	<u>139,592,578</u>	<u>23,923,035</u>
Deferred outflows of resources					
Deferred charge on refunding	-	265,181	-	265,181	-
Liabilities					
Current liabilities:					
Accounts payable	1,365,508	111,476	109,084	1,586,068	79,783
Accrued and other liabilities	351,880	145,781	11,125	508,786	612,036
Cash bonds and deposits	450	11,941	-	12,391	-
Bonds payable, due within one year	2,985,482	545,000	-	3,530,482	380,000
Other long-term liabilities, current	-	-	-	-	519,788
Unearned revenue	-	-	29,241	29,241	-
Compensated absences, current	103,124	22,070	13,806	139,000	72,324
Total current liabilities	<u>4,806,444</u>	<u>836,268</u>	<u>163,256</u>	<u>5,805,968</u>	<u>1,663,931</u>
Noncurrent liabilities:					
Bonds payable	32,910,360	10,446,036	-	43,356,396	1,985,476
Other long-term liabilities	-	-	-	-	519,788
Accrued compensated absences	102,943	22,031	13,782	138,756	73,106
Other postemployment benefit obligation	1,355,386	354,252	157,242	1,866,880	857,389
Total noncurrent liabilities	<u>34,368,689</u>	<u>10,822,319</u>	<u>171,024</u>	<u>45,362,032</u>	<u>3,435,759</u>
Total liabilities	<u>39,175,133</u>	<u>11,658,587</u>	<u>334,280</u>	<u>51,168,000</u>	<u>5,099,690</u>
Net position					
Net investment in capital assets	53,480,583	10,364,149	7,466,245	71,310,977	2,741,573
Unrestricted	11,120,275	5,602,409	656,098	17,378,782	16,081,772
Total net position	<u>\$ 64,600,858</u>	<u>\$ 15,966,558</u>	<u>\$ 8,122,343</u>	<u>\$ 88,689,759</u>	<u>\$ 18,823,345</u>

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Reconciliation

Net Position of Enterprise Funds
to Net Position of Business-Type Activities
June 30, 2013

Net position - total enterprise funds \$ 88,689,759

Amounts reported for *business-type activities* in the statement of net position
are different because:

Internal service funds are used by management to charge the costs of certain activities, such as insurance and other centralized costs, to individual funds. A portion of the net position of the internal service funds is allocated to the enterprise funds and reported in the statement of net position.

Net position of business-type activities accounted for in
governmental-type internal service funds

1,607,856

Net position of business-type activities

\$ 90,297,615

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Statement of Revenues, Expenses and Changes in Fund Net Position
Proprietary Funds
For the Year Ended June 30, 2013

	Business-Type Activities - Enterprise Funds			Governmental Activities
	Street	Water	Public Utilities	Public Utilities
Operating revenues				
Charges for services	\$ 26,532,412	\$ 3,348,553	\$ 2,719,101	\$ 32,600,066
Other	14,782	8,975	23,763	47,520
Total operating revenues	26,547,194	3,357,528	2,742,864	32,647,586
Operating expenses				
Salaries and benefits	2,604,840	829,660	436,345	3,870,845
Supplies	291,050	145,580	103,616	540,246
Water purchases	3,611,154	-	-	3,611,154
Sewage disposal services	11,365,693	-	-	11,365,693
Other services and charges	1,866,584	1,066,123	1,807,690	4,740,397
Depreciation	2,561,090	552,551	300,134	3,413,775
Total operating expenses	22,300,411	2,593,914	2,647,785	27,542,110
Operating income	4,246,783	763,614	95,079	5,105,476
Nonoperating revenues (expenses)				
Federal grants	-	-	7,852	7,852
Interest income	33,313	155,493	2,153	190,959
Contributions and donations	150,919	500,863	376	652,158
Interest expense	(1,070,612)	(607,818)	-	(1,678,430)
Gain on sale of capital assets	-	-	-	212
Total nonoperating revenues (expenses)	(886,380)	48,538	10,381	(827,461)
Income before transfers	3,360,403	812,152	105,460	4,278,015
Transfers				
Transfers in	70,921	-	195,000	265,921
Transfers out	(46,866)	(1,269)	(100,088)	(148,223)
Net transfers	24,055	(1,269)	94,912	117,698
Change in net position	3,384,458	810,883	200,372	4,395,713
Net position, beginning of year, as restated	61,216,400	15,155,675	7,921,971	84,294,046
Net position, end of year	\$ 64,600,858	\$ 15,966,558	\$ 8,122,343	\$ 88,689,759

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Reconciliation

Changes in Net Position of Enterprise Funds
to Changes in Net Position of Business-Type Activities
For the Year Ended June 30, 2013

Change in net position - total enterprise funds \$ 4,395,713

Amounts reported for *business-type activities* in the statement of activities
are different because:

Internal service funds are used by management to charge the costs of
certain activities, such as insurance and other centralized costs, to
individual funds. A portion of the operating income (loss) of the
internal service funds is allocated to the enterprise funds and
reported in the statement of activities.

Net operating income (loss) from business-type activities accounted
for in governmental-type internal service funds

584,844

Change in net position of business-type activities \$ 4,980,557

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Statement of Cash Flows
Proprietary Funds
For the Year Ended June 30, 2013

	Business-type Activities - Enterprise Funds				Governmental Activities
	Water	Sewer	Electric	Total	General Fund
Cash flows from operating activities					
Receipts from customers	\$ 27,762,528	\$ 3,348,353	\$ 2,699,936	\$ 33,810,817	\$ -
Internal activity - receipts from other funds	-	-	-	-	16,771,825
Other operating receipts	14,782	8,975	23,763	47,520	36,252
Payments to vendors	(18,145,595)	(1,201,034)	(1,829,806)	(21,176,435)	(2,713,122)
Payments to employees	(2,250,353)	(743,749)	(431,581)	(3,425,683)	(9,503,077)
Internal activity - payments to other funds	-	-	(134,097)	(134,097)	-
Net cash provided by operating activities	7,381,362	1,412,545	328,215	9,122,122	4,591,878
Cash flows from noncapital financing activities					
Federal operating grants	-	-	7,852	7,852	-
Contributions and donations	150,919	500,863	376	652,158	-
Transfers from other funds	70,921	-	195,000	265,921	1,126,500
Transfers to other funds	(46,866)	(1,269)	(100,088)	(148,223)	(27,197)
Net cash provided by noncapital financing activities	174,974	499,594	103,140	777,708	1,099,303
Cash flows from capital and related financing activities					
Purchase of capital assets	(2,993,781)	-	-	(2,993,781)	(636,726)
Principal paid on capital debt	(2,911,071)	(530,000)	-	(3,441,071)	(360,000)
Interest paid on capital debt	(1,063,927)	(573,437)	-	(1,637,364)	(108,724)
Proceeds from sale of capital assets	-	-	-	-	212
Net cash used in capital and related financing activities	(6,968,779)	(1,103,437)	-	(8,072,216)	(1,105,238)
Cash flows from investing activities					
Interest received on investments	33,313	155,493	2,153	190,959	-
Net change in cash and investments	620,870	964,195	433,508	2,018,573	4,585,943
Cash and investments balances, beginning of year	5,991,286	5,249,598	448,178	11,689,062	13,075,361
Cash and investments balances, end of year	\$ 6,612,156	\$ 6,213,793	\$ 881,686	\$ 13,707,635	\$ 17,661,304

continued...

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Statement of Cash Flows
Proprietary Funds
For the Year Ended June 30, 2013

	Business-Type Activities - Enterprise Funds				Governmental Activities
	Water	Sewer	Public Utilities	Total	General Fund
Reconciliation of operating income to net cash provided by operating activities:					
Operating income	\$ 4,246,783	\$ 763,614	\$ 95,079	\$ 5,105,476	\$ 4,061,231
Adjustments to reconcile operating income to net cash provided by operating activities:					
Depreciation	2,561,090	552,551	300,134	3,413,775	822,894
Changes in assets and liabilities:					
Receivables, net	869,179	100	(48,406)	820,873	871,270
Prepaid items	-	-	-	-	(917,846)
Inventories	54,180	(39,859)	-	14,321	(28,566)
Long-term receivables	359,748	-	-	359,748	-
Due from other governmental units	1,189	-	-	1,189	-
Accounts payable	(1,065,294)	50,528	45,489	(969,277)	48,616
Accrued and other liabilities	44,591	(374)	1,927	46,144	98,975
Due to other funds	-	-	(134,097)	(134,097)	-
Cash bonds and deposits	-	(300)	-	(300)	-
Other long-term liabilities	-	-	-	-	(566,052)
Unearned revenue	-	-	29,241	29,241	-
Accrued compensated absences	(8,892)	(2,457)	2,837	(8,512)	11,589
Other postemployment benefits obligation	318,788	88,742	36,011	443,541	189,767
Net cash provided by operating activities	\$ 7,381,362	\$ 1,412,545	\$ 328,215	\$ 9,122,122	\$ 4,591,878

concluded.

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

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EXHIBIT C

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CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Notes to Financial Statements

LONG TERM DEBT

The City issues bonds to provide for the acquisition and construction of major capital facilities. General obligation bonds are direct obligations and pledge the full faith and credit of the City. County contractual agreements are also general obligations of the City. Bond and contractual obligation activity and other long-term liabilities can be summarized as follows:

	Beginning Balance	Additions	Deductions	Ending Balance	Due Within One Year
Governmental Activities					
Limited tax general obligation - Court	\$ 4,755,000	\$ -	\$ (310,000)	\$ 4,445,000	\$ 325,000
Limited tax general obligation - Library	2,570,000	-	(190,000)	2,380,000	195,000
Limited tax general obligation bonds	3,185,000	-	(445,000)	2,740,000	465,000
Unlimited tax general obligation bonds	5,495,000	4,965,000	(5,495,000)	4,965,000	490,000
Total installment debt	16,005,000	4,965,000	(6,440,000)	14,530,000	1,475,000
Unamortized discount	(199,685)	-	63,318	(136,367)	-
Unamortized premium	10,668	292,966	(26,789)	276,845	-
Compensated absences	3,438,382	2,277,000	(2,188,110)	3,527,272	1,764,000
General liability claims	1,205,000	207,900	(861,630)	551,270	275,635
Workers compensation	400,628	412,791	(325,113)	488,306	244,153
Total governmental activities	\$ 20,859,993	\$ 8,155,657	\$ (9,778,324)	\$ 19,237,326	\$ 3,758,788
Business-type Activities					
Limited tax general obligation - Parking	\$ 11,710,000	\$ -	\$ (530,000)	\$ 11,180,000	\$ 545,000
Limited tax general obligation - Water	6,325,000	-	(295,000)	6,030,000	305,000
Drain bond - North Arm Relief Drain	6,922,387	-	(705,000)	6,217,387	720,000
Contractual obligations	25,650,523	-	(1,911,071)	23,739,452	1,960,482
Total installment debt	50,607,910	-	(3,441,071)	47,166,839	3,530,482
Unamortized discount	(300,366)	-	20,405	(279,961)	-
Compensated absences	286,268	178,000	(186,512)	277,756	139,000
Total business-type activities	\$ 50,593,812	\$ 178,000	\$ (3,607,178)	\$ 47,164,634	\$ 3,669,482
Component Units					
Compensated absences	\$ 14,288	\$ 7,000	\$ (8,254)	\$ 13,034	\$ 7,000

CITY OF ROYAL OAK, MICHIGAN

Notes to Financial Statements

Obligations for George W. Kuhn Project. The City is a participating community in the George W. Kuhn drain project. The project is administered by the Oakland County Drain Commission and financed through the sale of drain bonds, draw downs from the State of Michigan revolving fund, Federal and State of Michigan grants, and contributions from Oakland County, Michigan. The City along with thirteen other local communities are obligated for the payment of principal and interest of the outstanding debt. It is currently anticipated that the City's obligation at the end of construction will be approximately \$38,604,153 with an interest rate of 1.65-4.5%. As of June 30, 2013, the City's obligation is \$23,125,588 in principal.

Advanced Refunding

During fiscal year 2013, the City advance refunded \$5,060,000 of Building Authority Series 2001A unlimited tax general obligation bonds to provide resources to purchase U.S. government securities that were placed in an escrow fund for the purpose of generating resources for all future debt service payments of \$4,965,000 of refunded debt. As a result, the certificates are considered defeased and the liability has been removed from the statement of net position. The refunding resulted in a net present value savings of \$614,380 and an economic gain of \$661,854.

RISK MANAGEMENT

The government is exposed to various risks of loss related to property loss, torts, errors and omissions, and employee injuries (workers' compensation), as well as medical benefits provided to employees. The City participates in the Michigan Municipal Risk Management Authority for general property and liability claims.

The Michigan Municipal Risk Management Authority risk pool program operates as a common risk-sharing management program for local units of government in Michigan. Member premiums are used to purchase commercial excess insurance coverage and to establish a member loss fund. The loss fund is used to pay the member's self-insured retention portion of claims.

The City has a \$250,000 per occurrence self-insured retention for liability claims and \$15,000,000 per occurrence of excess liability insurance coverage. Coverage limits, retentions and deductibles for other types of coverage vary. All coverage is on an occurrence basis except for a stop loss policy which is on a claims paid basis. The stop loss policy limits the maximum total self-insured retention payments in any one fiscal year to \$872,000. Settlements have not exceeded coverages for each of the past three fiscal years.

Changes in the reported liability for the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 are as follows:

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Beginning of year	\$ 726,000	\$ 700,497	\$ (221,497)	\$ 1,205,000	\$ 551,270
End of year	1,205,000	207,900	(861,630)		

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George W. Kuhn Drainage District
Schedule of Rates and Charges
Page 3-

4. Flat Rate Storm Charge

	<u>11-2014</u>
DWSD Purchased Expense	\$ 30,914,120
OCWRC Operating Expense	<u>3,635,673</u>
Interest Income	<u>(253,300)</u>
Total	<u>24,295,593</u>

The new apportionment percentages have been reflected effective July 1, 2003.

Municipality	Allocation In Percent	2013 Annual Charge	2014 Annual Charge	\$ Inc./Dec.	Quarterly Charge	Monthly Charge	% Change
City of Berkeley	6.4895%	\$1,619,879.24	\$1,676,682.54	\$56,803.30	\$384,165.94	\$131,388.66	-2.7%
Village of Beverly Hills	0.8369%	206,903.44	203,328.82	\$-3,574.62	\$60,832.48	\$19,944.16	-2.7%
City of Birmingham	4.8837%	1,216,846.80	1,186,523.90	\$-30,322.90	\$296,630.98	\$98,876.99	-2.7%
City of Clawson	8.8282%	1,475,270.87	1,439,808.47	\$-35,462.41	\$366,451.37	\$119,983.79	-2.7%
City of Ferndale	10.2886%	2,568,199.20	2,499,682.14	\$-68,516.06	\$624,913.04	\$208,304.35	-2.7%
City of Hazel Park	2.2564%	562,982.61	\$47,982.82	\$-16,018.79	\$156,990.70	\$52,330.23	-2.7%
City of Huntington Woods	2.4671%	615,826.19	\$89,396.88	\$-16,429.60	\$146,843.16	\$48,947.72	-2.7%
City of Madison Heights	6.6410%	1,632,734.43	1,589,174.78	\$-43,559.65	\$397,293.69	\$132,431.23	-2.7%
City of Oak Park	13.6363%	3,404,328.82	3,313,596.94	\$-90,731.88	\$828,376.48	\$276,125.49	-2.7%
City of Pleasant Ridge	1.3390%	334,235.04	326,310.00	\$-7,925.04	\$81,329.60	\$27,109.83	-2.7%
City of Royal Oak	29.7028%	7,414,276.75	7,216,471.57	\$-197,805.18	\$1,804,117.85	\$601,372.63	-2.7%
Township of Royal Oak	1.2775%	316,883.88	310,379.21	\$-6,504.67	\$77,694.05	\$25,898.02	-2.7%
City of Southfield	7.7168%	1,925,932.70	1,874,689.82	\$-51,242.88	\$488,637.70	\$162,879.23	-2.7%
City of Troy	2.4789%	619,021.27	602,606.42	\$-16,414.85	\$150,656.61	\$50,218.87	-2.7%
Detroit Zoo	0.3384%	83,876.63	\$1,730.88	\$-240.25	\$20,432.59	\$6,810.86	-2.7%
Rackham Golf Course	0.1913%	47,751.43	46,477.47	\$-1,273.96	\$11,819.37	\$3,939.79	-2.7%
State of Michigan	2.1036%	526,086.03	511,857.51	\$-14,228.52	\$127,784.45	\$42,594.82	-2.7%
County of Oakland	1.5274%	381,262.88	371,080.98	\$-10,181.90	\$92,772.72	\$30,924.24	-2.7%
Total	100.00%	\$24,981,641.81	\$24,295,593.57	(\$686,048.24)	\$6,073,898.39	\$2,024,632.80	-2.67%

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City Manager's Transmittal Letter

To further increase flexibility, a building inspector position and a code enforcement officer position will be replaced with two building inspector/code enforcement officer positions. That gives him the ability to devote greater resources to building or to code enforcement, as needed.

We are restoring a full-time clerical position in building. This will move the existing shared Clerk/Steno III to the State Construction Code Fund and put a new Municipal Clerk I in the General Fund (Code Enforcement). The net cost of this to the general fund is negligible and the State Construction Code Fund can easily afford the increase. This will greatly reduce the all too frequent times when we have a certified Building Official working the front counter.

Police and Fire

Thanks to the voters who supported our millage request, these departments will be in excellent shape. We are in the process of implementing the ICMA recommendations as modified by the Chiefs and the Commission.

Our biggest problem in these departments is hiring and retaining talent. It takes time to hire and train new personnel, as we are only able to train three or four officers at a time. While we are hiring to get to the goal of 79 sworn officers, we have existing officers retiring or leaving and some of the trainees not completing the program. This will be a long process.

Strategic Plan

The Commission's 2013-2014 goals and objectives drive many of the changes for the 2013-2014 budget including the new economic development position, and the focus on roads, recreation and unfunded liabilities. Some other objectives also require budget action. An expenditure of \$30,000 is budgeted to create a program to manage the rodent population which residents recently identified as the most serious problem facing the City. There are several options for how we could tackle this problem, but we have not yet determined a specific solution. However, we do expect there will be an educational component to the program. We have also budgeted \$15,000 for a targeted talent and retention study.

This year's budget includes an objective to improve the City's measurement of outputs and outcomes. A potential means of achieving this objective is to join the ICMA's Center for Performance Measurement. The 2013-2014 budget includes a \$1,200 allocation in the event we decide that joining would help to realize the objective, and improve services. More analysis is needed before we can make that determination.

Water and Sewer

We have stabilized the water and sewer costs we control, however those only represent 25 percent of the total. We are facing increases paid to third parties for water and sewer service and for debt service. SOCWA will be increasing our water purchase rates by 1.1% percent. The Oakland County Drain Commission will be increasing sanitary sewage disposal rates by 4.9% percent and decreasing flat rate storm water charges by 2.7% percent. Both are ultimately customers of the City of Detroit and must pass on any rate increases they receive to us. By the same token, we have no choice but to pass these changes on to our water and sewer customers. This fund must remain solvent as we cannot return to the position we found ourselves in eight years ago with the water and sewer fund in debt to the general fund. While

City Manager's Transmittal Letter

the general fund is much stronger today than it was in 2005, it still can not be the "bank" for other funds. We are increasing the water and sewer rate by 1% percent.


Automobile Parking System

We are not making the budgeted transfer from Auto Parking to the General fund for 2012-13. Because the millage increase for public safety came at the half way point of our fiscal year and it was impossible to ramp up spending to the recommended level in that time period, the general fund does not need the budgeted transfer. Since we have an extraordinary cost planned for the Automobile Parking System in 2013-14, the demolition of 225 S. Troy and the construction of a parking lot, we are leaving this money in APS and use it for that purpose in 2013-14. We are budgeting a \$900,000 transfer from APS to the general fund for 2013-14.

Tax Rates

We have a slight decrease in the property tax rate for 2013-14 of 0.036 mill. We are keeping the new public safety rate at 3.475 mills which is .5 mill less than authorized by the voters. This is consistent with my original recommendation for this tax which called for the full amount not be levied until 2013-14. We are also keeping the public safety tax on the winter tax bill. This is the only city tax on the winter bill.

Respectfully submitted,



Donald E. Johnson
City Manager

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Kim Plets

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Order

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

April 29, 2020

Bridget M. McCormack,
Chief Justice

159758

David F. Viviano,
Chief Justice Pro Tem

KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Justices

v

SC: 159758
COA: 341076
Oakland CC: 2017-159351-CZ

OAKLAND COUNTY MICHIGAN,
Defendant,
and

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 2, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.



t0420

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 29, 2020


Clerk

EXHIBIT - 3

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Neutral

As of: January 9, 2024 6:30 PM Z

Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 9, 2023, Decided

No. 358868

Reporter

2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 *; 2023 WL 2436483

MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee.

Notice: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION IN THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS REPORTS.

Subsequent History: [*1] The Publication Status of this Document has been Changed by the Court from Unpublished to Published June 1, 2023.

Reconsideration denied by Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2870 (Mich. Ct. App., Apr. 24, 2023)

Prior History: Wayne Circuit Court. LC No. 18-014337-CZ.

Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 1643, 2023 WL 2436483 (Mich. Ct. App., Mar. 9, 2023)

Core Terms

charges, inspections, trial court, ordinance, retroactive, city council, permits, Counts, city charter, costs, summary disposition, fire marshal, permit fee, issuance, cause of action, enrichment, argues, taxes, property owner, Headlee Amendment, violations, general public, vested right, user fee, de novo, quotation, premised, marks

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-In a company's action challenging the

legality of certain annual charges imposed by the city, the city was properly granted summary disposition on the company's claim alleging violations of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91 because the fact that the charge was involuntary was insufficient to overcome the fact that the company received a benefit and that the fee was proportional, and thus, the charge at issue was a fee, not a tax; [2]-The trial court properly found no cause of action for its claims related to the violation of the city charter and ordinances because there was no violation of of an ordinance as the charges were a fee paid to obtain occupancy permits, city council's retroactive imposition of the charge did not affect the company as it incurred no new obligations to the city after the passing of the resolution.

Outcome

Judgment affirmed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN1 [📄] **Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation**

Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate, and MCL 141.91 prohibits cities from imposing taxes other than ad valorem property taxes.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law > Genuine Disputes

HN2 Standards of Review, De Novo Review

Whether a municipal charge is a tax is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. The appellate court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN3 Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN4 Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending

& Taxation

In concert, § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91 restrain a local government's ability to assess taxes. If the charges levied are not taxes, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated and claims based on violations of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91 would necessarily fail. User fees are not taxes and are not affected by the Headlee Amendment.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN5 Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment. Three primary factors are considered in determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax. The first criterion is that a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose. A second, and related, criterion is that user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service. A third criterion is voluntariness: fees generally are voluntary, while taxes are not. These criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN6 Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

Considering the first Bolt factor, whether the charge serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose, it is understood that a fee can raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying purpose. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that permit fees, as opposed to taxes, are regulatory in nature.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN7 **Local Governments, Finance**

A regulatory fee can have dual purposes and still maintain its regulatory characterization. As long as the primary purpose of a fee is regulatory in nature, the fee can also raise money provided that it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose, and use benefit the general public.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN8 **Local Governments, Finance**

A regulatory fee may confer a benefit on both the general public and the particular individuals who pay the fee and still maintain its regulatory character.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN9 **Local Governments, Finance**

Courts are to presume that the amount of a regulatory fee is reasonable.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN10 **Local Governments, Finance**

The lack of volition does not render a municipal charge a tax, particular where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax.

Civil Procedure > Trials > Bench Trials

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Questions of Fact & Law

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review

HN11 **Trials, Bench Trials**

A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are

reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. A trial court's interpretation of a municipal charter is a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

HN12 **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

There is no per se prohibition on retroactive application of legislation. However, retrospective application of a law is improper where the law takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

HN13 **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

Retroactive statutes curing defects in acts done, or authorizing or confirming the exercise of powers, are valid where the legislature originally had authority to confer the power or authorize the acts, except where it is attempted to impair vested rights.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

HN14 **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

The reason vested rights are not to be affected by retroactive legislation is that it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances &

Regulations

When interpreting an ordinance, courts are to give some deference to a municipality's interpretation.

Governments > Legislation > Effect &
Operation > Retrospective Operation

HN15 **Local Governments, Finance**

A retroactive application of municipal charges must be a rational means of achieving a city's legitimate objective.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > Questions of Fact & Law

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of
Review > De Novo Review

Governments > Local Governments > Charters

Governments > Local Governments > Property

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

HN16 **Local Governments, Charters**

Detroit, Mich., City Charter § 9-507 allows for the imposition of a charge for (1) admission to an agency-operated facility or (2) a service provided by a city agency.

HN19 **Standards of Review, Clearly Erroneous Review**

A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Nature &
Scope of Protection

Governments > Local Governments > Charters

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances &
Regulations

HN17 **Local Governments, Charters**

A city charter is to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. The provisions are to be read in context, with the plain and ordinary meaning given to every word. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is clear and unambiguous. Court apply unambiguous statutes as written. When a term is not defined in a statute, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.

HN20 **Equal Protection, Nature & Scope of Protection**

The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. Const. 1963, art 1, § 2 and U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Michigan's equal protection provision is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution. The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether there has been discriminatory intent or purposeful discrimination.

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender &
Sex

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Judicial
Review > Standards of Review

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > National
Origin & Race

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Nature &
Scope of Protection

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances &
Regulations

HN18 **Legislation, Interpretation**

HN21 **Equal Protection, Gender & Sex**

Where no suspect classification is involved, such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or illegitimacy, the proper level of review is rational basis. The rational basis test considers whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.

Counsel: For MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY/ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff - Appellant: GREGORY D. HANLEY.

For DETROIT CITY OF, Defendant - Appellee: SHERI L. WHYTE.

Judges: Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

Opinion by: Michael J. Riordan

Opinion

RIORDAN, J.

Plaintiff-appellant, Midwest Valve & Fitting Company, appeals as of right the trial court's order that, after a bench trial, dismissed its remaining claims related to the legality of certain fees charged by defendant, City of Detroit. The appeal also involves the trial court's earlier opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on appellant's other claims.

This case involves appellant's challenge to the legality of certain annual charges that are imposed by defendant. The trial court determined that the charges are legal and dismissed appellant's claims, some in a pretrial motion for summary disposition and the remainder after a bench trial. Because its arguments have no merit, we affirm.

I. FACTS

Defendant imposes an annual charge on owners of commercial real property [*2] and multiunit residential real property located in Detroit. Although appellant initially claimed that the charges were "fire inspection charges," appellant on appeal has acquiesced to the trial court's and defendant's position that they are "permit fees."

Appellant received bills from defendant for these charges since at least 2013 and paid them. However, appellant maintained that it never received any fire

safety inspection during this time.

Appellant filed a complaint, alleging numerous claims against defendant: Count I—violation of the Headlee Amendment, Count II—assumpsit/unreasonable charges, Count III—unjust enrichment/unreasonable charges, Count IV—assumpsit/violation of MCL 141.91, Count V—unjust enrichment/violation of MCL 141.91, Count VI—assumpsit/violation of city ordinance, Count VII—unjust enrichment/violation of city ordinance, and Count VIII—violation of equal protection.

Appellant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on Counts I, IV, and V. It argued that the charges constituted taxes, which were imposed in violation of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment¹ and MCL 141.91.² After analyzing the characteristics of the charges, the trial court ruled that the charges were fees, not taxes, and granted summary disposition in favor of defendant [*3] on Counts I, IV, and V.

The trial court conducted a one-day bench trial on the remaining counts. In support of its position that the charges at issue were inspection fees, appellant primarily relied on (1) a fire marshal web page indicating that inspections get scheduled after payment of the fee, and (2) some internal city documents³ that used terminology, such as "safety inspection charges" or "fire permit safety inspection," while referencing these charges. But, Fire Marshal Shawn Battle testified that those representations were factually incorrect because the fees were exclusively for permits, which allow businesses to operate, and have no relation to inspections.⁴ Although it was the department's goal to inspect every commercial property every year, Battle stated this was not feasible because of a lack of

¹ Const 1963, art 9, § 31.

² As will be discussed in greater detail below, HN1  § 31 of the Headlee Amendment "prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate," Durant v Mich, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 (1997), and MCL 141.91 prohibits cities from imposing taxes other than ad valorem property taxes.

³ The parties stipulated that these documents were created by an unknown city employee at some unknown time.

⁴ Battle also testified that 10 months before trial started, someone had put in a request to Detroit's Information Technology Department to have that information removed from the website, but apparently, the information was still present as of a few days before trial.

manpower. Battle also testified that his department did not utilize any of the documents appellant relied on and instead it used a system called MobileEyes, which identifies the charges as being for "permits." Further, the actual invoices and permits relating to these charges were admitted into evidence via stipulation. Those documents specifically reference "industrial/business/mercantile [*4] occupancy permit[s]," with no mention of inspections.

Although defendant was unable to verify that the city council had approved the charges any time before May 2021, the council later approved them retroactively back to 2013.

In its closing argument, appellant argued that even if the charges were "permit fees," they would be illegal because the city council never approved them, which was required by the city charter and ordinances. Appellant claimed that the city council's attempt to retroactively approve the charges was a legal nullity. Regarding its equal-protection claim, appellant argued that, with it not receiving any inspections, as opposed to other commercial property owners, it had not been treated objectively and reasonably.

The trial court found that the charges at issue are annual permit fees and not inspection fees. The trial court also noted that the burden was on appellant to prove that any fee or charge was unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Further, the trial court ruled that Counts II and VI were not viable because Michigan does not recognize an independent cause of action for assumpsit.

The trial court dismissed appellant's unjust enrichment claims in Counts III and [*5] VII. The court noted that Count III was premised on the allegation that the charges were for fire inspections when no inspections had taken place. The trial court rejected this claim because the charges are not for inspections, but are for permits. The trial court also ruled two additional arguments appellant raised relating to the claims of unjust enrichment were unpersuasive. First, the trial court rejected appellant's contention that the charges were in violation of the city ordinance because they were in excess of the cost of the "issuance" of permits. The trial court noted that cities are allowed to recover all of their direct and indirect costs related to the regulation of those who are charged the fee and that courts are to give deference to a city's interpretation of its own ordinances. Second, the court rejected appellant's contention that defendant was unjustly enriched

because the charges were never approved by the city council. The trial court then ruled that the city council's retroactive approval of the charges was permissible as a matter of law.

Finally, the trial court ruled that appellant failed to prove any of the essential elements of its equal-protection claim, including [*6] that defendant made a classification identifying a particular group, that defendant intentionally or purposefully treated that group differently from similarly situated individuals, and that there is no rational basis for defendant's disparate treatment.

II. HEADLEE AMENDMENT AND MCL 141.91

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V of its complaint. We disagree.

HN2 [↑] Whether a municipal charge is a "tax" is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Mapleview Estates, Inc v Brown City, 258 Mich App 412, 413-414; 671 NW2d 572 (2003). This Court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint." Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). "In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties." Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). A motion under (C)(10) is properly granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Michalski v Bar-Levav, 463 Mich 723, 730; 625 NW2d 754 (2001).

In Counts I, IV, and V, appellant alleges violations of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment states, in pertinent part:

Units of Local Government are hereby [*7] prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon. [Const 1963, art 9, § 31 (emphasis added).]

HN3 [↑] This section "prohibits units of local

government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate." *Durant v Mich*, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).

MCL 141.91 states:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964. [Emphasis added.]

HN4 [¶] In concert, these provisions restrain a local government's ability to assess taxes. If the charges levied are not taxes, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated and appellant's claims here, based on violations of the Headlee Amendment and *MCL 141.91*, would necessarily fail. See *Bolt v City of Lansing*, 459 Mich 152, 158-159; 587 NW2d 264 (1998) (stating that user fees are not taxes and are not affected by the Headlee Amendment).⁵

HN5 [¶] "There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment." *Id.* at 160. Three [*8] primary factors are considered in determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax. "The first criterion is that a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose." *Id.* at 161. "A second, and related, criterion is that user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service." *Id.* at 161-162. A third criterion is voluntariness: fees generally are voluntary, while taxes are not. *Id.* at 162. "[T]hese criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee." *Graham v Kochville Twp*, 236 Mich App 141, 151; 599 NW2d 793 (1999).

There is no question of fact that the charges at issue here were for the acquisition of permits, not inspections. Although appellant took the position below that the charges were "fire inspection charges" or "fire inspection fees," it submitted no evidence to show that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving an inspection.

⁵ Although *Bolt* only concerned whether a particular charge was a "tax" for the purposes of the Headlee Amendment, we find it equally relevant for determining whether a particular charge is a "tax" for the purposes of *MCL 141.91* as well.

Instead, the evidence showed that the charges were for obtaining occupancy permits. Thus, appellant's arguments that rely on the charges being fees for receiving inspection services are misplaced and are without merit.

HN6 [¶] Considering the first *Bolt* factor, whether the charge serves [*9] a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose, it is understood that a fee can raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying purpose. *Merrelli v. St. Clair Shores*, 355 Mich 575, 583; 96 NW2d 144 (1959). Indeed, in *Merrilli*, our Supreme Court held that permit fees, as opposed to taxes, are regulatory in nature. *Id.* at 582. Fire Marshal Battle testified in his deposition that the charge at issue provides the property owner with a permit, which allows the owner to operate in Detroit. Further, in a response to appellant's third set of interrogatories, defendant averred that those who pay the charge, and who do not receive an inspection, still receive the benefit of defendant's Fire Protection Program, which includes the "training of [the fire marshal] staff, maintenance of Fire Marshal's physical facility, public education, provision of information related to properties subject to the Fire Marshal's programs, maintenance of information, capacity to continue provision of services, including but not limited to inspections, etc."

Appellant argues that the Fire Protection Program serves a public purpose, but ignores the primary benefit to a property owner who pays the charge—a permit, allowing the owner to operate on its premises. Undoubtedly, the public [*10] also benefits from the Fire Protection Program, but as this Court recognized in *Westlake Trans. Inc v Pub Serv Comm*, 255 Mich App 589, 613; 662 NW2d 784 (2003), fees that benefit the general public still can maintain their regulatory nature.

In *Westlake*, the plaintiffs argued, in part, that fees assessed to trucking companies were an impermissible tax. *Id.* at 611. This Court stated:

[I]n exchange for the fees, a motor carrier receives the right to operate its trucks in Michigan, and the fees are used to enforce the provisions of the act that carry out the above-listed purposes. Thus, there is a direct benefit to the one who pays the fees. We recognize that promoting and regulating safe use of the highways benefits the general public as well. *HN7* [¶] However, a regulatory fee can have dual purposes and still maintain its regulatory characterization. As long as the primary purpose of a fee is regulatory in nature, the fee can also raise

money provided that it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose, and use benefit the general public. [*Id.* at 613 (citation omitted).]

The situation in *Westlake* is analogous to the circumstances before us. Like the plaintiffs in *Westlake*, who received the right to operate trucks in Michigan, appellant in the instant case receives a benefit by being allowed to operate its business [*11] in Detroit. Thus, appellant received "a direct benefit" from paying the charge. *HN8*[↑] The fact that the general public also benefits from the Fire Protection Program does not negate the charge's regulatory nature. See also *Jackson Co v City of Jackson*, 302 Mich App 90, 108; 836 NW2d 903 (2013) ("[A] regulatory fee may confer a benefit on both the general public and the particular individuals who pay the fee and still maintain its regulatory character"). Therefore, the first of the factors we must consider weighs in favor of the charge being a fee and not a tax.

Secondly, the city's charge appears to be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service it is providing. *HN9*[↑] Courts are to presume that the amount of the fee is reasonable. *Id.* at 109. Appellant's position is that the costs are not proportionate because, by not receiving any inspections, appellant received nothing different from anyone else in the city who was not required to pay the charges. We disagree with this argument because the main benefit of the city's charge was the receipt of a permit, not an inspection. Thus, those who paid the charge did receive a benefit distinct from someone who did not pay the fee—the right to occupy the premises as a business. Furthermore, these charges funded the year-to-year [*12] operations of the Fire Marshal Department. This is an important distinction from *Bolt*, in which our Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the charge, which it found to be a tax, was to finance a multiyear construction of a large infrastructure project. There, the benefit gained—new infrastructure—would substantially outlast the time period for which the charge was to be in place. *Bolt*, 459 Mich at 163-164. Further, the amounts collected from the charges in the case before us historically were significantly less than the program's costs. Consequently, the charge is reasonably proportional.

As to the third factor, we must consider whether the city's charge was voluntary. The trial court did not explicitly rule on this factor and instead simply assumed that the charge was not voluntary. We agree that the charge was not voluntary. Although, while technically, the charge is voluntary because a business could

decline to pay and simply opt to not operate in Detroit, that option is highly impractical for a business. Indeed, our Supreme Court in *Bolt* rejected the argument that a charge was voluntary because property owners could relinquish their rights of ownership. *Id.* at 168.

After weighing these same factors, the trial court ruled [*13] the charge was a fee, not a tax. We agree with the trial court's analysis and find it did not err. *HN10*[↑] Significantly, this Court has recognized that "the lack of volition does not render the charge a tax, particular where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax." *Wheeler v Shelby Twp*, 265 Mich App 657, 666; 697 NW2d 180 (2005). Thus, even with the charge at issue being involuntary, that fact alone is not sufficient to overcome the other two factors that appellant received a benefit and that the fee is proportional.

Because the charge at issue is a fee, not a tax, appellant is precluded from succeeding on its claims alleging violations of the Headlee Amendment and *MCL* 141.91. As a result, the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V.

III. VIOLATION OF CITY CHARTER AND ORDINANCES

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its claims related to the violation of the city charter and ordinances. We disagree.

HN11[↑] A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. *Walters v Snyder*, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the [*14] entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." *Id.* A trial court's interpretation of a municipal charter is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. *Save Our Downtown v. City of Traverse City*, Mich App , ; NW2d , 2022 Mich. App. LEXIS 6164 (2022) (Docket No. 359536); *slip op at 5*.

Initially, it should be recognized that after the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on some of appellant's counts, trial proceeded with respect to only Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII. The trial court dismissed Counts II and VI, which alleges independent causes of action of assumpsit. This was not erroneous because Michigan no longer recognizes an independent

cause of action for assumpsit.⁶ *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc.*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). Notably, appellant does not challenge the dismissal of those counts. Instead, appellant focuses on its allegations that the charges were unlawful because they were imposed in violation of the city charter and ordinances. Thus, only appellant's claims pertaining to the alleged violations of the city charter and ordinances are before this Court.⁷

In Count VII, appellant asserted a claim of unjust enrichment premised on a violation of *Detroit Ordinances*, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11, which stated at the time, in pertinent part:⁸

In accordance with Section 9-507 of the 1997 Detroit City Charter, the Fire Commissioner [*15] is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of:

- (1) Inspection and consultation;
- (2) Issuance of permits and certificates;
- (3) Administrative appeals;
- (4) Issuance of reports; and
- (5) Copying of records.

⁶Although no independent cause of action for assumpsit exists, "the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc.*, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 (2013). In this instance, appellant's counts of assumpsit essentially were covered by its claims of unjust enrichment.

⁷In Count III, appellant alleges that defendant unjustly enriched itself by collecting charges pertaining to fire inspections, while not providing such fire inspections. However, the trial court found that the charges at issue were fees for permits, not inspections. That finding, precluding unjust enrichment, is not clearly erroneous. Fire Marshal Battle testified at trial that the fees were for the issuance of permits, not inspections. Indeed, even the invoices that appellant received stated that the charges were for "permits," with no mention of "inspections." While there were some internal city documents that used terms such as "fire inspection fee," those documents could not be authenticated, and the trial court gave them little to no weight. The author of those documents is not known, and there is no evidence that defendant relied on them. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for that aspect of Count III.

⁸The Detroit City Code was later recodified in December 2019. The content in this quoted portion was moved to Detroit Ordinances, § 18-1-22, Subsection 1.6.2. Although there are some minor modifications to the 2019 recodification, the content is substantially the same.

Appellant alleges in its complaint that this ordinance was violated because the charges could not be considered "necessary" when a property owner does not receive a fire inspection. This position again is premised on the assertion that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving fire inspections, but as already explained, that is not the case. The charges are a fee paid to obtain occupancy permits.

Although appellant's complaint only alleges that the ordinances were violated in this one respect in its proposed conclusions of law, appellant asserted that the charges were unlawful for two other reasons: (1) the city council never approved the charges, and (2) the charter provision cited in the ordinance does not allow for permit fees. The trial court rejected the former argument, but did not address the latter.

Regarding the former, the parties stipulated that there was no evidence of the city council approving the charges any time [*16] before May 2021. But the city council later retroactively approved the charges. Appellant argues that the retroactive approval is a nullity.

HN12 [↑] There is no per se prohibition on retroactive application of legislation. See *Bd. of Trs. of the City v. City of Pontiac*, 317 Mich. App. 570, 578-579; 895 N.W.2d 206 (2016). However,

retrospective application of a law is improper where the law takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. [*In re Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit*, 416 Mich 558, 572; 331 NW2d 456 (1982) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also *LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC*, 496 Mich 26, 39; 852 NW2d 78 (2014).]

Appellant essentially argues that it had a vested right to not pay any of the charges until the city council approved them in May 2021. According to appellant, the retroactive imposition of those charges affected its vested right. Appellant's position is not persuasive. **HN13** [↑] "Retroactive statutes curing defects in acts done, or authorizing or confirming the exercise of powers, are valid where the legislature originally had authority to confer the power or authorize the acts, except where it is attempted to impair vested rights." *Stott v Stott Realty Co*, 288 Mich 35, 45; 284 NW 635

(1939). As discussed below, the city council at all relevant times had the power or authority to approve the charges, making its [*17] retroactive authorization permissible. Notably, appellant during the preceding years thought that the charges were legally due and paid them to defendant. **HN14** [↑] This is significant because the reason vested rights are not to be affected by retroactive legislation is that "it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions." *LaFontaine*, 496 Mich at 38 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because appellant had no expectation to be free from paying the permit fee, the retroactive authorization of that very same permit fee did not affect appellant. In other words, the retroactive imposition of the charge did not affect appellant as it incurred no new obligations to defendant after the passing of the resolution.

HN15 [↑] Additionally, a retroactive application must be a rational means of achieving a city's legitimate objective. *Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate*, 444 Mich 656, 667; 513 NW2d 807 (1994). In this case, the retroactive ratification of the charges was a rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose. The purpose was to maintain the Fire Protection Program, which certainly is a legitimate purpose, and the means to accomplish that was to simply authorize charges that property owners had already paid, which was reasonable.⁹

Appellant's latter argument [*18] not contained in its complaint was that the city council lacked the authority to approve the charges because they violate § 9-507 of the city charter. Section 9-507 provides:

Any agency of the City may, with the approval of the City Council, charge an admission or service fee to any facility operated, or for any service provided, by an agency. The approval of the City Council shall also be required for any change in any such admission or service fee.

HN16 [↑] This section allows for the imposition of a charge for (1) admission to an agency-operated facility or (2) a service provided by a city agency. Only the second clause is pertinent in this case. While appellant concedes that if the charge was for a fire inspection, then the charge would be for a service, it argues that if the charge is truly a "permit fee," then it is not a charge for a service. We disagree.

⁹ The only reason the charges had not been authorized earlier is that the Fire Marshal Department had thought that an authorization already was in place.

HN17 [↑] The city charter is to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. *Save Our Downtown*, Mich App at ; slip op at 5. "The provisions are to be read in context, with the plain and ordinary meaning given to every word. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is clear and unambiguous. Court apply unambiguous statutes as written." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). [*19] When a term is not defined in a statute, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. *Kent Co Aeronautics Bd v Dep't of State Police*, 239 Mich App 563, 578; 609 NW2d 593 (2000). As evidenced by the 27 different definitions of the noun "service" in the dictionary, the term is defined broadly. See *Random House Webster's College Dictionary* (1995). However, one of those definitions is most pertinent: "the duty or work of public servants." *Id.* Although the work provided in this instance is not the provision of a fire inspection, it nonetheless still is a service because it is providing a permit. Consequently, the city's imposition of a charge to a property owner to obtain a permit does not run afoul of the city charter.

Appellant also contends that it is improper for the charges to fund "all of the direct and indirect costs" of the Fire Prevention Program. Appellant avers that the ordinance only allows for defendant to recover the administrative costs associated with issuing the permits. Appellant provides no authority for this argument and merely quotes the applicable provision in the city code: "the Fire Commissioner is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of . . . [i]ssuance [*20] of permits and certificates." Detroit Ordinances, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11. Appellant focuses on the word "issuance" for its position. "Issuance" is defined as "the act of publishing or officially giving out or making available." *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (11th ed).

The strictly literal interpretation of this provision lends support to the suggestion that a charge is allowable only for the "act" of "giving out" the permit. However, the concept of a "permit" encompasses much more than a physical piece of paper. The more reasonable interpretation is that the cost of the issuance of a permit includes all the work involved with a particular program which that permit represents.

HN18 [↑] When interpreting an ordinance, courts are to give some deference to a municipality's interpretation. See *Macenas v Village of Michiana*, 433 Mich 380, 398; 446 NW2d 102 (1989). Battle testified that the Fire

Marshal Department has been issuing the permit in the same manner since at least 1996, and that it would not be possible to issue these permits if all of the Fire Marshal's related programs were not funded.¹⁰ Thus, the Fire Marshal Department has been interpreting the term "issuance" within the ordinance as encompassing the costs of the Fire Prevention Program, [*21] as well as the cost of physically issuing the permit itself. We defer to the Fire Marshal's interpretation of the ordinance and similarly conclude that the ordinance allows for the recovery of the costs of the Fire Prevention Program in the issuance of the permits.

Therefore, given the above analysis, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action on appellant's claims related to any alleged violations of city charter or ordinances.

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its equal-protection claim. We disagree.

HN19 [T] A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Walters, 239 Mich App at 456.

HN20 [T] "The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law." Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Twp, 486 Mich 311, 318; 783 NW2d 695 (2010), citing Const 1963, art 1, § 2 and US Const, Am XIV. "Michigan's equal protection provision is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution." Grimes v Van Hook-Williams, 302 Mich App 521, 532-533; 839 NW2d 237 (2013) (cleaned up). "The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment." Id. at 533 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry [*22] is whether there has been discriminatory intent or purposeful discrimination. Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App 302, 308; 553 NW2d 377 (1996).

Appellant claims that its "group" has been discriminated against because it did not receive fire inspections, while others who paid the charges at issue did. **HN21** [T] Because no suspect classification is involved, such as

race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or illegitimacy, the proper level of review is rational basis. See Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 434; 685 NW2d 174 (2004). "The rational basis test considers whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Fire Marshal Battle testified that the goal of his department is to inspect every property, but that the lack of funding and manpower makes it impossible to do so. Thus, while some properties in a given year received inspections, some did not, even though both inspected and uninspected properties pay the same charge. It is beyond dispute that a legitimate governmental interest is to provide fire inspections. It also is rationally related to only perform as many inspections as is economically feasible. Knowing that it is impossible to inspect every property, defendant was left with two choices: (1) conduct as many inspections [*23] as it could, or (2) conduct zero inspections so everyone was treated equally. Defendant's choice to proceed with the first option is eminently rational.

Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for appellant's equal-protection claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly ruled in favor of defendant on all counts. We affirm.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

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¹⁰ These also are findings of fact that the trial court made, which appellant does not challenge on appeal.

EXHIBIT - 4

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Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 30, 2023, Decided

No. 360116

Reporter

2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2259 *; 2023 WL 2717788

STEVEN R. GENTRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON, Defendant-Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Notice: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.

Subsequent History: Reconsideration denied by Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3294 (Mich. Ct. App., May 10, 2023)

Prior History: [*1] Macomb Circuit Court. LC No. 2021-002813-CZ.

Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton, 2022 Mich. App. LEXIS 2326 (Mich. Ct. App., Apr. 27, 2022)

Core Terms

tribunal, township, funds, millage, taxpayer, subject-matter, circuit court, refund, collected, special assessment, trial court, voters, exclusive jurisdiction, tax refund, summary disposition, plaintiff's claim, purposes, lawsuit, matters, tax revenue, quotation, escrow, marks, cause of action, plaintiffs', restitution, spent, unjust enrichment, property tax law, property taxes

Counsel: For STEVEN R. GENTRY, Plaintiff - Appellant: GREGORY D. HANLEY.

For CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON, Defendant - Appellee: SONAL H. MITHANI.

Judges: Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARKEY and BORRELLO, JJ.

Opinion

In this action generally challenging the Charter Township of Clinton's use of specific property tax revenue, plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court's order granting the township's motion for summary disposition based on a determination that the Michigan Tax Tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774. The trial court further concluded that even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's case should still be dismissed because plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing and plaintiff's action was untimely under Bigger v. City of Pontiac, 390 Mich 1; 210 NW2d 1 (1973). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's decision granting summary disposition in favor of the township because plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this purported class-action lawsuit on August 2, 2021, generally challenging the propriety of the township's use of revenue collected from a property tax millage that was approved [*2] by voters pursuant to a ballot initiative. Plaintiff alleged that in 2013, township voters had approved a millage for the purpose of purchasing additional police vehicles and covering operating costs of the police department, that this millage had been renewed by township voters in 2018 to continue through 2025, and that the township had not used the "vast majority" of the revenue collected from this millage for its intended purpose. As an owner of real property in the township, plaintiff claimed to have paid the property tax at issue.

Specifically, in his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that "the Township has simply hoarded millions of dollars raised by the Supplemental Police Tax and/or used those revenues to make payments to reduce its actuarially-accrued liability for retiree health care expenses—expenses that are not 'operational costs.'"

Plaintiff further alleged that the "Township increased the amount of money in its Police Fund from an already-excessive \$21 million to over \$36 million since the Supplemental Police Tax was first imposed, even after paying the improper nonoperational expenses." Plaintiff asserted claims for assumpsit, unjust enrichment, and injunctive [*3] relief. Based on these claims, plaintiff sought a refund to the class members of the tax allegedly unlawfully collected during the previous six years and plaintiff sought to enjoin the township from further collecting the millage.

The township moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (C)(5), (C)(7), and (C)(8). The township argued, as relevant to this appeal, that only the tax tribunal had jurisdiction over the type of claims raised by plaintiff, that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims because he had only alleged harm of the type experienced by all taxpayers generally, and that plaintiff's claims were untimely under Bigger.

In opposition, plaintiff argued that his action was supported by South Haven v Van Buren Co Bd of Comm'rs, 478 Mich 518; 734 NW2d 533 (2007), and that taxpayers have a cause of action for a refund where a municipality uses revenues from a voter approved millage for purposes other than those stated on the ballot. Plaintiff maintained that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the matter, rather than the tax tribunal, because plaintiff was only challenging the township's use of the tax proceeds, and plaintiff was not challenging the amount or validity of an assessment or seeking the type of refund under the state's property tax laws that would bring [*4] the matter within the tax tribunal's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also argued that he had standing because he had a direct cause of action under South Haven, thus negating the need to rely on concepts of taxpayer standing, and he nonetheless suffered a special injury by personally paying the tax at issue. Finally, as relevant to this appeal, plaintiff argued that Bigger did not apply to this case.

The trial court subsequently issued a written opinion and order, thoroughly analyzing the issues and explaining its reasoning for determining that the township was entitled to summary disposition. First, although the trial court concluded that the tax tribunal did not have jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(a), the trial court nevertheless granted the township's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because it determined that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774. The

trial court reasoned that plaintiff was seeking a refund of taxes, which brought his action within the scope of MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774, and that plaintiff had not explained how his equitable claims constituted extraordinary circumstances that warranted divesting the tax tribunal of jurisdiction. [*5] Additionally, the trial court concluded that even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff did not have standing to pursue his claims because he had not satisfied the requirements of demonstrating taxpayer standing. The court also determined that plaintiff's claims were barred under Bigger.

Plaintiff now appeals.

II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by determining that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court "review[s] de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition." Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc, 500 Mich 327, 333; 901 NW2d 566 (2017). The question whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. Hillsdale Co Senior Servs., Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 46, 51; 832 NW2d 728 (2013). This Court also reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. *Id*.

Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(4) if the "court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter."

In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), it is proper to consider the pleadings and any affidavits or other documentary evidence submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo, but this Court must determine whether [*6] the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence, demonstrate . . . [a lack of] subject matter jurisdiction. [Forest Hills Coop v Ann Arbor, 305 Mich App 572, 617; 854 NW2d 172 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipsis and alteration in original).]

B. ANALYSIS

The first issue presented by plaintiff appeal concerns whether the circuit court or tax tribunal had subject-

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matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. "Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to act and authority to hear and determine a case." *Id.* The question of subject-matter jurisdiction concerns "a court or tribunal's abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending." *New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Twp of Covert*, 334 Mich App 24, 48; 964 NW2d 378 (2020). As our Supreme Court has explained,

[j]urisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during the trial. [*Winkler*, 500 Mich at 333-334 (quotation marks [*7] and citation omitted; alteration in original).]

Furthermore, the "question of jurisdiction is not dependent on the truth or falsity of the allegations, but upon their nature." *Petersen Fin LLC v Kentwood*, 326 Mich App 433, 441-442; 928 NW2d 245 (2018). "The inquiry into subject-matter jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement of a case, not its conclusion." *Id.* at 442. "A court's subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by reference to the allegations listed in the complaint." *Id.* at 446 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Regarding the circuit court's jurisdiction, the Michigan Constitution provides:

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court. [*Const 1963, art 6, § 13.*]

Additionally, under *MCL 600.605*, "[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution [*8] or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction

by the constitution or statutes of this state." "Divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law." *Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm'r*, 413 Mich 728, 738; 322 NW2d 152 (1982). Circuit courts "are courts of general jurisdiction" and when construing relevant statutory and constitutional provisions implicating the potential divestiture of the circuit court's jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the circuit court retains jurisdiction and "any intent to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction must be clearly and unambiguously stated." *Winkler*, 500 Mich at 334 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

At issue in this case is *MCL 205.731*, in which the Legislature granted original and exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to the tax tribunal over certain types of proceedings. See also *New Covert*, 334 Mich App at 48. *MCL 205.731* provides in relevant part as follows:

The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all of the following:

- (a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.
- (b) A proceeding for a refund or [*9] redetermination of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state.
* * *
- (e) Any other proceeding provided by law.

Our Supreme Court has characterized *MCL 205.731* as an "exception" to the circuit court's jurisdiction for tax cases. *Hillsdale Co*, 494 Mich at 52. *MCL 205.731* is located within the *Tax Tribunal Act*, *MCL 205.701 et seq.* As used in this act, "tribunal" means "the tax tribunal created under section 21." *MCL 205.703(g)*. "Agency" means "a board, official, or administrative agency empowered to make a decision, finding, ruling, assessment, determination, or order that is subject to review under the jurisdiction of the tribunal or that has collected a tax for which a refund is claimed." *MCL 205.703(a)*. Pursuant to *MCL 205.774*, the "right to sue any agency for refund of any taxes other than by proceedings before the tribunal is abolished as of September 30, 1974[.]" and "[i]f a tax paid to an agency is erroneous or unlawful, it shall not be requisite that the payment be made under protest in order to invoke a right to refund by proceedings before the tribunal." "The tribunal's jurisdiction is based either on the subject matter of the proceeding (e.g., a direct review of a final

decision of an agency relating to special assessments[, assessments, valuation, rates, allocation, or equalization] under property [*10] tax laws) or the type of relief requested (i.e., a refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws)." *Wikman v City of Novi*, 413 Mich 617, 631; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).

Here, the trial court concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims pursuant to *MCL 205.731(b)* and *MCL 205.774*. In arguing to the contrary, plaintiff relies primarily on our Supreme Court's decision in *South Haven*, 478 Mich 518. Plaintiff contends that *South Haven* supports his argument that he may seek a refund under the circuit court's general equitable powers without invoking the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal under *MCL 205.731(b)*. Plaintiff also relies on our Supreme Court's decision in *Romulus*, 413 Mich 728, to argue that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter because the type of refund plaintiff seeks is not the type of typical tax refund contemplated by *MCL 205.731(b)*. Therefore, plaintiff argues under *South Haven* and *Romulus*, tax revenues from a millage may be returned to taxpayers when the funds were spent for a purpose not provided for by the millage. Consequently, plaintiff contends that the relief he is seeking is not a refund under the state's property tax laws (as contemplated by *MCL 205.731(b)*) but is instead an entirely different cause of action that [*11] is rooted in the Supreme Court's *South Haven* decision and based on a challenge to the use of tax revenue from a voter-approved millage.

In *South Haven*, 478 Mich at 521-522, the Supreme Court was presented with an issue involving a statute that required funds from a road millage to be distributed according to a specific formula between cities, villages, and the county for their roads. Voters in the county approved a road millage that only provided revenue to the county and did not contain a provision for the statutorily required distributions to cities and villages. *Id.* at 522-523. The city of South Haven, which did not have any county roads within its boundaries, subsequently objected to the county's failure to allocate any of the millage funds to the city and initiated a lawsuit in the circuit court. *Id.* at 523. The circuit court dismissed the action on summary disposition pursuant to *MCR 2.116(C)(4)*, concluding that the tax tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter. *Id.* The Court of Appeals reversed and held that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court rather than the tax tribunal "because the case did not involve assessment, valuation, rates,

special assessments, allocation, equalization, a refund, or a redetermination of a tax." *Id.* at 524.

On appeal to our [*12] Supreme Court, our Supreme Court determined that the statutory distribution procedure was violated, and the Court proceeded to address whether there was a remedy available to the city. *Id.* at 527-528. After first determining that the statute did not authorize a cause of action for restitution of misallocated funds, *id.* at 530-531, the Court stated that

although plaintiff may not seek restitution, this Court has permitted a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief when a government official does not conform to his or her statutory duty to distribute funds in a specified manner. Thus, two possible judicial remedies are available in a case where voters approve a ballot proposal that improperly allocates proceeds: to enjoin collection of the improper millage or to refund collected taxes to the taxpayers. These remedies would be unexceptional exercises of the power of the judiciary to give injunctive relief to prevent illegal acts. [*Id.* at 531 (citations omitted).]

The Supreme Court noted that "neither of these remedies [were] appropriate" in that case because "the millage ha[d] already been collected and the taxpayers were not seeking a refund[.]" *Id.* at 531 n 20. The Court then concluded:

Plaintiff seeks a third possible remedy: a writ of mandamus [*13] compelling defendants to disgorge the funds and allocate them in accordance with the statutory formula. This we decline to do because the city is not entitled to receive any of the funds. Under the General Property Tax Act, . . . when a millage proposal is submitted to the electors for approval, the ballot must "fully disclose each local unit of government to which the revenue from that millage will be disbursed," and must state "[a] clear statement of the purpose for the millage." This statute does not expressly preclude using for one purpose tax revenue specifically approved for a different purpose. However, a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the Legislature did not intend to do a useless thing. If funds that voters approved for the purpose stated on the ballot could be redirected to another purpose without seeking new approval, there would be no reason for including the purpose on the ballot. Indeed, voters could be lulled into voting for a millage for a popular

purpose, only to have the funds then used for something they may well have never approved. This is contrary to the General Property Tax Act. The voters of Van Buren County did not approve the allocation [*14] of funds for city roads, and perhaps would not have approved a proposal including that purpose. While no court has warrant to violate MCL 224.20b by ordering distribution contrary to that statute, it likewise may not violate MCL 211.24f by ordering these funds to be used for a purpose not approved by the voters. Accordingly, South Haven is not entitled to receive any of the proceeds of the millage. [*Id.* at 531-533 (citations omitted; alteration in original).]

In reaching this result, the Court additionally noted that the Legislature had authorized the Attorney General, by statute,¹ to pursue a civil action to recover misappropriated funds and that the city's "statutorily provided remedy [was] through the Attorney General." *Id.* at 530.

In Romulus, 413 Mich at 733-735, the plaintiffs brought an action in the circuit court challenging their drain taxes on the ground that the defendants allegedly committed a constructive fraud by using money collected through special assessments to pay for administrative expenses instead of properly using the special assessment revenue for its enumerated purposes and only relying on general taxation funds to pay administrative expenses. The plaintiffs included "township and city treasurers, acting in their official capacities, [*15] and landowners." *Id.* at 733. Our Supreme Court addressed the scope of the tax tribunal's jurisdiction and whether plaintiffs' constructive fraud claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal or whether it could properly be considered by the circuit court. *Id.* at 735-736.

In analyzing this issue, the Romulus Court noted that the "focus" of the plaintiffs' claim "concern[ed] not the factual underpinnings of the pertinent assessments, but rather how funds collected pursuant to the special assessment laws may be spent." *Id.* at 736. The Court explained that the matters within the tax tribunal's jurisdiction under MCL 205.731 "most clearly relate to the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper

uses which may be made of the funds once collected." *Id.* at 738. Our Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was not within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(a) because questions regarding how the funds collected from the special assessments may properly be expended are not implicated by disputes concerning any of the matters described in subsection (a).² *Id.* at 738-739. The Court reasoned as follows:

Because questions as to the lawful expenditure of funds do not arise within the other matters within the tribunal's jurisdiction, and because [*16] the tribunal's expertise relates much more directly to other questions concerning the lawfulness of challenged special assessments, we cannot assume that the Legislature intended to divest the circuit court of its equitable jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in matters involving the appropriate use of funds collected under the guise of special assessment laws. [*Romulus*, 413 Mich at 738-739.]

However, the plaintiffs' claim included a request for the return to the landowner plaintiffs of money, which was being held in escrow, that had been collected as special assessments and also earmarked for administrative expenses. *Id.* at 733-734. Thus, the Court stated that the question remained whether pursuant to MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774, the landowner plaintiffs' request for a return of the money in escrow was a matter within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction such that the circuit court was precluded from considering the claim or whether the landowner plaintiffs' request could be considered under the circuit court's equity jurisdiction. *Id.* at 732-733, 736, 739, 745-746. The Court held that the matter was, "at least in part, an equitable action, not within the Tax Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction, and thus properly brought in the circuit court." *Id.* at 732-733. Explaining [*17] its holding, the Court reasoned as follows:

We conclude that, if the funds in escrow have been justifiably withheld from the county, the landowner plaintiffs' claim that the funds should be repaid to them because of defendants' constructive fraud is not a claim for a tax refund within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.

¹ The Court cited MCL 224.30, which is specific to violations of certain laws regarding roads. See MCL 224.30; South Haven, 478 Mich at 530. Accordingly, this statute has no bearing on the instant case.

² As previously stated, these matters are "assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state." MCL 205.731(a).

We do not reach this conclusion by holding that equity jurisdiction supersedes the Legislature's intended jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. Rather, we believe that the Legislature has not shown a clear intent to abolish the circuit court's equity jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' claim to the funds in escrow. In accordance with the settled principle that the divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law, we will not presume an intent not clearly expressed. Although it is arguable that MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774 could apply because the funds in escrow were collected as purported special assessments, a return of the funds from this escrow account would not be a typical tax refund and to treat it as such would likely lead to an anomalous result. If the circuit court determines that the funds in escrow were properly withheld from the county, [*18] then principles of equity may dictate that the funds should be returned to those who paid them. If so, the court would be in an intractable position if such relief were deemed to be a tax refund over which the circuit court had no jurisdiction. Rather, the rule that equity will grant complete relief is applicable here. The Tax Tribunal Act does not prevent a court of equity from determining what should be done with funds that in extraordinary circumstances have been properly withheld from the county. [*Id.* at 746-747 (some citations omitted).]

Here, plaintiff's claims focus on allegations that the township improperly used tax revenue for purposes other than those for which that specific tax revenue was intended. Our Supreme Court's decision in South Haven supports the general proposition that revenue generated from a voter-approved millage may not be spent for purposes other than those approved by the voters without contravening the General Property Tax Act.³ South Haven, 478 Mich at 531-533. Because plaintiff's challenge in the instant case relates to how the millage revenue could lawfully be spent after being collected rather than the underlying basis for the tax, plaintiff's claims do not implicate the special expertise of the tax tribunal [*19] and therefore do not fall within the tax

tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(a). Romulus, 413 Mich at 736, 738-739. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by determining that the tax tribunal did not have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(a).

However, the question remains whether plaintiff's claims are within the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of the tax tribunal under MCL 205.731(b) because plaintiff seeks a "refund." Answering this question also implicates MCL 205.774, which generally prohibits lawsuits for tax refunds "other than by proceedings before the tribunal." In his first amended complaint, plaintiff specifically sought to have the township refund the money collected pursuant to the millage.

The tax tribunal's jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(b) is based on the type of relief requested. Wikman, 413 Mich at 631. The issue thus becomes whether plaintiff's requested relief actually constitutes "a refund . . . of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state," for purposes of MCL 205.731(b),⁴ or a "refund of any taxes," for purposes of MCL 205.774, such that jurisdiction in the circuit court is precluded.

The answer to this question is not entirely clear. Our Supreme Court in South Haven did not address the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, leaving intact the ruling of the Court [*20] of Appeals that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court. However, in South Haven there was no request by taxpayers for a *refund* of the tax revenue at issue; instead, the city sought to have the money reallocated by the county so that some of the revenue would flow to the city. South Haven, 478 Mich at 525, 531 n 20, 531-533. Thus, South Haven does not answer the question whether a request by a taxpayer to have tax revenue returned based on a claim that the revenue was spent for an improper purpose constitutes a "refund" for purposes of the tax tribunal act and the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court in South Haven was not asked to address the issue, thus, there is nothing in that opinion that could be cited to support a conclusion that the relief sought by plaintiff in the instant case either does or does not constitute a "refund" to taxpayers.⁵

³At this juncture, there is no need to express an opinion on whether the township actually spent funds for a purpose that would not fall within the purpose approved by the voters. As previously stated, the "question of jurisdiction is not dependent on the truth or falsity of the allegations, but upon their nature." Petersen, 326 Mich App at 441-442.

⁴There is no claim that plaintiff seeks a "redetermination" of his taxes.

⁵Despite the broad reading of this decision advocated by plaintiff, our Supreme Court's decision in South Haven was limited to a narrow issue that is not implicated in this case and, further, does not address the pertinent issue currently before

The Court in *Romulus* came closer to addressing the question currently before this Court. In *Romulus*, the Court held that a claim by landowner plaintiffs for a return of escrowed tax funds based on allegations that the taxing authority committed a constructive fraud by improperly allocating those funds to unauthorized administrative expenses did not constitute a claim for a "typical tax refund" [*21] within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under *MCL 205.731(b)* and *MCL 205.774*. *Romulus*, 413 Mich at 733-734, 745-747. Thus, the *Romulus* Court reasoned that "the Legislature has not shown a clear intent to abolish the circuit court's equity jurisdiction" under such circumstances. *Id.* at 746. However, the *Romulus* Court reached this conclusion based in part on the fact that money potentially subject to being returned to the taxpayers was being held in escrow and it was "not possible to determine that the funds in escrow were improperly withheld from the county." *Id.* at 746-747. Such factual circumstances are not present in the instant case where plaintiff seeks to have the township return tax money that it has already collected and allocated.

Thus, *Romulus* does not directly support plaintiff's argument. *Romulus* does, however, support the general proposition that the basis on which a plaintiff seeks money from the township that originated as tax revenue affects whether the relief claimed by plaintiff constitutes a "typical tax refund" such that the claim should be adjudicated in the tax tribunal or instead constitutes some other type of claim that properly belongs within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The mere fact that a tax is involved does not automatically place the matter within [*22] the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal. Cf. *Petersen*, 318 Mich App at 449 ("The MTT does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over contract disputes simply because the substance of the contract regards special assessments.").

this Court. Specifically, the Supreme Court in *South Haven* explained that it had granted leave to appeal "limited to consideration of whether the city was entitled to any of the tax proceeds," ordering the parties "to address whether the ballot proposal violated the statute and, if so, what remedy might be available, and whether the parties by their conduct 'otherwise agreed' to a different allocation than that required by statute." *Id.* at 525. The Supreme Court's analysis of that issue simply has no bearing on whether a request by a taxpayer, rather than a city, to have millage revenue directly returned to the taxpayer based on a claim that the taxing authority misallocated the millage revenue for in improper purpose constitutes a "refund" for purposes of the tax tribunal act. It similarly does not support plaintiff's claim that he has standing to bring this action, which is discussed later in this opinion.

Furthermore, *Romulus* supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over claims that implicate issues concerning how a municipality may lawfully spend money after it has been collected from taxes, in light of the nature of the tax tribunal's special expertise. As our Supreme Court explained in *Romulus*:

The tribunal that was created to exercise such jurisdiction was labeled a "quasi-judicial agency", *MCL 205.721*, whose membership is to be comprised of persons with various specified qualifications. Of the seven members, two must be attorneys with experience either in property tax matters or in judicial or quasi-judicial office. *MCL 205.722*. One member must be a certified assessor; one, an experienced professional real estate appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant with experience in state-local tax matters. . . . [P]ersons who are not members of any of the enumerated disciplines are required to have experience in state or local tax matters.

The expertise [*23] of the tribunal members can be seen to relate primarily to questions concerning the factual underpinnings of taxes. In cases not involving special assessments, the tribunal's membership is well-qualified to resolve the disputes concerning those matters that the Legislature has placed within its jurisdiction: assessments, valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. In special assessment cases, the tribunal is competent to ascertain whether the assessments are levied according to the benefits received. Although the tribunal, in making its determinations, will make conclusions of law, *MCL 205.751*, the matters within its jurisdiction under *MCL 205.731* most clearly relate to the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper uses which may be made of the funds once collected. [*Romulus*, 413 Mich at 737-738 (some citations omitted).]

Here, determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under *MCL 205.731(b)* requires a clear definition of the term "refund" as used in *MCL 205.731(b)* and *MCL 205.774*, both of which are contained within the Tax Tribunal Act. The *Romulus* Court did not define this term, although it stated that the factual circumstances in that case did not involve a "typical tax refund." *Romulus*, 413 Mich at 746.

Resolution [*24] of this question presents an issue of

statutory interpretation. When interpreting the language of a statute, courts seek to "ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute." *Koontz v Ameritech Servs. Inc.*, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted." *Farris v McKaig*, 324 Mich App 349, 353; 920 NW2d 377 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." *Koontz*, 466 Mich at 312. Statutory "words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." *MCL 8.3a*; see also *Farris*, 324 Mich App at 354.

Here, the term "refund" is not defined within the Tax Tribunal Act. See *MCL 205.703*. It is thus appropriate to consult dictionary definitions. *Farris*, 324 Mich App at 354. *Black's Law Dictionary* (11th ed) provides three definitions of "refund," two of which are relevant to the instant case: "1. The return of [*25] money to a person who overpaid, such as a taxpayer who overestimated tax liability or whose employer withheld too much tax from earnings. 2. The money returned to a person who overpaid." The definition for the term "tax refund" is "[m]oney that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority.—Also termed tax rebate." *Black's Law Dictionary* (11th ed). Accordingly, although these demonstrations show that a tax refund is accomplished by returning tax money to the taxpayer, it is also clear that a tax refund is given *based on some kind of overpayment*. In other words, the tax is refunded because the taxpayer did not owe the tax or owed less tax. That is not the basis on which plaintiff seeks monetary relief in this case.

According to the first amended complaint, plaintiff sought the return of millage funds based on his claims of "ASSUMPSIT (MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED)" and "UNJUST ENRICHMENT."

"Unjust enrichment is a cause of action to correct a defendant's unjust retention of a benefit owed to another." *Wright v Genesee Co*, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 (2019). "A claim of unjust enrichment can arise when a party has and retains money or benefits

which in justice and equity belong to another." *Id.* at 418 (quotation marks and citation omitted). [*26] Though plaintiff's complaint contains a claim of "assumpsit," assumpsit has technically been abolished as a cause of action, but "the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]" *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich App 161, 213; 969 NW2d 570 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). "At common law, assumpsit was a proper vehicle for recovering unlawful fees, charges, or exactions—including unlawful utility charges—that the plaintiff had paid to a municipality under compulsion of local law." *Id.* However, "an 'assumpsit' claim is modernly treated as a claim arising under 'quasi-contractual' principles, which represent 'a subset of the law of unjust enrichment.'" *Id.* (citation omitted).

"The remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution." *Wright*, 504 Mich at 418. "A claimant entitled to restitution may obtain a judgment for money in the amount of the defendant's unjust enrichment." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Restitution restores a party who yielded excessive and unjust benefits to his or her rightful position." *Id.* at 419. In sum, as our Supreme Court has explained,

[u]njust enrichment has evolved from a category of restitutionary claims with components in law and equity into a unified independent doctrine that [*27] serves a unique legal purpose: it corrects for a benefit received by the defendant rather than compensating for the defendant's wrongful behavior. Both the nature of an unjust-enrichment action and its remedy—whether restitution at law or in equity—separate it from tort and contract. [*Id.* at 422.]

Additionally, plaintiff sought injunctive relief asking the court to enjoin the township from any further collection of the millage because the township was allegedly spending the revenue for unauthorized purposes. It is thus clear from examining plaintiff's first amended complaint that the essence of his claim is that because the township has collected revenue from a voter-approved millage and improperly spent that revenue for purposes not authorized by the voters, the township should be enjoined from further collecting the millage revenue and should also make restitution for its unauthorized actions by returning the millage proceeds to the voters. "It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to

determine the exact nature of the claim." Adams v Adams (On Reconsideration), 276 Mich App 704, 710-711; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).

Accordingly, the crucial issue to be adjudicated with respect [*28] to plaintiff's claims is whether the township improperly used the revenue from the millage and, if so, whether such a finding provides a proper basis for the remedies of restitution or injunctive relief.⁶ Accordingly, because plaintiff only challenges the township's use of tax revenue that has already been collected and because plaintiff seeks restitution on that basis rather than a refund of a tax overpayment, the relief sought by plaintiff is not a "typical tax refund" and his claim does not fall within the tax tribunal's exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774. See Romulus 413 Mich at 746-747.

Our Supreme Court's opinion in Hillsdale does not compel a different outcome. In Hillsdale, 494 Mich at 50 & n 2, the circuit court granted plaintiff's requested writ of mandamus to the extent of requiring the defendant county to levy the full amount of a millage that had been approved by the voters. Our Supreme Court addressed the issue "whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesse[d] jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund plaintiff Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS)." [*29] Id. at 48. The Court concluded that the case was within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction because "the heart of the dispute pertains to the 'amount of a charge' by defendant to its property taxpayers," which constituted a property tax "rate" for purposes of MCL 205.731(a). Id. at 53-55. The Hillsdale Court stated, "this case does not involve a proceeding for a refund under MCL 205.731(b); rather, it involves a proceeding under MCL 205.731(a)." Id. at 61.

The issue of how the millage revenue should be spent, which is the central issue in the instant case, was not before the Supreme Court in Hillsdale. Admittedly, the Hillsdale Court stated that "Wikman and Romulus are of limited application outside the context of special assessments." Id. at 59. Also, with respect to the issue presented in the instant case regarding jurisdiction over a matter involving a challenge to how tax revenue was spent, there does not seem to be any appreciable

difference between whether that revenue was collected pursuant to a special assessment or a millage. Accordingly, we conclude that Hillsdale does not provide any rule or legal analysis that requires us to reach a different result in this case.

In the present case, as in Romulus, it is not the merely because plaintiff sought equitable relief [*30] that this case remains within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. Romulus, 413 Mich at 746. Rather, the Legislature did not indicate a clear intent to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over a matter of this type because the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint does not involve any of the enumerated issues in MCL 205.731(a) and the relief requested by plaintiff did not constitute a "refund" for purposes of MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774. See Wikman, 413 Mich at 631. Accordingly, the trial court erred when deciding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, we reverse that ruling. In light of our conclusion that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's additional argument that the trial court was precluded from making additional alternative rulings (regarding standing and the application of Bigger) if the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction⁷ is moot. "An issue is deemed moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief." B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

III. STANDING

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by determining that he lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a party has standing presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v Glen Lake Ass'n, 264 Mich App 523, 527; 695 NW2d 508 (2004). This Court [*31] "review[s] de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition." Winkler, 500 Mich at 333.

B. ANALYSIS

In Michigan, courts employ a "limited, prudential approach" to standing. Lansing Sch Ed Ass'n v Lansing

⁶ At this juncture, we do not express an opinion on whether plaintiff would be entitled to either of these remedies if it were shown that the township improperly spent the millage funds.

⁷ "When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court's acts and proceedings are of no force and validity." Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, Inc, 249 Mich App 580, 586; 644 NW2d 54 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 352-353; 792 NW2d 686 (2010). "[T]he standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 355 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In *Lansing*, the Supreme Court held:

We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan's long-standing historical approach to standing. Under this approach, a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the [*32] Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [Id. at 372.]

The Supreme Court explained the historical development of Michigan's standing doctrine in relevant part as follows:

Historically, the standing doctrine grew out of cases where parties were seeking writs of mandamus to compel a public officer to perform a statutory duty. Standing was a prudential limit, which is to say that the court's decision to invoke it was "one of discretion and not of law." The general rule was that a court would not hear a case where "an individual citizen, who is only interested in common with all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of [the] complaint," was suing a public entity to force compliance with a legal duty. Generally, the court exercised its discretion to hear a case if the citizen had "some individual interest in the subject matter of [the] complaint which is not common to all the citizens of the state" This was sometimes articulated as a special or specific injury or interest. [Id. at 355-356] (citations omitted; alterations and ellipsis in original).]

At issue in the instance case is a concept sometimes referred to as "taxpayer standing." "Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing [*33] to vindicate a

public wrong or enforce a public right if he or she has not been injured in a manner that is different from the public at large. Therefore, under general standing principles, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds if the threatened injury to him or her is no different than that to taxpayers generally." Mich Ass'n of Home Builders v City of Troy, 504 Mich 204, 226; 934 NW2d 713 (2019) (citation omitted). Accord Waterford Sch Dist v State Bd of Ed, 98 Mich App 658, 662; 296 NW2d 328 (1980) ("Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large. Therefore, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds where the threatened injury to him is no different than that to taxpayers generally.") (citation omitted).

In *Waterford*, this Court noted that this common-law bar on taxpayer lawsuits could be relaxed by statute. Id. at 662-663. The statute cited in *Waterford*, MCL 600.2041(3), is not implicated here because that statute pertains to actions to "prevent the illegal expenditure of state funds." MCL 600.2041(3); Waterford, 98 Mich App at 663 (emphasis added). However, there is an analogous statute relevant to the factual circumstances in this case. MCL 129.61 specifically grants standing in certain taxpayer actions if specific conditions are met. That statute [*34] provides:

Any person or persons, firm or corporation, resident in any township or school district, paying taxes to such political unit, may institute suits or actions at law or in equity on behalf of or for the benefit of the treasurer of such political subdivision, for an accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission of such political subdivision. Before such suit is instituted a demand shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to take action in relation thereto. Security for costs shall be filed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit or action and all costs and expenses of the same shall be paid by the person or persons instituting the same unless and until a recovery of such funds or moneys be obtained as the result of such proceedings. [MCL 129.61.]

Our Supreme Court has explained that MCL 129.61 reflects the Legislature's authorization of lawsuits by individual township taxpayers to recover funds

misappropriated or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission of the township, if all of the statutory [*35] prerequisites are fulfilled. *Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Sch*, 479 Mich 336, 346; 737 NW2d 158 (2007), overruled in part on other grounds by *Lansing*, 487 Mich 349.⁸ The *Rohde* Court further explained some of the statutory requirements in *MCL 129.61* as follows:

The statute provides that before a taxpayer may institute a lawsuit, a demand must be made "on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit" for recovery of unlawfully expended funds. The statute does not expressly require that the demand be for a lawsuit. Further, just because the public body has the ultimate duty to bring a lawsuit if it is needed does not mean that the demand must be for a lawsuit. The taxpayer demand, at a minimum, calls on a conscientious public body to reevaluate whether it is carrying out its duties properly and, in fact, this may result in the public body's acting in compliance with the demand. It may do this by any number of means, only one of which is to enter into litigation. In fact, when the statute uses the phrase "whose duty it may be to maintain such suit" (emphasis added), it recognizes this. Moreover, the statute provides that after a demand, before the taxpayer may bring a suit, a precondition is that the public body must neglect or refuse "to take action in relation [*36] thereto." This implies that the public body need not necessarily file suit, only that it needs to take some kind of action relating to the matter. [*Rohde*, 479 Mich at 345-346.]

Here, plaintiff alleged that he resided in the township and paid taxes to the township, and he brought an action against the township to recover funds he alleged had been unlawfully expended by the township. Thus, plaintiff could potentially satisfy the requirements for standing under *MCL 129.61*. However, plaintiff does not claim to have made any kind of "demand" before

initiating this lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff did not satisfy the prerequisites for bringing an action under *MCL 129.61*. With respect to an alleged statutory violation, "a private cause of action does not exist where the statute provides a comprehensive, exclusive scheme of enforcement of the rights and duties it creates." *Home Builders*, 504 Mich at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory prerequisites under *MCL 129.61*, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he has standing to bring this action.

Moreover, even when there exists a statute that relaxes the common-law bar on taxpayer suits, "[t]he taxpayers must demonstrate that they will sustain substantial injury or suffer [*37] loss or damage as taxpayers, through increased taxation and the consequences thereof." *Waterford*, 98 Mich App at 663. Rather than address the requirements of taxpayer standing, plaintiff merely argues that these principles do not apply. However, considering that plaintiff has attempted to challenge the township's use of the millage tax revenue that plaintiff claims to have paid as a property owner in the township, the principles of taxpayer standing undoubtedly apply. See *Home Builders*, 504 Mich at 226; *Waterford*, 98 Mich App at 662-663; *MCL 129.61*. As explained above, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he possesses standing to bring this action.

To the extent this reasoning differs from the trial court's reasoning for determining that plaintiff did not have standing, this Court may nonetheless affirm a trial court's decision that reaches the correct result for different reasons. See *Kyocera Corp v Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC*, 313 Mich App 437, 449; 886 NW2d 445 (2015) ("We will affirm a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition if it reached the correct result, even if our reasoning differs."). Thus, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing, and the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of the township is affirmed on that basis.

Given this conclusion, we decline to address plaintiff's final argument that the [*38] trial court erred in its application of *Bigger*. Even if plaintiff were correct that his action was not barred by the holding in *Bigger*, he still does not have standing to bring his claim and there is no relief this Court may grant based on this issue. Thus, the issue is moot. *B P 7*, 231 Mich App at 359.

Affirmed. No costs are awarded to either party, a public question being involved. *MCR 7.216(A)(7)* and *MCR 7.219(A)*. *City of Bay City v Bay County Treasurer*, 292

⁸In *Rohde*, 479 Mich at 340, our Supreme Court held "that *MCL 129.61* is unconstitutional to the extent that it confers standing on taxpayers who do not meet the three-part test for determining whether a party has constitutional standing." However, in *Lansing*, the Court subsequently overruled *Rohde* and other cases applying a constitutional standing requirement. *Lansing*, 487 Mich at 352-353, 359-360, 371 n 18. Accordingly, *MCL 129.61* remains good law under our Supreme Court's current standing jurisprudence.

Mich App 156, 172; 807 NW2d 892 (2011).

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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EXHIBIT - 7

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

OAKLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JEFFREY EISENBERG,
individually and as representative of a Class
of similarly-situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

Honorable David M. Cohen

v.

Case 2023-200422-CZ

GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
a component unit of Oakland County with a separate
legal existence, and CITY OF ROYAL OAK,
MICHIGAN, a municipal corporation.

Defendants.

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**GEORGE W. KUHN DRAINAGE DISTRICT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO
MCR 2.116(C)(7) AND MCR 2.116(C)(8)**

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Rules

MCR 2.116(C)(7)..... 3

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I. INTRODUCTION

This Court must dismiss Kickham Hanley PLLC's Alleged Stormwater Overcharge attack which has already been rejected by two different trial court judges in this circuit and six different appellate judges. (See **Exhibit 2** and **Exhibit 3**).¹ In this latest attack, Plaintiff asserts "two counts" against the Drainage District: (1) Assumpsit, and (2) Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiff's "assumpsit count" fails. Plaintiff concedes assumpsit was abolished as a cause of action. (Response, p 10) (conceding that "[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished."). Plaintiff's "unjust enrichment" count also fails. Plaintiff does *not* allege the Drainage District retained a benefit as to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge. See *Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich App 161, 213; 969 NW2d 570 (2021) (reasoning, in a Kickham Hanley PLLC led case, that an action "will not lie against one who has not been personally enriched by the transaction' because the fundamental 'basis' of the action 'is not only the loss occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the payment of the money, but the consequent enrichment of the defendant by reason of having received the same.'" (internal citation omitted). Further, the elements of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and release are met and Plaintiff's lawsuit against the Drainage District is subject to dismissal on these additional bases, too.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Count I Against the Drainage District Must Be Dismissed: Plaintiff Concedes Assumpsit Is Not a Cause of Action.

Plaintiff's Response concedes assumpsit was abolished as a cause of action, and assumpsit may only serve as a *remedy* when there is an underlying, stand-alone cause of action. (See Response, p 10) (conceding that "[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963,

¹ Definitions and exhibit references from the Drainage District's Motion apply herein.

assumpsit as a form of action was abolished.”); (*id.* at p 11) (conceding Plaintiff “invokes the equitable doctrine of assumpsit to obtain a remedy[]”). Plaintiff’s “assumpsit count” (Count I) must be dismissed. (Motion, pp 14-15).

B. Count II Against the Drainage District Must Be Dismissed: Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not Allege the Drainage District Retained Any Benefit As to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge.

Plaintiff’s Response does not address the fact that “Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against the Drainage District because it does *not* allege the Drainage District retained a benefit as to the Alleged Stormwater Overcharge[.]”² (Motion, p 5, pp 14-15) (emphasis in original). Rather, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Drainage District communities like Royal Oak (where the storm (pollution) percentage is greater than the sewage (sanitary) percentage) pay too much toward the Drainage District’s GLWA bills which necessarily benefits Drainage District communities like Troy (where the storm (pollution) percentage is less than the sewage (sanitary) percentage) who, in turn, pay too little. (Motion, pp 10-11). A plaintiff asserting an unjust enrichment claim must plead facts to show the defendant **“received a benefit from plaintiff, and that an inequity resulted to plaintiff as a consequence of defendant’s retention of that benefit.”** See, e.g., *Liggett Rest Group, Inc v City of Pontiac*, 260 Mich App 127, 137; 676 NW2d 633 (2003) (emphasis added). Put simply, there is no allegation that the Drainage District retains a benefit by how the Drainage District interprets GLWA’s bills and then distributes GLWA’s bills to the Drainage District’s customer communities so that the Drainage District’s GLWA bills may be paid.

² “[A] party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningful argument in support of its position.” *Berger v Berger*, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). See also *Mekani v Homecomings Fin, LLC*, 752 F Supp 2d 785, 797 (ED Mich 2010) (finding that where plaintiff fails to respond to an argument in a motion to dismiss, “the Court assumes he concedes this point and abandons the claim.”); *Central Cartage v Fewless*, 232 Mich App 517, 529; 591 NW2d 422 (1998) (noting that the court is not obligated to search for authority to support a party’s position).

C. Additional Bases for Dismissal: Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Release.

Plaintiff's lawsuit against the Drainage District fails as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Notwithstanding, the Drainage District addresses each additional basis for dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(7) at issue.

1. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Also Bars This 2023 Action.

Plaintiff engages in semantics in an attempt to avoid dismissal based on res judicata. Plaintiff dubiously asserts res judicata does not apply because “[a] cursory glance at the caption shows that this case does not involve the same parties as the prior action the Drainage District invokes [i.e. 2017 Action], or their privies[.]”³ and Plaintiff and Kickham Hanley PLLC are “obviously different persons or entities.” (Response, pp 12-13). This distinction is meaningless. Kickham Hanley PLLC, the Named Plaintiff in the 2017 Action, attempted to bring claims against the Drainage District *for the purported benefit* of the certified class from the 2014 Action, and the Named Plaintiff in this case was part of the certified class in the 2014 Action.

³ Plaintiff also asserts it is “irrelevant and absurd[.]” to find Kickham Hanley PLLC is in privity with Plaintiff. (Response, p 14). Not so. Privity exists because Kickham Hanley PLLC attempted to bring claims “as the trustee of a trust for the benefit of class members that included the Plaintiff in this action[.]” (Response, p 14); *Phinisee v Rogers*, 229 Mich App 547, 553-54; 582 NW2d 852 (1998) (reasoning privity between a party to the first case and a “non-party” exists where there is “a substantial identity of interests and a working or functional relationship . . . in which the interests of the non-party are presented and protected by the party in the litigation.”). The case Plaintiff relies on for the assertion that “a lawyer is not in privity with his or her client for the purpose of res judicata[.]” does not support Plaintiff’s argument. *Williams v Logan*, 184 Mich App 472; 459 MW2d 62 (1990), involved a professional malpractice claim against a law firm that previously handled a wrongful death action on behalf of the decedent’s estate. Unlike Kickham Hanley PLLC, which was the Named Plaintiff in the 2017 Action who brought claims for the purported benefit of the certified class in the 2014 Action (which included the Named Plaintiff in this case), the law firm in *Williams* was **not** a Named Plaintiff in the wrongful death action, nor did the law firm attempt to assert claims for the benefit of the decedent’s estate as a Named Plaintiff in the wrongful death action. Plaintiff’s reliance on *Williams* is misplaced. (See also Motion, pp 15-17).

(Motion, pp 16-17). Thus, this 2023 Action is an improper attempt to relitigate the Alleged Stormwater Overcharges from the 2017 Action.

Plaintiff's suggestion that res judicata also does not apply because Plaintiff's claims in this case are based on different facts, and relate to "[alleged] unlawful charges imposed between 2019 and the present [i.e. after the 2017 Action]" is also wrong (Response, p 15), and the cases Plaintiff offers in purported support have no applicability to this case.⁴ This 2023 Action involves the same facts and same Alleged Stormwater Overcharge theory that have been rejected previously, including in the 2017 Action. (Motion, pp 16-17).

2. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Also Bars This 2023 Action.

Arguing against dismissal based on collateral estoppel, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff brought this case "at the Court of Appeals' express invitation," which, according to Plaintiff, "twice expressly found that end user ratepayers, like Plaintiff, were the proper parties to bring suit against the Drainage District for its [alleged] overcharges" (Response, p 9, p 3). Not so. The Court of Appeals in the 2017 Action related to Royal Oak and the 2019 Action related to Oak Park each unanimously rejected Kickham Hanley PLLC's surreptitious scheme. To be sure, neither panel "expressly found" that Royal Oak and Oak Park ratepayers have "standing" (an issue wholly irrelevant to the pending Motion) to bring Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims

⁴ For example, *State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Wise*, 277 Mich 643; 270 NW 165 (1936), does not even mention res judicata. As another example, in *In re Hamlet*, 225 Mich App 505; 571 NW2d 750 (1997), res judicata did not apply to subsequent proceedings related to parental rights to minor children where the prior judgment was reversed and the case was retried. As a further example, in *Mazzola v Vineyard Homes, Inc*, 54 Mich App 608; 221 NW2d 406 (1974), res judicata did not bar a subsequent action to restrain threatened violations of certain alleged agreements pertaining to an adjoining tract of land, where the prior action did not include any allegations concerning the adjoining tract of land, and the subsequent action involved different legal theories. By contrast, the allegations in Plaintiff's 2023 Action are not new; Kickham Hanley PLLC on behalf of Plaintiff Eisenberg is attempting to assert, once again, Alleged Stormwater Overcharge claims. (See Motion, pp 16-17).

against the Drainage District. (Response, p 7). Moreover, the settlement of the 2014 Action, which formed the basis of Kickham Hanley PLLC's scheme purporting to serve as the basis for the 2017 Action, also eviscerates Plaintiff's argument. (**Exhibit 1**, ¶¶15-16) (providing the class "will dismiss the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice," and that Royal Oak "may continue to include the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harges in its calculation of the Rates.") (emphasis added).

3. Release Also Bars This 2023 Action.

Arguing against dismissal based on release, Plaintiff asserts the Drainage District was "not a party to the release" in the 2014 Action, and the release "only covered 'the City's Rates and Charges[.]'" (Response, pp 17-18) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff further asserts that even if release bars Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff is "entitled to recover for [alleged] charges [] imposed between February 1, 2017 and the present[]" (Response, p 18). However, Plaintiff ignores that the 2014 Action included a release "dismiss[ing] the Class claims relating to the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harge with prejudice," and provided that Royal Oak "may continue to include the [Alleged] Stormwater [Over][c]harges in its calculation of the Rates." (**Exhibit 1**, ¶¶15-16); see also *Xu v Gay*, 257 Mich App 263; 668 NW2d 166 (2003).

Respectfully Submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

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Dated: January 17, 2024

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 17, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MiFile TrueFiling system which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record.

/s/Peter H. Webster

Peter H. Webster (P48783)

4868-5480-7193 v9 [12840-456]

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EXHIBIT - 8

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Neutral

As of: November 19, 2024 10:01 PM Z

Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 9, 2023, Decided

No. 358868

Reporter

2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3915 *; 2023 WL 2436483

MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee.

Notice: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION IN THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS REPORTS.

Subsequent History: [*1] The Publication Status of this Document has been Changed by the Court from Unpublished to Published June 1, 2023.

Reconsideration denied by [Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2870 \(Mich. Ct. App., Apr. 24, 2023\)](#)

Later proceeding at [Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2024 Mich. LEXIS 659, 2024 WL 1600913 \(Apr. 12, 2024\)](#)

Motion granted by [Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2024 Mich. LEXIS 1468 \(Mich., Aug. 16, 2024\)](#)

Prior History: Wayne Circuit Court. LC No. 18-014337-CZ.

[Midwest Valve & Fitting Co. v. City of Detroit, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 1643 \(Mich. Ct. App., Mar. 9, 2023\)](#)

Core Terms

charges, inspections, trial court, ordinance, retroactive, city council, permits, Counts, city charter, costs, summary disposition, fire marshal, permit fee, issuance, cause of action, enrichment, argues, taxes, property owner, Headlee Amendment, violations, general public, vested right, user fee, de novo, quotation, premised, marks

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-In a company's action challenging the legality of certain annual charges imposed by the city, the city was properly granted summary disposition on the company's claim alleging violations of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and [MCL 141.91](#) because the fact that the charge was involuntary was insufficient to overcome the fact that the company received a benefit and that the fee was proportional, and thus, the charge at issue was a fee, not a tax; [2]-The trial court properly found no cause of action for its claims related to the violation of the city charter and ordinances because there was no violation of of an ordinance as the charges were a fee paid to obtain occupancy permits, city council's retroactive imposition of the charge did not affect the company as it incurred no new obligations to the city after the passing of the resolution.

Outcome

Judgment affirmed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN1](#) **Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation**

Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment prohibits units of

local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate, and [MCL 141.91](#) prohibits cities from imposing taxes other than ad valorem property taxes.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law > Genuine Disputes

[HN2](#) Standards of Review, De Novo Review

Whether a municipal charge is a tax is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. The appellate court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties. A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) is properly granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN3](#) Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN4](#) Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

In concert, § 31 of the Headlee Amendment and [MCL 141.91](#) restrain a local government's ability to assess taxes. If the charges levied are not taxes, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated and claims based on violations of the Headlee Amendment and [MCL 141.91](#) would necessarily fail. User fees are not taxes and are not affected by the Headlee Amendment.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN5](#) Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment. Three primary factors are considered in determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax. The first criterion is that a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose. A second, and related, criterion is that user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service. A third criterion is voluntariness: fees generally are voluntary, while taxes are not. These criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Spending & Taxation

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

[HN6](#) Congressional Duties & Powers, Spending & Taxation

Considering the first Bolt factor, whether the charge serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose, it is understood that a fee can raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying purpose. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that permit fees, as opposed to taxes, are regulatory in nature.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN7](#) **Local Governments, Finance**

A regulatory fee can have dual purposes and still maintain its regulatory characterization. As long as the primary purpose of a fee is regulatory in nature, the fee can also raise money provided that it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose, and use benefit the general public.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN8](#) **Local Governments, Finance**

A regulatory fee may confer a benefit on both the general public and the particular individuals who pay the fee and still maintain its regulatory character.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN9](#) **Local Governments, Finance**

Courts are to presume that the amount of a regulatory fee is reasonable.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN10](#) **Local Governments, Finance**

The lack of volition does not render a municipal charge a tax, particular where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax.

Civil Procedure > Trials > Bench Trials

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Questions of Fact & Law

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review

[HN11](#) **Trials, Bench Trials**

A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. A trial court's interpretation of a municipal charter is a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

[HN12](#) **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

There is no per se prohibition on retroactive application of legislation. However, retrospective application of a law is improper where the law takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

[HN13](#) **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

Retroactive statutes curing defects in acts done, or authorizing or confirming the exercise of powers, are valid where the legislature originally had authority to confer the power or authorize the acts, except where it is attempted to impair vested rights.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

[HN14](#) **Effect & Operation, Retrospective Operation**

The reason vested rights are not to be affected by retroactive legislation is that it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances & Regulations

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Retrospective Operation

[HN15](#) [down arrow] Local Governments, Finance

A retroactive application of municipal charges must be a rational means of achieving a city's legitimate objective.

Governments > Local Governments > Charters

Governments > Local Governments > Property

Governments > Local Governments > Finance

[HN16](#) [down arrow] Local Governments, Charters

Detroit, Mich., City Charter § 9-507 allows for the imposition of a charge for (1) admission to an agency-operated facility or (2) a service provided by a city agency.

Governments > Local Governments > Charters

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances & Regulations

[HN17](#) [down arrow] Local Governments, Charters

A city charter is to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. The provisions are to be read in context, with the plain and ordinary meaning given to every word. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is clear and unambiguous. Court apply unambiguous statutes as written. When a term is not defined in a statute, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Local Governments > Ordinances & Regulations

[HN18](#) [down arrow] Legislation, Interpretation

When interpreting an ordinance, courts are to give some deference to a municipality's interpretation.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Questions of Fact & Law

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

[HN19](#) [down arrow] Standards of Review, Clearly Erroneous Review

A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Nature & Scope of Protection

[HN20](#) [down arrow] Equal Protection, Nature & Scope of Protection

The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. [Const. 1963, art 1, § 2](#) and [U.S. Const. amend. XIV](#). Michigan's equal protection provision is coextensive with the [Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution](#). The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether there has been discriminatory intent or purposeful discrimination.

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Judicial Review > Standards of Review

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > National
Origin & Race

Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Nature &
Scope of Protection

[HN21](#) **Equal Protection, Gender & Sex**

Where no suspect classification is involved, such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or illegitimacy, the proper level of review is rational basis. The rational basis test considers whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.

Counsel: For MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY/ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff - Appellant: GREGORY D. HANLEY.

For DETROIT CITY OF, Defendant - Appellee: SHERI L. WHYTE.

Judges: Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

Opinion by: Michael J. Riordan

Opinion

RIORDAN, J.

Plaintiff-appellant, Midwest Valve & Fitting Company, appeals as of right the trial court's order that, after a bench trial, dismissed its remaining claims related to the legality of certain fees charged by defendant, City of Detroit. The appeal also involves the trial court's earlier opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on appellant's other claims.

This case involves appellant's challenge to the legality of certain annual charges that are imposed by defendant. The trial court determined that the charges are legal and dismissed appellant's claims, some in a pretrial motion for summary disposition and the remainder after a bench trial. Because its arguments have no merit, we affirm.

I. FACTS

Defendant imposes an annual charge on owners of commercial real property [*2] and multiunit residential real property located in Detroit. Although appellant initially claimed that the charges were "fire inspection charges," appellant on appeal has acquiesced to the

trial court's and defendant's position that they are "permit fees."

Appellant received bills from defendant for these charges since at least 2013 and paid them. However, appellant maintained that it never received any fire safety inspection during this time.

Appellant filed a complaint, alleging numerous claims against defendant: Count I—violation of the Headlee Amendment, Count II—assumpsit/unreasonable charges, Count III—unjust enrichment/unreasonable charges, Count IV—assumpsit/violation of [MCL 141.91](#), Count V—unjust enrichment/violation of [MCL 141.91](#), Count VI—assumpsit/violation of city ordinance, Count VII—unjust enrichment/violation of city ordinance, and Count VIII—violation of equal protection.

Appellant moved for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) on Counts I, IV, and V. It argued that the charges constituted taxes, which were imposed in violation of [§ 31 of the Headlee Amendment](#)¹ and [MCL 141.91](#).² After analyzing the characteristics of the charges, the trial court ruled that the charges were fees, not taxes, and granted summary disposition in favor of defendant [*3] on Counts I, IV, and V.

The trial court conducted a one-day bench trial on the remaining counts. In support of its position that the charges at issue were inspection fees, appellant primarily relied on (1) a fire marshal web page indicating that inspections get scheduled after payment of the fee, and (2) some internal city documents³ that used terminology, such as "safety inspection charges" or "fire permit safety inspection," while referencing these charges. But, Fire Marshal Shawn Battle testified that those representations were factually incorrect because the fees were exclusively for permits, which allow businesses to operate, and have no relation to

¹ [Const 1963, art 9, § 31](#).

² As will be discussed in greater detail below, [HN1](#)  [§ 31 of the Headlee Amendment](#) "prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate," [Durant v Mich, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 \(1997\)](#), and [MCL 141.91](#) prohibits cities from imposing taxes other than ad valorem property taxes.

³ The parties stipulated that these documents were created by an unknown city employee at some unknown time.

inspections.⁴ Although it was the department's goal to inspect every commercial property every year, Battle stated this was not feasible because of a lack of manpower. Battle also testified that his department did not utilize any of the documents appellant relied on and instead it used a system called MobileEyes, which identifies the charges as being for "permits." Further, the actual invoices and permits relating to these charges were admitted into evidence via stipulation. Those documents specifically reference "industrial/business/mercantile [*4] occupancy permit[s]," with no mention of inspections.

Although defendant was unable to verify that the city council had approved the charges any time before May 2021, the council later approved them retroactively back to 2013.

In its closing argument, appellant argued that even if the charges were "permit fees," they would be illegal because the city council never approved them, which was required by the city charter and ordinances. Appellant claimed that the city council's attempt to retroactively approve the charges was a legal nullity. Regarding its equal-protection claim, appellant argued that, with it not receiving any inspections, as opposed to other commercial property owners, it had not been treated objectively and reasonably.

The trial court found that the charges at issue are annual permit fees and not inspection fees. The trial court also noted that the burden was on appellant to prove that any fee or charge was unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Further, the trial court ruled that Counts II and VI were not viable because Michigan does not recognize an independent cause of action for assumpsit.

The trial court dismissed appellant's unjust enrichment claims in Counts III and [*5] VII. The court noted that Count III was premised on the allegation that the charges were for fire inspections when no inspections had taken place. The trial court rejected this claim because the charges are not for inspections, but are for permits. The trial court also ruled two additional arguments appellant raised relating to the claims of unjust enrichment were unpersuasive. First, the trial

court rejected appellant's contention that the charges were in violation of the city ordinance because they were in excess of the cost of the "issuance" of permits. The trial court noted that cities are allowed to recover all of their direct and indirect costs related to the regulation of those who are charged the fee and that courts are to give deference to a city's interpretation of its own ordinances. Second, the court rejected appellant's contention that defendant was unjustly enriched because the charges were never approved by the city council. The trial court then ruled that the city council's retroactive approval of the charges was permissible as a matter of law.

Finally, the trial court ruled that appellant failed to prove any of the essential elements of its equal-protection claim, including [*6] that defendant made a classification identifying a particular group, that defendant intentionally or purposefully treated that group differently from similarly situated individuals, and that there is no rational basis for defendant's disparate treatment.

II. HEADLEE AMENDMENT AND [MCL 141.91](#)

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V of its complaint. We disagree.

[HN2](#)^[↑] Whether a municipal charge is a "tax" is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. [Mapleview Estates, Inc v Brown City, 258 Mich App 412, 413-414; 671 NW2d 572 \(2003\)](#). This Court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. [Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 \(2008\)](#). "A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint." [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 \(1999\)](#). "In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties." [Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 \(2004\)](#). A motion under [\(C\)\(10\)](#) is properly granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Michalski v Bar-Levav, 463 Mich 723, 730; 625 NW2d 754 \(2001\)](#).

In Counts I, IV, and V, appellant alleges violations of [§ 31 of the Headlee Amendment](#) and [MCL 141.91, Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment](#) states, in pertinent part:

⁴Battle also testified that 10 months before trial started, someone had put in a request to Detroit's Information Technology Department to have that information removed from the website, but apparently, the information was still present as of a few days before trial.

Units of Local Government are hereby [*7] prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon. [*Const 1963, art 9, § 31* (emphasis added).]

HN3[↑] This section "prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or increasing any existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the unit's electorate." *Durant v Mich*, 456 Mich 175, 183; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).

MCL 141.91 states:

Except as otherwise provided by law and notwithstanding any provision of its charter, a city or village shall not impose, levy or collect a tax, other than an ad valorem property tax, on any subject of taxation, unless the tax was being imposed by the city or village on January 1, 1964. [Emphasis added.]

HN4[↑] In concert, these provisions restrain a local government's ability to assess taxes. If the charges levied are not taxes, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated and appellant's claims here, based on violations of the Headlee Amendment and *MCL 141.91*, would necessarily fail. See *Bolt v City of Lansing*, 459 Mich 152, 158-159; 587 NW2d 264 (1998) (stating that user fees are not taxes and are not affected by the Headlee Amendment).⁵

HN5[↑] "There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the Headlee Amendment." *Id.* at 160. Three [*8] primary factors are considered in determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax. "The first criterion is that a user fee must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose." *Id.* at 161. "A second, and related, criterion is that user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service." *Id.* at 161-162. A third criterion is voluntariness: fees generally are voluntary, while taxes are not. *Id.* at 162. "[T]hese criteria are not to be considered in isolation, but rather in their totality, such that a weakness in one area would not necessarily mandate a finding that the charge is not a fee." *Graham*

⁵Although *Bolt* only concerned whether a particular charge was a "tax" for the purposes of the Headlee Amendment, we find it equally relevant for determining whether a particular charge is a "tax" for the purposes of *MCL 141.91* as well.

v Kochville Twp, 236 Mich App 141, 151; 599 NW2d 793 (1999).

There is no question of fact that the charges at issue here were for the acquisition of permits, not inspections. Although appellant took the position below that the charges were "fire inspection charges" or "fire inspection fees," it submitted no evidence to show that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving an inspection. Instead, the evidence showed that the charges were for obtaining occupancy permits. Thus, appellant's arguments that rely on the charges being fees for receiving inspection services are misplaced and are without merit.

HN6[↑] Considering the first *Bolt* factor, whether the charge serves [*9] a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose, it is understood that a fee can raise money as long as it is in support of the underlying purpose. *Merrelli v. St. Clair Shores*, 355 Mich 575, 583; 96 NW2d 144 (1959). Indeed, in *Merrilli*, our Supreme Court held that permit fees, as opposed to taxes, are regulatory in nature. *Id.* at 582. Fire Marshal Battle testified in his deposition that the charge at issue provides the property owner with a permit, which allows the owner to operate in Detroit. Further, in a response to appellant's third set of interrogatories, defendant averred that those who pay the charge, and who do not receive an inspection, still receive the benefit of defendant's Fire Protection Program, which includes the "training of [the fire marshal] staff, maintenance of Fire Marshal's physical facility, public education, provision of information related to properties subject to the Fire Marshal's programs, maintenance of information, capacity to continue provision of services, including but not limited to inspections, etc."

Appellant argues that the Fire Protection Program serves a public purpose, but ignores the primary benefit to a property owner who pays the charge—a permit, allowing the owner to operate on its premises. Undoubtedly, the public [*10] also benefits from the Fire Protection Program, but as this Court recognized in *Westlake Trans, Inc v Pub Serv Comm*, 255 Mich App 589, 613; 662 NW2d 784 (2003), fees that benefit the general public still can maintain their regulatory nature.

In *Westlake*, the plaintiffs argued, in part, that fees assessed to trucking companies were an impermissible tax. *Id.* at 611. This Court stated:

[I]n exchange for the fees, a motor carrier receives the right to operate its trucks in Michigan, and the

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fees are used to enforce the provisions of the act that carry out the above-listed purposes. Thus, there is a direct benefit to the one who pays the fees. We recognize that promoting and regulating safe use of the highways benefits the general public as well. [HN7](#)^[↑] However, a regulatory fee can have dual purposes and still maintain its regulatory characterization. As long as the primary purpose of a fee is regulatory in nature, the fee can also raise money provided that it is in support of the underlying regulatory purpose, and use benefit the general public. [Id. at 613](#) (citation omitted).]

The situation in [Westlake](#) is analogous to the circumstances before us. Like the plaintiffs in [Westlake](#), who received the right to operate trucks in Michigan, appellant in the instant case receives a benefit by being allowed to operate its business [*11] in Detroit. Thus, appellant received "a direct benefit" from paying the charge. [HN8](#)^[↑] The fact that the general public also benefits from the Fire Protection Program does not negate the charge's regulatory nature. See also [Jackson Co v City of Jackson, 302 Mich App 90, 108; 836 NW2d 903 \(2013\)](#) ("[A] regulatory fee may confer a benefit on both the general public and the particular individuals who pay the fee and still maintain its regulatory character . . ."). Therefore, the first of the factors we must consider weighs in favor of the charge being a fee and not a tax.

Secondly, the city's charge appears to be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service it is providing. [HN9](#)^[↑] Courts do to presume that the amount of the fee is reasonable. [Id. at 109](#). Appellant's position is that the costs are not proportionate because, by not receiving any inspections, appellant received nothing different from anyone else in the city who was not required to pay the charges. We disagree with this argument because the main benefit of the city's charge was the receipt of a permit, not an inspection. Thus, those who paid the charge did receive a benefit distinct from someone who did not pay the fee—the right to occupy the premises as a business. Furthermore, these charges funded the year-to-year [*12] operations of the Fire Marshal Department. This is an important distinction from [Bolt](#), in which our Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the charge, which it found to be a tax, was to finance a multiyear construction of a large infrastructure project. There, the benefit gained—new infrastructure—would substantially outlast the time period for which the charge was to be in place. [Bolt, 459 Mich at 163-164](#). Further, the amounts collected from the charges in the case before us historically were

significantly less than the program's costs. Consequently, the charge is reasonably proportional.

As to the third factor, we must consider whether the city's charge was voluntary. The trial court did not explicitly rule on this factor and instead simply assumed that the charge was not voluntary. We agree that the charge was not voluntary. Although, while technically, the charge is voluntary because a business could decline to pay and simply opt to not operate in Detroit, that option is highly impractical for a business. Indeed, our Supreme Court in [Bolt](#) rejected the argument that a charge was voluntary because property owners could relinquish their rights of ownership. [Id. at 168](#).

After weighing these same factors, the trial court ruled [*13] the charge was a fee, not a tax. We agree with the trial court's analysis and find it did not err. [HN10](#)^[↑] Significantly, this Court has recognized that "the lack of volition does not render the charge a tax, particular where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax." [Wheeler v Shelby Twp, 265 Mich App 657, 666; 697 NW2d 180 \(2005\)](#). Thus, even with the charge at issue being involuntary, that fact alone is not sufficient to overcome the other two factors that appellant received a benefit and that the fee is proportional.

Because the charge at issue is a fee, not a tax, appellant is precluded from succeeding on its claims alleging violations of the Headlee Amendment and [MCL 141.91](#). As a result, the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on Counts I, IV, and V.

III. VIOLATION OF CITY CHARTER AND ORDINANCES

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its claims related to the violation of the city charter and ordinances. We disagree.

[HN11](#)^[↑] A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. [Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 \(2000\)](#). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the [*14] entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." *Id.* A trial court's interpretation of a municipal charter is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. [Save Our Downtown v. City of Traverse City, Mich App , , ; NW2d , 2022 Mich. App. LEXIS 6164 \(2022\) \(Docket No. 359536\)](#);

[slip op at 5.](#)

Initially, it should be recognized that after the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on some of appellant's counts, trial proceeded with respect to only Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII. The trial court dismissed Counts II and VI, which alleges independent causes of action of assumpsit. This was not erroneous because Michigan no longer recognizes an independent cause of action for assumpsit.⁶ [Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc., 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 \(2013\)](#). Notably, appellant does not challenge the dismissal of those counts. Instead, appellant focuses on its allegations that the charges were unlawful because they were imposed in violation of the city charter and ordinances. Thus, only appellant's claims pertaining to the alleged violations of the city charter and ordinances are before this Court.⁷

In Count VII, appellant asserted a claim of unjust enrichment premised on a violation of Detroit Ordinances, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11, which stated at the time, in pertinent part:⁸

In accordance with *Section 9-507* of the 1997

⁶Although no independent cause of action for assumpsit exists, "the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." [Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc., 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 NW2d 244 \(2013\)](#). In this instance, appellant's counts of assumpsit essentially were covered by its claims of unjust enrichment.

⁷In Count III, appellant alleges that defendant unjustly enriched itself by collecting charges pertaining to fire inspections, while not providing such fire inspections. However, the trial court found that the charges at issue were fees for permits, not inspections. That finding, precluding unjust enrichment, is not clearly erroneous. Fire Marshal Battle testified at trial that the fees were for the issuance of permits, not inspections. Indeed, even the invoices that appellant received stated that the charges were for "permits," with no mention of "inspections." While there were some internal city documents that used terms such as "fire inspection fee," those documents could not be authenticated, and the trial court gave them little to no weight. The author of those documents is not known, and there is no evidence that defendant relied on them. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for that aspect of Count III.

⁸The Detroit City Code was later recodified in December 2019. The content in this quoted portion was moved to Detroit Ordinances, § 18-1-22, Subsection 1.6.2. Although there are some minor modifications to the 2019 recodification, the content is substantially the same.

Detroit City Charter, the Fire Commissioner [*15] is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of:

- (1) Inspection and consultation;
- (2) Issuance of permits and certificates;
- (3) Administrative appeals;
- (4) Issuance of reports; and
- (5) Copying of records.

Appellant alleges in its complaint that this ordinance was violated because the charges could not be considered "necessary" when a property owner does not receive a fire inspection. This position again is premised on the assertion that the charges were paid in consideration for receiving fire inspections, but as already explained, that is not the case. The charges are a fee paid to obtain occupancy permits.

Although appellant's complaint only alleges that the ordinances were violated in this one respect in its proposed conclusions of law, appellant asserted that the charges were unlawful for two other reasons: (1) the city council never approved the charges, and (2) the charter provision cited in the ordinance does not allow for permit fees. The trial court rejected the former argument, but did not address the latter.

Regarding the former, the parties stipulated that there was no evidence of the city council approving the charges any time [*16] before May 2021. But the city council later retroactively approved the charges. Appellant argues that the retroactive approval is a nullity.

[HN12](#)[↑] There is no per se prohibition on retroactive application of legislation. See [Bd. of Trs. of the City v. City of Pontiac, 317 Mich. App. 570, 578-579; 895 N.W.2d 206 \(2016\)](#). However,

retrospective application of a law is improper where the law takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. [[In re Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 416 Mich 558, 572; 331 NW2d 456 \(1982\)](#)] (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also [LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26, 39; 852 NW2d 78 \(2014\)](#).]

Appellant essentially argues that it had a vested right to not pay any of the charges until the city council

approved them in May 2021. According to appellant, the retroactive imposition of those charges affected its vested right. Appellant's position is not persuasive. [HN13](#)^[↑] "Retroactive statutes curing defects in acts done, or authorizing or confirming the exercise of powers, are valid where the legislature originally had authority to confer the power or authorize the acts, except where it is attempted to impair vested rights." [Stott v Stott Realty Co, 288 Mich 35, 45; 284 NW 635 \(1939\)](#). As discussed below, the city council at all relevant times had the power or authority to approve the charges, making its [\[*17\]](#) retroactive authorization permissible. Notably, appellant during the preceding years thought that the charges were legally due and paid them to defendant. [HN14](#)^[↑] This is significant because the reason vested rights are not to be affected by retroactive legislation is that "it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions." [LaFontaine, 496 Mich at 38](#) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because appellant had no expectation to be free from paying the permit fee, the retroactive authorization of that very same permit fee did not affect appellant. In other words, the retroactive imposition of the charge did not affect appellant as it incurred no new obligations to defendant after the passing of the resolution.

[HN15](#)^[↑] Additionally, a retroactive application must be a rational means of achieving a city's legitimate objective. [Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate, 444 Mich 656, 667; 513 NW2d 807 \(1994\)](#). In this case, the retroactive ratification of the charges was a rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose. The purpose was to maintain the Fire Protection Program, which certainly is a legitimate purpose, and the means to accomplish that was to simply authorize charges that property owners had already paid, which was reasonable.⁹

Appellant's latter argument [\[*18\]](#) not contained in its complaint was that the city council lacked the authority to approve the charges because they violate § 9-507 of the city charter. *Section 9-507* provides:

Any agency of the City may, with the approval of the City Council, charge an admission or service fee to any facility operated, or for any service provided, by an agency. The approval of the City Council shall also be required for any change in any such admission or service fee.

⁹ The only reason the charges had not been authorized earlier is that the Fire Marshal Department had thought that an authorization already was in place.

[HN16](#)^[↑] This section allows for the imposition of a charge for (1) admission to an agency-operated facility or (2) a service provided by a city agency. Only the second clause is pertinent in this case. While appellant concedes that if the charge was for a fire inspection, then the charge would be for a service, it argues that if the charge is truly a "permit fee," then it is not a charge for a service. We disagree.

[HN17](#)^[↑] The city charter is to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. [Save Our Downtown, Mich App at ; slip op at 5](#). "The provisions are to be read in context, with the plain and ordinary meaning given to every word. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is clear and unambiguous. Court apply unambiguous statutes as written." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). [\[*19\]](#) When a term is not defined in a statute, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. [Kent Co Aeronautics Bd v Dep't of State Police, 239 Mich App 563, 578; 609 NW2d 593 \(2000\)](#). As evidenced by the 27 different definitions of the noun "service" in the dictionary, the term is defined broadly. See *Random House Webster's College Dictionary* (1995). However, one of those definitions is most pertinent: "the duty or work of public servants." *Id.* Although the work provided in this instance is not the provision of a fire inspection, it nonetheless still is a service because it is providing a permit. Consequently, the city's imposition of a charge to a property owner to obtain a permit does not run afoul of the city charter.

Appellant also contends that it is improper for the charges to fund "all of the direct and indirect costs" of the Fire Prevention Program. Appellant avers that the ordinance only allows for defendant to recover the administrative costs associated with issuing the permits. Appellant provides no authority for this argument and merely quotes the applicable provision in the city code: "the Fire Commissioner is authorized to establish necessary fees, with the approval of the City Council, for the cost of . . . [i]ssuance [\[*20\]](#) of permits and certificates." Detroit Ordinances, § 19-1-22, Subsection 1.4.11. Appellant focuses on the word "issuance" for its position. "Issuance" is defined as "the act of publishing or officially giving out or making available." *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (11th ed).

The strictly literal interpretation of this provision lends support to the suggestion that a charge is allowable only for the "act" of "giving out" the permit. However, the concept of a "permit" encompasses much more than a

physical piece of paper. The more reasonable interpretation is that the cost of the issuance of a permit includes all the work involved with a particular program which that permit represents.

[HN18](#)^[↑] When interpreting an ordinance, courts are to give some deference to a municipality's interpretation. See [Macenas v Village of Michiana, 433 Mich 380, 398; 446 NW2d 102 \(1989\)](#). Battle testified that the Fire Marshal Department has been issuing the permit in the same manner since at least 1996, and that it would not be possible to issue these permits if all of the Fire Marshal's related programs were not funded.¹⁰ Thus, the Fire Marshal Department has been interpreting the term "issuance" within the ordinance as encompassing the costs of the Fire Prevention Program, [\[*21\]](#) as well as the cost of physically issuing the permit itself. We defer to the Fire Marshal's interpretation of the ordinance and similarly conclude that the ordinance allows for the recovery of the costs of the Fire Prevention Program in the issuance of the permits.

Therefore, given the above analysis, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action on appellant's claims related to any alleged violations of city charter or ordinances.

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by finding no cause of action for its equal-protection claim. We disagree.

[HN19](#)^[↑] A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. [Walters, 239 Mich App at 456](#).

[HN20](#)^[↑] "The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law." [Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Twp, 486 Mich 311, 318; 783 NW2d 695 \(2010\)](#), citing [Const 1963, art 1, § 2](#) and [US Const, Am XIV](#). "Michigan's equal protection provision is coextensive with the [Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution](#)." [Grimes v Van Hook-Williams, 302 Mich App 521, 532-533; 839 NW2d 237 \(2013\)](#) (cleaned up). "The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment." [Id. at 533](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,

the relevant inquiry [\[*22\]](#) is whether there has been discriminatory intent or purposeful discrimination. [Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App 302, 308; 553 NW2d 377 \(1996\)](#).

Appellant claims that its "group" has been discriminated against because it did not receive fire inspections, while others who paid the charges at issue did. [HN21](#)^[↑] Because no suspect classification is involved, such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or illegitimacy, the proper level of review is rational basis. See [Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 434; 685 NW2d 174 \(2004\)](#). "The rational basis test considers whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." *Id.* (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Fire Marshal Battle testified that the goal of his department is to inspect every property, but that the lack of funding and manpower makes it impossible to do so. Thus, while some properties in a given year received inspections, some did not, even though both inspected and uninspected properties pay the same charge. It is beyond dispute that a legitimate governmental interest is to provide fire inspections. It also is rationally related to only perform as many inspections as is economically feasible. Knowing that it is impossible to inspect every property, defendant was left with two choices: (1) conduct as many inspections [\[*23\]](#) as it could, or (2) conduct zero inspections so everyone was treated equally. Defendant's choice to proceed with the first option is eminently rational.

Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding no cause of action for appellant's equal-protection claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly ruled in favor of defendant on all counts. We affirm.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

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¹⁰ These also are findings of fact that the trial court made, which appellant does not challenge on appeal.

EXHIBIT - 9

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As of: November 19, 2024 10:03 PM Z

Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 30, 2023, Decided

No. 360116

Reporter

2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 2259 *; 2023 WL 2717788

STEVEN R. GENTRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON, Defendant-Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Notice: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.

Subsequent History: Reconsideration denied by [Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton, 2023 Mich. App. LEXIS 3294 \(Mich. Ct. App., May 10, 2023\)](#)

Prior History: [*1] Macomb Circuit Court. LC No. 2021-002813-CZ.

[Gentry v. Charter Twp. of Clinton, 2022 Mich. App. LEXIS 2326 \(Mich. Ct. App., Apr. 27, 2022\)](#)

Core Terms

tribunal, township, funds, millage, taxpayer, subject-matter, circuit court, refund, collected, special assessment, trial court, voters, exclusive jurisdiction, tax refund, summary disposition, plaintiff's claim, purposes, lawsuit, matters, tax revenue, quotation, escrow, marks, cause of action, plaintiffs', restitution, spent, unjust enrichment, property tax law, property taxes

Counsel: For STEVEN R. GENTRY, Plaintiff - Appellant: GREGORY D. HANLEY.

For CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON, Defendant - Appellee: SONAL H. MITHANI.

Judges: Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARKEY and BORRELLO, JJ.

Opinion

In this action generally challenging the Charter Township of Clinton's use of specific property tax revenue, plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court's order granting the township's motion for summary disposition based on a determination that the Michigan Tax Tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#). The trial court further concluded that even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's case should still be dismissed because plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing and plaintiff's action was untimely under [Bigger v City of Pontiac, 390 Mich 1; 210 NW2d 1 \(1973\)](#). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's decision granting summary disposition in favor of the township because plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this purported class-action lawsuit on August 2, 2021, generally challenging the propriety of the township's use of revenue collected from a property tax millage that was approved [*2] by voters pursuant to a ballot initiative. Plaintiff alleged that in 2013, township voters had approved a millage for the purpose of purchasing additional police vehicles and covering operating costs of the police department, that this millage had been renewed by township voters in 2018 to continue through 2025, and that the township had not used the "vast majority" of the revenue collected from this millage for its intended purpose. As an owner of real property in the township, plaintiff claimed to have paid the property tax at issue.

Specifically, in his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that "the Township has simply hoarded millions of dollars raised by the Supplemental Police Tax and/or used those revenues to make payments to reduce its actuarially-accrued liability for retiree health care expenses—expenses that are not 'operational costs.'"

Plaintiff further alleged that the "Township increased the amount of money in its Police Fund from an already-excessive \$21 million to over \$36 million since the Supplemental Police Tax was first imposed, even after paying the improper nonoperational expenses." Plaintiff asserted claims for assumpsit, unjust enrichment, and injunctive [*3] relief. Based on these claims, plaintiff sought a refund to the class members of the tax allegedly unlawfully collected during the previous six years and plaintiff sought to enjoin the township from further collecting the millage.

The township moved for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(4\)](#), [\(C\)\(5\)](#), [\(C\)\(7\)](#), and [\(C\)\(8\)](#). The township argued, as relevant to this appeal, that only the tax tribunal had jurisdiction over the type of claims raised by plaintiff, that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims because he had only alleged harm of the type experienced by all taxpayers generally, and that plaintiff's claims were untimely under [Bigger](#).

In opposition, plaintiff argued that his action was supported by [South Haven v Van Buren Co Bd of Comm'rs](#), 478 Mich 518; 734 NW2d 533 (2007), and that taxpayers have a cause of action for a refund where a municipality uses revenues from a voter approved millage for purposes other than those stated on the ballot. Plaintiff maintained that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the matter, rather than the tax tribunal, because plaintiff was only challenging the township's use of the tax proceeds, and plaintiff was not challenging the amount or validity of an assessment or seeking the type of refund under the state's property tax laws that would bring [*4] the matter within the tax tribunal's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also argued that he had standing because he had a direct cause of action under [South Haven](#), thus negating the need to rely on concepts of taxpayer standing, and he nonetheless suffered a special injury by personally paying the tax at issue. Finally, as relevant to this appeal, plaintiff argued that [Bigger](#) did not apply to this case.

The trial court subsequently issued a written opinion and order, thoroughly analyzing the issues and explaining its reasoning for determining that the township was entitled to summary disposition. First, although the trial court concluded that the tax tribunal did not have jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#), the trial court nevertheless granted the township's motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(4\)](#) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because it determined that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#). The

trial court reasoned that plaintiff was seeking a refund of taxes, which brought his action within the scope of [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#), and that plaintiff had not explained how his equitable claims constituted extraordinary circumstances that warranted divesting the tax tribunal of jurisdiction. [*5] Additionally, the trial court concluded that even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff did not have standing to pursue his claims because he had not satisfied the requirements of demonstrating taxpayer standing. The court also determined that plaintiff's claims were barred under [Bigger](#).

Plaintiff now appeals.

II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by determining that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court "review[s] de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition." [Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc](#), 500 Mich 327, 333; 901 NW2d 566 (2017). The question whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. [Hillsdale Co Senior Servs., Inc v Hillsdale Co](#), 494 Mich 46, 51; 832 NW2d 728 (2013). This Court also reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. *Id*.

Summary disposition may be granted under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(4\)](#) if the "court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter."

In reviewing a motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(4\)](#), it is proper to consider the pleadings and any affidavits or other documentary evidence submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo, but this Court must determine whether [*6] the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence, demonstrate . . . [a lack of] subject matter jurisdiction. [[Forest Hills Coop v Ann Arbor](#), 305 Mich App 572, 617; 854 NW2d 172 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipsis and alteration in original).]

B. ANALYSIS

The first issue presented by plaintiff appeal concerns whether the circuit court or tax tribunal had subject-

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matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. "Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to act and authority to hear and determine a case." *Id.* The question of subject-matter jurisdiction concerns "a court or tribunal's abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending." [New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Twp of Covert, 334 Mich App 24, 48; 964 NW2d 378 \(2020\)](#). As our Supreme Court has explained,

[j]urisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during the trial. [Winkler, 500 Mich at 333-334](#) (quotation marks [*7] and citation omitted; alteration in original).]

Furthermore, the "question of jurisdiction is not dependent on the truth or falsity of the allegations, but upon their nature." [Petersen Fin LLC v Kentwood, 326 Mich App 433, 441-442; 928 NW2d 245 \(2018\)](#). "The inquiry into subject-matter jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement of a case, not its conclusion." *Id.* at 442. "A court's subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by reference to the allegations listed in the complaint." *Id.* at 446 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Regarding the circuit court's jurisdiction, the Michigan Constitution provides:

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court. [Const 1963, art 6, § 13.](#)

Additionally, under [MCL 600.605](#), "[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution [*8] or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction

by the constitution or statutes of this state." "Divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law." [Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm'r, 413 Mich 728, 738; 322 NW2d 152 \(1982\)](#). Circuit courts "are courts of general jurisdiction" and when construing relevant statutory and constitutional provisions implicating the potential divestiture of the circuit court's jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the circuit court retains jurisdiction and "any intent to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction must be clearly and unambiguously stated." [Winkler, 500 Mich at 334](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

At issue in this case is [MCL 205.731](#), in which the Legislature granted original and exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to the tax tribunal over certain types of proceedings. See also [New Covert, 334 Mich App at 48](#). [MCL 205.731](#) provides in relevant part as follows:

The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all of the following:

- (a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.
- (b) A proceeding for a refund or [*9] redetermination of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state.
* * *
- (e) Any other proceeding provided by law.

Our Supreme Court has characterized [MCL 205.731](#) as an "exception" to the circuit court's jurisdiction for tax cases. [Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich at 52](#). [MCL 205.731](#) is located within the [Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq.](#) As used in this act, "tribunal" means "the tax tribunal created under section 21." [MCL 205.703\(g\)](#). "Agency" means "a board, official, or administrative agency empowered to make a decision, finding, ruling, assessment, determination, or order that is subject to review under the jurisdiction of the tribunal or that has collected a tax for which a refund is claimed." [MCL 205.703\(a\)](#). Pursuant to [MCL 205.774](#), the "right to sue any agency for refund of any taxes other than by proceedings before the tribunal is abolished as of September 30, 1974[.]" and "[i]f a tax paid to an agency is erroneous or unlawful, it shall not be requisite that the payment be made under protest in order to invoke a right to refund by proceedings before the tribunal." "The tribunal's jurisdiction is based either on the subject matter of the proceeding (e.g., a direct review of a final

decision of an agency relating to special assessments[, assessments, valuation, rates, allocation, or equalization] under property [*10] tax laws) or the type of relief requested (i.e., a refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws)." *Wikman v City of Novi*, 413 Mich 617, 631; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).

Here, the trial court concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims pursuant to MCL 205.731(b) and MCL 205.774. In arguing to the contrary, plaintiff relies primarily on our Supreme Court's decision in *South Haven*, 478 Mich 518. Plaintiff contends that *South Haven* supports his argument that he may seek a refund under the circuit court's general equitable powers without invoking the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal under MCL 205.731(b). Plaintiff also relies on our Supreme Court's decision in *Romulus*, 413 Mich 728, to argue that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter because the type of refund plaintiff seeks is not the type of typical tax refund contemplated by MCL 205.731(b). Therefore, plaintiff argues under *South Haven* and *Romulus*, tax revenues from a millage may be returned to taxpayers when the funds were spent for a purpose not provided for by the millage. Consequently, plaintiff contends that the relief he is seeking is not a refund under the state's property tax laws (as contemplated by MCL 205.731(b)) but is instead an entirely different cause of action that [*11] is rooted in the Supreme Court's *South Haven* decision and based on a challenge to the use of tax revenue from a voter-approved millage.

In *South Haven*, 478 Mich at 521-522, the Supreme Court was presented with an issue involving a statute that required funds from a road millage to be distributed according to a specific formula between cities, villages, and the county for their roads. Voters in the county approved a road millage that only provided revenue to the county and did not contain a provision for the statutorily required distributions to cities and villages. *Id.* at 522-523. The city of South Haven, which did not have any county roads within its boundaries, subsequently objected to the county's failure to allocate any of the millage funds to the city and initiated a lawsuit in the circuit court. *Id.* at 523. The circuit court dismissed the action on summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), concluding that the tax tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter. *Id.* The Court of Appeals reversed and held that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court rather than the tax tribunal "because the case did not involve assessment, valuation, rates,

special assessments, allocation, equalization, a refund, or a redetermination of a tax." *Id.* at 524.

On appeal to our [*12] Supreme Court, our Supreme Court determined that the statutory distribution procedure was violated, and the Court proceeded to address whether there was a remedy available to the city. *Id.* at 527-528. After first determining that the statute did not authorize a cause of action for restitution of misallocated funds, *id.* at 530-531, the Court stated that

although plaintiff may not seek restitution, this Court has permitted a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief when a government official does not conform to his or her statutory duty to distribute funds in a specified manner. Thus, two possible judicial remedies are available in a case where voters approve a ballot proposal that improperly allocates proceeds: to enjoin collection of the improper millage or to refund collected taxes to the taxpayers. These remedies would be unexceptional exercises of the power of the judiciary to give injunctive relief to prevent illegal acts. [*Id.* at 531 (citations omitted).]

The Supreme Court noted that "neither of these remedies [were] appropriate" in that case because "the millage ha[d] already been collected and the taxpayers were not seeking a refund[.]" *Id.* at 531 n 20. The Court then concluded:

Plaintiff seeks a third possible remedy: a writ of mandamus [*13] compelling defendants to disgorge the funds and allocate them in accordance with the statutory formula. This we decline to do because the city is not entitled to receive any of the funds. Under the General Property Tax Act, . . . when a millage proposal is submitted to the electors for approval, the ballot must "fully disclose each local unit of government to which the revenue from that millage will be disbursed," and must state "[a] clear statement of the purpose for the millage." This statute does not expressly preclude using for one purpose tax revenue specifically approved for a different purpose. However, a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the Legislature did not intend to do a useless thing. If funds that voters approved for the purpose stated on the ballot could be redirected to another purpose without seeking new approval, there would be no reason for including the purpose on the ballot. Indeed, voters could be lulled into voting for a millage for a popular

purpose, only to have the funds then used for something they may well have never approved. This is contrary to the General Property Tax Act. The voters of Van Buren County did not approve the allocation [*14] of funds for city roads, and perhaps would not have approved a proposal including that purpose. While no court has warrant to violate [MCL 224.20b](#) by ordering distribution contrary to that statute, it likewise may not violate [MCL 211.24f](#) by ordering these funds to be used for a purpose not approved by the voters. Accordingly, South Haven is not entitled to receive any of the proceeds of the millage. [*Id.* at 531-533 (citations omitted; alteration in original).]

In reaching this result, the Court additionally noted that the Legislature had authorized the Attorney General, by statute,¹ to pursue a civil action to recover misappropriated funds and that the city's "statutorily provided remedy [was] through the Attorney General." [Id.](#) at 530.

In [Romulus, 413 Mich at 733-735](#), the plaintiffs brought an action in the circuit court challenging their drain taxes on the ground that the defendants allegedly committed a constructive fraud by using money collected through special assessments to pay for administrative expenses instead of properly using the special assessment revenue for its enumerated purposes and only relying on general taxation funds to pay administrative expenses. The plaintiffs included "township and city treasurers, acting in their official capacities, [*15] and landowners." [Id.](#) at 733. Our Supreme Court addressed the scope of the tax tribunal's jurisdiction and whether plaintiffs' constructive fraud claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal or whether it could properly be considered by the circuit court. [Id.](#) at 735-736.

In analyzing this issue, the [Romulus](#) Court noted that the "focus" of the plaintiffs' claim "concern[ed] not the factual underpinnings of the pertinent assessments, but rather how funds collected pursuant to the special assessment laws may be spent." [Id.](#) at 736. The Court explained that the matters within the tax tribunal's jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731](#) "most clearly relate to the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper

uses which may be made of the funds once collected." [Id.](#) at 738. Our Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was not within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#) because questions regarding how the funds collected from the special assessments may properly be expended are not implicated by disputes concerning any of the matters described in subsection (a).² [Id.](#) at 738-739. The Court reasoned as follows:

Because questions as to the lawful expenditure of funds do not arise within the other matters within the tribunal's jurisdiction, and because [*16] the tribunal's expertise relates much more directly to other questions concerning the lawfulness of challenged special assessments, we cannot assume that the Legislature intended to divest the circuit court of its equitable jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in matters involving the appropriate use of funds collected under the guise of special assessment laws. [*Romulus, 413 Mich at 738-739.*]

However, the plaintiffs' claim included a request for the return to the landowner plaintiffs of money, which was being held in escrow, that had been collected as special assessments and also earmarked for administrative expenses. [Id.](#) at 733-734. Thus, the Court stated that the question remained whether pursuant to [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#), the landowner plaintiffs' request for a return of the money in escrow was a matter within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction such that the circuit court was precluded from considering the claim or whether the landowner plaintiffs' request could be considered under the circuit court's equity jurisdiction. [Id.](#) at 732-733, 736, 739, 745-746. The Court held that the matter was, "at least in part, an equitable action, not within the Tax Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction, and thus properly brought in the circuit court." [Id.](#) at 732-733. Explaining [*17] its holding, the Court reasoned as follows:

We conclude that, if the funds in escrow have been justifiably withheld from the county, the landowner plaintiffs' claim that the funds should be repaid to them because of defendants' constructive fraud is not a claim for a tax refund within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.

¹ The Court cited [MCL 224.30](#), which is specific to violations of certain laws regarding roads. See [MCL 224.30](#); [South Haven, 478 Mich at 530](#). Accordingly, this statute has no bearing on the instant case.

² As previously stated, these matters are "assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state." [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#).

We do not reach this conclusion by holding that equity jurisdiction supersedes the Legislature's intended jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. Rather, we believe that the Legislature has not shown a clear intent to abolish the circuit court's equity jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' claim to the funds in escrow. In accordance with the settled principle that the divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law, we will not presume an intent not clearly expressed. Although it is arguable that [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#) could apply because the funds in escrow were collected as purported special assessments, a return of the funds from this escrow account would not be a typical tax refund and to treat it as such would likely lead to an anomalous result. If the circuit court determines that the funds in escrow were properly withheld from the county, [*18] then principles of equity may dictate that the funds should be returned to those who paid them. If so, the court would be in an intractable position if such relief were deemed to be a tax refund over which the circuit court had no jurisdiction. Rather, the rule that equity will grant complete relief is applicable here. The Tax Tribunal Act does not prevent a court of equity from determining what should be done with funds that in extraordinary circumstances have been properly withheld from the county. [*Id.* at 746-747 (some citations omitted).]

Here, plaintiff's claims focus on allegations that the township improperly used tax revenue for purposes other than those for which that specific tax revenue was intended. Our Supreme Court's decision in [South Haven](#) supports the general proposition that revenue generated from a voter-approved millage may not be spent for purposes other than those approved by the voters without contravening the General Property Tax Act.³ [South Haven](#), 478 Mich at 531-533. Because plaintiff's challenge in the instant case relates to how the millage revenue could lawfully be spent after being collected rather than the underlying basis for the tax, plaintiff's claims do not implicate the special expertise of the tax tribunal [*19] and therefore do not fall within the tax

tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#). [Romulus](#), 413 Mich at 736, 738-739. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by determining that the tax tribunal did not have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#).

However, the question remains whether plaintiff's claims are within the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of the tax tribunal under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) because plaintiff seeks a "refund." Answering this question also implicates [MCL 205.774](#), which generally prohibits lawsuits for tax refunds "other than by proceedings before the tribunal." In his first amended complaint, plaintiff specifically sought to have the township refund the money collected pursuant to the millage.

The tax tribunal's jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) is based on the type of relief requested. [Wikman](#), 413 Mich at 631. The issue thus becomes whether plaintiff's requested relief actually constitutes "a refund . . . of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state," for purposes of [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#),⁴ or a "refund of any taxes," for purposes of [MCL 205.774](#), such that jurisdiction in the circuit court is precluded.

The answer to this question is not entirely clear. Our Supreme Court in [South Haven](#) did not address the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, leaving intact the ruling of the Court [*20] of Appeals that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court. However, in [South Haven](#) there was no request by taxpayers for a *refund* of the tax revenue at issue; instead, the city sought to have the money reallocated by the county so that some of the revenue would flow to the city. [South Haven](#), 478 Mich at 525, 531 n 20, 531-533. Thus, [South Haven](#) does not answer the question whether a request by a taxpayer to have tax revenue returned based on a claim that the revenue was spent for an improper purpose constitutes a "refund" for purposes of the tax tribunal act and the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court in [South Haven](#) was not asked to address the issue, thus, there is nothing in that opinion that could be cited to support a conclusion that the relief sought by plaintiff in the instant case either does or does not constitute a "refund" to taxpayers.⁵

³At this juncture, there is no need to express an opinion on whether the township actually spent funds for a purpose that would not fall within the purpose approved by the voters. As previously stated, the "question of jurisdiction is not dependent on the truth or falsity of the allegations, but upon their nature." [Petersen](#), 326 Mich App at 441-442.

⁴There is no claim that plaintiff seeks a "redetermination" of his taxes.

⁵Despite the broad reading of this decision advocated by plaintiff, our Supreme Court's decision in [South Haven](#) was limited to a narrow issue that is not implicated in this case and, further, does not address the pertinent issue currently before

The Court in [Romulus](#) came closer to addressing the question currently before this Court. In [Romulus](#), the Court held that a claim by landowner plaintiffs for a return of escrowed tax funds based on allegations that the taxing authority committed a constructive fraud by improperly allocating those funds to unauthorized administrative expenses did not constitute a claim for a "typical tax refund" [*21] within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#). [Romulus](#), 413 Mich at 733-734, 745-747. Thus, the [Romulus](#) Court reasoned that "the Legislature has not shown a clear intent to abolish the circuit court's equity jurisdiction" under such circumstances. [Id. at 746](#). However, the [Romulus](#) Court reached this conclusion based in part on the fact that money potentially subject to being returned to the taxpayers was being held in escrow and it was "not possible to determine that the funds in escrow were improperly withheld from the county." [Id. at 746-747](#). Such factual circumstances are not present in the instant case where plaintiff seeks to have the township return tax money that it has already collected and allocated.

Thus, [Romulus](#) does not directly support plaintiff's argument. [Romulus](#) does, however, support the general proposition that the basis on which a plaintiff seeks money from the township that originated as tax revenue affects whether the relief claimed by plaintiff constitutes a "typical tax refund" such that the claim should be adjudicated in the tax tribunal or instead constitutes some other type of claim that properly belongs within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The mere fact that a tax is involved does not automatically place the matter within [*22] the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal. Cf. [Petersen](#), 318 Mich App at 449 ("The MTT does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over contract disputes simply because the substance of the contract regards special assessments.").

this Court. Specifically, the Supreme Court in [South Haven](#) explained that it had granted leave to appeal "limited to consideration of whether the city was entitled to any of the tax proceeds," ordering the parties "to address whether the ballot proposal violated the statute and, if so, what remedy might be available, and whether the parties by their conduct 'otherwise agreed' to a different allocation than that required by statute." [Id. at 525](#). The Supreme Court's analysis of that issue simply has no bearing on whether a request by a taxpayer, rather than a city, to have millage revenue directly returned to the taxpayer based on a claim that the taxing authority misallocated the millage revenue for in improper purpose constitutes a "refund" for purposes of the tax tribunal act. It similarly does not support plaintiff's claim that he has standing to bring this action, which is discussed later in this opinion.

Furthermore, [Romulus](#) supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over claims that implicate issues concerning how a municipality may lawfully spend money after it has been collected from taxes, in light of the nature of the tax tribunal's special expertise. As our Supreme Court explained in [Romulus](#):

The tribunal that was created to exercise such jurisdiction was labeled a "quasi-judicial agency", [MCL 205.721](#), whose membership is to be comprised of persons with various specified qualifications. Of the seven members, two must be attorneys with experience either in property tax matters or in judicial or quasi-judicial office. [MCL 205.722](#). One member must be a certified assessor; one, an experienced professional real estate appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant with experience in state-local tax matters. . . . [P]ersons who are not members of any of the enumerated disciplines are required to have experience in state or local tax matters.

The expertise [*23] of the tribunal members can be seen to relate primarily to questions concerning the factual underpinnings of taxes. In cases not involving special assessments, the tribunal's membership is well-qualified to resolve the disputes concerning those matters that the Legislature has placed within its jurisdiction: assessments, valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. In special assessment cases, the tribunal is competent to ascertain whether the assessments are levied according to the benefits received. Although the tribunal, in making its determinations, will make conclusions of law, [MCL 205.751](#), the matters within its jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731](#) most clearly relate to the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper uses which may be made of the funds once collected. [[Romulus](#), 413 Mich at 737-738 (some citations omitted).]

Here, determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that the tax tribunal had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) requires a clear definition of the term "refund" as used in [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#), both of which are contained within the Tax Tribunal Act. The [Romulus](#) Court did not define this term, although it stated that the factual circumstances in that case did not involve a "typical tax refund." [Romulus](#), 413 Mich at 746.

Resolution [*24] of this question presents an issue of

statutory interpretation. When interpreting the language of a statute, courts seek to "ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute." [*Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc*, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 \(2002\)](#). "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted." [*Farris v McKaig*, 324 Mich App 349, 353; 920 NW2d 377 \(2018\)](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." [*Koontz*, 466 Mich at 312](#). Statutory "words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." [*MCL 8.3a*](#); see also [*Farris*, 324 Mich App at 354](#).

Here, the term "refund" is not defined within the Tax Tribunal Act. See [*MCL 205.703*](#). It is thus appropriate to consult dictionary definitions. [*Farris*, 324 Mich App at 354](#). *Black's Law Dictionary* (11th ed) provides three definitions of "refund," two of which are relevant to the instant case: "1. The return of [*25] money to a person who overpaid, such as a taxpayer who overestimated tax liability or whose employer withheld too much tax from earnings. 2. The money returned to a person who overpaid." The definition for the term "tax refund" is "[m]oney that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority.—Also termed tax rebate." *Black's Law Dictionary* (11th ed). Accordingly, although these demonstrations show that a tax refund is accomplished by returning tax money to the taxpayer, it is also clear that a tax refund is given *based on some kind of overpayment*. In other words, the tax is refunded because the taxpayer did not owe the tax or owed less tax. That is not the basis on which plaintiff seeks monetary relief in this case.

According to the first amended complaint, plaintiff sought the return of millage funds based on his claims of "ASSUMPSIT (MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED)" and "UNJUST ENRICHMENT."

"Unjust enrichment is a cause of action to correct a defendant's unjust retention of a benefit owed to another." [*Wright v Genesee Co*, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 \(2019\)](#). "A claim of unjust enrichment can arise when a party has and retains money or benefits

which in justice and equity belong to another." [*Id.* at 418](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). [*26] Though plaintiff's complaint contains a claim of "assumpsit," assumpsit has technically been abolished as a cause of action, but "the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved[.]" [*Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield*, 336 Mich App 161, 213; 969 NW2d 570 \(2021\)](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). "At common law, assumpsit was a proper vehicle for recovering unlawful fees, charges, or exactions—including unlawful utility charges—that the plaintiff had paid to a municipality under compulsion of local law." *Id.* However, "an 'assumpsit' claim is modernly treated as a claim arising under 'quasi-contractual' principles, which represent 'a subset of the law of unjust enrichment.'" *Id.* (citation omitted).

"The remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution." [*Wright*, 504 Mich at 418](#). "A claimant entitled to restitution may obtain a judgment for money in the amount of the defendant's unjust enrichment." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Restitution restores a party who yielded excessive and unjust benefits to his or her rightful position." [*Id.* at 419](#). In sum, as our Supreme Court has explained,

[u]njust enrichment has evolved from a category of restitutionary claims with components in law and equity into a unified independent doctrine that [*27] serves a unique legal purpose: it corrects for a benefit received by the defendant rather than compensating for the defendant's wrongful behavior. Both the nature of an unjust-enrichment action and its remedy—whether restitution at law or in equity—separate it from tort and contract. [*Id.* at 422](#).]

Additionally, plaintiff sought injunctive relief asking the court to enjoin the township from any further collection of the millage because the township was allegedly spending the revenue for unauthorized purposes. It is thus clear from examining plaintiff's first amended complaint that the essence of his claim is that because the township has collected revenue from a voter-approved millage and improperly spent that revenue for purposes not authorized by the voters, the township should be enjoined from further collecting the millage revenue and should also make restitution for its unauthorized actions by returning the millage proceeds to the voters. "It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to

determine the exact nature of the claim." [Adams v. Adams \(On Reconsideration\)](#), 276 Mich App 704, 710-711; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).

Accordingly, the crucial issue to be adjudicated with respect [*28] to plaintiff's claims is whether the township improperly used the revenue from the millage and, if so, whether such a finding provides a proper basis for the remedies of restitution or injunctive relief.⁶ Accordingly, because plaintiff only challenges the township's use of tax revenue that has already been collected and because plaintiff seeks restitution on that basis rather than a refund of a tax overpayment, the relief sought by plaintiff is not a "typical tax refund" and his claim does not fall within the tax tribunal's exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#). See [Romulus](#) 413 Mich at 746-747.

Our Supreme Court's opinion in *Hillsdale* does not compel a different outcome. In [Hillsdale](#), 494 Mich at 50 & n 2, the circuit court granted plaintiff's requested writ of mandamus to the extent of requiring the defendant county to levy the full amount of a millage that had been approved by the voters. Our Supreme Court addressed the issue "whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesse[d] jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund plaintiff Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS)." [*29] [Id.](#) at 48. The Court concluded that the case was within the tax tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction because "the heart of the dispute pertains to the 'amount of a charge' by defendant to its property taxpayers," which constituted a property tax "rate" for purposes of [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#). [Id.](#) at 53-55. The *Hillsdale* Court stated, "this case does not involve a proceeding for a refund under [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#); rather, it involves a proceeding under [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#)." [Id.](#) at 61.

The issue of how the millage revenue should be spent, which is the central issue in the instant case, was not before the Supreme Court in *Hillsdale*. Admittedly, the *Hillsdale* Court stated that "[Wikman](#) and [Romulus](#) are of limited application outside the context of special assessments." [Id.](#) at 59. Also, with respect to the issue presented in the instant case regarding jurisdiction over a matter involving a challenge to how tax revenue was spent, there does not seem to be any appreciable

difference between whether that revenue was collected pursuant to a special assessment or a millage. Accordingly, we conclude that *Hillsdale* does not provide any rule or legal analysis that requires us to reach a different result in this case.

In the present case, as in [Romulus](#), it is not the merely because plaintiff sought equitable relief [*30] that this case remains within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. [Romulus](#), 413 Mich at 746. Rather, the Legislature did not indicate a clear intent to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over a matter of this type because the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint does not involve any of the enumerated issues in [MCL 205.731\(a\)](#) and the relief requested by plaintiff did not constitute a "refund" for purposes of [MCL 205.731\(b\)](#) and [MCL 205.774](#). See [Wikman](#), 413 Mich at 631. Accordingly, the trial court erred when deciding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, we reverse that ruling. In light of our conclusion that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's additional argument that the trial court was precluded from making additional alternative rulings (regarding standing and the application of [Bigger](#)) if the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction⁷ is moot. "An issue is deemed moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief." [B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery](#), 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

III. STANDING

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by determining that he lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a party has standing presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. [Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v Glen Lake Ass'n](#), 264 Mich App 523, 527; 695 NW2d 508 (2004). This Court [*31] "review[s] de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition." [Winkler](#), 500 Mich at 333.

B. ANALYSIS

In Michigan, courts employ a "limited, prudential approach" to standing. [Lansing Sch Ed Ass'n v Lansing](#)

⁶At this juncture, we do not express an opinion on whether plaintiff would be entitled to either of these remedies if it were shown that the township improperly spent the millage funds.

⁷"When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court's acts and proceedings are of no force and validity." [Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, Inc](#), 249 Mich App 580, 586; 644 NW2d 54 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 352-353; 792 NW2d 686 (2010). "[T]he standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 355 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In *Lansing*, the Supreme Court held:

We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan's long-standing historical approach to standing. Under this approach, a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the [*32] Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. Id. at 372.]

The Supreme Court explained the historical development of Michigan's standing doctrine in relevant part as follows:

Historically, the standing doctrine grew out of cases where parties were seeking writs of mandamus to compel a public officer to perform a statutory duty. Standing was a prudential limit, which is to say that the court's decision to invoke it was "one of discretion and not of law." The general rule was that a court would not hear a case where "an individual citizen, who is only interested in common with all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of [the] complaint," was suing a public entity to force compliance with a legal duty. Generally, the court exercised its discretion to hear a case if the citizen had "some individual interest in the subject matter of [the] complaint which is not common to all the citizens of the state" This was sometimes articulated as a special or specific injury or interest. Id. at 355-356 (citations omitted; alterations and ellipsis in original).]

At issue in the instance case is a concept sometimes referred to as "taxpayer standing." "Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing [*33] to vindicate a

public wrong or enforce a public right if he or she has not been injured in a manner that is different from the public at large. Therefore, under general standing principles, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds if the threatened injury to him or her is no different than that to taxpayers generally." Mich Ass'n of Home Builders v City of Troy, 504 Mich 204, 226; 934 NW2d 713 (2019) (citation omitted). Accord Waterford Sch Dist v State Bd of Ed, 98 Mich App 658, 662; 296 NW2d 328 (1980) ("Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large. Therefore, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds where the threatened injury to him is no different than that to taxpayers generally.") (citation omitted).

In Waterford, this Court noted that this common-law bar on taxpayer lawsuits could be relaxed by statute. Id. at 662-663. The statute cited in Waterford, MCL 600.2041(3), is not implicated here because that statute pertains to actions to "prevent the illegal expenditure of state funds." MCL 600.2041(3); Waterford, 98 Mich App at 663 (emphasis added). However, there is an analogous statute relevant to the factual circumstances in this case. MCL 129.61 specifically grants standing in certain taxpayer actions if specific conditions are met. That statute [*34] provides:

Any person or persons, firm or corporation, resident in any township or school district, paying taxes to such political unit, may institute suits or actions at law or in equity on behalf of or for the benefit of the treasurer of such political subdivision, for an accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission of such political subdivision. Before such suit is instituted a demand shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to take action in relation thereto. Security for costs shall be filed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit or action and all costs and expenses of the same shall be paid by the person or persons instituting the same unless and until a recovery of such funds or moneys be obtained as the result of such proceedings. [MCL 129.61.]

Our Supreme Court has explained that MCL 129.61 reflects the Legislature's authorization of lawsuits by individual township taxpayers to recover funds

misappropriated or unlawfully expended by any public officer, board or commission of the township, if all of the statutory [*35] prerequisites are fulfilled. Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Sch, 479 Mich 336, 346; 737 NW2d 158 (2007), overruled in part on other grounds by Lansing, 487 Mich 349.⁸ The Rohde Court further explained some of the statutory requirements in MCL 129.61 as follows:

The statute provides that before a taxpayer may institute a lawsuit, a demand must be made "on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit" for recovery of unlawfully expended funds. The statute does not expressly require that the demand be for a lawsuit. Further, just because the public body has the ultimate duty to bring a lawsuit if it is needed does not mean that the demand must be for a lawsuit. The taxpayer demand, at a minimum, calls on a conscientious public body to reevaluate whether it is carrying out its duties properly and, in fact, this may result in the public body's acting in compliance with the demand. It may do this by any number of means, only one of which is to enter into litigation. In fact, when the statute uses the phrase "whose duty it may be to maintain such suit" (emphasis added), it recognizes this. Moreover, the statute provides that after a demand, before the taxpayer may bring a suit, a precondition is that the public body must neglect or refuse "to take action in relation [*36] thereto." This implies that the public body need not necessarily file suit, only that it needs to take some kind of action relating to the matter. [Rohde, 479 Mich at 345-346.]

Here, plaintiff alleged that he resided in the township and paid taxes to the township, and he brought an action against the township to recover funds he alleged had been unlawfully expended by the township. Thus, plaintiff could potentially satisfy the requirements for standing under MCL 129.61. However, plaintiff does not claim to have made any kind of "demand" before

initiating this lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff did not satisfy the prerequisites for bringing an action under MCL 129.61. With respect to an alleged statutory violation, "a private cause of action does not exist where the statute provides a comprehensive, exclusive scheme of enforcement of the rights and duties it creates." Home Builders, 504 Mich at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory prerequisites under MCL 129.61, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he has standing to bring this action.

Moreover, even when there exists a statute that relaxes the common-law bar on taxpayer suits, "[t]he taxpayers must demonstrate that they will sustain substantial injury or suffer [*37] loss or damage as taxpayers, through increased taxation and the consequences thereof." Waterford, 98 Mich App at 663. Rather than address the requirements of taxpayer standing, plaintiff merely argues that these principles do not apply. However, considering that plaintiff has attempted to challenge the township's use of the millage tax revenue that plaintiff claims to have paid as a property owner in the township, the principles of taxpayer standing undoubtedly apply. See Home Builders, 504 Mich at 226; Waterford, 98 Mich App at 662-663; MCL 129.61. As explained above, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he possesses standing to bring this action.

To the extent this reasoning differs from the trial court's reasoning for determining that plaintiff did not have standing, this Court may nonetheless affirm a trial court's decision that reaches the correct result for different reasons. See Kyocera Corp v Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 313 Mich App 437, 449; 886 NW2d 445 (2015) ("We will affirm a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition if it reached the correct result, even if our reasoning differs."). Thus, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing, and the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of the township is affirmed on that basis.

Given this conclusion, we decline to address plaintiff's final argument that the [*38] trial court erred in its application of Bigger. Even if plaintiff were correct that his action was not barred by the holding in Bigger, he still does not have standing to bring his claim and there is no relief this Court may grant based on this issue. Thus, the issue is moot. B P 7, 231 Mich App at 359.

Affirmed. No costs are awarded to either party, a public question being involved. MCR 7.216(A)(7) and MCR 7.219(A). City of Bay City v Bay County Treasurer, 292

⁸ In Rohde, 479 Mich at 340, our Supreme Court held "that MCL 129.61 is unconstitutional to the extent that it confers standing on taxpayers who do not meet the three-part test for determining whether a party has constitutional standing." However, in Lansing, the Court subsequently overruled Rohde and other cases applying a constitutional standing requirement. Lansing, 487 Mich at 352-353, 359-360, 371 n 18. Accordingly, MCL 129.61 remains good law under our Supreme Court's current standing jurisprudence.

[Mich App 156, 172; 807 NW2d 892 \(2011\).](#)

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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EXHIBIT - 10

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Woodland Condos. Homeowners Ass'n v. Fannie Mae

Court of Appeals of Michigan

February 28, 2019, Decided

No. 339850

Reporter

2019 Mich. App. LEXIS 384 *; 2019 WL 982924

WOODLAND CONDOMINIUMS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, also known as FANNIE MAE, Defendant-Appellant, and DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant, and FUTURE HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendant/Cross-Defendant, and MARY ANN WUJCIAK, Defendant.

Notice: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.

Prior History: [*1] Genesee Circuit Court. LC No. 16-107570-CH.

Core Terms

summary disposition, restoration, repair, insurance proceeds, feasible, defendants', plaintiff's claim, trial court, reconstruction, mortgage contract, quotation, mortgage, marks, genuine issue of material fact, conversion, assumpsit, funds, matter of law, proceeds, parties, condominium unit, pleadings, costs, opposing party, own motion, motions

Judges: Before: TUKEL, P.J., and SHAPIRO and GADOLA, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Ditech Financial, LLC ("Ditech"), formerly known as Green Tree Servicing, LLC, appeal by leave granted the trial court's order denying their

motion for summary disposition pursuant to [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) (no genuine issue of material fact). We reverse and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendants.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff is the homeowners association for the Woodland condominium development. Mary Ann Wujciak owned a condominium unit in the development. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Ditech was the servicer of a mortgage owned by Fannie Mae that secured a purchase money loan for the unit. The development was insured by a master policy issued by Farm Bureau General Insurance Company to plaintiff covering the standard condominium unit for fire and other damage. The Farm Bureau master policy identified plaintiff and Ditech as parties with an insurable interest in Wujciak's unit.

The mortgage contract between Ditech and Wujciak contained the following provision addressing insurance proceeds:

In the [*2] event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. *Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened.* During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing

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or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and [*3] shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. *If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower.* Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. [Emphasis added.]

Plaintiff's bylaws, Article V, Sections 4, 5, and 8, state:

Section 4. ASSOCIATION RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAIR. Except as otherwise provided in the Master Deed and in Section 3 hereof, the Association shall be responsible for the reconstruction, repair and maintenance of the Common Elements. Immediately after a casualty causing damage to property for which the Association has the responsibility of maintenance, repair and reconstruction, the Association shall obtain reliable and detailed estimates of the cost to replace the damaged property in a condition as good as that existing before the damage. *If the proceeds of insurance are not sufficient to defray the estimated costs of reconstruction or repair required to be performed by the Association, or if at any time during such reconstruction or repair, or upon completion of such reconstruction [*4] or repair, the funds for the payment of the costs thereof are insufficient, assessment shall be made against all Co-owners for the cost of reconstruction or repair of the damaged property in sufficient amounts to provide funds to pay the estimated or actual cost of repair.* [Emphasis added.]

Section 5. TIMELY RECONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR. If damage to Common Elements or a Unit adversely affects the appearance of the Project, the Association or Co-owner responsible for the reconstruction, repair and maintenance thereof shall proceed with replacement of the damaged property without delay, and shall complete such replacement within 6 months after the date of occurrence which caused damage to the property.

* * *

Section 8. PRIORITY OF MORTGAGEE INTERESTS. Nothing contained in the Condominium Documents shall be construed to

give a Condominium Unit Owner, or any other party, *priority over any rights of first mortgagees of Condominium Units pursuant to their mortgages in the case of a distribution to Condominium Unit Owners of insurance proceeds or condemnation awards for losses to or a taking of Condominium Units* [Emphasis added.]

On December 7, 2014, the subject unit was destroyed by a fire. Plaintiff obtained [*5] from J.C. Chappell Construction ("Chappell") a quote of \$141,000 for the cost of restoring the property. Plaintiff submitted to Farm Bureau a proof of claim. Plaintiff entered into a restoration agreement with Chappell. On April 14, 2015, Farm Bureau issued a check for \$87,900, jointly payable to Ditech and plaintiff. Plaintiff's agent, Anna Bincsik-Hawker, endorsed the check on plaintiff's behalf without restriction and delivered the check to Ditech. Ditech deposited the funds into an escrow account pending receipt of further information regarding plaintiff's claim. On July 27, 2015, Ditech issued a check in the amount of \$43,950, payable to Wujciak, Chappell, and plaintiff, but the check was returned as undeliverable because Wujciak's address was unknown.

In the meantime, Wujciak failed to make timely payments under her mortgage. A balance of \$106,469.91 remained due on Wujciak's mortgage debt. Without informing plaintiff, Ditech decided that restoration of the unit was not feasible because the insurance proceeds were insufficient. Ditech initiated foreclosure by sheriff's sale in December 2016. The proceeds from the sheriff's sale and the insurance payment satisfied Wujciak's mortgage [*6] debt in full.

Plaintiff thereafter brought this action against defendants for statutory and common-law conversion, breach of contract, and assumpsit. These claims were based on plaintiff's theory that Ditech's original plan to apply the insurance proceeds to restoration precluded Ditech from subsequently abandoning that plan on the ground that restoration was not feasible. Ditech brought a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition of Ditech's counterclaim. Defendants also moved for summary disposition pursuant to [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#), arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that restoration was not feasible because the insurance proceeds were insufficient to cover the restoration costs. The trial court jointly heard both motions and thereafter issued an opinion and order denying both motions on the basis that there were questions of fact precluding summary disposition in favor of either party. However, the court

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did not identify the question or questions that it found to be in dispute.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION ANALYSIS

A. PROCEDURAL GROUND

Preliminarily, we reject defendants' unpreserved argument that procedural deficiencies in plaintiff's response [*7] to defendants' summary disposition motion entitled defendants to summary disposition as a matter of law.

Defendants filed their motion for summary disposition shortly after plaintiff filed its own motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#). Plaintiff's brief in response to defendants' motion simply referenced plaintiff's own motion and supporting brief, and the exhibits submitted with plaintiff's motion, to oppose defendants' motion for summary disposition. Defendants argue that plaintiff's response to their motion was procedurally deficient, entitling them to summary disposition as a matter of law. We disagree. We review de novo issues involving the interpretation and application of court rules. [Lech v Huntmore Estates Condo Ass'n, 315 Mich App 288, 290; 890 NW2d 378 \(2016\)](#).

When a party files a motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#), "[t]he moving party has the initial burden to support its claim for summary disposition by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence." [Lockwood v Ellington Twp, 323 Mich App 392, 401; 917 NW2d 413 \(2018\)](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Once that burden is satisfied, "the party opposing summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material [*8] fact exists." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendants argue that the trial court should have granted their motion for summary disposition because plaintiff failed to submit a properly supported response. Defendants rely on [MCR 2.116\(G\)](#), which provides, in pertinent part:

(3) Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in support of the grounds asserted in the motion are required

(a) when the grounds asserted do not appear on the face of the pleadings, or

(b) when judgment is sought based on [subrule \(C\)\(10\)](#).

(4) A motion under [subrule \(C\)\(10\)](#) must specifically identify the issues as to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. When a motion under [subrule \(C\)\(10\)](#) is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him or her.

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of [subparagraph \(G\)\(4\) \[*9\]](#) by filing a response that merely referenced plaintiff's own motion for summary disposition. Defendants also argue that plaintiff failed to satisfy [MCR 2.119\(A\)\(2\)](#), which provides that "[a] motion or response to a motion that presents an issue of law must be accompanied by a brief citing the authority on which it is based." Defendants further argue that plaintiff's attempt to incorporate by reference its brief in support of its own motion for summary disposition was ineffective pursuant to [MCR 2.113\(G\)](#), which provides that "[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference only in another part of the same pleading."

A motion for summary disposition brought under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) "tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint," and "should be granted when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." [Lockwood, 323 Mich App at 400](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Even accepting that plaintiff's response to defendants' motion could be considered procedurally deficient because, standing alone, it did not properly set forth the factual support for plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion, we are not persuaded that this deficiency entitled defendants to summary disposition [*10] as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case.

Defendants and plaintiff had filed competing motions for summary disposition. The motions involved the same legal and factual issues. The trial court had discretion to hear and decide the motions at the same time, cf. [Zaremba Equip, Inc v Harco Nat'l Ins Co, 302 Mich App 7, 21; 837 NW2d 686 \(2013\)](#), which it did. Moreover, a court hearing a summary disposition motion may sua sponte render judgment in favor of the opposing party if it determines that the opposing party is entitled to judgment. [MCR 2.116\(I\)\(2\)](#). Thus, regardless of whether

plaintiff failed to adhere to the formalities for responding to a motion by failing to file an entirely separate brief in response to defendants' motion, the trial court was still permitted to consider plaintiff's cross-motion for summary disposition, as well as that motion's supporting brief and exhibits, in determining whether plaintiff or defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendants' reliance on [*Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc*, 285 Mich App 362; 775 NW2d 618 \(2009\)](#), is misplaced. In that case, this Court recognized that a trial court does not have a duty "to independently consider all the evidence contained in the court record" before granting a motion for summary disposition. [*Id.* at 375-376](#). In this case, plaintiff did not invite the trial court [*11] to conduct its own review of the record to determine if the evidence supported finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded judgment for defendants. Rather, plaintiff referenced the supportive evidence it submitted in support of its own motion for summary disposition, which was properly before the court at the time it considered and decided defendants' cross-motion for summary disposition. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to relief on this basis. See [*id.* at 377](#) ("[I]f a party refers to and relies on an affidavit, pleading, deposition, admission, or other documentary evidence, and that evidence is 'then filed in the action or submitted by the parties,' the trial court must consider it.").

B. SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

Defendants argue that the trial court erred by finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition in their favor with respect to each of plaintiff's claims. We agree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. [*Lockwood*, 323 Mich App at 400](#). When reviewing a motion under [*MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)*](#), the court must consider all of the admissible evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. [*Liparoto Constr, Inc v Gen Shale Brick, Inc*, 284 Mich App 25, 29; 772 NW2d 801 \(2009\)](#). "However, the party [*12] opposing summary disposition under [*MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)*](#) may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." [*Lockwood*, 323 Mich App at 401](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which

reasonable minds might differ." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). A motion brought under [*MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)*](#) is properly "granted when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." [*Id.* at 400](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Additionally, questions concerning the proper interpretation of a contract are questions of law that we review de novo. [*McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co*, 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 \(2008\)](#).

1. CONVERSION

The civil tort of conversion is defined as "any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another's property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein." [*Lawsuit Fin, LLC v Curry*, 261 Mich App 579, 591; 683 NW2d 233 \(2004\)](#) (citation omitted). Statutory conversion requires an additional showing that the defendant "employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant's interests." [*Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc*, 497 Mich 337, 358-359; 871 NW2d 136 \(2015\)](#); see also [*MCL 600.2919a*](#).

"To support an [*13] action for conversion of money, the defendant must have obtained the money without the owner's consent to the creation of a debtor-creditor relationship and must have had an obligation to return the specific money entrusted to his care." [*Lawsuit Fin, 261 Mich App at 591*](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for conversion because Ditech was entitled to retain the insurance proceeds pursuant to the mortgage contract and plaintiff's bylaws. "In interpreting a contract, it is a court's obligation to determine the intent of the parties by examining the language of the contract according to its plain and ordinary meaning." [*In re Smith Trust*, 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 \(2008\)](#). "If the contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written, because an unambiguous contract reflects the parties' intent as a matter of law." *Id.*

The plain language of the mortgage contract unambiguously imposes on Ditech the requirement to apply the proceeds of the property insurance to restoration or repair of the subject unit, (1) if the restoration or repair is economically feasible, and (2) if Ditech's security is not lessened. The plain language of plaintiff's bylaws provides that the bylaws cannot take [*14] priority over the rights of Ditech, as first mortgagee, pursuant to the mortgage contract. It is not

disputed that the cost of restoration of the subject unit was \$141,000, or that Farm Bureau's insurance payout was \$87,900. That left \$53,100 unpaid on the restoration contract. Together with the \$12,000 paid for demolition, that left a net unpaid balance of \$41,100 unpaid. These figures support Ditech's determination that restoration was not feasible because Ditech would be required to pay approximately one-third of the cost of restoration merely to return the subject unit to its status quo ante as security for the loan. Thus, Ditech's security interest would be lessened.

Plaintiff argues that Ditech originally pursued a plan of restoration but abandoned that course without informing plaintiff of its changed decision, and that this conduct should preclude Ditech from contending that restoration was not feasible. Even if plaintiff's frustration with the events is understandable, the circumstances here do not provide a legal basis for concluding that Ditech had no right to apply the insurance proceeds to Wujciak's unpaid loan balance. The mortgage contract did not require Ditech to give [*15] plaintiff notice or to consult with plaintiff before applying the proceeds to Wujciak's debt. The mortgage contract did not prohibit Ditech from effectively rescinding the \$43,950 check after it failed in its efforts to deliver the check to Wujciak for her endorsement.

Plaintiff also asserts that there is a question of fact regarding the feasibility of restoration because the \$87,900 payment would be supplemented by the insurance payments for debris removal and depreciation, and by plaintiff's \$30,000 contribution. Plaintiff asserts that the \$144,000 sum of the \$87,900 payment, its own \$30,000 expenditure, the \$12,000 insurance payment for demolition and debris removal, and the depreciation check for \$14,100, was sufficient to pay Chappell's \$141,000 total cost. However, the notation in Farm Bureau's record that plaintiff "had to use" \$30,000 from its own savings account because Ditech "has not released any funds" indicates that plaintiff was not contributing part of the cost to supplement the insurance deficiency, but instead acting on the expectation that it would eventually receive payment from Ditech. There is no evidence that plaintiff attempted to negotiate a shared cost arrangement [*16] with Ditech. Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot establish a question of fact whether Ditech should have known that restoration was feasible despite the substantial difference between the insurance proceeds and restoration costs.

Plaintiff also argues that defendants are estopped from

claiming that reconstruction was not feasible because defendants originally agreed to reconstruction by issuing the check for \$43,950 payable to Chappell, Wujciak, and plaintiff. "Estoppel arises where a party, by representations, admissions or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, and the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief, and will be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the facts." [*Wigfall v Detroit*, 322 Mich App 36, 43; 910 NW2d 730 \(2017\)](#). Defendants did not misrepresent facts related to the feasibility of reconstruction. Plaintiff and defendants had access to the same facts concerning Chappell's estimate and Farm Bureau's resolution of the claim. The response to an e-mail in August 2016, from Farm Bureau's claims specialist, Thomas Nault, to plaintiff's board member, Jacqueline Gutierrez, showed that plaintiff expected payment in addition to the \$87,900 and [*17] smaller payments already received, contrary to the adjuster's report issued on July 6, 2015. Defendant, however, was not responsible for plaintiff's misunderstanding.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiff's claims for conversion.

2. BREACH OF CONTRACT

To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: "(1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the breach resulted in damages to the party claiming breach." [*Bank of America, NA v First American Title Ins Co*, 499 Mich 74, 100; 878 NW2d 816 \(2016\)](#). "A valid contract requires five elements: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation." [*Id. at 101*](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendants assert that they were entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff's claim for breach of contract because there was no evidence of a contract between plaintiff and defendants. We agree.

Plaintiff addresses this argument indirectly, by stating that Ditech "breached the contract implied by the mortgage by applying the proceeds of Woodland's insurance to Wujciak's loan." Plaintiff does not identify [*18] any transaction, document, or communication in which plaintiff and Ditech entered into a contract. "It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize

the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position." [Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845, 854 \(1998\)](#) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff was not a party to the mortgage contract between defendants and Wujciak. Plaintiff claims that the mortgage contract language did not give Ditech discretion on whether to apply the insurance proceeds, but plaintiff does not claim status as a third-party beneficiary to the contract. Plaintiff and Ditech were parties to the insurance policy as insureds, but the policy does not govern application of proceeds toward repair cost and debt satisfaction.

For these reasons, the trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.¹

3. ASSUMPSIT

Defendants argue that they were entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff's claim for assumpsit because assumpsit has been [*19] abolished as a form of action. In [Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc, 494 Mich 543, 564; 837 N W2d 244 \(2013\)](#), our Supreme Court recognized that "assumpsit as a form of action was abolished" with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963. The Court further stated, however, that "notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." *Id.* Consequently, plaintiff's use of the term "assumpsit" in labeling its claim does not warrant dismissal if plaintiff otherwise substantively pleaded a valid claim. See also [Adams v Adams \(On Reconsideration\), 276 Mich App 704, 710-711; 742 NW2d 399 \(2007\)](#) ("It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.").

Plaintiff alleged in Count III that (1) it was the owner of the insurance proceeds with the right to immediate possession of the funds for restoration costs; (2) defendants were holding the funds; and (3) defendants were unjustly enriched by exercising dominion over the funds. In substance, this claim was a reiteration of

plaintiff's conversion claim. This is a valid theory of relief, but as already addressed, there is no evidentiary support for plaintiff's claim that defendants were not [*20] entitled to apply the funds to satisfy the mortgage debt. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to this claim.

III. CONCLUSION

All of plaintiff's claims against defendants lacked evidentiary support because the mortgage contract authorized defendants to apply the insurance proceeds toward satisfaction of Wujciak's mortgage debt if restoration and repair of the property was not feasible. There was no genuine issue of material fact that restoration was not feasible because the insurance proceeds were insufficient to pay the restoration cost of \$141,000. The trial court therefore erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition on plaintiff's claims. This matter is remanded for entry of an order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, as to plaintiff's claims. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendants, as the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to [MCR 7.219](#).

/s/ Jonathan Tukul

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

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¹ In light of our decision on this issue, it is unnecessary to address defendants' additional argument that any oral contract would have been unenforceable under the statute of frauds, [MCL 566.132](#).

EXHIBIT - 11

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Neutral

As of: November 18, 2024 12:13 AM Z

Isaac v. Future Holdings, LLC

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 27, 2024, Decided

No. 365303

Reporter

2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 5016 *; 2024 WL 3216378

IYAD ISAAC and ISAAC INVESTMENTS, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v FUTURE HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.

Notice: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.

Subsequent History: Reconsideration denied by [Isaac v. Future Holdings LLC, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 6082 \(Mich. Ct. App., Aug. 7, 2024\)](#)

Prior History: [*1] Genesee Circuit Court. LC No. 2021-116290-CK.

Core Terms

Holdings, plaintiffs', summary disposition, promissory note, second amended complaint, trial court, recoupment, allegations, breach-of-contract, loans, breach of contract, affirmative defense, res judicata, unjust enrichment, equitable, defenses, unclean, deposited, pleadings, repayment, parties, funds

Counsel: For IYAD ISAAC, Plaintiff - Appellant: BRIAN D. HARRISON.

For FUTURE HOLDINGS LLC, Defendant - Appellee: VALDEMAR L. WASHINGTON.

Judges: Before: O'BRIEN, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and FEENEY, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Iyad Isaac ("Iyad") and Isaac Investments, Inc.

("Isaac Investments"), appeal as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendant, Future Holdings, LLC (Future Holdings), under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) (res judicata) and [\(8\)](#) (failure to state a claim for relief) in this action for repayment of a loan. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a series of business dealings between Iyad Isaac, his business, Isaac Investments, his deceased brother, Imad Isaac ("Imad"), and Imad's business, Future Holdings. Plaintiffs allege that Iyad was occasionally asked to provide cash infusions to defendant Future Holdings, which were made through a series of loans made from May 2017 to April 2019. Isaac Investments initially loaned \$75,000 to Future Holdings on May 31, 2017, and loaned another \$15,000 to Future Holdings on August 30, 2017. These alleged [*2] loans were documented by copies of checks drawn from the account of Isaac Investments, made payable to Future Holdings, with the term "loan" written on the memo line. On April 25, 2019, Imad executed a promissory note in which he agreed to pay \$190,000 to Iyad. The promissory note stated that it "supersedes and replaces any previous notes for loans given on 05/17/2017 for \$75,000.00, 08/30/2017 for \$15,000.00, and includes \$100,000.00 received today 04/25/2019." Like the previous checks, the April 25, 2019 check for \$100,000 was issued by Isaac Investments and made payable to Future Holdings. The promissory note provided that it was payable within 180 days of demand.

Plaintiffs allege that they demanded repayment of the promissory note in January 2021, but neither Imad nor Future Holdings timely tendered payment. In October 2021, Iyad brought this action against Imad for breach of contract. In an amended complaint filed in April 2022, Isaac Investments was added as a plaintiff and Future Holdings was added as a defendant. The parties filed

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cross-motions for summary disposition. As relevant to this appeal, Future Holdings argued that it could not be liable for breach of contract because [*3] it was not a party to the April 25, 2019, promissory note, which was signed only by Imad in his individual capacity. Future Holdings had also raised the affirmative defense of recoupment, which was based on an allegation that Iyad failed to obtain investors to fund three housing projects, and instead used Future Holdings' money to fund the projects, resulting in a loss of approximately \$140,000 to Future Holdings. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition of the Future Holdings' asserted recoupment defense under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(9\)](#). The trial court agreed that plaintiffs' first amended complaint failed to state a claim against Future Holdings because it was not a party to the April 25, 2019 promissory note, and therefore, it was not necessary to address the validity of the defense of recoupment. However, the court allowed plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint to given them the opportunity to plead a valid contract claim or some other theory of relief against Future Holdings.

In the meantime, Imad died in July 2022 and he was later dismissed as a defendant. In accordance with the trial court's previous order, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in October 2022, against Future Holdings [*4] only. The complaint asserted claims for breach of contract (Count I), monies had and received (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count III). In lieu of filing an answer, Future Holdings filed a motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) and (8). Future Holdings argued that plaintiffs' claims were based on the alleged indebtedness reflected by the April 25, 2019 promissory note, it was undisputed that it was not a party to that promissory note, and plaintiffs had not alleged the existence of any other documentation to support its liability for that indebtedness, and therefore, it was entitled to summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) because plaintiff failed to state claims on which relief could be granted. Future Holdings further argued that it was entitled to summary disposition of the breach-of-contract claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata because the trial court had already dismissed the contract claim when it granted in part Future Holdings' first motion for summary disposition. The trial court agreed with Future Holdings' arguments and granted its motion pursuant to [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) and (8). Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition [*5] is reviewed de novo. *Soave v Dep't of*

Treasury, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 364415); slip op at 3. Future Holdings moved for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) and (C)(8). Summary disposition may be granted under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) if a claim is barred by res judicata. *Jackson v Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative*, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 361397), slip op at 24, app held in abeyance ___ Mich ___ (2024) (Docket No. 361397). As observed in *Soave*, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3:

When addressing such a motion, a trial court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint unless contradicted by the parties' documentary submissions. *Patterson v Kleiman*, 447 Mich 429, 434 n 6, 526 NW2d 879 (1994). Although not required to do so, a party moving for summary disposition under [Subrule \(C\)\(7\)](#) may support the motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other admissible documentary evidence, which the reviewing court must consider. *Maiden v Rozwood*, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). [Citation omitted.]

A trial court's application of a common-law doctrine is also reviewed de novo. *Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co*, 509 Mich 276, 282; 983 NW2d 401 (2022).

As explained in *El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc*, 504 Mich 152, 159-160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019):

A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) tests the *legal sufficiency* of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint. *Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp*, 475 Mich 663, 672; 719 NW2d 1 (2006). When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone. *Bailey v Schaaf*, 494 Mich 595, 603; 835 NW2d 413 (2013); [MCR 2.116\(G\)\(5\)](#). A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. *Adair v Michigan*, 470 Mich 105, 119; 680 NW2d 386 (2004).

III. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Although we agree that the trial court [*6] erred by ruling that dismissal of plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim was justified under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) on the basis of res judicata, the court did not err by dismissing that

claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#).

Res judicata will preclude a second action on the same claim if (1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the same parties, or their privies, are involved in both actions, and (3) the matter at issue in the second case was resolved, or could have been resolved, in the first case. [Mecosta Co Med Ctr, 509 Mich at 282](#). The underlying purpose of the doctrine is to "prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action." [Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 121; 680 NW2d 386 \(2004\)](#).

Res judicata does not apply to the circumstances here. Initially, this case does not involve a prior action and a subsequent, second action. At issue is whether the trial court previously dismissed any breach-of-contract claim against Future Holdings when it decided Future Holdings' earlier motion for summary disposition in the same proceeding. The record discloses that the trial court did not fully resolve the availability of a breach-of-contract claim against Future Holdings when it decided the first motion for summary disposition. Although the court determined that the first amended complaint did not state a claim [*7] for breach of contract against Future Holdings because the claim was based on the April 25, 2019 promissory note and the documentation attached to the complaint demonstrated that Future Holdings was not a party to that agreement, it gave plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint and provide supplemental materials to demonstrate a legal basis for pursuing a breach-of-contract claim against Future Holdings or allege additional theories of relief. Further, the court's August 8, 2022 written order provided that dismissal of the contract claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) would occur only if plaintiffs failed to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs did file a second amended complaint, which attempted to modify and clarify plaintiffs' theory under which Future Holdings could be liable for breach of contract.

Under these circumstances, where the trial court's prior order did not fully resolve whether plaintiffs could plead or prove a breach-of-contract claim against Future Holdings and the breach-of-contract claim asserted in the second amended complaint was authorized by the trial court's prior order, the trial court erred to the extent that it dismissed plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim in [*8] the second amended complaint on the basis of res judicata.

We agree with Future Holdings, however, that dismissal of plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim was appropriate under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#). To plead a legal claim for

breach of contract, plaintiffs were required to demonstrate the following elements: (1) parties that are competent to enter into the contract, (2) an appropriate subject matter, (3) legal consideration supporting the contract, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation. [AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235; 866 NW2d 782 \(2015\)](#).

Although plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleges facts related to the two 2017 loans and the April 25, 2019 loan provided by Isaac Investments to Future Holdings, and alleges that Future Holdings agreed to repay the loans, it also alleges that the parties reached an amended agreement on April 25, 2019, which resulted in the April 25, 2019 promissory note that plaintiffs attached as Exhibit D to their complaint. Only Imad and Iyad were parties to that agreement, which, by its terms, stated that it "supersedes and replaces any previous notes for loans given on 5/17/2017 for \$75,000, and 8/20/2017 for \$15,000, and includes \$100,000 received today 04/25/2019."¹ The factual basis for plaintiffs' breach-of-contract [*9] claim was Future Holdings' failure to pay the alleged debt as required by the April 25, 2019 promissory note. Plaintiffs alleged in their second amended complaint that "Future's failure to pay on the April '19 loan as required constitutes a breach of contract." It is undisputed that Future Holdings was not a party to the promissory note that is the basis for plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim. Further, to the extent that plaintiffs' alleged that Future Holdings also promised to pay the debt evidenced by Imad's promissory note, such a promise is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, [MCL 566.132\(1\)\(b\)](#), unless it is in writing and signed by the party charged with the promise. Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of any such writing signed by Future Holdings. Additionally, even though an oral promise to pay one's own debt is not within the statute of frauds, [Barbour v Thomas, 7 F Supp 271, 279 \(ED Mich, 1933\)](#), any previous promises Future Holdings had made regarding repayment were superseded by the

¹ Although review of a motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) is limited to the pleadings, [MCR 2.116\(G\)\(5\)](#), the trial court properly could consider the contents of the promissory note when reviewing Future Holdings' motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs attached the promissory note to their amended complaint, and therefore, it is considered part of the pleadings for all purposes. [MCR 2.113\(C\)\(1\)](#) and (2); [Abdelmaguid v Dimensions Ins Group, LLC, Mich App , , NW2d , 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 1044, *13 \(2024\) \(Docket No. 361674\)](#).

promissory note lyad accepted.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract against Future Holdings and dismissing that claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#).

IV. MONIES HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT [*10]

Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their claims for monies had and received and unjust enrichment under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#). We agree.

A. MONIES HAD AND RECEIVED

Michigan recognizes the quasi-contractual claim of monies had and received, which is based on the common-law claim of "assumpsit for money had and received," an equitable action grounded in the equitable principle that if a defendant holds money that is actually the plaintiff's, the plaintiff should be able to recover those funds. In [Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield](#), 336 Mich App 161, 213; 969 NW2d 570 (2021), this Court, quoting [Moore v Mandlebaum](#), 8 Mich 433, 448 (1860), observed:

[A]s a general rule, where money has been received by a defendant under any state of facts which would, in a court of equity, entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the money, when that is the specific relief sought, the same state of facts will entitle him to recover the money in this action.

In [Youmans](#), this Court acknowledged that when the General Court Rules were adopted in 1963, assumpsit as a cause of action was abolished, but the substantive remedies underlying the claim remained available. [Youmans](#), 336 Mich App at 213. This Court stated that "[a]n assumpsit claim is generally regarded as a claim that arises under 'quasi-contractual' principles which represent 'a subset of the law of [*11] unjust enrichment.'" [Id. at 213-214](#), quoting [Wright v. Genesee Cty.](#), 504 Mich 410, 421; 934 NW2d 805 (2019).

The factual allegations in plaintiffs' second amended complaint, accepted as true, indicate that Isaac Holdings loaned Future Holdings \$75,000 and \$15,000 in May 2017 and August 2017, respectively, and another \$100,000 in April 2019, and that Future Holdings received the loan proceeds and deposited the funds into its bank account. Although only Imad signed a promissory note agreeing to repay the combined balance of \$190,000, plaintiffs alleged that Imad did not pay back the money when payment was demanded and

subsequently died in 2022, apparently without any assets. Despite that only Imad promised to repay the money, plaintiffs' allegations indicate that the funds from Isaac Investments were actually transferred to Imad's business, Future Holdings, and deposited into Future Holdings' bank account. These facts, accepted as true, are such that equity may be able to intervene to allow plaintiffs to recover their funds from Future Holdings, the party actually in possession of the \$190,000 loaned by Isaac Investments with the expectation of repayment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for monies had and received under [*12] [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#).

B. UNJUST ENRICHMENT

In [Meisner Law Group v Weston Downs Condo Ass'n](#), 321 Mich App 702, 721; 909 NW2d 890 (2017), this Court set forth the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment as follows: "(1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff, and (2) which benefit it is inequitable that the defendant retain." [Citation and quotation marks omitted.]

Plaintiffs' allegations of unjust enrichment are not "so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." [El-Khalil](#), 504 Mich at 160 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The factual allegations in support of this claim are that Isaac Investments loaned Future Holdings a combined total of \$190,000, which Future Holdings deposited in its bank account. In addition to these allegations, plaintiffs attached as exhibits to their second amended complaint copies of checks from Isaac Investments and payable to Future Holdings, in the amounts of \$15,000, \$75,000, and \$100,000, respectively, all of which are marked "loan" on the memo line, consistent with the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Because these checks were attached to the complaint, they are part of the pleadings. Only Imad signed a promissory note for the consolidated loan amount of \$190,000, and the note indicates that it superseded and replaced [*13] any notes given for previous loans; plaintiffs' allegations, if accepted as true, demonstrate that the funds were actually received by Future Holdings and deposited into its bank account, which supports that Future Holdings received a substantial monetary benefit from Isaac Investments. It is unclear why only Imad signed the promissory note for repayment of the debt, and plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Future Holdings is contractually obligated to repay the loan proceeds because it was not a party to the promissory note. Nevertheless, plaintiffs' allegations that it would be

inequitable to allow Future Holdings to keep \$190,000 received from plaintiffs, which plaintiffs understood would be repaid, are not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly allow recovery. Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#).

C. UNCLEAN HANDS AND RECOUPMENT

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have ruled that Future Holdings' defense of unclean hands is without merit. Also, Future Holdings argues that if this Court reverses the trial court's dismissal of any of plaintiffs' claims, it should consider the [*14] validity of Future Holding's equitable affirmative defense of recoupment. These arguments are related. In its brief in support of its motion for summary disposition, Future Holdings asserted that "Iyad's hands are unclean herein, as he owes Future \$140,000 for his ill-advised efforts to build three new houses as a newly licensed contractor builder." Future Holdings' request for recoupment is based on these same allegations. Specifically, in its motion for summary disposition, Future Holdings asserted:

Without formally pleading the Affirmative Defense of Recoupment at this point, since the instant motion is being filed in lieu of an answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Defendant, Future Holdings, L.L.C. hereby places Plaintiff, Iyad Isaac, on notice that should this Court deny the instant Motion for Summary Disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#) Recoupment will be sought by Future Holdings, L.L.C. from Iyad Isaac in the amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars (\$140,000.00).

"The unclean-hands doctrine is 'a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequiteness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may [*15] have been the behavior of the [opposing party].'" [New Prods Corp v Harbor Shores BHB Land Dev, LLC, 331 Mich App 614, 627; 953 NW2d 476 \(2019\)](#) (citation and emphasis omitted). "Any willful act that transgresses equitable standards of conduct is sufficient to allow a court to deny a party equitable relief." *Id.*

This Court has described recoupment as a crossclaim or counterclaim for damages, but it is also an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in a proper manner. [McCoig Materials, LLC v Galui Constr., Inc., 295 Mich.](#)

[App. 684, 694; 818 N.W.2d 410 \(2012\)](#). Recoupment is grounded in equitable principles, and is based on the rationale that the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, based on equitable reasons and good conscience, should be reduced. *Id.* at 695. In its motion for summary disposition, Future Holdings explained, without any factual development, that to the extent that it is found liable for the unpaid loan amounts, it is entitled to reduce its liability by the amount of its loss from Iyad's prior failed building project. We decline to consider the merits of these defenses because they are not properly before this Court.

Future Holdings asserted the affirmative defense of recoupment in response to plaintiffs' first amended complaint and plaintiffs moved to dismiss that defense under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(9\)](#). The trial court found that the validity of the defense was moot because the [*16] only claim against Future Holdings was for breach of contract and Future Holdings was not established as a party to a contract with plaintiffs. However, the trial court also permitted plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. After plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, Future Holdings filed its motion for summary disposition in lieu of filing an answer or affirmative defenses. Thus, when the trial court decided Future Holdings' second motion for summary disposition, Future Holdings had not yet filed an answer or any affirmative defense to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Although Future Holdings addressed the defense of recoupment in its motion for summary disposition, it did so only in the context of expressing its intent to affirmatively assert the defense in answer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint should the trial court deny its motion for summary disposition.

Furthermore, in addition to requesting summary disposition of plaintiffs' contract claim under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) on the basis of res judicata, Future Holdings only sought summary disposition of plaintiffs' remaining claims under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#), where the court's review is limited to the pleadings alone. Although Future Holdings [*17] discussed the potential applicability of the unclean hands doctrine and the defense of recoupment in its motion for summary disposition, the factual bases for those defenses is not apparent from the pleadings. Indeed, as mentioned, Future Holdings had not yet filed an answer or affirmative defenses to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Clearly, whether Future Holdings can properly rely on the defenses of unclean hands and recoupment is dependent upon allegations and evidence that are not a matter of record. Therefore, it would be inappropriate and premature for

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this Court to address the potential availability of these defenses in this appeal.

Accordingly, we decline to consider the defenses of unclean hands and recoupment, without prejudice to Future Holdings properly asserting the defenses in answer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint and the parties' opportunity to raise and address the validity of any asserted defense in an appropriate motion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs.

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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EXHIBIT - 12

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Corey v. Wayne Cty.

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 15, 2016, Decided

No. 325465

Reporter

2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 513 *

JAMES ROBERT COREY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v WAYNE COUNTY and CATHY M. GARRETT, Defendants-Appellees.

Notice: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.

Prior History: [*1] Wayne Circuit Court. LC No. 14-010111-NZ.

Corey v. Wayne Cnty., 497 Mich. 1028, 863 N.W.2d 323, 2015 Mich. LEXIS 1286 (May 28, 2015)

Core Terms

refund, summary disposition, collected, immunity, unjust enrichment, circuit court, trial court, defendants', conversion, tort liability, due process, executive authority, plaintiff's claim, collect fees, filing fee, custody, collection of fees, executive official, memorandums, mandates, clerk of the court, county clerk, absolute immunity, final judgment, recommendations, procedures

Judges: Before: SAAD, P.J., and SAWYER and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition and dismissing his complaint. Because the trial court properly granted defendants' motion for summary disposition, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2012, plaintiff's then-wife filed for divorce in Wayne Circuit Court and paid \$230 in filing fees. In June 2012, plaintiff filed a motion regarding custody of his minor child in the divorce action, at which time plaintiff paid an \$80 "Friend of the Court" fee, collected by the clerk of the court pursuant to the former [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#), which provided:

(1) In the circuit court, the following fees shall be paid to the clerk of the court:

(d) Before entry of a final judgment or order in an action in which the custody, support, or parenting time of minor children is determined or modified, the party submitting the judgment or order shall pay 1 of the following fees:

(i) In an action in which the custody or parenting time of minor children is determined, \$80.00.¹

In August [*2] of 2014, plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging claims of common law conversion, fraud, statutory conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of due process. This lawsuit pertains to the collection of the \$80 fee by the clerk of the court, Cathy Garrett and, in particular, the assertion that Garrett illegally collected this fee contrary to [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) and the directives of the Supreme Court Administrative Office (SCAO). Simply stated, plaintiff contends that Garrett could not collect a fee when he filed his motion because his wife paid any filing fees when she initiated the divorce action and the assessment of a duplicative fee was not appropriate given that the relief plaintiff sought in his motion for custody was temporary and would not have resulted in a final disposition. Plaintiff claims that, after collecting the unauthorized \$80 fee, Garrett did not refund the fee to him, but transferred the funds to the Wayne County

¹ [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)](#) was amended by Pub Acts 2014, No. 532, effective April 14, 2015.

Treasurer, [MCL 600.2529\(4\)](#), and then appropriated the funds pursuant to [MCL 600.2530\(2\)](#). Plaintiff brought this action "on behalf of himself and all other individuals who have been illegally charged the \$80 fee contrary to [MCL 600.2529\(1\)](#), and who have not received a refund [*3] of that particular fee."

To support his claims, plaintiff relied on two memorandums issued by the SCAO, in 2009 and again in 2012, advising circuit courts that the fee prescribed by [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) applies only to orders and judgments finally disposing of a specific action or motion in the case and do not apply to interim or temporary orders, which are not final dispositions of an action or motion, or to any orders entered while a final determination is pending. In these memorandums, the SCAO recommended the circuit courts establish policies and procedures governing the collection and management of the fees prescribed by [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)](#), including, among other things, establishing procedures (1) to assure that the judgment fee is only collected once per final judgment or order and (2) for refunding the fees in cases in which a final judgment or order is not entered.

After plaintiff filed his complaint, defendants brought a motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) and [\(C\)\(8\)](#). Defendants argued that they are immune from tort liability under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, (GTLA) [MCL 691.1401 et seq.](#), and that plaintiff's non-tort claims could not be maintained. After conducting a hearing, the court granted defendants' motion for summary [*4] disposition with respect to all of plaintiff's claims and dismissed the complaint against defendants. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition. [Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 61; 783 NW2d 124 \(2010\)](#). "Questions of law, such as construction of a statute, are also reviewed de novo." *Id.* "When a claim is barred by governmental immunity, summary disposition is appropriate under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#)." [Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 201; 833 NW2d 247 \(2013\)](#). Under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#), the moving party may support its motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. *Id.* "In reviewing a motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#), we accept the factual contents of the complaint as true unless contradicted by the movant's documentation." *Id.* When the material facts are not in dispute, courts may decide whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by immunity as a matter of law.

Id.

Defendant also moved for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(8\)](#). However, with respect to this motion, the parties both relied on evidence beyond the pleadings in support of their positions in the trial court. See [MCR 2.116\(G\)\(5\)](#). Because the trial court considered materials outside of the pleadings, the motion is properly considered under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#). [Hughes v Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 277 Mich App 268, 273; 744 NW2d 10 \(2007\)](#). A motion under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#) tests the factual sufficiency [*5] of a complaint and is properly granted when no material question of fact remains. [Beckett-Buffum Agency, Inc v Allied Prop & Cas Ins Co, 311 Mich App 41; 873 NW2d 117 \(2015\)](#). In analyzing a motion brought under [\(C\)\(10\)](#), a reviewing court must consider the affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. [Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 \(2004\)](#). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." [West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 \(2003\)](#).

III. TORT CLAIMS AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Plaintiff's complaint includes three tort claims subject to the GTLA: common law conversion, statutory conversion,² and fraud. The trial court concluded that Garrett and Wayne County were entitled to immunity from tort liability under the GTLA. Plaintiff now contests this determination on appeal with respect to Garrett, asserting that Garrett could not claim absolute immunity under [MCL 691.1407\(5\)](#) because her collection and retention of the fee in question fell outside of her authority as the highest ranking executive official of a level of government.³ We disagree.

² Although the trial court did not dismiss plaintiff's statutory conversion claim on governmental immunity grounds, [*6] statutory conversion is a tort, [Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distribution Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 361; 871 NW2d 136 \(2015\)](#), and the GTLA provides immunity from all tort liability, [Nawrocki, 463 Mich at 158](#).

³ Plaintiff confines his appellate arguments to Garrett's entitlement to immunity and he does not challenge the trial court's determination that the GTLA provided Wayne County with immunity from tort liability. Because plaintiff fails to brief this issue on appeal, we consider it abandoned. See [Houghton](#)

Under the GTLA, "[a] judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority." [MCL 691.1407\(5\)](#). This provision provides the identified high-ranking officials with "absolute [*7] immunity from tort liability." [Petipren, 494 Mich at 204](#). The purpose of this broad grant of immunity is to ensure that "these officials and, therefore, their governmental agencies, will not be intimidated nor timid in the discharge of their public duties." [Grahovac v Munising Twp, 263 Mich App 589, 595; 689 NW2d 498 \(2004\)](#) (quotation omitted). To qualify for this absolute immunity, the individual governmental employee must (1) be a judge, legislator, or the elective or highest appointive executive official of a level of government and (2) he or she must have acted within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority. [Petipren, 494 Mich at 204](#).

In this case, Garrett is the Wayne County Clerk, an elected executive official of the County. See [Const. 1963, art 7, § 4](#). In this role of high-ranking executive official in county government, "county clerks are absolutely immune if they are acting within their executive authority." [Gracey v Wayne Co Clerk, 213 Mich App 412, 416-417; 540 NW2d 710 \(1995\)](#), abrogated on other grounds by [Am Transmissions, Inc v Attorney Gen, 454 Mich. 135; 560 N.W.2d 50 \(1997\)](#). Therefore, pursuant to [MCL 691.1407\(5\)](#), Garrett is entitled to absolute immunity from tort liability so long as she was acting within the scope of her "executive authority."

As used in [MCL 691.1407\(5\)](#), the phrase "executive authority" refers to "all authority vested in the highest executive official by virtue of his or her role in the executive branch." [Petipren, 494 Mich at 193-194, 208](#) (emphasis is original). [*8] This includes the performance of acts that might otherwise be performed by a lower-level employee if those actions fall within the

authority vested in the official by virtue of his or her role as an executive official. [Id. at 194](#). "The determination whether particular acts are within their [executive] authority depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the specific acts alleged, the position held by the official alleged to have performed the acts, the charter, ordinances, or other local law defining the official's authority, and the structure and allocation of powers in the particular level of government." [Id. at 206](#), quoting [American Transmissions, Inc, 454 Mich at 141](#). Acts expressly or impliedly authorized by constitution, statute, or other law are part of the actor's "executive authority." See [Petipren, 494 Mich at 213](#); [Marrocco v Randlett, 431 Mich 700, 708; 433 N.W.2d 68 nn 7 & 8; 431 Mich. 700, 433 N.W.2d 68 \(1988\)](#).

In Garrett's case, she undoubtedly had the statutory authority, as a result of her election as Wayne County Clerk, to collect case filing fees, including fees related to cases involving custody or parenting time. See former [MCL 600.2529](#). In particular, by virtue of her position as Wayne County Clerk, Garrett became vested with the authority to act as clerk of the circuit court. See [Const. 1963, art 6, § 14](#); [MCL 600.571\(a\)](#). Thus, as directed by the judiciary, Garrett must perform [*9] noncustodial ministerial duties related to court administration. See [Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich 146, 149-150, 161-164, 170-171; 665 NW2d 452 \(2003\)](#). It follows that Garrett's authority included the authority to collect case filing fees, including fees related to cases involving custody or parenting time. See former [MCL 600.2529](#). Indeed, [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) explicitly directs the clerk of the court to collect the \$80 filing fee before entry of a final judgment in an action in which the custody or parenting time of minor children is determined or modified. Thus, as prescribed by [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#), Garrett had the authority to collect such fees.

Plaintiff does not dispute Garrett's authority under [MCL 600.2529](#) to collect fees as a general proposition. Rather, plaintiff contends that the manner in which Garrett carried out this function was improper and illegal in light of the SCAO memorandums advising circuit courts on the proper collection and return of fees. In other words, because of Garrett's purported violation of these memoranda, plaintiff argues that Garrett acted outside the scope of her "executive authority" when she collected duplicative filing fees from plaintiff and failed to refund these amounts. This argument is without merit. It is true that the judiciary possesses the authority to prescribe the clerk [*10] of the court's ministerial duties. See [Lapeer Co Clerk, 469 Mich at 161-164, 171](#); [MCL](#)

[v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339-340; 662 NW2d 854 \(2003\)](#). In any event, the collection and retention of fees incident to court filings plainly constitutes a governmental function, and Wayne County is immune from all tort liability when engaged in a governmental function. See [MCL 691.1407\(1\)](#); [MCL 691.1401\(a\)](#), [\(b\)](#), and [\(e\)](#). None of the statutory exceptions to this broad grant of immunity apply, and the trial court thus properly granted summary disposition to Wayne County on the basis of governmental immunity. See [MCL 691.1407\(1\)](#); [Nawrocki, 463 Mich at 158](#).

[600.571\(f\)](#); [MCR 8.110\(C\)\(1\)](#) and [\(3\)](#). But, in this case, neither the Supreme Court, nor the Chief Judge of Wayne Circuit Court, mandated or ordered Garrett, in her capacity as the clerk of the court, to collect the fees in accordance with the SCAO's interpretation of [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)](#) or in the manner set forth in the SCAO memorandums. Although the SCAO provided guidance and recommendations regarding the collection of the fees under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)](#), an advisory memorandum does not constitute a Supreme Court order.⁴ Consequently, unlike the statutory provisions empowering Garrett to collect filing fees, the SCAO recommendations and memorandums do not constitute binding authority. See [Chelsea Inv Group LLC v Chelsea](#), 288 Mich. App. 239, 260; 792 N.W.2d 781 (2010). The statute does not prohibit the collection of the judgment fee at the time an action or motion is filed; nor does the statute provide a specific refund mechanism. Absent such a directive from the judiciary, Garrett's collection of fees fell within the scope of her authority as set forth in [MCL 600.2529](#) and it was within her discretion how to discharge these duties. She is therefore entitled to the immunity provided by [MCL 691.1407\(5\)](#), and this immunity applies to all of plaintiff's tort claims, including conversion, statutory conversion, and fraud. [*11] Thus, summary disposition was properly granted under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(7\)](#) with respect to plaintiff's tort claims.

IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on his claim for unjust enrichment. According to plaintiff, his pleadings set forth a claim of unjust enrichment and, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a question of fact remains regarding this issue. We disagree.

Whether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained presents a question of law subject to de novo review. [Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc](#), 273 Mich App 187, 193; 729 NW2d 898 (2006). "Unjust

enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of 'money or benefits which in justice and equity belongs to another.'" [Tkachik v Mandeville](#), 487 Mich 38, 47-48; 790 NW2d 260 (2010) (quotation omitted). A claim alleging unjust enrichment [*12] requires a plaintiff to establish: "(1) the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant." [Morris Pumps](#), 273 Mich App at 195. "[T]he law will imply a contract to prevent unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the plaintiff's expense." *Id.*

Plaintiff's claim alleging unjust enrichment arises from Wayne County Clerk Garrett's collection of the \$80 fee under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#), which he alleges defendants improperly retained and converted for the County's use and benefit. However, under the statutory scheme, [MCL 600.2529\(4\)](#) mandates that each fee collected under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) "shall be paid to the county treasurer and deposited by the county treasurer as provided under [section 2530](#) to be used to fund services." [MCL 600.2530\(1\)](#), in turn, mandates that the county treasurer "shall deposit *all* fees collected under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)](#)" in an interest-bearing account known as the "Friend of the Court fund." [MCL 600.2530\(2\)](#) mandates that the county board of commissioners must appropriate *all* sums in the Friend of the Court fund for the purposes of fulfilling the statutory obligations of the Friend of the Court as provided in the Friend of the Court Act, [MCL 552.501 et seq.](#) In short, [*13] under the statutory scheme, defendants Wayne County and/or Garrett could not retain any of the fees collected under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) for their own benefit; rather, the fees collected must be used to fund the Friend of the Court, an arm of the circuit court. [MCL 600.2529\(4\)](#); [MCL 600.2530\(1\)](#) & [\(2\)](#). See also [MCL 552.503](#); [Morrison v Richerson](#), 198 Mich App 202, 212; 497 NW2d 506 (1992). Without evidence that defendants failed to treat funds in this manner, this mandatory statutory scheme establishes that defendants did not receive a benefit from the fees collected or retained, and it follows that defendants could not have been unjustly enriched by collecting the fees pursuant to [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#).

In response to defendants' motion for summary disposition, plaintiff did not set forth any specific facts or present any evidence to dispute that Garrett acted according to the statutory mandates or otherwise to establish that she benefited from the fees collected. To the contrary, the only evidence on this point is the sworn affidavit of the supervisor of accounting of the Wayne

⁴The role of the SCAO is to "supervise and examine the administrative methods and systems employed in the offices of the courts, including the offices of the clerks and other officers, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for the improvement of the administration of the courts." [MCR 8.103\(1\)](#). Thus, the SCAO memorandums, which were advisory in nature, did not have the effect of an order of the Supreme Court that the chief judge and the clerk of the court must comply with. See [MCR 8.110\(C\)\(3\)](#); [Lapeer Co Clerk](#), 469 Mich at 162-164.

County Clerk's office, who processes the filing fees collected under [MCL 600.2529\(1\)](#). The supervisor indicated that the fees collected are transmitted to the circuit court in accordance with the statutory mandates of [MCL 600.2529\(4\)](#) and [MCL 600.2530](#) and are not retained by the County Clerk. [*14] Rather than present documentary evidence to the contrary, plaintiff's argument in response to this evidence rests on the unsupported allegation that the benefit to defendants is "obvious." However, in response to a motion for summary disposition, plaintiff's mere allegations of this nature are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary disposition. See [Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 \(1996\)](#). Given the statutory scheme and the complete dearth of evidence supporting plaintiff's position, plaintiff has not shown the existence of a material question of fact with respect to defendants' receipt of a benefit from these funds.⁵ Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no factual dispute and defendants are entitled to summary disposition under [MCR 2.116\(C\)\(10\)](#).

V. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS

Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by

⁵On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court's summary dismissal of his claim, without allowing plaintiff additional discovery to remedy the prejudice caused by the late filing of defendants' affidavits, constitutes reversible error. Plaintiff failed to properly present this issue for our review because he did not separately identify it as a question presented, meaning that the issue need not be considered. See [MCR 7.212\(C\)\(5\); Michigan's Adventure, Inc v Dalton Twp, 290 Mich App 328, 337 n 3; 802 NW2d 353 \(2010\)](#). Additionally, plaintiff does not cite [*15] any law to support his position, and this failure to properly brief the claim of error constitutes abandonment of the issue. [Houghton, 256 Mich App at 339-340](#). In any event, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's consideration of the late-filed affidavits given that the affidavits assisted in the determination of the motion and were not unfairly prejudicial to plaintiff, particularly in light of the statutes mandating the transmittal of the collected fees. See [Prussing v Gen Motors Corp, 403 Mich 366, 370; 269 NW2d 181 \(1978\)](#). Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's argument, he could not have been unduly surprised by the affidavits because defendants submitted a similar affidavit from the former supervisor of accounting in other recent litigation between the parties. Ultimately, while plaintiff claims additional discovery was warranted, we see no basis for concluding that further discovery would have benefited plaintiff's position. See [Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 566; 618 NW2d 23 \(2000\)](#). The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition without allowing further discovery.

granting summary disposition to defendants with respect to plaintiff's claims of due process violations. Specifically, plaintiff claims that [MCL 600.2529](#) creates a substantive due process [*16] right to the return of fees and that defendants failed to establish a meaningful mechanism for refund of the fees in question thereby violating plaintiff's procedural due process rights. We disagree.

With regard to plaintiff's substantive due process argument, "[t]he underlying purpose of substantive due process is to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power." [Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App 677, 700; 770 NW2d 421 \(2009\)](#) (citation omitted). "In the context of individual government actions or actors . . . to establish a substantive due process violation, the governmental conduct must be so arbitrary and capricious as to shock the conscience." [Id. at 701](#) (quotation and citation omitted). "The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised [governmental] decisions." [Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 206; 761 NW2d 293 \(2008\)](#) (citation omitted). Rather, under this standard, "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense." [Id. at 197](#).

In the present case, even if incorrect or ill-advised, Garrett's collection of the fees and defendants' failure to devise a specific process for refunds does not rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious conduct as to shock the conscience. [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) authorizes the collection of fees in custody matters, meaning that [*17] there was some basis for Garrett's collection of the fees in question. Although the SCAO recommended the imposition of procedures for refunding the fee under certain circumstances, [MCL 600.2529\(1\)\(d\)\(i\)](#) provides no specific refund procedures or mechanisms. Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that defendants provided a refund of the fees in question to any litigant who requested such a refund.⁶ Even if imperfect, the collection of fees and the payment of refunds upon request does not rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious conduct giving rise to a substantive due process claim.

With regard to plaintiff's claim of procedural due process, "[t]he United States and Michigan Constitutions

⁶Defendants' undisputed evidence indicated that refunds of the \$80 judgment fee have been issued when requested and there has been no litigant who has sought a refund of their final judgment fee that has been denied.

preclude the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." [Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc v Dep't of Community Health, 261 Mich App 604, 605-606; 683 NW2d 759 \(2004\)](#), citing *US Const, Amend XIV*; [Const 1963, art 1, § 17](#). "Procedural due process serves as a limitation on governmental action and requires a government to institute safeguards in proceedings that might result in a deprivation of life, liberty, [*18] or property." [Mettler Walloon, LLC, 281 Mich App at 213](#). "A procedural due process analysis requires a dual inquiry: (1) whether a liberty or property interest exists which the state has interfered with, and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." [Hinky Dinky, 261 Mich App at 606](#) (citation omitted). Generally, due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker. *Id.* In certain circumstances, a meaningful postdeprivation remedy may satisfy due process. See, e.g., [DaimlerChrysler Corp v Mich Dep't of Treasury, 268 Mich App 528, 540; 708 NW2d 461 \(2005\)](#); [Am States Ins Co v State Dep't of Treasury, 220 Mich App 586, 590; 560 NW2d 644 \(1996\)](#).

The actual owner of money has a property interest protected by due process. See [Dow v State, 396 Mich 192, 204; 240 NW2d 450 \(1976\)](#). Thus, in this case, plaintiff has an interest in his \$80. In particular, given the plain language of [MCL 600.2529](#) and the SCAO memoranda, plaintiff arguably had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the return of this \$80. Nevertheless, we conclude that plaintiff cannot maintain his claim that defendants' conduct denied him the right to procedural due process. Defendants' failure to establish a mechanism for an automatic refund did not interfere with, or deprive plaintiff of, his right to a refund of the fees or a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue because plaintiff could have sought a refund of the allegedly [*19] erroneously charged fee. Because there was an adequate remedy available, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's due process claim.⁷

⁷ Our opinion today addresses the claims raised by plaintiff in his complaint in the trial court, i.e., conversion, fraud, statutory conversion, unjust enrichment, and due process. However, we note that a claim to recover fees paid to the state in excess of the amount allowed under applicable law is properly filed as an action in assumpsit for money had and received. [Yellow Freight Sys Inc v State of Mich, 231 Mich App 194, 203; 585 NW2d 762 \(1998\)](#), rev'd on other grounds [Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v State, 464 Mich 21; 627 NW2d 236 \(2001\)](#), rev'd [537 U.S. 36; 123 S. Ct. 371; 154 L. Ed. 2d 377 \(2002\)](#). See also [Serv Coal Co v Mich Unemployment Comp Comm, 333 Mich](#)

Affirmed. [*20]

/s/ Henry William Saad

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra

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[526, 531; 53 N.W.2d 362 \(1952\)](#). Thus, when there has been an illegal or excessive collection of fees, it may be possible to maintain a class "action of assumpsit to recover back the amount of the illegal exaction." [Bond v Pub Sch of Ann Arbor Sch Dist, 383 Mich 693, 704; 178 NW2d 484 \(1970\)](#). But, plaintiff did not frame his complaint in this way, and "as a court of review that is principally charged with the duty of correcting errors," we think it inappropriate to rewrite plaintiff's complaint or address unpreserved claims. See [Burns v Detroit \(On Remand\), 253 Mich App 608, 615; 660 NW2d 85 \(2002\)](#). Consequently, we confine our review to the claims pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, and we offer no opinion on the legality of the fees collected or whether plaintiff should receive a refund of those amounts under [MCL 600.2529](#).

EXHIBIT - 13

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

HURON VALLEY OUTFITTERS, LLC,
A Michigan limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No: 20-179677-CK
Hon. Leo Bowman

v.

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF LYON,
A Municipal corporation,
Defendant.

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GREGORY D. HANELY (P51204)
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Proof of Service

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the within instrument was served upon the attorneys of record or the parties not represented by counsel in the above case at their respective addresses disclosed on the pleadings on the 3 day of June 2020, by:

- ☐ US Mail
☐ Hand Delivered
☒ Electronic Filing System

/s/ V. King

V King

OPINION AND ORDER

At a session of said Court held in the Courthouse in Pontiac,
Oakland County, Michigan on 6/3/2020

PRESENT: LEO BOWMAN, Circuit Judge

I. Introduction

This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for partial summary disposition as to

Counts II and III filed on April 14, 2020.¹ Plaintiff alleges that it entered into an agreement with defendant to purchase property identified as sidwell number 21-03-352-006 located in Lyon Township and consisting of 17,988 acres (Property). Plaintiff further alleges that it conveyed an easement over the Property to defendant so that it could construct “Ring Road” designed to connect Grand River Avenue with Milford Road. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant advised it that it no longer intended to construct Ring Road. Plaintiff additionally alleges that defendant breached the parties’ agreement and overcharged the capital charges and sewage disposal rates based on its residential equivalency units (REUs) so it filed this lawsuit seeking money damages. Defendant brings its motion for partial summary disposition as to Counts II and Count III pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). For the reasons stated more fully below, defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition as to Counts II and III is DENIED.

II. Background

Defendant acknowledges that it provides sewage disposal and treatment services to its residential and commercial property owners pursuant to its ordinance. (Defendant’s *Exhibits 1 - Lyon Ordinance 46-286 and 2 – Lyon Ordinance 46-338*).² Defendant alleges that its REU (residential equivalency units) charges are based in significant part on its sewage disposal and treatment facility agreement (Facility Agreement) with Lyon Wastewater (Wastewater). (Defendant’s *Exhibit 3 – Second Amended Sewage Disposal Facility Agreement*). Defendant further alleges that the its agreement with Wastewater goes back to 1997 when it contracted with Wastewater to construct a sanitary sewer treatment facility at Wastewater’s cost on land owned by

¹ This Court acknowledges that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition as to Count I filed on April 14, 2020, which will be addressed in a separate opinion and order.

² Lyon Ordinance 46-286 statutes that users pay “[c]apital charges for connection to the township’s sewer” and that these charges “shall be based on user connection unites as identified in section 46-338. . .” and Lyon Ordinance 46-338 provides for the number of “[u]sers connection units, also referred to in this chapter as residential equivalency units

Wastewater to service defendant's residents and businesses. Defendant also alleges that Wastewater owned the Treatment Facility and the land and it paid Wastewater fees for the Treatment Facility's use. Defendant next alleges the parties entered into the Facility Agreement in 2006, which transferred the Treatment Facility from Wastewater and the land to defendant and allowed Wastewater retained ownership of the Treatment Facility's sewage treatment capacity. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 3 and 4). Defendant additionally alleges that the Facility Agreement (1) provides that Wastewater sells sewage treatment capacity to defendant in exchange for compensation; (2) measures sewage capacity by REUs; (3) requires defendant to pay a base rate to Wastewater per REU (as REUs are acquired by third parties for connection); and (4) adjusts REU base rate annually in accordance with indexes agreed to by the parties (Eleven Bond Index for many years changed to a Consumer Price Index). (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5 and 6 and Defendant's **Exhibit 4** – Third Amendment to Second Amended Sewage Disposal Facility Agreement at ¶ 4). Further, defendant alleges that a majority of its REU charges to its users is a pass-through of its primary costs to provide the REUs to each user (e.g., the amounts owed to Wastewater) pursuant to the Facility Agreement.

Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant has a sewer system that provides sewage disposal services to its inhabitants. Plaintiff further acknowledges that defendant imposes a Capital Charge pursuant to Ordinance 46-286 (intended to reimburse defendant for its share of the capital costs associated with the Sewer System) and that the charge is based in part on the number of REUs assigned by defendant to plaintiff. Plaintiff further acknowledges that defendant separately charges plaintiff for the costs allegedly associated with the disposal and treatment of sewage generated by plaintiff pursuant to Ordinance 46-287. Plaintiff alleges that defendant overcharged it for sewer-related expenses as follows: (1) defendant allocated an excessive number of REUs to plaintiff based

(REUs)" per user based on a chart setting forth various property "usages" and "unit Factors" that relate to the sewer

on a nonsensical methodology; (2) defendant's capital charge per REU is grossly excessive and wholly disproportionate to the actual costs defendant intends to recoup through the charge; and (3) defendant's sewer rates have been excessive and unreasonable.

Defendant acknowledges that plaintiff purchased the Property (a vacant parcel) from defendant legally described in the Purchase Agreement. (Defendant's *Exhibit 7* – Purchase Agreement). Defendant alleges that plaintiff constructed improvements at the Property including a multi-unit, commercial building that houses an indoor shooting range. Defendant also alleges that plaintiff later added a full restaurant and a barber shop. Defendant next alleges that plaintiff increased its necessary capacity and added connections to defendant's sewage disposal and treatment system such that it incurred "capital charges" for additional REUs under Lyon Ordinances. Defendant asserts that the REU Application Forms accurately reflect the number of REUs that plaintiff was required to pay under the Lyon Ordinances and the Facility Agreement and the amount payable to Wastewater pursuant to the Facility Agreement. (Defendant's *Exhibits 8* – Request to Connect to Sanitary Sewer Systems dated 9/29/2016 (reflecting 4 total REUs), *9* – Request to Connect to Sanitary Sewer Systems undated (probably 7/17/2017 (reflecting 1.8 total REUs), *10* – Request to Connect to Sanitary Sewer Systems dated 7/16/2019 (reflecting 4.9 total REUs), and *11* – Leslie Zawada's affidavit (averring that she reviewed the requests and verified their accuracy and estimated charges)). Defendant alleges that plaintiff was required to pay \$89,277.08 of the total \$127,972.82 in REU charges based on 10.7 REUs paid by it to Wastewater as a pass-through under the Facility Agreement. (Defendant's *Exhs. 8, 9, and 10*).

Plaintiff acknowledges that it owns the Property and that it receives sewage disposal services from defendant through its sewer facilities. Plaintiff notes that Counts II and III of its complaint

treatment capacity. (Defendant's *Exhibits 1* - Lyon Ordinance 46-286 and 46-338).

challenges the reasonableness of the “capital charges” and the sewage disposal rates imposed by defendant.

On February 14, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging (1) breach of contract (Count I); (2) unjust enrichment – unreasonable water and sewer rates (Count II); and (3) assumpsit – money had and received unreasonable water and sewer rates (Count III). On April 13, 2020, defendant filed an answer, which denies the allegations of liability as untrue and states affirmative defenses. On April 14, 2020, defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition as to Counts II and III pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). On April 16, 2020, this Court entered a Brief Scheduling Order pursuant to MCR 2.116(G),³ which stated that “[t]he responding party’s responsive brief shall be filed and received by the Court and opposing counsel on or before **May 20, 2020** by 4:30 p.m.” Plaintiff filed a timely response. The Brief Scheduling Order also provided that the moving party *may* file a reply brief pursuant to MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(iii) and it must be filed on or before **May 27, 2020** by 4:30 p.m. Defendant elected to file a reply brief.

III. Standard of Review

MCR 2.116(C)(8) states that the court will grant summary disposition when the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Maiden v Rozwood*, 461 Mich 109, 119 (1999). Unless a claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery, the court should deny the motion. *Adell v Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, and Schwartz, PC*,

³ A trial court may order the parties to meet scheduling deadlines when the court “concludes that such an order would facilitate the progress of the case[.]” MCR 2.401(B)(2)(a). Also, MCR 2.401(B)(2) provides trial courts with the discretion to decline to consider motions a party files after the ordered deadline. *Velez v Tuma*, 283 Mich App 396, 409 (2009), *rev’d in part* on other grounds 492 Mich 1 (2012). This court rule “promotes the efficient management of the trial court’s docket[.]” *Kemerko Clawson LLC v RXIV Inc*, 269 Mich App 347, 350 (2005).

170 Mich App 196, 203 (1988).

Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court will grant a motion for summary disposition if there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10). The courts generally recognize that summary disposition is premature under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if discovery is not complete “**unless** there is **no fair likelihood that further discovery** will **yield support** for the nonmoving party’s position.” *Townsend v Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp*, 254 Mich App 133, 140 (2002) (emphasis added). In determining a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court must consider “the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Richie-Gamester v City of Berkley*, 461 Mich 73, 76 (1999). Additionally, a party opposing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) has the burden of showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. The party opposing such a motion must produce documentary evidence to set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. *Patterson v Kleiman*, 447 Mich 429, 432 (1994).

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging (1) breach of contract (Count I); (2) unjust enrichment – unreasonable water and sewer rates (Count II); and (3) assumpsit – money had and received unreasonable water and sewer rates (Count III). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s assumpsit claim because it was abolished under Michigan law pursuant to *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564 (2013) and it is entitled to summary disposition on the unjust enrichment claim because (1) the “capital charges” were a pass-through of direct cost such that it was not benefited and (2) there is an express contract between the parties that covers the charges at issue. In response, plaintiff disagrees. Defendant

elected to file a reply brief.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff argues that defendant's motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is premature because the parties have not engaged in the discovery. Plaintiff addressed this argument as it relates to whether the parties entered into an express contract with respect to the REDUs. To support its argument, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to *CMI Int'l v Intermet Int'l Corp*, 251 Mich App 125, 134-35 (2002). Then, plaintiff argues that it is entitled to take discovery and that it anticipates that it will demonstrate that the parties did not intend to form a contract based on the Request to Connect and that it did not voluntarily assent to any contract when it paid defendant for the REUs. Having considered the documentary evidence attached as well as the parties' argument, this Court does not find that it is premature for this Court to decide defendant's motion for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10).

In *Fisher Sand*, *supra* at 564, Michigan Supreme Court recognized that "assumpsit as a form of action was abolished" with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963. The *Fisher* Court further stated that "notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." *Id.* As such, a plaintiff's use of the term "assumpsit" in labeling its claim does not warrant dismissal if plaintiff otherwise substantively pleaded a valid claim. See also *Adams v Adam* (On Reconsideration), 276 Mich App 704, 710-711 (2007) ("It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.").

The equitable theory of unjust enrichment (also known as quantum meruit)⁴ is based on the theory that the law will imply a contract in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of another party.

⁴ See *Spartan Distributions v Golf Coast International*, unpublished per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 17, 2011 (Docket No. 295408) (stating that "the elements of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit are: '(1) the receipt of a benefit by defendant from plaintiff, and (2) an inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of

Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478 (2003). As the Court of Appeals observed in *Belle Isle Grill Corp, supra* at 478, a claim for unjust enrichment requires that the plaintiff establish:

- (1) The receipt of a benefit by defendant from plaintiff and
- (2) An inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by defendant.

However, a contract to prevent unjust enrichment will be implied “only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.” *Id.* When there is an express contract covering the same subject matter, summary disposition of the unjust enrichment claim is properly granted. *Id.* at 479. *Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit*, 256 Mich App 463, 478 (2003).

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s assumpsit claim because it was abolished under Michigan law pursuant to *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564 (2013). To support its argument, defendant recognizes that plaintiff claims the “Township’s Rates” are unreasonable so it is entitled to relief under an assumpsit cause of action for money had and received. Then, defendant directs this Court’s attention to *Fisher Sand, supra* at 564 as well as cases from the Eastern District of Michigan that recognized the abolishment of assumpsit as a cause of action. Next, defendant acknowledges that plaintiff claims to be entitled to bring an equitable action of assumpsit to recover “the amount of the legal exaction” pursuant to *Bond v Pub Sch of Ann Arbor Sch Dist*, 383 Mich 693, 704 (1970). Then, defendant challenges that this claim would be sufficient to revive plaintiff’s cause of action because “[a] remedy . . . is not a cause of action.” See *Friess v City of Detroit*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued March 27, 2019, at *9 (Docket. No. 17-14139) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to statute a viable cause of action). Defendant further argues that this claim relies on an assertion that the REU charges were unreasonable. Defendant challenges

the benefit by defendant”” quoting *Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit*, 256 Mich App 463, 478 (2003)).

this assertion when it argues for summary disposition as to the unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, defendant concludes that this Court should dismiss plaintiff's claim for assumpsit.

In response, plaintiff disagrees. Plaintiff acknowledges that *Fisher Sand*, *supra* abolished assumpsit as a form of action; however, it argues that it bases its cause of action on defendant's violation of common law principles, which requires the municipal utility rates to be "reasonable" and that assumpsit merely provides the substantive remedy for defendant's violation of common law not the source of plaintiff's substantive rights. To support its argument, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to case⁵ law recognizing that there are common law limitations on a municipality's water and sewer rates and charges and defining reasonable fees. Then, plaintiff acknowledges the four principals (municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable; presumption of reasonableness may be overcome by showing proper evidence; plaintiff has the burden to show any given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable; and must provide clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in the municipal utility's rate) and concludes that reasonableness is typically a question of a fact. Next, plaintiff notes that the case is in its infancy so that it has not yet obtained discovery of the actual methodology for determining REU Charges and Sewer Charges. Then, plaintiff asserts that a cursory review of defendant's financial statement confirms that the Charges consistently generate revenue that exceeds the cost of service and concludes that the overcharges left defendant flush with cash where the Sewage Fund had over \$8 million. (Plaintiff's *Exhibit D* – Fiscal Year ending 2018 (noting defendant's cash revenues exceeded its cash expenses by over \$1.7 million)). Next, plaintiff argues that assumpsit is a proper remedy for governmental overcharges and directs this Court's

⁵ *Wogamood v Village of Constantine*, 302 Mich 384, 404-405 (1942); *City of Plymouth v City of Detroit*, 423 Mich 106, 133 (1985); *Trahey v City of Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 595 (2015); *Kircher v Ypsilanti*, 269 Mich App 224, 231-232 (2005); and *Mich Ass'n of Home Builders v City of Troy*, 504 Mich 204, 220 (2019) (citation omitted).

attention to case⁶ law (generally laying the foundation for the cause of action) and *Fisher Sand, surpa* (recognizing that General Court Rules in 1963 abolished assumpsit as a cause action but preserving its substantive remedies). Plaintiff argues that assumpsit provides its substantive remedy for defendant's violation of the common law principals that require municipalities to have reasonable municipal utility rates. To support its argument, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to *Woodland Condos Homeowners Ass'n v Fannie Mae*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appelas, issued February 28, 2019 (Docket No 339850) (recognizing that the use of the term assumpsit does not warrant dismissal). As such, plaintiff requests that this Court allow it to proceed on its claim that defendant imposed unreasonable sewer rates and charges in violation of the common law so that it can seek a substantive remedy as set forth in assumpsit for defendant's improper acts.

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. To support its argument, defendant directs this Court's attention to *Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc*, 273 Mich App 187, 195 (2006)(citations omitted), which sets forth the elements for an unjust enrichment claim. Specifically, defendant states the following arguments to support its request for summary disposition:

- **Defendant's REU charges were reasonable because they were based on its contractual costs to provide REUs to plaintiff; therefore, plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fails.** To support its argument, defendant directs this Court's attention to *Trahey v City of Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 594 (2015) and its findings that (1) municipal utility rates are presumptively reasonable; (2) plaintiff has the burden to show that a given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable; (3) a court has no authority to disregard the presumption absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in the municipal utility rate; and (4) mathematic precision is not required to calculate the municipal utility rate. Then, defendant concludes that *Trahey, supra* establishes that its municipal utility rate is presumed

⁶ *Moore v Mandlebaum*, 8 Mich 433, 448 (1860); *De Croupet v Frank*, 212 Mich 465, 467 (1920); *Bond, supra*; *Service Coal C v Unemployment Compensation Comm*, 333 Mich 526, 530-531 (1952); and *Yellow Freight Sys Inc v Michigan*, 231 Mich App 194, 203 (1998) *rev'd on other grounds* 464 Mich 21 (2001), *rev'd* 537 US 36, 123 S Ct 371, 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002).

reasonable when based on direct costs of providing the service if it does not include any illegal or improper expenses. Next, defendant notes that it incurs a contractual cost for sewage disposal and treatment capacity that it owes to Wastewater per REU sold to its users. As such, defendant concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the contractually Wastewater REU payments were defendant's actual, direct costs of providing sewage disposal and treatment services to plaintiff. Then, defendant requests that this Court dismiss plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim for that reason alone. Next, defendant requests that this Court dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because it was not benefited by plaintiff since the payments are reviewed and approved by Wastewater and defendant remits the payment to Wastewater as a "pass through" payment within 30 days pursuant to the Facility Agreement. Defendant concludes that it would also be entitled to summary disposition because there is no genuine issue of material fact that it did not benefit from the payment because remitted it as a pass-through payment to Wastewater within 30 days.

- **Defendant collected the subject charges by lawful ordinance not by unjust or inequitable means, which bars plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.** To support its argument, defendant directs this Court's attention to *Kochis v City of Westland*, 409 F Supp 39 598, 611 (ED Mich 2019), which granted summary disposition of an unjust enrichment claim as to fees collected pursuant to ordinance that – on their face – were not unlawful. Then, defendant notes that it charged the fees in question pursuant to its lawful ordinance and requests dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim.
- **An express contract between plaintiff and defendant exists that covers the same subject matter that bars plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.** To support its argument, defendant directs this Court's attention to *Morris Pumps, supra* at 194 (citation omitted), which recognized that a contract will only be implied when there is no express contract covering the same subject. Then, defendant directs this Court's attention to case⁷ law discussing the formation of an express contract. Then, defendant directs this Court's attention to the first written REU Application Form submitted by plaintiff on September 29, 2016 (one week after the sale of the Property). (Defendant's *Exh. 8*). Defendant alleges that it notified plaintiff of the number of the REUs and the amount it would be charged for the REUs based on plaintiff's then disclosed intended usage of the Property and number of employees. (Defendants' *Exhs. 8 and 11*). Defendant asserts that its response constituted an offer that also included a note directing plaintiff's attention to the certain language in Lyon Ordinance 46-96. Defendant alleges that plaintiff paid the required REU charges on October 5, 2016 and purchased the Property the next day such that it concludes that plaintiff agreed to and accepted the terms

⁷ *Bodnar v St John Providence, Inc*, 327 Mich App 203, 213 (2019), *app denied* __ Mich __ (2019) and *DaimlerChrysler Corp v Wesco Distribution, Inc*, 281 Mich App 240, 247 (2020).

of the offer pursuant to the terms contained in the application. (Defendant's *Exhs. 8* and *15*). Defendant next notes that plaintiff altered the use of the Property on two subsequent occasions and it submitted additional REU Application Forms that authorized defendant to increase or decrease the number of REUs assigned to the Property based on actual usage. Defendant concludes that the parties had a meeting of the minds when plaintiff remitted payment. To support its argument, defendant directs this Court's attention to *Autumn Acres Senior Vill, Inc v Vill of Mayville*, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 19, 2019 (Docket No. 343485)(affirming that the court will not imply a contract between parties in equity when one already exists on the same subject matter).

For each of the above reasons, defendant requests that this Court grant it summary disposition on plaintiff's unjust enrichment – unreasonable water and sewer rates (Count II) claim.

In response, plaintiff disagrees. Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendant's attack as to the unjust enrichment claims ignores and distorts plaintiff's allegations. To support its argument, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to *Morris Pumps, supra* and *Wright v Genesee County*, 504 Mich 410 (2019) and concludes that the Court of Appeals applied well-established principles to require a municipality that illegally collected funds to return those funds to the person or entity that paid those funds. Then, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to *Mercy Services for the Aging v City of Rochester Hills*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 21, 2010 (Docket No. 292569) (holding that the plaintiff could recover annual service charges paid that violated a state statute). Next, plaintiff addresses defendant's arguments as follows:

- **Defendant retained the benefit of capital charges and sewer charges that plaintiff paid.** Plaintiff further argues that defendant's own bills for Capital Charges (Defendant's *Exhs. 8* to *10*) combined with Zawada's Affidavit (Defendant's *Exh. 11*) confirm the amount plaintiff paid, the amount defendant received, and the amount not remitted to Wastewater that defendant retained. Plaintiff additionally argues that defendant focuses only on the REU Overcharge and not the Sewer Rate Overcharge.
- **The fact that the charges are authorized by an ordinance does not preclude a finding that the charges are unreasonable such that defendant was unjustly enriched.** Plaintiff acknowledges defendant's

argument that it could not have been unjustly enriched because it imposed the charges pursuant to a “lawful” ordinance. Then, plaintiff directs this Court’s attention to *Oshtemo Charter Twp v Kalamazoo County Rd Comm’n*, 302 Mich App 574, 576-577 (2013) to support that the charges must be reasonable and the ordinance cannot conflict with state law. As such, plaintiff concludes that municipal utility rate-setting must be reasonable and cannot be cured with the enactment of an ordinance.

- **The existence of an express contract does not preclude the unjust enrich claim.** First, plaintiff argues that even if an express contract existed, it only applies to REU overcharges and not to sewer rate overcharges. Next, plaintiff acknowledges that defendant’s argument turns on the “request to connect” forms and plaintiff’s payment to defendant. Then, plaintiff directs this Court’s attention to the fact that it never signed the 2019 Request to Connect and that it submitted its payment for 2018 with the notation “REU FEES PAID UNDER PROTEST.” (Defendant’s *Exhibits 10* and *11*). Then, plaintiff directs this Court’s attention to *Blackburne & Brown Mortg Co v Ziomek*, 264 Mich App 615, 627 (2004) to support its contention that a payment under protest cannot be recognized as an unequivocal intent to be bound. As such, plaintiff concludes that its third and final payment could not be recognized as forming an express contract. Next, plaintiff argues that its payment of legally required fee cannot be consideration. To support its argument, plaintiff directs its attention to *Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp v Dep’t of State*, 433 Mich 16, 20-22 (1989) (holding that the payment of a fee required by law cannot be consideration for a contract between a party and the government. Then, plaintiff concludes that it had no choice but to pay the REUs so that it could develop the Property such that the payment cannot be consideration. Finally, plaintiff argues that issues of fact exist as to whether the parties entered into an express contract with respect to the REUs based on (1) mutuality of agreement; (2) mutuality of obligation; (3) mutuality of acceptance; (4) contained essential terms (e.g., time for performance); and (5) illusory because it did not bind defendant to charge a particular price.

For each of the above reasons, plaintiff requests that this Court deny defendant’s request for summary disposition on the unjust enrichment claim.

Defendant elected to file a reply brief that reiterates its argument that the independent claim of assumpsit and the claim for unjust enrichment should be dismissed.

Accepting plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, this Court does not find that plaintiff’s claims is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. The

parties acknowledge that the *Fisher Sand* Court recognized that “assumpsit as a form of action was abolished” with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963 but it preserved “the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit.” *Fisher Sands, supra.* at 564. Having reviewed the complaint, this Court finds that plaintiff used the term “assumpsit” in labeling its claim but that does not automatically warrant dismissal. *Adams, supra* at 710-711. Plaintiff’s allegations clearly seek the substantive remedy traditionally available under assumpsit pursuant to its claim that defendant violated common laws when it charged the sewage rates. Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) is, therefore, inappropriate.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Having reviewed the documentary evidence, this Court finds that disputed material facts exist as to (1) whether the charges (sewage rates and capital) are reasonable; (2) whether defendant benefited from the payment; and (3) whether the parties formed an express contract as to the charges. Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is, therefore, inappropriate.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition as to Counts II and III is DENIED. *This Order is not a final Order so it does not resolve the last pending claim and does not close the case.*

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo Bowman

Hon. Leo Bowman

6/3/2020

Date

EXHIBIT - 14

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

WILLIAM NOFAR, individually and as
representative of a class of similarly-
situated persons and entities,

Plaintiff,

-v-

Case Number: **2020-183155-CZ**
Honorable Nanci J. Grant

CITY OF NOVI, MICHIGAN,
a municipal corporation,

Defendant,

ORDER AND OPINION

At a session of said Court, held in the
Courthouse in the City of Pontiac, County of
Oakland, State of Michigan on the 21st day
of January, 2022,

PRESENT: HONORABLE Nanci J. Grant, Circuit Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Novi's (herein the "City") Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). This is a class action lawsuit wherein Plaintiff alleges that since 2015, the City has set its water and sewer rates at a level that far exceeds what was necessary to finance the actual costs of providing water and sewage disposal services. Plaintiff alleges that these unreasonably high rates have left the City with a surplus of funds, and that the rates far exceed established water and sewer rate-setting methodologies. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that the City should be required to "disgorge the amounts" or Plaintiff should "recover the amounts" that the City allegedly has collected in excess of the amounts it was "entitled" to collect.

Plaintiff alleges that these rate overcharges are unlawful taxes in violation of the Prohibited Taxes by Cities and Villages Act, MCL 141.91; that the rates are unreasonable under the common law because they generate revenue far in excess of the City's actual cost of providing water and sewer service; and that the rates violate the City's Charter, Section 13.3, because they are not "just and reasonable." Plaintiff's Complaint consists of six counts: three counts for "unjust enrichment" and three counts for "assumpsit." The City argues that all of Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement and rules as follows:

The City's Authority to Collect Utility Fees and Plaintiff's Claims

As a matter of legal background, the City is required to charge and collect the public water and sanity sewer fees under State statutes, the City Charter, and the City Code. The Michigan Legislature mandates that the City establish rates to support its Utility Systems under Section 21(1) of the Revenue Bond Act (herein "RBA"). The RBA states as follows:

- (1) Rates for services furnished by a public improvement shall be fixed before the issuance of the bonds. The rates shall be sufficient to provide for all the following:
 - (a) The payment of the expenses of administration and operation and the expenses for the maintenance of the public improvement as may be necessary to preserve the public improvement in good repair and working order.
 - (b) The payment of the interest on and the principal of bonds payable from the public improvements when the bonds become due and payable.
 - (c) The creation of any reserve for the bonds as required in the ordinance.
 - (d) Other expenditures and funds for the public improvement as the ordinance may require. [MCL 141.121(1)].

Consistent with MCL 141.121(1), Section 13.3 of the City Charter states, as a general authorization that:

The Council shall have the power to fix, from time to time, such just and reasonable rates as may be deemed advisable for supplying inhabitants of the City and others with such public-utility services as the City may provide. There shall be no discrimination in such rates within any classification of users thereof nor shall free service be permitted, but higher rates may be charged for services outside the City limits.

Sections 34-145(b), 34-17, and 34-19 of the City Code further provide more specific legal authority for the City to establish sewer and water rates, as follows:

Section 34-145(b):

(b) The rates and charges established pursuant to subsection (a) shall be based upon a methodology which complies with applicable federal and state statutes and regulations. The amount of the rates and charges shall be sufficient to provide for debt service and for the expenses of operation, maintenance and replacement of the system as necessary to preserve the same in good repair and working order. The amount of the rates and charges shall be reviewed annually and revised when necessary to ensure system expenses are met and that all users pay their proportionate share of operation, maintenance and equipment replacement expenses.

Section 34-17:

The water system shall be operated on a public utility rate basis, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 94 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1933 (MCL 141.101 et seq.), as amended. The system shall be operated under the management and direction of the city manager, subject to the overall general supervision and control of the council, and/or as a division of the sewer and water department as the council shall direct.

Section 34-19:

The rates to be charged by the water system shall be established and charged in accordance with the schedule of rates set by resolution of the council.

The City argues that it has the authority to set water and sewer rates, as well as the authority to take any surplus rates and transfer them to another fund pursuant to the Michigan Department of Treasury's Uniform Charts of Accounts, which states that regarding water and sewer funds, "money that accumulates as unrestricted net position of this fund may be transferred to another fund if authorized by the governing body." See Michigan Department of Treasury's Uniform Charts of Account, pg. 117, 130-132.

As stated above, Plaintiff brings six (6) Counts, all based on unjust enrichment and assumpsit. Specifically, Plaintiff's claims allege that the City was unjustly enriched by its violation of MCL 141.91, which prohibits a municipality from charging fees disguised as taxes, as well as by violating Section 13.3 of the Charter, cited above. Plaintiff has not sought redress directly under MCL 141.91 or Section 13.3 of the Charter; rather, Plaintiff claims that the City was unjustly enriched by the funds collected in violation of those statutes.

The City's Arguments for Summary Disposition

The City's Motion for Summary Disposition makes five arguments. First, it argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all counts because Plaintiff's claims are "equitable causes of action that constitute an attempt to 'dodge the bar' established by law for causes of action under [the Headlee Amendment]." See the City's Brief at 6. Second, it argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all counts because "the City...collected and expended the subject charges by lawful statutory, charter, ordinance, and Michigan Department of Treasury requirements and not by unjust or inequitable means, or through malicious intent, capricious action, or corrupt conduct." See the City's Brief at 8. Third, it argues that it is entitled to summary disposition on all counts because "...each count alleges a contract claim that is necessarily based on the City allegedly exceeding its legal authority, which claims are prohibited as a matter of law." See the City's Brief at 12.

Fourth, it argues that Counts II, III, IV and V should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not have a private right of action against the City to enforce its Charter and because MCL 141.91 does not provide a private right of action. Finally, it argues that Counts IV, V, and VI should be dismissed because assumpsit has been abolished in Michigan as a cause of action.

1. Whether Plaintiff's claims are Improper Equitable Claims Plead Only to Dodge the One-Year Statute of Limitations for Headlee Amendment claims.

Plaintiff's Complaint makes numerous allegations that the City's water and sewer rates are "excessive," "unreasonable," "overcharges," "revenue raising," and "disproportionate," essentially claiming that the water and sewer rates are "disguised taxes." The City characterizes these claims as "fee vs tax cases" which involve a violation of the Headlee Amendment, Article 9, Section 31 of the Michigan Constitution. See *Bolt v City of Lansing*, 459 Mich 152 (1998). The City claims that Plaintiff is attempting to disguise Headlee Amendment claims as equitable causes of action for unjust enrichment and assumpsit to avoid the one-year statute of limitations on Headlee Amendment claims and invalidly achieve six years of damages instead of one.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that statute of limitations periods should apply to "analogous equitable suits" so that "a plaintiff [cannot] dodge the bar set up by a limitations

statute simply by resorting to an alternate form of relief provided by equity.” *Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v Wayne County*, 450 Mich 119, 127 n 9 (1995)(internal citations omitted). Further, in *Taxpayers Allied*, the Supreme Court determined that the one-year period for Headlee claims is “a reasonable restriction designed to protect the fiscal integrity of governmental units who might otherwise face the prospect of losing several years’ revenue from a tax that had previously been thought to comply with Headlee restrictions.” *Id* at 124-26.

The City relies on a very recent Michigan Supreme Court decision, *Gottesman v City of Harper Woods*, ____ Mich ____ (September 29, 2021). In *Gottesman*, the Michigan Supreme Court applied the decision in *Taxpayers Allied*, supra, to a class action complaint challenging municipal utility fees on equitable unjust enrichment and assumpsit grounds, similar to what Plaintiff is attempting to do in this case. The Court held, “the Court of Appeals erred by holding that plaintiff’s equitable claims could afford additional relief because ‘plaintiff would be entitled to recover for several more years under [his equitable claims] than under [the Headlee Amendment.]’” *Id.* quoting from *Gottesman v Harper Woods*, Unpublished Per Curiam Opinion of the Court of Appeals, December 3, 2019 (Docket No. 344568)(brackets in original). Interestingly, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine “whether plaintiff may seek equitable remedies for the alleged violation of MCL 141.91 beyond the one-year limitations period governing the Headlee Amendment claim.” *Id.*

The Court finds that the holding in *Gottesman* does not go as far as the City would like. During oral argument, the City admitted that *Gottesman* provides this Court with a “roadmap” to conclude that such claims would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations; however, a “roadmap” is not binding precedent. The *Gottesman* Court did not make a ruling that equitable claims for an alleged violation of MCL 141.91 are always limited to the one-year limitations period of Headlee Amendment claims. Rather, it merely pointed out that a plaintiff is not automatically guaranteed the benefit of the six-year statute of limitations for equitable claims which are “analogous” to Headlee Amendment claims.

The Court finds that City is not entitled to summary disposition pursuant to *Gottesman*.

2. Whether the City Lawfully Collected and Expended the Subject Water and Sewer Rates and Whether its Actions were Reasonable.

The City next argues that it is entitled to summary disposition because it lawfully collected the water and sewer rates at issue, not by “unjust or inequitable means, or through

malicious intent, capricious action, or corrupt conduct.” See the City’s Brief at 8. Regarding similar claims related to the unreasonableness of municipal utility rates, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held, “[t]he burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that any given rate or ratemaking practice is unreasonable.” *Trahey v City of Inkster*, 311 Mich App 582, 594 (2015). The *Trahey* Court further stated, “absent clear evidence of illegal or improper expenses included in a municipal utility’s rates, a court has no authority to disregard the presumption that the rate is reasonable.” *Id.* at 595.

The Michigan Supreme Court held, “[c]ourts of law are ill equipped to deal with the complex, technical processes required to evaluate the various cost factors and various methods of weighing those factors required in rate-making.” *City of Novi v Detroit*, 433 Mich 414, 430 (1989). The Court held, “the rate-making authority of a municipal entity is expressly reserved to the legislative body given the power to set rates under the municipal charter.” *Id.* at 429.

The City argues that because Plaintiff has made only equitable claims (i.e., unjust enrichment and assumpsit), that Plaintiff must plead allegations necessary to establish malicious intent, capricious action, or corrupt conduct. “In order to warrant the interposition of a court of equity in municipal affairs, there must be malicious intent, capricious action, or corrupt conduct, something which shows the action of the body whose acts are complained of did not arise from an exercise of judgment and discretion vested by law in them.” *Wolgamood v Village of Constatine*, 302 Mich 384, 395 (1942) citing *Veldman v City of Grand Rapids*, 275 Mich 100, 113 (1936).

In his Response, Plaintiff cites to *Youmans v Bloomfield Township*, ____ Mich App ____ (January 7, 2021), which held that a plaintiff claiming that water and sewer rates are excessive via an unjust enrichment claim (like the case at bar) must prove more than just a problem with the municipality’s ratemaking method. Specifically, the *Youmans* Court held, “[w]hether [the municipality] would receive an unjust benefit from retaining the disputed rate charges...depends on whether the water and sewer rates, viewed as a whole, were unreasonable inasmuch as they were ‘excessive,’ not on whether some aspect of the Township’s ratemaking methodology was improper.” *Id.* The *Youmans* Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, which ordered the defendant township to reimburse the taxpayer more than \$9 million, holding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the township “would be excessively (and thus unjustly) enriched by the retention of such funds.” *Id.* at 23.

Youmans is the most recent precedent for this type of case. Consequently, the Court fails to see to see how the City is entitled to summary disposition based on the Plaintiff’s failure to

plead allegations of “malicious intent, capricious action, or corrupt conduct.” The *Youmans* Court made it clear that to bring a successful unjust enrichment claim in this circumstance, a class of plaintiffs must prove only that the municipal entity was “excessively (and thus unjustly) enriched.” *Id.* The Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to plead that the City acted with “malicious intent, etc.,” is not grounds for summary disposition.

Next, the City argues that Plaintiff’s equitable claims (unjust enrichment and assumpsit) fail regardless of whether Plaintiff pleads “malicious intent, etc.,” because the City acted lawfully in collecting water and sewer rates and was not unjustly enriched because the Plaintiff actually benefited from the City’s collection and “investment” of the water and sewer rates.

Unjust enrichment claims require, “1) the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and 2) an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant...in other words, the law will imply a contract to prevent unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the plaintiff’s expense.” *Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc.*, 273 Mich App 187, 195 (2006). Assumpsit is a remedy “sounding in unjust enrichment.” *Woods v Ayres*, 39 Mich 345, 348-49 (1878). Like unjust enrichment, assumpsit involves the recovery of money invalidly collected. *Bond v Pub Sch of Ann Arbor Sch Dist*, 383 Mich 693, 704 (1970).

Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically alleges that the City was unjustly enriched by the water and sewer rates because there were transfers of funds from the Water and Sewer Fund to the Capital Improvements Fund. In other words, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the City was unjustly enriched because it was able to transfer excess money out of the Water and Sewer Fund and use it to finance other, unrelated City projects. The City cites MCL 141.121(1), Section 13.3 of the City Charter, and Sections 34-145(b), 34-17, and 34-19 of the City Code, arguing that it collected the rates in a lawful manner, and notes that any alleged improper transfers of funds from the Water and Sewer Fund to other projects was done according to a City Council Resolution adopted on June 19, 2017 (herein the “2017 Resolution”). The 2017 Resolution mandated the repayment of any monies advanced by the City from the Water and Sewer Fund with interest monthly and full repayment within 90 days, if needed for any utility system improvement projects, emergencies, etc. In other words, the City was loaning other City departments money from the Water and Sewer Fund, to be repaid to the Water and Sewer Fund, with interest, and requiring full repayment within 90 days in the event that there was a water and sewer emergency.

The City argues that it was not “unjustly enriched” by the transfers because it had to repay the transfers to itself with interest, pointing to the 2017 Resolution. The City also cites to the Michigan Department of Treasury, which specifically authorizes such transfers by a City Utility System “enterprise fund.” The Michigan Department of Treasury Uniform Charts of Accounts states as follows, “Money that accumulates as unrestricted net position of this fund may be transferred to another fund if authorized by the governing body.” MCL 123.391 also allows municipalities owning a public utility to make “contributions from the operating revenues of the utility in such amounts and for such purposes as shall be determined by the governing body of the public utility to be in the public interest, subject to the approval of the legislative body of the municipality.”

The City argues that pursuant to the Michigan Department of Treasury guidelines as well as MCL 123.391, the transfers from the water and sewer fund into other funds were lawful and could not have unjustly enriched the City to Plaintiff’s detriment because the borrowed funds were to be repaid with interest. The City argues that these transfers were an “investment” that actually benefited the Plaintiff class. Therefore, the City argues that Plaintiff’s claims for assumpsit and unjust enrichment fail as a matter of law.

The Court is unconvinced this argument wins the day by way of a (C)(8)¹ Motion. Essentially, the City is claiming that because its process of borrowing money from the Water and Sewer Fund and using it for other City projects is lawful, it absolutely cannot be unjustly enriched. Again, the *Youmans* Court held that the plaintiff class must prove that the defendant municipality was “excessively (and thus unjustly) enriched” by this process. The *Youmans* Court did not foreclose the possibility of unjust enrichment claims based on a lawful collection process. Whether the City was “excessively (and thus unjustly)” enriched cannot be determined on the pleadings alone. Therefore, summary disposition on this basis is denied.

3. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Fail because they are Contract Claims Necessarily Based on the City Exceeding its Legal Authority.

¹ “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint. *El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.*, 504 Mich 152, 159-60 (2019). When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone. *Bailey v Schaaf*, 494 Mich 595, 603 (2013).

Next, the City argues it is entitled to summary disposition because each of Plaintiff's claims "alleges a contract claim that is necessarily based on the City allegedly exceeding its legal authority, which claims are prohibited as a matter of law." See the City's Brief at 12. The City cites *AFT Mich v State*, 202 Mich App 651, 677 (2014), which held that unjust enrichment is merely "the equitable counterpart to a claim for breach of contract...occurring when a person has or maintains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another." Moreover, "[a]ssumpsit may be upon an express contract or promise, or for nonperformance of an oral or simple written contract, or it may be a general assumpsit upon a promise or contract implied by law." *Kristoffy v Iwanski*, 255 Mich 25, 28 (1931).

Based on these legal principals regarding unjust enrichment and assumpsit, the City argues that these claims are assertions that the City's water and sewer rates are unjust and inequitable because the City charged and received an amount beyond the amount it was entitled to by law. Therefore, the City argues that Plaintiff's claims are based in an implied contract that arises out of the authority granted under state and local laws, outlined above, requiring the City to charge water and sewer fees.

The City argues this Court should consider Plaintiff's claims as implied contract claims and apply the holding in *Studier v Michigan Pub Sch Employees Ret Bd*, 472 Mich 642, 661 (2005) applies. In *Studier*, the Michigan Supreme Court held that due to limitations on legislative power, the law necessarily provides for a "strong presumption that statutes do not create contractual rights." *Id.* at 661. Therefore, "in order for a statute to form the basis of a contract, the statutory language 'must be plain and susceptible of no other reasonable construction than that the Legislature intended to be bound to a contract.'" *Id.* at 662. Unless there is an expression of an actual intent of the government to bind itself through legislation, "courts should not construe laws declaring a scheme of public regulation as also creating private contracts" to which the government is a party. *Id.*

The City relies on *In re Certified Question (Fun 'N Sun RV, Inc v Michigan)*, 447 Mich 765, 777-778 (1994). The Court in *Sun RV* addressed the issue of whether policyholders who paid premiums into a State of Michigan accident fund were entitled to reserve funds in excess of what was needed to cover liabilities. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to such excess amounts under an implied contract theory based on the applicable statutes governing the state accident fund. *Id.* at 776. The Court ultimately found that because there was no provision in those laws indicating that the policyholders were promised or entitled to the excess funds, the plaintiffs

had no contract rights to make a claim for a distribution of said excess funds to them. *Id.* at 777-785.

Based on the foregoing, the City argues that Plaintiff has not identified any provision in the law that would demonstrate a legislative intent to create or imply a contract between the class members and the City that would allow them to bring claims that sound in contract, like assumpsit or unjust enrichment.

In his Response, Plaintiff argues that none of this applies because he is not seeking contractual damages, merely restitution. Plaintiff cites *Logan v Charter Township of West Bloomfield*, Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals, February 18, 2020 (Docket No. 333452). In *Logan*, the plaintiff challenged certain fees imposed by the defendant municipality's building division that were allegedly excessive and imposed in violation of the statute Construction Code Act (herein, "CCA"). The plaintiff brought statutory claims under the CCA, violation of the Headlee Amendment, as well as unjust enrichment premised on the municipality's violation of the CCA. This is similar to the case at bar, wherein Plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment based on a violation of MCL 141.91 and Section 13.3 of the City Charter.

The Court of Appeals in *Logan* ultimately held that the remedy that the plaintiffs sought via unjust enrichment was "...not meant as compensation. Rather, plaintiffs in this action ... seek the return of monies paid over to defendant that should not have been charged in the first instance and therefore was unjustly held by defendant. Requesting the return of the funds was not a tort or contract action, but an action to divest the township of benefits unjustly retained." *Id.* The *Logan* Court overturned the decision of the trial court granting the defendant municipality summary disposition on this issue.

The Court finds that *Sun RV*, supra, does not entitle the City to summary disposition. The facts in *Sun RV* are entirely different than what is presented here. In *Sun RV*, the plaintiffs alleged that they had an actual contractual right to the excess monies placed into the accident fund by the State, and that the Legislature was unconstitutionally impairing their rights to those funds by enacting a statute which allowed the State to sell the rights and liabilities of the accident fund to an insurance company. See *Sun RV*, supra, at 775-776. The *Sun RV* plaintiffs did not bring an unjust enrichment claim, but claimed that their contractual right to the proceeds would be "unconstitutionally impaired" if the State were permitted to transfer the excess monies in the accident fund. The *Sun RV* plaintiffs' claims arose from Article 1, Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution which provides, "no bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the

obligation of contract shall be enacted.” *Id.* at 776-777. Therefore, any analysis of contractual claims in relation to statutes at issue in *Sun RV* does not apply here.

The Court finds that summary disposition is inappropriate on this basis.

4. Whether Counts II, III, IV, and V Should be Dismissed because there is no Private Right of Action contained in the City Charter or in MCL 141.91.

Counts II, III, IV, and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint allege unjust enrichment and assumpsit based on the City’s violation of the City Charter, Section 13.3, and MCL 141.91, for allegedly assessing unreasonable water and sewer rates. As held in *Logan*, supra, the Court of Appeals held that even though the plaintiff did not have a private right of action under the CCA, he could still seek a refund of the excessive fees under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. The City did not attempt to explain why *Logan*, despite that it is unpublished, is not persuasive authority.

In his Response, Plaintiff cites to *Kincaid v City of Flint*, Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals, April 16, 2020 (Docket No. 337972; 337976). *Kincaid* is yet another case in which a class of plaintiffs challenged a municipality’s water and sewer rates, claiming the defendant city was unjustly enriched by its unreasonably high water and sewer rates. The Court of Appeals in *Kincaid* held that the plaintiff’s breach of implied contract claims failed as a matter of law because an implied contract claim cannot stand based on the violation of a statute or ordinance. However, the Court held that the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims should stand because “...it is plain that plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action for money damages based on defendant’s mere violation of a city ordinance, but it is equally clear that plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for a refund of an unlawful exaction.” *Id.*

Despite that there is no private right of action in any of the above-cited statutes or ordinances granting the City authority to assess taxes for a water and sewer fund, the Plaintiff brought equitable claims for a refund/return of monies paid to the City as water and sewer fees, which the Court of Appeals has recently and repeatedly upheld in multiple cases. Therefore, summary disposition on this basis—in all of its iterations in the City’s brief—is inappropriate.

5. Whether Summary Disposition should be granted as to Counts IV, V, and VI because Michigan has Abolished Assumpsit as a Cause of Action.

Finally, the City argues that all of Plaintiff's assumpsit claims fail because Michigan has abolished assumpsit as a cause of action. Assumpsit is like unjust enrichment and is defined as "an express or implied promise, not under seal, by which one person undertakes to do some act or pay something to another." *Fisher Sand & Gravel Co v Neal A Sweebe, Inc*, 494 Mich 543, 564 (2013). In *Fisher Sand*, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court held that "assumpsit as a form of action was abolished" with the passage of the General Court Rules in 1963. However, the City conveniently leaves out a majority of the *Fisher* opinion in its brief. *Fisher* actually says, "with the adoption of the General Court Rules in 1963, assumpsit as a form of action was abolished. But notwithstanding the abolition of assumpsit, the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved." *Id.*

A recent Court of Appeals decision addressed the City's argument. In *Woodland Condos Homeowners Ass'n v Fannie Mae*, Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals, February 28 2019 (Docket No. 339850), the Court of Appeals held as follows:

Defendants argue that they were entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff's claims for assumpsit because assumpsit has been abolished as a form of action. In *Fisher*, [supra], our Supreme Court recognized that assumpsit was abolished...with the adoption of the General Court Rules...however...the substantive remedies traditionally available under assumpsit were preserved. Consequently, plaintiff's use of the term 'assumpsit' in labeling its claim does not warrant dismissal if plaintiff otherwise substantively pleaded a valid claim. [*Id.* citing *Fisher*, supra].


The use of the word "assumpsit" does not necessarily preclude these claims. Here, the Plaintiff's allegations clearly seek the substantive remedy available under assumpsit, i.e., a return of monies allegedly unlawfully collected by the City in excess of what the City was permitted to collect. Summary disposition on this basis is inappropriate.

Conclusion

Summary disposition based on MCL 2.116(C)(8) is not appropriate. While the Court appreciates that the City may have an argument as to whether it was actually unjustly enriched based on an alleged benefit to this class of Plaintiffs, such an argument may only prevail by looking outside the pleadings.

Defendant's Motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



NANCI J. GRANT, Circuit Court Judge SL

EXHIBIT - 15

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COA 363356

WILLIAM NOFAR V CITY OF NOVI
Lower Court/Tribunal
OAKLAND CIRCUIT COURT
Judge(s)
GRANT Nanci J

Docket Case Documents

Case Information

Case Header

Case Number

COA #363356

Case Status

COA Open

Parties & Attorneys to the Case – Court of Appeals

1
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2
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Defendant - Appellee - Cross-Appellant

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Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

10/12/2022	1 Claim of Appeal - Civil	+
09/23/2022	2 Order Appealed From	+
10/14/2022	3 Notice Of Filing Transcript	+
10/14/2022	4 Transcript Filed By Party	+
10/17/2022	5 Appearance - Appellee	+
10/17/2022	6 Appearance - Appellee	+
10/17/2022	7 Appearance - Appellee	+
11/02/2022	8 Steno Certificate - Tr Request Received	+
11/02/2022	9 Claim of Cross Appeal	+
11/14/2022	10 Docketing Statement MCR 7.204H	+
11/28/2022	11 Stipulation: Extend Time - AT Brief	+
11/30/2022	12 Docketing Statement MCR 7.204H	+
01/03/2023	13 Motion: Extend Time - Appellant	+
01/05/2023	14 Motion: Extend Time - Appellant	+
01/17/2023	15 Submitted on Administrative Motion Docket	+
01/17/2023	16 Order: Extend Time - Appellant Brief - Grant	+
01/30/2023	17 Transcript Filed By Party	+
01/30/2023	18 Notice Of Filing Transcript	+
01/30/2023	19 Email Contact	+
01/30/2023	20 Telephone Contact	+
02/03/2023	21 Brief: Appellant	+
02/22/2023	22 Motion: Extend Time - Cross-Appellant	+
02/22/2023	23 Motion: Extend Time - Appellee	+
03/07/2023	24 Submitted on Administrative Motion Docket	+
03/07/2023	25 Order: Extend Time - Appellee Brief - Grant	+
05/05/2023	26 Brief: Appellee	+
05/08/2023	27 Invol Dismissal Warning - No Cross - Appellant Brief	+
05/08/2023	28 Telephone Contact	+
05/08/2023	29 Order: Extend Time - Cross-Appellant Brief - Grant	+

Eisenberg v. George W. Kuhn Drainage Dist. Case No. 369632
Cross-Appellant's Appendix on Cross-Appeal

Case Details | WILLIAM NO FAR V CITY OF NOVI

05/22/2023	30 Brief: Cross-Appellant	+
05/26/2023	31 Brief: Reply	+
06/02/2023	32 Stipulation: Extend Time - XAE Brief	+
07/24/2023	33 Brief: Cross-Appellee	+
07/25/2023	34 Noticed	+
07/31/2023	35 Electronic Record Filed	+
08/03/2023	37 Correspondence Received	+
08/14/2023	38 Brief: Reply - Cross Appeal	+
07/02/2024	51 Brief: Supplemental Auth'y	+
07/03/2024	52 Brief: Supplemental Auth'y	+
07/09/2024	50 Submitted on Case Call	+
07/09/2024	53 Oral Argument Audio	+
07/10/2024	54 Correspondence Received	+
11/14/2024	55 Motion: Supplemental Brief	+
11/14/2024	56 Submitted on Motion Docket Affecting Call	+

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